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ABSTRACT 
This thesis demonstrates the development of F.R.Leavis's critical 
vocabulary through an examination of his critical practice. The socia] 
and political dimension of his critical orientation is examined by 
means of a reading of his own early pamphlets and articles; and of 
Q.D.Leavis's Fiction and the Reading Public (1932). This chapter 
indicates the nature of Leavis's approach to literature and criticism. 
An analysis of Leavis's preliminary considerations on poetry 
illustrates the gradual advancement of his critical terminology under 
the influence of T.S.Eliot. The judgements produced are examined and 
their value and reasoning are ,accounted for. Leavis's work on the 
novel is examined, showing how the critical terminology was transferred 
from criticism of the poetry to criticism of the novel. The source 
and function of Leavis's categories of 'tradition' and 'morality' 
are analysed. The ensuing critical judgements are assessed to show 
how and why such judgements were of ambiguous value. Leavis's study 
of Lawrence demonstrates centrally the advantages and disadvantages 
of Leavis's critical method. A discussion of the 'two cultures' debate 
illustrates Leavis's continuing polemical engagements and how this 
affects his critical priorities. Finally. an examination of Leavis's 
later work on Dickens and T.S.Eliot shows how Leavis's critical 
vocabulary matured a metaphysical, almost 'religious', dimension in 
its striving to maintain a connection between his concepts of 'art' 
and 'life'. Throughout this thesis, Leavis's criticism is examined 
by means of a rehearsal of his major arguments. This is combined with 
a discussion and assessment of the integrity of and sources for those 
arguments and an analysis of their resultant literary judgements. 
The thesis presents an objective account of the nature and function 
of Leavis's critical vocabulary, with a demonstration of its sources 
and an assessment of its achievements. 
1 
PREFACE 
Many academic writers have defended Leavis's views: many more 
have reiterated them wittingly or not in countless variations: 
and still more have criticized him on a scale of dissent 
ranging from journalistic aside to full -scale assault. But 
even the best products of the last category have been no more 
than partial: and none, in any category, could credibly claim 
to be a systematic reconstitution and assessment of Leavis's 
aesthetics, literary criticism and cultural analysis.1 
Since his death in 1978 there have been several books published dealing 
with the work of F.R.Leavis. Before 1978, the subject of Leavis had 
been discussed typically in the course of wider studies: for example, 
by Vincent Buckley in Poetry and Morality (1959) and John Casey in 
The Language of Criticism (1966). Both of these examinations aimed 
to place Leavis's critical practice in a wider comparative intellectual 
and historical context. Neither of them represent a detailed inquiry 
into the nature of Leavis's literary criticism. 
The progress of the criticism of Leavis has beenunsatisfactory. 
A reasonably objective account of the criticism in any detail is not 
available. The worst excesses of partiality are represented by Pro- 
9 
fessor Walsh in his F.R.Leavis (1980). In a recent article- Bernard 
Bergonzi called Walsh's book 'hagiographic'. In Walsh's book, critical 
judgement has been, effectively. suspended. For the reader who requires 
1. Francis Mulhern. The Moment of 'Scrutiny' (1979). p viii. 
2. Cf Bernard Bergonzi. 'Leavis and Eliot: the lone road to rejection' 
Critical Quarterly. 26 1 & 2 11984) pp 21 -4 
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an introduction to the development and substance of Leavis's criticism. 
Professor Walsh's study provides no assistance. Its excessive toler- 
ance and its failure to examine the implications of any of Leavis's 
ideas means that the study can be no more than an outline of and an 
apologia for Leavis's criticism. The comprehensive acceptance by 
Walsh of all of Leavis's positions makes the study impossible to criti- 
cize directly; one may as well return to the Leavis canon and engage 
in direct debate with the critic himself. 
Other studies of Leavis are more useful, albeit in limited ways. 
Two brief guides in which a critical stance is maintained are Edward 
Greenwood, F.R.Leavis (1978)3 and Robert Boyers, F.R.Leavis: Judgement 
and the Discipline of Thought (1978). Neither of these studies aspires 
to the status of a comprehensive survey. They are both introductory 
guides which aim to give an outline to Leavis's intellectual career 
and a résumé of his social, critical and educational position. 
Neither of these two studies approach the deeper problems of 
Leavis's critical method. Greenwood. in fact, borrows a major insight 
from another source. which is not acknowledged. The technique is 
characteristic of Greenwood's book. He says that 
it can reasonably be claimed that what Leavis provided 
was a way of grappling with moral problems without 
3. Greenwood's book is part of the 'Writers and their work. a critical 
and bibliographical series' supported by the British Council 
(general editor Ian Scott -Kilvert). 
commitment to discarded substantive ideologies on the 
one hand, and without the vacuousness of the meta - 
ethical approaches which had begun to engross the moral 
philosophy itself on the other. In short, it filled 
the gap left for the ethical sensibility by Positivists 
like Ramsey and Ayer.4 
It is contradictory for an essay in the guise of an introductionto 
the subject of F.R.Leavis to evoke, obliquely and obscurely, such 
an amount of another line of British intellectual history. Since 
Greenwood does not develop this point to indicate what bearing it 
may have on an understanding of Leavis's work, the evocation is redun- 
dant and confusing. Restrictions of space have clearly forced Green- 
wood to compromise his desire for setting out a fuller social, cultural 
and historical context for Leavis's work in favour of the oblique 
gesture towards larger matters. A readier compromise would have been 
to refer the reader to Perry Anderson's article in the New Left Review 
of 19685 which gives the fuller picture from this point of view and 
which was the probable source for this part of Greenwood's argument.6 
4. Greenwood, op. cit. p 26. 
5 Perry Anderson, 'Components of the National Culture', New Left 
Review, 50 (1968). 
6 Anderson's is a long and complex argument, and a Marxist analysis. 
He claims that there was a failure in Britain to develop a 'clas- 
sical sociology' or to generate a response to the challenge of 
Marxism. These two disciplines, sociology and Marxism. were 'a 
synthesis designed to capture the "structure of structures" - 
the social totality as such'. Britain has 'lacked any form what- 
ever of such thought' and this has led to British culture being 
'determined - and dislocated' by an 'absent centre'. Leavis's 
ambitions for literary criticism - that they should be central 
to the humanities and the university - was 'a symptom of the ob- 
jective vacuum at the centre of culture': 
4 
Elsewhere, Greenwood's account of Leavis focuses more intently 
on the criticism itself. Brief passages of summarisation encapsulate 
complex themes readily and clearly. / However, the discussion is pre- 
dominantly superficial. The account of The Great Tradition and 
Leavis's achievement in general with regard to the novel is extremely 
abbreviated. It takes the form of a synopsis of the main themes 
of Leavis's novel criticism and is marked by an almost complete lack 
of critical analysis. Critical commentary is in fact largely confined 
to the expression of 'reservations': 
[ Leavis] was undoubtedly too dismissive of both Proust 
and Mann. One suspects he was too much influenced by the 
fact that the first was taken up by Clive Bell and 
Bloomsbury, and that both were treated somewhat critically 
by D.H.Lawrence.9 
On the whole, Greenwood's study maintains a balance between the ex- 
tremes of excessive tolerance of and partisan hostility towards 
A preliminary definition would be to say that when philosophy became 
'technical'. a displacement occurred and literary criticism became 
'ethical.' (Cf. Anderson, loc. cit. pp 11 -12; 50 -51) 
Greenwood echoes distinctlythe point made here by Anderson. 
7. See for example Greenwood's outline of Leavis's discussion of 
'modernism', op. cit. p 31. 
8. Cf. pp 45-46-- 
9. Ibid p 45. 
Leavis's work, but at the expense of making firm conclusive judgements. 
By and large, Greenwood propagates conventional wisdoms about Leavis: 
that it was 'disingenuous' not to be more open about the change of 
position on Dickens;1° that in his attitude towards Lawrence he 
allowed assertion to replace analysis.11 Yet the deeper significances 
of these issues are not dealt with. However, as a general introduction 
to the subject, Greenwood's guide is not superfluous. 
The same is true for Boyers' F.R.Leavis: Judgement and the Dis- 
cipline of Thought (1978), although this study does aim to provide 
a critical rather than merely synoptic account of Leavis's criticism. 
To this end, Boyers focuses closely on particular areas of the critic- 
ism which are seen as representative of the whole. This means that 
Leavis's poetry criticism is approached by a discussion of his attitude 
towards Auden and Milton: his criticism of the novel is dealt with 
by an analysis of Leavis's position with regard to James and Lawrence. 
However, the 'Milton controversy' was in a sense peripheral to 
Leavis's poetry criticism: his critical method with regard to poetry 
can only be defined negatively through his comments on Milton, which 
represent the obverse of his position. T.S.Eliot remained the central 
poetic challenge to Leavis until as late as 1975 and the publication 
of The Living Principle. Any discussion of Leavis's poetry criticism 
which does not acknowledge this fact by concentrating on the developing 
10. Ibid p 46. 
11. Ibid p 47. 
relationship between Leavis and Filet cannot do that criticism justice. 
Perversely, Boyers presents an extended discussion of Leavis's attitude 
towards Auden. Leavis wrote little on Auden, almost all of it dismis- 
sive. Boyers at one point is even forced to introduce into the argu- 
ment comments from reviews by other Scrutiny contributors, as if they 
represented Leavis's own position.12 Boyers, in fact, is engaged 
in a defence of Auden against the general Scrutiny rejection. This 
approach does not yield many rewarding insights into Leavis's critical 
method as regards poetry and the space might have been better occupied 
with an analysis of Leavis's developing interest in Eliot, the per- 
manent central feature of Leavis's criticism of poetry. Such a dis- 
cussion would necessarily focus attention on Leavis's fundamental 
principles in a way that a defence of Auden against Leavisian stric- 
tures cannot. 
At other places, Boyers study is both frustrating and uncritical. 
This is apparent in the discussion of James's What Maisie Knew and 
Leavis's critique of that noveL It is not certain whether Boyers 
is more interested in illuminating Leavis's position with regard to 
the novel or his own.13 Certainly, the narrowing of the focus in 
this way limits Boyers's ability to give a broad and coherent account 
of Leavis's novel criticism. The Great Tradition and Dickens the 
Novelist are not touched upon in Boyers's study. The arguments are 
12. Boyers quotes R.G.Lienhardt. 'Auden's Inverted Development'. 
Scrutiny XIII (1945) and Robin Mayhead. 'The Latest Auden'. 
Scrutiny XVIII (1952) 
13. Cf op. cit. pp 89-99. 
more in the nature of polemica] dissent than objective critica] analy- 
sis. 
A large part of Boyers's book is given over to Leavis's relation- 
ship with Lawrence.14 This discussion is a mixture of irrelevant 
speculation, undeveloped insights, the uncritical acceptance of 
Leavis's terms, and the occasional misreading. 
In an unnecessary speculative digression, Boyers wonders why Leavis 
had such strong positive feelings for Lawrence.15 The parallels bet- 
ween the respective careers of Lawrence and Leavis - hostility and 
ostracism - which Boyers cites, are only superficial.16 They cannot 
be seriously considered as reasons for assuming a sentimental self - 
identification with Lawrence by Leavis. Yet Boyers posits them as 
a key to Leavis's criticism of Lawrence. , 
Boyers's commentary is similarly casual throughout and fails every- 
where to be specific. He states that 
Where [Leavis's] readings fail, they are too avid to make 
Lawrence stand for something that cannot be effectively 
14. 22 pages out of 122, or one -sixth: this compares with 24 pages 
given over to the Auden problem. 
1$. Cf. Ibid pp 101 -102. 
16. As George Steiner points out. some of the 'hostility' towards 
Leavis was a myth Leavis himself encouraged for strategic purposes 
Cf. 'F.R.Leavis' in Language and Silence (1967) 
communicated by the critic outside of his active engagement 
with the Lawrentian text) / 
This may point to a significant truth about Leavis's Lawrence criticism 
but it would need to be demonstrated rather than merely asserted in 
order to be substantiated and convincing. The same is'true of the 
following statement: 
Leavis is so good on Women in Love because the novel so 
clearly mistrusts its own willed conclusions, because 
it puts one constantly in mind of the terrible resi tances 
built into the fabric of its own unfolding design.1° 
What does it mean to be 'good on Women in Love'? in what particulars 
of critical insight does thisachievement inhere ? is it Leavis or 
Boyers who insists that the novel 'mistrusts its own willed con- 
clusions'? what does this last phrase mean? do the final phrases 
of the sentence mean anything at all? These questions all throw 
Boyer's critical judgement into doubt and diminish the value of his 
commentary. In other places,l' this commentary is indistinguishable 
from gloss, analysis, paraphrase or original speculations on the part 
of the author. The study is at certain points confusing and direction- 
less. This weakness is compounded by Boyer$'s tendency to adopt. 
17. Ibid p 104. 
18. Ibid p 109. 
19. Cf. for example pp 116 -117. 
without defining his usage or the critic's, Leavis terminology. 
. 
u 
Moreover, the inadequacy of Boyer's critical appreciation of Law- 
rence and of Leavis leads him to a simplistic misreading of The Cap- 
tain's Doll' and of Leavis's exposition of that tale. The tale, dif- 
ficult and imperfect. requires a more subtle reading than Boyers seems 
inclined to pursue; Leavis's claims for the work are defensible in 
a way that his claims for St Mawr are not. For Boyers to characterise 
Leavis's essays21 on 'The Captain's Doll' as a plain 'failure'22 is 
to trivialise Leavis's involvement with the tale and reflects poorly 
on Boyers's personal critical abilities. Moreover, Boyers goes on 
to say that this 'failure' was 'unfortunate, and eminently forgivable', 
which is to crown his lack of critical acumen with pusillanimity. 
Professor R.P.Bilan's The Literary Criticism of F.R.Leavis (1979) 
is on a larger scale altogether than the brief introductions of Green- 
wood and Boyers. Bergonzi, in the article cited above, describes Pro- 
fessor Bilan's style as 'limp' and the commentary as disinclined toward 
making conclusive judgements. 
23 
This is generally the case throughout 
the book and such characteristics commonly weaken the force of any 
interpretative or analytical line. There are other general features 
20. Cf. the two complete sentences of the first paragraph on p 117. 
21. Boyers refers to essays on 'The Captain's Doll' in both DH Lawrence: 
Novelist (1955) and Thought. Words. Creativity(1976) 
22. Boyers op. cit. p 122. 
23. Cf. Bergonzi, art. cit. p 41n. 
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of this study which are significant. 
Bilan's commentary on Leavis's criticism of poetry is not extensive. 
The emphasis is instead placed on Leavis's social and cultural analysis, 
his general principles with regard to criticism of the novel and his 
work on Lawrence. Appended to the study is a brief chapter entitled 
'The Religious Spirit' in which Bilan attempts to make sense of 
Leavis's late metaphysical adumbrations. In fact, Bilan attempts 
to summarise his whole case in this final chapter. He seems to feel 
that the metaphysical tendencies of Leavis's late period were the 
rational outcome of the developments of the preceding years. The 
first section of Part Three, 'Leavis on Lawrence', is entitled 'The 
Early Religious Concern'. Clearly, Bilan feels that the 'religious -' 
element or dimension of Leavis's writings was present from the begin- 
ning. 
The bias in Bilan's book is away from the poetry criticism in favour 
of criticism of the novel. In discussing Leavis's 'religious spirit' 
Bilan prefers to concentrate on themes predominant in D.H. Lawrence: 
Novelist and Dickens the Novelist, rather than those of The Living 
Principle. In the third section of this latter work, Leavis engages 
more explicitly than elsewhere with metaphysical and theological prob- 
lems. His metaphysics, indeed, develop as a direct result of the 
years spent grappling with the significances of Four Quartets. In 
the light of this, Bilan's emphasis is surprising. 
Bilan's account is necessarily in a large degree a matter of para- 
phrasing. This is as unavoidable in an analysis of the work of a 
11 
literary critic as is the exposition of narrative plot to a critique 
of the novel. Yet too much of Bilan's commentary is of the nature 
of synoptic outline: too often he fails to provide a conclusive 
critical judgement on the matters in hand. For example. after a résumé 
of the arguments surrounding Leavis's refusal to involve himself in 
'theoretical' or 'abstract' discussions. Bilan says 
Leavis himself only presents a general proposition 
about literature in terms of his own immediate 
response to a text. It is only by maintaining a 
fidelity to the concrete, Leavis believes, that 
criticism, as opposed,to philosophy, shows its 
distinctive concern with fundamentals.24 
This is a bit lame. It is not untrue; it is a bare statement of 
fact that is contentious only in its glib generalisation, 'as opposed 
to philosiphy'. However. Bilan's discussion is concluded precisely 
at the point where the questions become most interesting. If the 
reader wants to know the principal arguments forwarded by Leavis to 
oppose the consideration of theoretical matters, Bilan's summary 
is admirable. He provides a useful synopsis of the debates in which 
Leavis was involved on this issue. However. the deeper aspects of 
the question are not engaged. Leavis's reluctance to embark on 
theoretical disscussions meant that he was unwilling to define his 
evaluative terms and values in the abstract. His critical vocabulary 
24. R.P.Bilan, op. cit. p 7Q. 
12 
thus became self -referring, defined, Leavis said. by its context. 
This is a complex problem. What implications are there for a criticism 
that defines its scheme of values in the act of deploying them in 
a critical analysis? What rewards or disadvantages might this have 
for the critic, or his reader? Bilan, to the detriment of his inquiry, 
does not address himself to these questions. 
Nonetheless, there is a place for a coherent synopsis of the basic 
tenets of Leavis's criticism. Bilan's account of the preliminary 
cultural analysis, its terms and their sources, is valuable. So too 
are his observations on the change from poetry to novel criticism, 
and on Leavis's concept of 'morality'. His account of 'the basic 
concepts of Leavis's novel criticism' is also useful. In none of 
these areas does Bilan explore the deeper ramifying implications of 
Leavis's ideas and positions, but as an introduction to these matters, 
his book supercedes those of Greenwood and Boyers. 
Bilan devotes almost one third of his book to Leavis's critical 
writings on Lawrence. Such a distribution of emphasis is justifiable, 
given the nature of Leavis's enthusiasm for Lawrence. Leavis's criti- 
cism of Lawrence is mixed in its achievements. His writings on the 
novels range from the brilliant exegeses of The Rainbow and Women in 
Love to his perversely exaggerated valuation of St Mawr and some of 
the tales. Bilan notes these extremes and points to some of the causes 
of Leavis's misreadings. For instance. Bilan feels that with regard 
to The Rainbow 
13 
Leavis has a greater belief in culture and education 
than Lawrence has and he reads this into the novel 2 
and that he is over tolerant of Lawrence's excesses in Fantasia of 
the Unconscious. Bilan also feels that Leavis's interpretation of 
County Dionys in The Ladybird is mistaken. Clearly, all these points 
are valid. Yet Bilan's concluding comment is that 
in these cases Leavis can praise Lawrence only by 
misrepresenting him, by making it appear that Lawrence 
considers the critical intelligence as important as 
he himself does.26 
Something stronger and more searching than this is needed. It 
is possible to inquire further into the relationship between Leavis 
and Lawrence and identify the sources and methods behind Leavis's 
critical successes and failures. It is possible to relate these find- 
ings to the general methods of Leavis's criticism and in this way 
come to a better understanding of that method, its strengths and weak- 
nesses. Bilan does not involve himself in such an inquiry. 
Bilan's treatment of Leavis's essays on Four Quartets is also symp- 
tomatic of the incompleteness of his inquiry. Bilan disputes the 
25. Ibid p 233. 
26. Ibid p 234. 
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level of attention Leavis gives to 'East Coker' as compared to 'Burnt 
Norton'. In a passage of superficial poetic analysis, Bilan attempts 
to controvert Leavis's opinion that the close of 'East Coker' shows 
Eliot's'negative attitude to human time'. The characteristic'limpness' 
of style noticed by Bergonzi appears in this statement: 
The ending of 'East Coker' is clearly quite different 
from that of 'Burnt Norton' and certainly deserves more 
attention than Leavis gives it. 27 
Underlying all of Leavis's critical judgements there is a system of 
reasoning which gave rise to those judgements. All of Leavis's 
criticism depends upon a specialised vocabulary for the presentation 
of his evaluative commentary. Bilan does not explore these aspects 
of Leavis's criticism. His account remains determinedly superficial. 
This superficiality is more apparent in Bilan's closing essay, 
'The Religious Spirit'. On the one hand, he provides a coherent and 
illuminating account of Leavis's concept of 'religion', dealing with 
Bunyan, Dickens and Blake. Yet on the other hand, Bilan attempts 
to place Leavis in a collocation with 'modern theologians' such as 
Martin Buber, John A.T.Robinson and Ivan Tillich. Bilan forgets that 
Leavis's metaphysics were an intrinsic part of his literary criticism. 
An explicit metaphysical and theological statement was urged out of 
27. Cf. Ibid p 279. 
li 
Leavis in his grappling with the challenge of Four Quartets. This 
struggle was sustained for the best part of forty years. Leavis's 
essays on Four Quartets in The Living Principle represents the cul- 
mination of that developing engagement. The essays are nonetheless 
literary critical; the metaphysical element cannot be regarded, in 
the manner of Bilan, as extrinsic. To place Leavis's idiosyncratic 
metaphysics in whatever kind of relation with contemporary theology 
is to generate no valuable insight into the nature of his literary 
criticism.28 Bilan's book is marred throughout by these character- 
istics of misdirection and superficiality. 
PJM Robertson's The Leavises on Fiction (1981) is another work which 
suffers from too great a partiality towards the Leavis cause. With 
regard to F.R.Leavis particularly, Robertson's exclusive concentration 
on the novel is a mistake. F.R.Leavis's attitude towards the novel, 
unlike that of Q.D.Leavis, cannot be adequately understood apart from 
the poetry criticism. Bilan's book, in fact, is most valuable in 
the section where he discusses the transition in Leavis's criticism 
from poetry to the novel and the interconnectedness of the types of 
critical endeavour. Robertson's thesis is therefore limited from 
the outset. 
28 The final sentence of Bilan's book reads: 'And in pointing us 
towards Blake, Dickens and Lawrence as the source of wisdom, health 
and life that our civilisation needs. Leavis shows a compelling 
centrality of judgement'. 
Bilan op. cit. p 80. 
Statements like this do not mean very much. 
I () 
A representative consequence of the omission of consideration of 
Leavis's poetry occurs in the context of Robertson's explanation for 
Leavis's rejection of Joyce. Robertson summarises Leavis's position 
as: 'Shakespeare "realises" while Joyce "contrives ".'29 Nowhere 
does Robertson closely examine what Leavis means by these terms. 
He assumes, in the manner characteristic of the partial Leavis observer 
that they are self -explanatory. Yet the whole concept of 'realisation' 
and 
was developed by Leavis in his criticism of poetry translated from 
there into the criticism of the novel. For it to mean anything in 
relation to Joyce, Robertson would have to show this development and 
explain the appropriateness, if any, of employing such a concept in 
an incomparable genre. 
Robertson concludes these few pages on the essay 'Joyce and "the 
revolution of the word "'30 thus: 
this early essay . . . shows that Leavis had tackled 
Joyce and not arbitrarily dismissed him. He had in 
fact examined him according to the highest standard. 
Shakespeare: a compliment to Joyce.31 
In what way is Joyce comparable to Shakespeare? Such a comparison 
29. Robertson op. cit. p 80. 
30. Scrutiny II (1933): reprinted in For Continuity (1933) 
31. Op. cit. p 81. 
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makes sense only given an understanding of the grounding of Leavis's 
novel criticism in his criticism of poetry. Robertson's whole study 
is marked by a similar superficiality and partiality throughout; 
it accepts too many of Leavis's ideas and positions too readily and 
too uncritically: 
For Leavis, Eliot fails to reach the highest creativity because 
he fails to recognise Blake's distinction between 'selfhood' 
and 'identity' and remains imprisoned in his 'selfhood'.32 
This kind of commentary is clearly inadequate. The vocabulary Leavis 
is employing needs to be examined in greater detail and the signifi- 
cances of his usages accounted for. This absence of close analytical 
attention to the substance of Leavis's criticism, his vocabulary of 
evaluative terms, is the undermining characteristic of Robertson's 
study. 
Other studies dealing with Leavis or the Leavises include Francis 
Mulhern, The Moment of 'Scrutiny' (1979) and Chris Baldick, The Social 
Mission of English Criticism 1848 -1932 (1983). The latter work con- 
tains a chapter entitled 'The Leavises: Armed against the herd'. 
32. Ibid p 91. 
It is a Marxist account of the Leavises' social and cultural analysis. 
Its strongest passages include the summarisation and critique of Q.D. 
Leavis's Fiction and the Reading Public. Baldick's critique consti- 
tutes the first seriously political response to the implications of 
Q.D.Leavis's thesis. Baldick also deals intelligently with the concep- 
tual problems associated with F.R.Leavis's equation of politics with 
economics, to the exclusion of other considerations. Baldick also 
demonstrates some of the naivety and ill -informedness of the Leavises' 
early political positions. This book constitutes an interesting ancil- 
lary study of the Leavises' social and cultural analysis which attempts 
to place that analysis in a historical context. 
Mulhern's book is a study also ancillary to an inquiry into the 
literary criticism of the Leavises, but it is essential reading. 
It is a Marxist Account of the history of Scrutiny and is "extremely 
detailed. The historical account of the journal and its politics 
cannot be divorced from the polemical ideological line that Mulhern takes 
in his summary. Such a separation is not essential. however. since 
the Marxist interpretation of the politics of Scrutiny provides some 
insights into the nature of Leavis's cultural analysis, literary criti- 
cism and educational programme. In common with Baldick's essay, 
though, Leavis's actual literary criticism is not the primary focus 
of Mulhern's attention. 
The present study is designed to trace the development of Leavis's 
critical vocabulary and his grammar of evaluative terms. This is 
i 
done by means of a close analytical and critical commentary, concen- 
trating for the most part on Leavis's literary criticism. Such a 
study involves the type of paraphrase which is in effect a practice 
of the 'reconstitution' of Leavis's arguments. By this means it is 
possible to understand the processes through which Leavis's critical 
vocabulary develops and operates. 
'Reconstitution' represents something more than simple paraphrase. 
It is necessarily a selective process. In the choices governing the 
selection, the problems of where the emphasis is to be placed, a cer- 
tain evaluation is implicit; but this would not be adequate to the 
requirements of a full critical inquiry. The major aspect, 'assess- 
ment' of Leavis's criticism, is contained in the demonstrations of 
the ways in which Leavis's terminology is shown to work and in the 
analysis of the judgements which Leavis's criticism produces. 
By concentrating in this way on Leavis's specific literary critical 
judgements and the vocabulary which allows for their expression, it 
is possible to produce an impartial account of Leavis's achievement. 
That achievement was mixed. The different elements which make up 
the body of Leavis's criticism need to be distinguished. Broad his- 
torical synopsis, the close analysis of a particular poem or novel, 
the polemical insistence on the centrality of literature and literary 
criticism are all features of Leavis's work. The unifying element 
throughout is the critical language - the vocabulary - Leavis employs. 
The source, nature and operation of that vocabulary are the subjects 
of this study. 
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1. Diagnosis and Remedy: cultural analysis and critical principles 
(1930 -32) 
F.R. Leavis's early writings serve as a prologue to the whole of 
his subsequent intellectual career. We can identify in them the 
sources and preliminary considerations of themes which were to be 
central to his literary criticism. Out of the main arguments of 
these polemical sketches and critiques there developed the basic 
tenets of Leavis's critical method. They contain the initial for- 
mulations of what was to develop gradually into a comprehensive 
critical terminology. A résumé of these early ideas makes possible 
an analysis of Leavis's fundamental principles to see how they 
develop into the particular kinds of critical practice which Leavis 
pursued. 
A certain amount of paraphrase is necessary in reconstituting 
the main arguments and clarifying their essential elements from 
an objective point of view. Much of Leavis's early writing took 
the form of a kind of literary journalism. Occasional articles 
and reviews involved him in the frequentation of recurrent problems 
of contemporary culture. This involvement only gradually emerged 
as a formulated account of the nature of those problems and a prac- 
tical strategy for combating them. This early material was disparate 
and repetitive. calling on the same evidence in different places 
and making the same points in different contexts. In order to gain 
a clearer sense of the fundamental positions it is necessary to 
highlight points of reference in the pamphlets and articles that 
are representative of the main elements of Leavis's critical dis- 
course. Leavis collected these writings in For Continuity (1933) 
and this volume, which includes the first articles for Scrutiny, 
together with New Bearings in English Poetry (1932). represent 
Leavis's developed intellectual position for the first phase of 
his career. 
There were two main elements in Leavis's account of contemporary 
culture. The first was analytical or diagnostic of current cultural 
formulations and ranged over varied material; and the second was 
corrective or remedial, proposing organisations and strategies 
for ameliorating the diagnosed 'crisis', centring on the 'function 
of criticism'. The relations between the two approaches were 
complex and interactive. The diagnostic perspective, for example, 
utilised in its analysis of cultural phenomena the Book 
Societies, say, or Arnold Bennett's journalism - an implicit set 
of critical values that only had their concrete formulation in the 
remedial sections of the discourse. 'Remedy', in fact, was implicit 
in the diagnosis. It was clearly futile to mount a sustained attack 
on contemporary culture without accompanying this attack with 
optimistic proposals that were generated by the positive impulse 
that induced the initial critique. If the critique had a basis 
in a set of alternative values, rather than being merely negative, 
then it ought to be possible to elaborate those values in the 
realm of action. The other course was descent into a resigned 
fatalism. or the 'proud, philosophical indifference' sanctioned 
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by Spengler.1 The diagnostic element, for its part. was organised 
with the remedial strategy in mind. This meant that there was a 
correspondence between the kinds of material Leavis deprecated as 
inconducive to cultural 'health' and the potential areas of adjust- 
ment or focus that were central to the 'remedy'.2 
Leavis's pamphlet, Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture (1930) 
grew out of the work Q.D.Leavis was doing towards Fiction and the 
Reading Public (1932). The argument of the concluding section of 
the latter concerned the relative decline in 'reading capacity' 
and its consequences in the present age. This.theme was developed 
along more general lines in F.R.Leavis's pamphlet. Similar sources 
were used as evidence for the decline, and in support of the asser- 
tion that great literature is essential to the well -being of the 
culture; and parallel conclusions were drawn in both works. Where 
Q.D.Leavis confined her observations to the novel, F.R. Leavis ex- 
tended the discussion to include wider social issues, utilising 
1. 'Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture' in For Continuity (1933) 
p 16. 
Leavis's early commentaries were collected in For Continuity. 
which comprises a volume of remarkable radical polemicism. 
Leavis wrote that these articles and reviews 'all illustrate. 
develop and enforce, in ways more or less obvious, the same 
preoccupation and the same argument - that of Mass Civilisation 
and Minority Culture'. Hence the publication in a single volume. 
which constituted, he felt, 'more than a collection'. (See 
'Prefatory: Marxism and Cultural Continuity', For Continuity. 
p 1.) Page references to these articles, pamphlets and reviews 
are to For Continuity throughout this chapter. 
2. 'Health' and 'vitality' were part of Leavis's vocabulary with 
regard to contemporary culture, but he did not use the terms 
'diagnosis' or 'remedy' extensively himself. 
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many non -literary examples to further his case. 
The pattern of the argument of the thesis and of the pamphlet 
was broadly similar. It consisted of generalised observations on 
'the contemporary situation'3 derived from representative materials 
exploited to illustrate the age's component weaknesses and the 
collapse of critical standards. This argument was supplemented 
by a kind of historical analysis which purported to show that 
standards and values and the whole nature of cultural relations 
had, in the pre- industrial past, been substantially different. 
Out of the contrast thus drawn, an analysis of the present could 
be staged which involved judgements of value.4 The conditions of 
the past and the present could be used to demonstrate a qualititive 
change - that is, a decline. Leavis's pamphlet was less rigidly 
structured than this, butthe same three types of argument interpose 
themselves, and similar conclusions were drawn. 
Two premises were central to Q.D.Leavis's argument: that of 
the existence of the guardian 'minority': and that which held that 
great literature is essential to cultural health. The concept of 
the minority was not new. but the Leavises were involved in making 
3. 'The Contemporary Situation' is the heading for part I of Fiction 
and the Reading Public. 
4. Q.D.Leavis postponed the introduction of values: 'discussion 
of values has as far as possible been suspended till the last 
section of the book was reached, since it could not conveniently 
be carried on until a body of evidence was placed before the 
reader to which reference could be made.' 
Fiction and the Reading Public p xv. 
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new demands of what slender minority still existed with the aim 
of revitalising its function. The operation of this function in 
society had been indicated by Matthew Arnold: 
The mass of mankind will never have any ardent zeal for 
seeing things as they are; very inadequate ideas will 
always satisfy them. On these inadequate ideas repose, 
and must repose, the general practice of the world. 
That is as much as saying that whoever sets himself to 
see things as they are will find himself one of a very 
small circle; but it is only by this small circle 
resolutely doing its own work that adequate ideas will 
ever get current at all.5 
This is the historical antecedent to F.R. Leavis's version of the 
same principle, which is also quoted in Fiction and the Reading 
Public 
In any period it is upon a very small minority that the 
discerning appreciation of art and literature depends: it 
is, (apart from cases of the simple and familiar) only a 
few who are capable of unprompted, first -hand judgement.' 
5. Arnold, 'The Function of Criticism at the Present Time', The 
National Review. 1 (November 1864) pp 230 -51. Cf The Complete 
Prose Works of Matthew Arnold (ed R.H.Super), III: Lectures 
and Essays in Criticism (Michigan 1962) p 274. 
6. Fiction and the Reading Public p 202. 
7. For Continuity pp 13 -14 
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Sources for the premise regarding the importance of literature are 
manifold, but the Leavises referred specifically to I.A.Richards's 
statements around the issue, on several occasions. The main point 
of these references was encapsulated in the quotation from Richards 
given by F.R. Leavis in the pamphlet: 
If we do not live in consonance with good poetry, we must 
live in consonance with bad poetry . . . On the whole 
evidence, I do not see how we can avoid the conclusion 
thata general insensitivity to poetry does witness a low 
level of general imaginative life.8 
This principle was fundamental to the ideas of the Leavises. 
Q.D.Leavis was preoccupied with the significance of the apparent 
decline to all forms of literature that had taken 
place with the growth of the advanced industrial society: 'The 
novel's effect . . . is cumulative, and such a form demands from 
the reader a prolonged expenditure of effort. To be equal to this 
demand is the first requisite in a reader '9 . The 'reading capacity' 
of various ages can therefore be gauged by the demands made on the 
reader by popular fiction. In assessing historical variations in 
'reading capacity' Q.D.Leavis contrasted the relative qualities 
of the Elizabethan Thomas Nashe (1567- 1601), the eighteenth century 
8. For Continuity p 24. Cf Richards, 
Practical Criticism (1929) pp 319 -20 
9. Fiction and the Reading Public p 214. 
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Laurence Sterne(1713 -68) and the modern. Virginia Woolf: all writers 
considered 'difficult' in some way. Leavis's interest was focused 
on each writer's 'technique' and its relation to the expectations 
and abilities of the reader. Nashe's10 'incoherence' and 'complete 
absence of consideration for the reader' makes his prose hard going 
for the twentieth century reader who 'is accustomed to writers who 
take pains to make their line of thought apparent'11. For his con- 
temporary audience, however, this would have presented no problems, 
'sermon, drama, and music [having] accustomed it to follow atten- 
tively and alertly'12. The difficulties in Nashe have to do with 
sense obscured by the haphazard prose style. In Sterne they are 
more cryptic: his technique 'depends on the establishment of a 
social tone, . . . his progress, like Byron's in Don Juan, is not 
structural but consists in rapid variations in the scale of feeling, 
in unexpected changes in the emotional pressure'. This technique 
required 'a far more subtle understanding between author and 
public'13 than had been possible in an earlier period. This under- 
standing had been made available by virtue of the existence of 
a social literature . . . equally removed from the naive 
humour and full -bodied tragic passion of the Elizabethan 
10. Leavis quoted from The Unfortunate Traveller (1549). (See 
Fiction and the Reading Public pp 87; 216) 
11. Ibid p 217. 
12. Ibid pp 217-218. 
13. Ibid p 220. 
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audience on the one side and from the undiscriminating 
surrender to bursts of laughter and storms of tears of 
Dickens's public on the other.14 
The reading public who enjoyed Sterne's virtuosity were reading 
for more than mere amusement. Both Nashe and Sterne achieved a 
popular status because'the conditions of the age made them accessible 
to the common reader.' In contrast, To the Lighthouse 'is especially 
calculated to baffle the general public of the twentieth century', 
that public which was 'accustomed to nothing more ambitious than 
the elementary prose of the journalist'.15 
Q.D.Leavis inquired into the causes of this change in reading 
capacity to find why the twentieth century reader - 'whose ancestors 
have been competent readers of Sterne and Nashe'16 - no longer ex- 
hibited the same degree of mental attentiveness or 'athleticism'. 
The blame was found to lie in the prevailing cultural environment: 
The training of the reader who spends his leisure in cinemas, 
looking through magazines and newspapers, listening to jazz 
music, does not merely fail to help him, it prevents him 
from normal development . . . partly by providing him with 
a set of habits inimical to mental effort. . . . We have 
no practice in making the effort necessary to master a work 
that presents some surface difficulty or offers no 
immediate payment.l 
14. Ibid pp 220-21. 
15. Ibid p 222. 
16. Ibid p 223. 
17. Ibid pp 224: 226. 
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Such reading activity as is still pursued has the aim not of self - 
advancement and the acquisition of knowledge, but of escape: Leavis's 
final chapter is entitled 'Living at the novelist's expense'. In 
the pre -industrial and immediately post- industrial ages - 'as long 
as the Puritan tradition survived' - the working classes18 read 'to 
qualify themselves to live to more purpose'. In the modern period, 
major changes in the social environment - in working conditions, 
in the nature of printed matter (books and the press19), in the kind 
of alternative amusements available - had undermined this ambition. 
The widespread commercialisation of literary production meant 'read- 
ing' had become an antithetical activity to what it had been in the 
past: 'It is only a world run by Big Business that has produced 
a civilisation whose workers must have recourse to substitute 
living'.20 Q.D. Leavis's central argument was augmented by a profu- 
sion of detail and a series of complex analyses, critical and histor- 
ical, of novels, novelists and readers. Fiction and the Reading 
Public gave F.R. Leavis initial material and additional support for 
his assertion of the fact of 'cultural crisis' and its potential 
significance. It provided him with a model for the practice of a 
diagnostic analysis of the present combined with a comparative histor- 
ical inquiry. 
18. '. . . the journeyman, peasants, and tradesmen . . 
Ibid p 206. 
19. 'Northcliffe's interference with reading habits alone has 
effectively put literature out of the reach of the average man'. 
Ibid. p 224. 
20. Ibid pp 206 -7. 
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The present condition of contemporary culture can only he deter- 
mined by a comparison with the perceived condition of culture in 
the past. Historical analysis is rarely objective or unbiased since 
the selection of material relevant to the particular argument will 
be determined by the ideological bias germane to the rationale that 
saw the argument as initially significant. When the prevailing line 
of the rationale is towards a comparative critique, the observations 
on the past will be attuned to the tenor of the criticism that is to 
be made on the present. The analysis of the past and the diagnosis 
of the present are not discrete_ activities. In the same way that 
the 'diagnostic' and the 'remed.ial' aspects of the Leavises' discourse 
were reciprocally related, so are the two elements of the historical 
comparison. The ideological predisposition that governs the selection 
of historical materials and the light in which they are projected 
has its source in the underlyìrig set of values that are pre -existent 
to the main analysis; these are the values that, by creating the 
ideological bias, organise the comparative critique along its specific 
lines. 
It was F.R.Leavis's contention that the consequences of the indus- 
trial revolution had interposed a disruptive effect in the process 
of 'normal' historical development; his concern was 'for continuity'. 
Continuity between the past and the present, and the present and 
the future, guaranteed the vitality of the culture because trans- 
mission of cultural values is dependent on the language employed 
in their expression andiat language must adapt idiomatically to 
its successive historical contexts. 
30 
Upon [the_lminority depends our power of profiting by the 
finest human experience of the past; they keep alive the 
subtlest and most perishable parts of tradition. Upon them 
depend the implicit standards that order the finer living 
of an age, the sense that this is worth more than that, 
this rather than that is the direction in which to go. 
. . . In their keeping . . . is the language. the changing 
idiom, upon which fine living depends, and without which 
distinction of spirit is thwarted and incoherent. By 
'culture' I mean the use of such a language.21 
Since 'culture' scarcely exists without language, this can be seen 
as a highly refined definition of 'culture'. Even so, narrowing 
of the focus to 'language' facilitated Leavis in his exposition 
of the paramountcy of cultural values, their transmission and preser- 
vation, and the 'breach in continuity' that threatened their 
existence. 
The minority was a conscious élite, guardians of the cultural 
heritage which was embodied in the idiom of the language at its 
highest pitch of excellence, in its literary manifestations. The 
crisis that Leavis perceived was not merely the dwindling numbers 
of the minority so much as the collapse of its influence on the 
contemporary culture. This is where F.R.Leavis's pamphlet made 
its closest connections with Fiction and the Reading Public. The 
reader capable of profiting from To the Lighthouse belonged im- 
plicitly to the minority because the operation of the industrial 
culture had excluded the 'common reader' from these forms of height- 
ened expression. 'Mass production and standardisation' were 
21. For Continuity p 15. 
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invariably accompanied. for example in the Press, by 'a process 
of levelling- down'22 . The cinema and broadcasting were 'passive' 
forms of entertainment not calculated to stimulate 'active re- 
creation' 3. Contemporary civilisation was characterised by the 
'deliberate exploitation of the cheap response' 24. These factors 
all contributed to the alienation of the minority from any serious 
influence on standards and meant that 'the living subtlety of the 
finest idiom', as embodied in literature, was becoming the exclusive 
property of the minority. If, then, the 'idiom' was in the preserve 
of an élite impotent to exert an influence on the prevailing culture, 
what was to be the fate of the 'cultural heritage'? 
The immediate prospect was 'a breach in continuity', a loss of 
contact with the values of the past. The 'machine . . . has brought 
about change in habit and the circumstances of life at a rate for 
which we have no parallel'.25 The nature of the current historical 
period - 'the modern phase of human history' - was unique in this 
respect. the Spenglerian theory of 'inexorable cycles' failing to 
account for this major shift in the pace of historical change. 
Leavis saw this rate of change as 'catastrophic' and painted a bleak 
picture of current events: 'the generations find it hard to adjust 
themselves to each other, and parents are helpless to deal with 
22. Ibid p 18. 
23. Ibid p 21. 
24. Ibid p 22. 
25. 'bid p 16. 
their children'26. The advent of the "machine age' both contributed 
to the loss of potency of the minority and simultaneously made its 
function more crucial. The problem Leavis faced was how to escape 
this dilemma. 
In one sense, Leavis's diagnosis was idealist and atavistic. 
It proposed a version of the past in which the relations between 
society and culture had attained a status in which there was no 
separation between the literature that embodied 'the finest idiom' 
and the general 'reading public': the literary tradition was 'in 
living relation with a real culture, shared by the people at 
large' 
27. 
This ideal past was captured by Leavis in the concept 
of the 'organic community', representing an ordering of social and 
cultural relations that served as a positive contrast to the present 
situation. The present had been arrived at by a process of gradual 
decay: the emergence of an advanced industrial society in England 
had induced an irresistible state of disintegration in those rela- 
tions. The old rural order ('a national culture rooted in the 
soil'28) was gradually supplanted by a suburban, mechanical organisa- 
tion and a population disorientated by the traumatic interruptions 
of 'constant rapid change'29. In this context, 'improvisation' 
is forced to replace 'the mature. inherited codes of habit and 
26. Ibid p 17. 
27. ' "Under Which King. Bezonian? " For Continuity p 165. 
25. 'Joyce and "the revolution of the word ''. For Continuity p 
216. 
29. Ibid p 215. 
valuation'30. The relation between 'tradition' and 'culture' is 
thereby undermined. The commercialisation of literary production- 
actively discouraged the mental habits necessary for resistance 
to the prevailing disintegration - it immunised the reading public 
against challenges, originating with the minority, to its complacent . 
acceptance of the second- rate.32 Of these elements, one was gene- 
rated in the process of change in the material structure of indust- 
rial society; the other deliberately exploited the changes thus 
engendered. They both contributed to the 'loss of the organic com- 
munity' and threatened p. 'beach in continuity' ,33 
Whether or not the 'organic community' ever actually existed 
30. 'Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture',For Continuity p 1.7. 
31. 'Book Clubs . . . are instruments not for improving taste but 
for standardising it at the middlebrow level, thus preventing 
the natural progression of taste that in the later eighteenth 
century, for instance, was assisted.' 
Fiction and the Reading Public p 229. 
Cf. 'The Supply of Reading Matter' in Leavis & Thompson. Culture 
and Environment (1933) pp 38-45. 
32. Cf. Q.D.Leavis: ' ['the popular novels of the age'] substitute 
an emotional code which . . . is actually inferior to the tradi- 
tional code of the illiterate and which helps to make a social 
atmosphere unfavourable to the aspirations of the minority. 
They actually get in the way of genuine feeling and responsible 
thinking by creating cheap mechanical responses and by throwing 
their weight on the side of social, national, and herd pre- 
judices.' 
Fiction and the Reading Public p 74. 
Cf. Chris Baldick, The Social Mission of English Criticism 1848 - 
1932 (1983) for a discussion of the sources for Q.D.Leavis's 
concept of the 'herd'. 
33. Cf. 'The Loss of the Organic Community' in Culture and Environ- 
ment pp 93 -98. 
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in the form outlined by Leavis, or whether positive gains in the 
material condition of human life have been made with the advancement 
of the sciences, or whether evidence can be made available to show 
that a yearning for a lost 'golden age' is manifested in every 
historical period, are not the relevant criticisms to be levelled 
at the Leavises' version of the past. The idealism and atavism 
of their historical analysis reside in specific areas of the critical 
discourse. The social and cultural relations that were said to 
have existed in the pre- industrial age was a system of relations 
that can only properly be said to exist in the terminology of 
Leavis's exposition. The idealist tendency of this exposition de- 
rived from the circumstances that generated it. The diagnosis of 
present conditions could only be given a qualitative substance by 
setting it in the context of a comparative analysis. It was evident 
that radical in the 'modern of human 
history': what was not so obvious was that the change was neces- 
sarily for the worse, that industrial advance should be equated 
automatically with cultural decline. It was the burden of Leavis's 
historical exposition to demonstrate that this equation should be 
made. Hence the earlier phases of human history were presented 
as embodying a structure of social and cultural relations that was 
'ideal', in a relative and an absolute sense. It was ideal relative 
to the present because of the forms of literature that were produced 
(eg. Pilgrim's Progress (1678 )and the reading capacity of the 
society that made such literature popular and of central significance 
to the consciousness of the age, its culture, where "culture" 'is 
a sense of relative value and a memory - such wisdom as constitutes 
the residuum of the general experience'.34 It was idea] in an ab- 
solute sense because of the way this structure of relations operated 
to perpetuate and transmit 'the living subtlety of the finest idiom' 
and because to live in 'a homogeneous culture is to move among sig- 
nals of limited variety, illustrating one predominant ethos, grammar 
and idiom . . . and to acquire discrimination as one moves'.35 So 
the old rural order, the 'organic community', was the 'ideal' order 
and one which had been supervened by the mechanical industrial 
society. Industrialism was incapable of attending to the problems 
and needs of the 'culture' and the 'cultural heritage'. This in- 
capacity manifested in the loss of potency of the minority, the 
'decay of the common reader'36 and the threat to cultural continuity. 
the transmission of 'inherited codes of habit and valuation'. In- 
dustrialisation must be interpreted therefore as a process of decline, 
a crisis involving loss, the negation of positive values and the 
disruption of consciousness. 
The 'organic community' was an ideal that operated as an essential 
component in the Leavises' discourse on the contemporary cultural 
crisis and as such it cannot be read as an analysis of historical 
fact. The atavistic tendency of the analysis took a narrow form, 
in the sense that what was stipulated was not a reversion to the 
34. The Literary Mind', For Continuity p 64. 
35. How to Teach Reading: a Primer for Ezra Pound (1932) p 3. 
36. Ibid pp 3 -4. 
pre- industrial agrarian code,o' but to a cultural formation that 
was capable of existing outside the prevailing social order, resis- 
tant to its corruptive influence. The solution offered to the 'up- 
rooting' of the 'national culture' was not to attempt to replant 
it in alien soil, but to pursue the dislocation to its logical ex- 
treme, to develop a culture that was permanently and consciously 
'root -less'. 
The diagnostic analysis had these historical and social forms; 
it also concentrated attention in the field of literary criticism. 
The polemical guise of much of Leavis's early articles for Scrutiny 
was the result of his responses to various items in the current 
of critical discussion that he saw as symptomatic in particular 
ways of the general process of decline. This polemicism was where 
the diagnostic approach had its concrete formation. The direction 
of this polemic is indicated in the attitudes to the material Leavis 
undertook to review. An author's work was described as 'too naive 
and muddled in its complacent philistinism to be seriously discussed' 
but the author did 'indeed witness most impressively to the decay 
of literary culture'.38 In another case. a book was described as 
37. 'We must realise that there can be no mere going back: it 
is useless to think of emulating the Erewhonians and scrapping 
the machine in the hope of restoring the old order. Even if 
agriculture were revived, that would not bring back the organic 
community'. 
38. 
Culture and Environment p 96. 
'The Literary Mind', For Continuity p 47. 
'a document of unusual interest' because 'its badness is an essential 
c 
part of its documentary value'. 39 Desmond MacCarthy, a 'journalist - 
middleman of cultivated talk', at least testified to the existence 
of a'cultivated milieu', but his interest for Leavis lay in his 
'lonely eminence': 'in a healthy state we should have at least 
twenty journalist- critics of his quality',¢0 but they do not exist. 
'What's Wrong With Criticism ?' continued with detailed attacks on 
the Royal Society, the English Association and the BBC.41 Mass Civil- 
isation and Minority Culture had pointed to the inadequacies of 
contemporary literary journals (a theme which recurred in the 'mani- 
festo' for Scrutiny). 42 The comments, ironies and polemical attacks 
of Leavis's literary reviewing were all designed to enforce the 
same claim: that the 'literary tradition' had 'dissolved': 
the centre - Arnold's "centre of intelligent and urbane 
spirit ", which, in spite of his plaints [sic]. we can see 
by comparison to have existed in his day - has vanished. 
Instead we have the Book Society Ltd., recommending 
"worthwhile" books with the psychological resources of 
modern publicity.43 
39. 'Arnold Bennett: American Version' [review of Dorothy Dudley. 
Dreiser and the Land of the Free (1933)] Fo- Continuity p 
97 
40. 'What's Wrong With Criticism ?', For Continuity p 77. 
41. See For Continuity pp 78 -88 
42. Ibid p 32. 
43. Ibid p 77. 
Leavis's interest in John Dos Passos (197- 1970) an unusually 
serious artist' - developed out of his perception that this writer 
related his individuals 'to the society and civilisation that make 
the individual life possible'. 44 But the problems of industrialism 
that Nineteen -nineteen (1932) deals with also lead to the 'artistic 
shortcomings' of the novel, which cannot be excused on the grounds 
of 'propaganda' - the claim that the weaknesses 'are necessary to 
a work that exhibits the decay of capitalist society'. Dos Passos's 
proposed solution - 'revolution' - is also inadequate: it 'shows 
nothing like an adequate awareness of - or concern for - what has 
been lost'.45 Again, in a résumé of recent poetry magazines, Leavis 
found that they showed 'that there is not in any serious sense a 
public for poetry' and 'the absence of such a public is the most 
conclusive evidence of the absence of an effective contemporary 
sensibility'. 46 
Leavis's diagnosis of the main features of contemporary culture, 
its 'historical' background and its present form, had its reflection 
in these more specific commentaries on particular details of the 
'literary tradition'. These comments were intended to substantiate 
the claim that the modern movements of civilisation were organised 
against the interests of this tradition by illustrating the symp- 
44. 'John Dos Passos'. review of Manhattan Transfer (1924). The 
42nd Parallel (1930) ,Nineteen- nineteen (1932), For Continuity 
pp 102 -3. 
45. lipid pp 105-7. 
46. 'This Poetical Renascence', For Continuity pp 191, 194. 
tomatic effects that the dissolution of the tradition had had on 
contemporary literary manifestations. The criticism, the fiction, 
the poetry of the age were disabled from a high intellectual or 
artistic attainment as a result of the advance of literary commer- 
cialism and the obstruction of the transmission of 'inherited codes 
of habit and valuation' that had been brought about by expanding 
industrialism. Evidence in literary terms for the decline in cul- 
tural values that had been foreshadowed in the reduction of 'reading 
capacity' and the supervention of the values of 'community' by the 
commercial ethic was presented by F.R.Leavis in these reviews and 
articles. The generalised social and historical commentary had 
its specific concrete counterpart in this detailed literary critical 
survey. 
Leavis's diagnosis was far -reaching and its conclusions were 
extreme. The problem for the Leavises was not confined to establish- 
ing the historical comparison and revealing the contemporary cultural 
condition. There was the further difficulty presented by the fact 
that with the increasing insularity of the minority went the dis- 
appearance of 'an educated public' and the 'abeyance' of the function 
of criticism. In such circumstances, 'it becomes impossible even 
to get the plight recognised'.47 This problem provided another 
motive for the polemical effort of these early writings. The 
Leavises were determined to mount a full -scale campaign of enlighten- 
47. Ibid pp 71-72 
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ment about, and resistance to, these potentially disastrous elements 
in industrial civilisation. In the context of the diagnosis of 
such an extreme condition, remedial resources available to 
the Leavises and their colleagues that would be capable of halting 
a collapse into a Spenglerian fatalism would of necessity partake 
of acommensurate extremity: the nature of the case dictated radical 
treatment. 
Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture ended on a last -minute, 
optimistic upward note, but it was more in the nature of.an appeal 
to attitudes than a formulated plan: 
48. 'The prospects of culture, then, are very dark. There is the 
less room for hope in that a standardised civilisation is rapid- 
ly enveloping the whole world. . . . It is vain to resist 
the triumph of the machine. It is equally vain to console 
us with the promise of a "mass culture" that shall be utterly 
new. It would, no doubt, be possible to argue that such a 
"mass culture" might be better than the culture we are losing, 
but it would be futile: the "utterly new" surrenders everything 
that can interest us'. 
'Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture', For Continuity pp 
44 -45. 
The pessimistic tone of the pamphlet was sustained virtually 
to the final paragraph. This imbalance of detail between the 
diagnostic and the remedial elements in Leavis is not wholly 
compensated for in writings that followed the pamphlet. This 
is, in part, due to the fact that the diagnosis deals with 
the present and the past and remedy projects an adjusted present 
(adjusted by the remedial interventions) into the future, where 
faith and optimism take the place of detail. But this effect 
is also exacerbated by the fact that Leavis's remedial proposals 
have their ultimate sanction only in the realm of abstract 
values. 
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Ridiculous, priggish and presumptuous as it may be, if 
we care at all about the issues we cannot help believing that, 
for the immediate future, at any rate, we have some 
responsibility. 49 
Q.D.Leavis outlined the direction that a remedial programme ought 
to take and her conclusion to Fiction and the Reading Public was 
emphatic - 'All that can be donc, it must be realised, must take 
the form of resistance by an armed and conscious minority'50 
and was concerned with details. The minority thus constituted would 
be active on two fronts: that of education and that of the organisa- 
tion of a 'public' and the dissemination of ideas that could be 
achieved by a periodical and a 'non -commercial Press'. The educa- 
tional effort would be directed towards research: 'a fully docu- 
mented presentment of the history of the reading public' would be 
'essential' to expand the awareness of the changes that have taken 
and are taking place; and, in schools and universities, it would 
be directed towards cultivating a resistance to 'such appeals as 
those made by the journalist, the middleman, the bestseller, the 
cinema and advertising' since 'some education of this kind is an 
essential part of the training of taste'.51 The periodical and 
49. For Continuity p 46. 
50. Fiction and the Reading Public p 270. 
51. Ibid pp 270 -71. 
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the Press52 would be looked to by the minority 'to register and 
sum up progress, to assist in creating awareness, and to provide 
organisation',53 
The practicality of these proposals is less important than the 
spirit in which they were presented, as revealed in Q.D.Leavis's 
outline and in the 'manifesto' in the first number of Scrutiny in 
1932. F.R.Leavis was not an official member of the editorial board54 
but the phraseology and tone of the 'manifesto' reveal his influence. 
Denys Thompson and F.R.Leavis collaborated to produce Culture and 
Environment: the training of critical awareness (1933), which used 
material that overlapped with that of Fiction and the Reading Public 
and was designed as a teaching aid for use in schools and univer- 
sities.55 F.R.Leavis also edited a collection of essays and reviews 
from The Calendar of Modern Letters - the journal which served as 
a model and a caution to the editors of Scrutiny - called Towards 
Standards of Criticism (1933). In all these writings the same essen- 
tial theme was apparent: this theme was characterised by the com- 
plete conviction of the fact of prevailing 'crisis' and a sense 
of urgency regarding the necessity for action: and an equally un- 
52. Gordon Fraser's Minority Press was established in 1930,'publish- 
ing pamphlets [including two by F.R.Leavisl which without any 
publicity have paid their way'. 
Ibid p 272. 
53. Ibid p 273. 
54 The board consisted of L.C.Knights and Donald Culver. Denys 
Thompson and F.R.Leavis joined for 1,3 (Dec. 1932). 
55 'The earlier the age at which the kind of work [this book] 
deals with is begun the better; but all its topics are capable 
of a subtlety and a depth of development demanding the maturest 
approach.' 
'Uses for which this book is intended'. Culture and Environment 
p vii. 
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shakeable belief that it was only in the field of literary criticism 
that the problems could be forced into recognition and the remedial 
programme instigated: 'Scrutiny . . . will be seriously preoccupied 
with the movement of modern civilisation'.56 
This preoccupation was what had been at the heart of the Leavises' 
diagnostic concerns in the years preceding the establishment of 
Scrutiny. The question now was to do with maintaining the diagnostic 
habit and engaging in a critical practice that performed in a way 
that potentiated the acts of 'resistance by an armed and conscious 
minority' to the dominant forms of cultural expression. There was 
in existence a minority who perceived the 'necessary relationship 
between the quality of the individual's response to art and his 
general fitness for a humane existence', but they were 'scattered 
and unorganised'.57 This was a state of affairs that Scrutiny 
aimed to remedy: 
A review is necessary that combines criticism of literature 
with criticism of extra -literary activities. We take it 
as axiomatic that concern for standards of living implies 
concern for standards in the arts.58 
The practice of literary criticism was the activity that would 
generate and sustain all the remedial priorities concerning education, 
56. 'Manifesto', Scrutiny I, 1 (1932) p 3. 
57. Ibid p 5. 
58. Ibid p 2. 
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the organisation of the minority and the asscrtionof values and 
standards antithetical to the current commerical -industrial order. 
The practice of literary criticism - conducted according to the 
stipulations and conditions insisted on by Leavis - should contain 
within itself all the implicit values that were necessary to these 
acts of 'resistance' and assertion. There was to be no reference 
to a higher evaluative sanction: literary criticism was the inte]- 
lectual process that was capable of recovering a previous system 
of cultural relations to set against the depredations of the indus- 
trial code. 
This programme was a radical version of the function of criticism 
in more than one sense. It was an extension of the Arnoldian concept 
of criticism into the sphere of active political struggle. Moreover, 
it was also radical in its refusal to adopt any larger or more ab- 
stract system of values to which 'literary criticism' could be refer- 
red: on the contrary, 'literary criticism' constituted the whole 
field of reference. F.R.Leavis asserted this autonomy in a rejection 
of the claims of the Anglo- Catholic creed or of Marxism to answer 
to the needs of contemporary culture. The key elements are Leavis's 
definition of the practice of criticism and the inescapable emergence 
of terms of value that were essential components of that criticism. 
These terms had their ultimate definition only in the realm of the 
abstract that Leavis was determined to avoid: this was the unavoid- 
able paradox of the function of criticism in Leavis's interpretation. 
T.S. Eliot's criticism in the period following his conversion to Angli- 
canism (1927) provoked an ambiguous response in Leavis, since Eliot had 
been a major influence in Leavis's early career and was still to 
exercise that influence over his criticism of poetry. Yet, from 
the point of view of discharging responsibilities in the world of 
concrete problems, of attacking the dominant cultural forms, Eliot 
had, in Leavis's view, defaulted. The orthodoxy of the Anglo- 
Catholic creed which Eliot had adopted militated against the pos- 
sibility of asserting practical critical values against the general 
drift into decline and discontinuity. Revealingly, Leavis was sym- 
pathetic to the moral aspect: 'the recovery of religious sanctions 
in some form seems necessary to the heath of the world'. But he 
found that in the practical sphere of constructive action the Anglo- 
Catholic creed did not involve 'an effective attitude towards the 
problems. The impressive statement, in the abstract, of a coherent 
position is not enough'.59 The evidence for the inadequacies of 
the orthodox creed was found by Leavis in the Criterion, which showed 
'no signs of coming any nearer than before to effective partic- 
ularity', and it was a matter of 'general regret that the name of 
the Criterion has become so dismal an irony and that the Editor 
is so far from applying to his contributors the standards we have 
learnt from him',60 
59. ' "Under Which King, Bezonian ? "', For Continuity p 173. 
60. Ibid p 174. See also : '[The Criterion's] high price, a certain 
tendency to substitute solemnity for seriousness, and, during 
the last two years, a narrowing of its interests, prevent it 
from influencing more than a small proportion of the reading 
public. It is necessary, but not the unum necessarium'. 
'Manifesto', Scrutiny I, 1 p 3n. 
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This dissatisfaction with Eliot's orthodoxy was in essence a re- 
jection on Leavis's part of the process whereby any system of beliefs 
that aims to make 'values' operative in the actual social world, 
in the realm of active social relations, must have access to a set 
of referents that are not contingent upon the changing circumstances 
of the everyday, but which have an applicability that is absolute; 
the relativism of quotidian, temporary ad hoc valuations limits 
their efficacy. However much Leavis protested against the operation 
of this process, it was inescapable if the proposed system of values 
was to have a real effect. Leavis's predominant concern was with 
making an effective intervention in the contemporary cultural order 
and so his attention was concentrated primarily in the arena of 
concrete action. His intention was to create an intellectual subver- 
sion of the prevailing conditions by nurturing an enclave (the 
minority) that would resist the prevailing currencies and disseminate 
an alternative cultural attitude. Q.D.Leavis had discussed the 
educational priority as being one of cultivating a resistance to 
the appeals of the commercial world61 and this general habit of 
61. See p 15 above. L.C.Knights'slater formulation represented 
the educational principle: 'lt is precisely by unfitting his 
pupils for the environment . . . that the educator can hope 
to change it, and to change it more radically than if he concen- 
trates on "political" issues only'. 
'The Modern Universities: a Post -script', Scrutiny VII, 1 (June 
1938) p 3. 
In other words, it was only by concentrating on the whole 
social /cultural formation, rather than inculcating a specific 
theoretical political radicalism, that qualitative change could 
be effected. Focusing on particular 'political issues' implied 
a concession to the permanence of the status of the prevailing 
social order. 
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of active political struggle permeated the Scrutiny enterprise. 
If use of language' is the final measure of the state of culture, 
and is dependent upon the economic and social order, then an attack 
on the social -economic order must proceed by attending to the use 
of language.62 This concentration of attention involved gaining 
recognition of the current habits of linguistic usage and their 
significance, as well as a campaign to improve and expand that usage 
through the encouragement of the production and reception of literary 
work: these were the responsibilities of practical literary criti- 
cism. 
Leavis was not immune to the problems that existed outside the liter- 
ary sphere of society: 'Of course the economic maladjustments, in- 
equities and oppressions demand direct attention and demand it 
urgently, and of course there is a sense in which economic problems 
are prior'.63 The question was how to tackle these problems without 
simply fulfilling the 'cultural process of capitalism'.64 Scrutiny, 
62. 'It is only by acquiring access to good poetry, great drama, 
and the best novels, the forms of art that, since they achieve 
their effects through language, most readily improve the quality 
of living, that the atmosphere in which we live may be oxygen- 
ated'. 
Fiction and the Reading Public p 211. 
63. 'Marxism and Cultural Continuity', For Continuity p 6. See 
also: 'A serious interest in literature cannot be merely liter- 
ary; indeed not only must the seriousness involve, it is likely 
to derive from, a perception of - which must be a preoccupation 
with - the problems of socialequity and order and cultural 
health'. 
'Introduction', Determinations (ed. Leavis)(1933) p 2. 
64. 'Marxism and Cultural Continuity', For Continuity p 6. 
Leavis said, did not demand an apolitical stance from its supporters 
nor did it prohibitthem from seeing 'some kind of communism as 
the solution of the economic problem'. 
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However: 
to identify Scrutiny with a social, economic or political 
creed or platform would be to compromise and impede its 
special function. This, in its bearing on the challenge 
now-in view, has already been glossed by: "the free play 
of intelligence on the underlying issues". 66 
An alternative challenge in the field of major social and economic 
change_ came from Marxism, which claimed to be as radical and 
revolutionary in its political analysis and its vision of future 
possibilities as Scrutiny was. Leavis rejected the claims of 
Marxism to two grounds: first, that the dialectic of its analysis 
interfered with "the free play of intelligence upon the underlying 
issues ": and second, that by failing to rise above the social 
and economic system it could only assist in its consummation 
at a material level: the 'culture', as represented by language 
- 'the finest idiom' - was unassimilable into the Marxian analysis 
and therefore remained untouched by it. The 'radicalism' of 
Marxism resided. in Leavis's view, in the narrow area of 
65. "Under Which King. Bezonian ? "'. For Continuity p 
66. Ibid pp 160 -61. 
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of the declaration of the claims of the proletariat:67 as a com- 
prehensive strategy for dealing with the large matters of the 'cul- 
tural crisis' this radicalism was limited by Marxism's fundamental 
materialism. 
The function of literary criticism as a means to active political 
struggle depended on the definition of the literary criticism that 
undertook these responsibilities. Leavis's definition was plainly 
stated: 'To be concerned, as Scrutiny is, for literary criticism 
is to be vigilant and scrupulous about the relation between words 
and the concrete'.68 This principle was more fully defined and 
demonstrated in Leavis's criticism of poetry. It reflects once 
more a determined avoidance of an abstract terminology of judgement. 
In the first instances of critical appraisal, at the level of lin- 
guistic and metrical analysis and comparative evaluation, Leavis 
was determined to stick as closely as possible to the actual poetic 
material. Therefore, any commentary thus generated has the advantage 
of being more convincingly provable, by reference to the actual 
words and phrases of the poetry. Complex questions are raised, 
however, when it comes to legitimising judgements of value in the 
broader extra -literary plane, away from exact comments on particular 
texts. As Leavis saw it, these judgements could not be valid at 
67. The humanitarian impulse of this aspect of Marxism was under- 
mined by its emergence in the practical sphere as incitement 
to Class War, which ultimately could only be 'effective, if 
at all, in precipitatingsome Fascist coup d'état, with the 
attendant advance of brutalisation'. 
Ibid p 12. 
68. Ibid p 171. 
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the general level without some previous response having been gene- 
rated at the level of the particular: 
where judgement is in question, the criterion is, what 
are the standards? The values of intelligence, tradition 
and orthodox Christianity ?69 But judgement is not a 
matter of abstractions; it involves particular immediate 
acts of choice, and these do not advance the business of 
judgement in any serious sense unless there has been a real 
and appropriate responsiveness to the thing offered. 
Without a free and delicate receptivity to fresh experience, 
whatever the criterion alleged, there is no judging, but 
merely negation.70 
Leavis's complaint against Marxism was that its attitude to liter- 
ature militated against this kind of responsiveness. This form 
of approach was visible in the vocabulary of Marxist criticism. 
This, Leavis said, was a vocabulary that escaped definition in 
its eagerness to enforce the. ideological points; and its judgements 
discriminated not along lines of artistic achievement but of ideo- 
logical persuasion. Dmitri Mirsky and Edmund Wilson were deprecated 
by Leavis for writing about 'les valeurs vivants Lqui] sont du cóté 
de la classe ouvriere',71 because 'values' is irretrievably vague 
69. Leavis was replying to criticism of Scrutiny that stated that. 
in contrast to the Criterion, the journal was 'uncommitted' 
(the reviewer complained that no marked preference was shown 
for either Lawrence or Eliot). See The New English Weekly 
January 5 1933. 
70. 'Restatement for Critics - (editorial)'. For Continuity p 177. 
71. See For Continuity p 169. Mirsky's essay, 'T.S.Eliot et la 
fin de la poèsie boureeoise',appeared in Échanges (Paris) (Dec. 
1931). 
in meaning; and for acceding to such collocations as "Dostoevsky, 
Cervantes, Defoe, E.E. Cummings, . . . "72 which is self-condemning. 
Leavis rejected the attempt to realise a Marxian analysis in the 
field of creative art because, distracted by the requirements of 
its radical ideology and political bias, it failed to produce either 
an adequate critical vocabulary or a respectable capacity for making 
discriminations of value: 
the Marxist dialectic. with its appearance of algebraic 
rigour, stern realism and contemptuous practicality, 
has great advantages - in dialectic - over those who 
are pusillanimous enough to let themselves be bothered 
by the duty and difficulty of using words precisely. 
The rigour, of course, is illusory, and, consequently, 
so are the realism and the practicality.73 
A further reason that Leavis elaborated for dissenting from the 
Marxist analysis had to do with its relentless materialism. By 
concentrating on the 'Class War' - the resolution of fundamental 
inequities in the modes and relations of production and contradic- 
tions in the distribution of labour and wealth - Marxism. as an 
egalitarian political doctrine, was itself contributing to the 
greater expansion of the capitalist economy. 'Mass -production' 
and 'standardisation', though erosive of the cultural tradition. 
have nevertheless facilitated the eradication of 'the cultural 
72. Ibid p 170- (Wilson's comments appeared in the New Statesman 
and Nation Autumn Books Supp. (Oct. 15 1932) p v -vi. 
73. Ibid pp 168 -69. 
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differences between the "classes "': it has made it 'inessential'. 
The differences that persist are largely 'financial', and superficial 
rather than systemic. To propose solutions of the present crisis 
in terms of 'class war' consummates the capitalist process and ren- 
ders class relations in terms of commodities, productivity and 
labour. The elimination of inequalities at a material level predi- 
cates the wider availability of those commodities and the greater 
control of the individual over his labour, which must in turn guaran- 
tee the expansion of productivity to meet the demands of the growth 
in consumption. The machinery of the capitalist economy is thus 
expanded and developed: 'the work of capitalism, the cheap car, 
the wireless, the cinema'74 is thus completed. 
Leavis rejected 'the dogma of the priority of economic conditions' 
as representing a 'hostility towards the function represented by 
Scrutiny'.75 It was only by escaping from the confines of the 
mechanics of economic relations that a real assault could be made 
on those elements of contemporary culture that were responsible 
for the prevailing 'crisis'. The development of a critical practice 
that was capable of performing the tasks that Leavis set it could 
only be achieved 'outside' the general cultural structure. This 
'outside' was represented by an attitude, a search for an independ- 
ence and an orientation which were 'hostile' to the dominant order. 
This hostility was represented in Leavis's criticism, which extended 
its perceptions of qualitative differences in art into a discussion 
74. Ibid p 172. 
75. Ibid p 162. 
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of the 'symptomatic' implications of those judgements. The prin- 
ciple of diagnosis itself implies a distancing from the thing diag- 
nosed, an approach to the organism that is sick undertaken by one 
that is healthy, that exists separately and in isolation from its 
subject. The problems of the contemporary cultural crisis could 
not be attacked from within: the dominant values and the diminished 
authority of the minority - the group capable of seeing through 
the surface valuations to their underlying significance - meant 
that it was difficult even to gain recognition amongst an influential 
proportion of people that the problems existed. The 'minority', 
the 'function of criticism', both had to be set apart from the main 
system of values and relations to assert a separate and autonomous 
system capable of generating a criticism which was immune to the 
corruptive influence of the commercial -industrial order. Only by 
means of this radical alienation was it possible for the function 
of criticism as Leavis perceived it to operate, uncontaminated by 
the pressures of the profit motive or anti -élitist populism. It 
was necessary to develop a culture 'independent of any economic, 
technical or social system as none has been before'.76 'a rootless 
culture' that, in its isolation from the commercial- industrial en- 
vironment, could sustain genuine creative achievement. 
The crux of Leavis's conception of the function cf criticism 
lies in this expansion from observations on the particular text 
to extra -literary judgements of value. The practical criticism 
was based on a simple principle: 'to be vigilant and scrupulous 
76. For Continuity p 168. 
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about the relation between words and the concrete'.77 But on what 
basis did Leavis universalise judgements made at this level into 
a critique that was capable of involving a system of values which 
represented a fundamental antithesis to that of the prevailing cul- 
tural ethos? On what grounds did the literary criticism extend 
itself into an essentially supra- literary discourse on morality 
and ideology? For Leavis, criticism and art were alike in having 
parallel responsibilities for the 'contemporary sensibility': each 
had an equal part in the approach to 'those conditions which it 
rests with the poet and the critic to modify':78 'Criticism, when 
it performs its function, not merely expresses and defines the "con- 
temporary sensibility "; it helps to form it'.79 If criticism was 
performing this function from a position 'outside', detached from, 
the main system of social relations and values (which it sees as 
antipathetic), the difficulty was to establish a set of referents 
capable of validating the judgements of value either at the level 
of a close textual analysis or a generalised extra -literary dis- 
course. 'Criticism' for Leavis was nota passive activity wholly 
dependent on the priority of art for its existence; it had an 
active. interventionist function. It interposed itself between 
text and reader, in a manner that involved the exploration of an 
independent system of values not subordinate to the contingent 
demands of the individual text but which sought in its intervention 
in each creative work confirmation or substantiation of its own 
77. Ibid p 171. 
78. New Bearings in English Poetry (1932) p 7. 
79. 'Restatement for Critics'. For Continuity p 183. 
established literary and human values. Such an approach denies 
the passive subordination of criticism, insisting that the critical 
act inevitably involves the reflection of prior values: it is in 
the nature of reading. What Leavis did was to make this normal 
reader /text relation conscious, by means of a set of referents con- 
sisting of Leavis's a priori values, existing in an extra -literary 
realm, 'outside' the prevailing system of cultural values. The 
substance of this set of referents resided entirely in its terms 
of value, since in its isolation from the social -economic environment 
anything more concrete was prohibited, the values of the dominant 
order having been undermined by the commerical ethos. Leavis be- 
lieved that collaborative debate would engender the sense of 'value': 
Out of agreement and disagreement with particular judgements, 
of value a sense of relative value in the concrete will 
define itself, and, without this, no amount of talk about 
"values" in the abstract is worth anything.80 
Yet this 'sense of relative value in the concrete' must establish 
itself in isolation from the prevailing cultural order. as a 'root- 
less culture' is developed in opposition to it. This meant that 
the judgements of value were necessarily dependent on a set of essen- 
tially abstract terms of value which could lay claim to no definitive 
relations with 'the concrete'. In the following analyses of Leavis's 
discussion of poetry and his development of the idea of 'the ereat 
tradition' this dependency will be seen to manifest itself as a 
80. Ibid p 184. 
reliance upon a vocabulary of value -terms ('intelligence'. 
'sincerity') and a structure of concepts ('tradition'. 'morality') 
which had no essential or objectifiable significance except that 
generated by the dependence of Leavis's discourse upon them. These 
'terms of value' will gradually be seen to become fundamental to 
Leavis's critical discourse; they developed inevitably out of the 
formulation of a remedial programme capable of answering to the 
demands implicit in the Leavises' social and cultural diagnosis. 
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2. The Criticism of Poetry (1932 -43) 
1. 'Poetry and the Modern World': the influence of T.S.Eliot 
The critical and poetic example of T.S.Eliot is at the centre of 
Leavis's discussion of modern poetry. In New Bearings in English 
Poetry Leavis confronted the problem of literature and its place in 
a culture that was in a state of disintegration and decline. The 
sociology of the 'present crisis' outlined above was to be applied 
to the present condition of modern poetry. The pessimism of Leavis's 
account of contemporary society was also manifested in his impressions 
of modern poetry -- 'Poetry matters little to the modern world'(,) 
1 
- but was similarly modified by a determination to find evidence of 
possibilities for arresting the decline and changing the prevailing 
order. The main witness to the potential of poetry to persist in 
a mass technology society was Eliot. In New Bearings in English Poetry 
Leavis intended to assertEliot's pre- eminent significance in the 
context of current poetic achievement and thus to develop and establish 
a 'revised tradition' of the English poetry that was more than a simple 
escape from the problems of contemporary life. In the process of 
elaborating these ideas Leavis discovered a vocabulary of critical 
terms and an emerging sense of the past history of English poetry 
that was to be expanded in Revaluation.(1936) 
1. Figures in parentheses refer to page numbers in New Bearings in 
English Poetry (1932) 
Leavis adapted and expanded Eliot's ideas in a manner that is not 
as straightforward as has been supposed. R.P. I3ilan, describing 
Leavis's borrowings from Eliot, makes the following paraphrase of 
a passage in Leavis: 'Leavis describes nineteenth century poetry 
as pre -occupied with the creation of a dream -world and acknowledges 
that it was Eliot who had pointed this out in Homage to John Dryden'. 
The passage in New Bearings in English Poetry is as follows: 
There is something further to be noted of the 'poetical' 
in the nineteenth century. It comes out if one considers 
these half -dozen poems: La Belle Dame Sans Merci, Mariana, 
The Lady of Shalott, The Blessed Damozel, Morris's The 
Nymph's Song to Hylas, A Forsaken Garden, O'Shaughnessy's 
Ode. Nineteenth century poetry, we realised, was 
characteristically preoccupied with the creation of a 
dream- world.(10) 
This is supplemented by a footnote which states that 'Eliot has pointed 
this out in Homage to John Dryden'. Significantly, Leavis developed 
the point as if from a perusal of the named poems. acknowledging his 
source only tangentially, rather than using the formulation, in the 
main text, 'As Eliot has shown . . ' It appears that Leavis was 
reluctant to allow Eliot full credit for the observation. Furthermore. 
Eliot's comments on the 'dream -world' in nineteenth century poetry 
were made with characteristic brevity and with little substantiating 
evidence (Eliot refers to Morris's 'day- dreamy feeling'): 
2. Bilan. R.P.. The Literary Criticism of F.R.Leavis (Cambridge 1979) 
p. 87. 
'30 
The effort to construct a dream -world, which alters 
English poetry so greatly in the nineteenth century, 
a dream -world utterly different from the visionary 
realities of the Vita Nuova or of the poetry of Dante's 
contemporaries, is a problem of which various explanations 
may no doubt be found; in any case, the result makes a 
poet of the nineteenth century, of the same size as 
Marvell, a more trivial and less serious figures 
Whatever the 'explanations' might be, Eliot clearly was not much in- 
terested in them. His comment was characteristically unelaborated, 
suggestive rather than constituting an interpretation of literary 
history; it was opinion elevated to assertion for the purposes of 
the argument, with no ancillary evidence to support it. This fact 
perhaps explains why Leavis consigned his reference to Eliot to a 
footnote. The supporting evidence was provided by Leavis,He provided 
the list of examples and investigated the question with a practical 
analysis of specific poetry which aimed to demonstrate the validity 
of Eliot's suggestion. 
Leavis's 'indebtedness'4 to Eliot was manifested typically in 
this way. However, the process does not end with Leavis simply finding 
evidence to support Eliot's propositions. The suggestions and ideas 
were developed and expanded and Leavis's original perceptions regarding 
the relationship between literature and society, and his considerations 
on the current social and political climate, provided the means for 
'Andrew Marvell'. Selected Essays (1951) p 301. 
4. See the preface to New Bearings in English Poetry: 'This book 
. . . is largely an acknowledgement to a certain critic and 
poet'.(1) 
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Leavis to extend his criticism away from any servile adherence to 
Eliot's view. Leavis recreated Eliot's arguments in a wider context 
with the intention of establishing therein positions of his own. 
The process was one of synthesis. In a key passage in this first 
chapter ('Poetry and the modern world'), Leavis used Eliot's dictum 
regarding the conventions of a cliched vocabulary of nineteenth century 
poetry alongsi'c I.A.Richards's notion of the identity of the poet 
as one who exhibits the most significant expressive capacity of anyone 
of his generation. Richards described the poet of significant achieve- 
ment. as a representative organic sport out of,the main body of the 
collective consciousness of society: 'he is thepDint at which the 
growth of the mind shows itself. His experiences, those at least 
which give value to his work, represent conciliations of impulses 
which in most minds are still confused, intertrammelled and conflict - 
ing'f.5 A similar idea occurred in Eliot: 'When a poet's mind is per- 
fectly equipped for its work, it is constantly amalgamating disparate 
experience; the ordinary man's experience is chaotic, irregular. 
fragmentary'.6 Leavis acceded to these conceptual generalities - 
'the poet'. and 'the growth of the mind', where 'the mind' indicates 
a vague sense of the collective cultural awareness of the rest of 
society: 'Poetry matters because of the kind of poet who is more 
alive than other people, more alive in his own age. He is, as it 
5. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism (1925): the first sen- 
tence of this passage is quoted by Leavis, p 16. 
6. Eliot, 'The Metaphysical Poets'. Selected Essays (1951) p 287: 
cf. Coleridge: ' . . . a more than usual state of emotion, with 
more than usual order.' Biographia Literaria . II. XIV. 
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were at the most conscious point of the race in his time.'(13) The 
formulations were altogether too loose to be of specific practical 
value. Yet it was this lack of definition that appealed to Leavis. 
Eliot was concerned with understanding the 'mechanism of sensibility' 
that produced the poetry of Donne, Marvell and the Metaphysicals. 
This sensibility, 'which could devour any kind of experience',7 had 
diminished in its powers of aggregation as language and sensibility 
were gradually 'dissociated'. This, again, as Eliot himself acknow- 
ledged,8 was an insight that he did not analyse very closely and one 
that supplied the minimum of assistance in the effort to understand 
even the obvious changes in English poetry since the seventeenth cen- 
tury. Richards, on the other hand, was dealing with the problems of 
'Art and Morals',9 of defining 'a morality which will explain . . 
the place and value of the arts in human affairs.'10 The artist, 
preoccupied with 'minute particulars ,of response and attitude', was 
thus better placed to make judgements of value, 'since the fine conduct 
of life springs only from fine ordering of responses far too subtle 
to be touched by any general ethical maxims.' 
11 
Richards and Eliot 
were applying the general terms ('the poet', 'the mind') of their 
respective conceptions of poetry in specific ways. to augment the 
particular thesis they each proposed. The cogency of their terms 
was transient and dependent upon the particular context. 
7. Eliot loe. cit. p 287. 
8. '. . . this brief exposition of a theory - too brief, perhaps, 
to carry conviction.' loe. cit. p 288. 
9. 'Art and Morals' is the heading of the chapter in which this dis- 
cussion takes place in Principles of Literary Criticism. 
10. Principles of Literary Criticism, p 58. 
11. Richards. loe. cit. pp 61 -62. 
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Leavis, however, attempted to fashion a concrete critical principle 
out of the raw material of this loosely defined vocabulary of concepts. 
The difference with his development of the concepts is first that 
he elicited from them a putative theoretical principle, rather than 
leaving them as ideas dependent on a contingent discursive logic: 
and secondly that he combined this theoretical position with his pole- 
mical thesis regarding the 'present crisis'. For Leavis, 
the potentialities of human experience in any age are 
realised only by a tiny minority, and the important 
poet is important because he belongs to this (and he has 
also, of course, the power of communication). Indeed, his 
capacity for experiencing and his power of communicating 
are indistinguishable; not merely because we should not 
know of the one without the other, but because his power 
of making words express what he feels is indistinguishable 
from his awareness of what he feels. He is unusually 
sensitive, unusually aware, more sincere and more himself 
than the ordinary man can óe.(13) 
These are straightforward assertions comparable to those of Richards 
and Eliot. Large claims are made, in an appropriately impressive 
language and the impressiveness is substituted for detailed argument. 
Leavis followed the same line as his predecessors in insisting on 
the expressionist doctrine that makes the poet incapable of knowing 
his experiences if he cannot describe or express them: 'his power 
of making words express what he feels is indistinguishable from his 
awareness of what he feels'. This was an extension of themes in 
Richards and Eliot into a more comprehensive and schematic proposal. 
Both Richards and Eliot were more circumspect and speculative regarding 
the problem. Richards from a neurophysiological point of view. Eliot 
in the position of analysing the creative experience of which he had 
first -hand knowledge (Richards posited this as a reason for the poet's 
reluctance to discuss at length the act of writing). Richards's idea 
was that 'a large part of the distinctive features of the mind are 
due to its being an instrument for communication. An experience has 
to be formed, no doubt, before it is communicated, but it takes the 
form it does because it may have to be communicated'.19 This was 
not presented as a definitive statement of the relationship between 
experience and communication, but was an attempt to arrive at a useful 
description of the relationship that was based on a 'scientific' prin- 
ciple. Richards everywhere tried to avoid, in his analysis of 'value', 
terminology that was essentially indefinable, such as 'beauty'. He 
made no analogies between 'communicative efficacy' and aesthetic 
achievement13 and he aimed throughout at an empirical investigation: 
'The two pillars upon which a theory of criticism must rest are an 
account of value and an account of communication'.14 
Eliot, likewise, did not aim at definitive statements; he implied 
the expressionist doctrine to the extent of saying that the meta- 
physical poets 'were, at best. engaged in the task of trying to find 
the verbal equivalent for states of mind and feeling'.15 Eliot may 
represent one of Richards's imagined poets, one of those artists 'who 
12. Ibid. p 25. 
13. 'I am not going to identify "beauty" with "communicative effi- 
cacy". This is a trap which it is easy to fall into. 'Principles 
of Literary Criticism, p 28n. 
14. Ibid. p 25. 
15. 'The Metaphysical Poets'. Selected Essays p 289. 
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both knew what to do with a work of art and also understood what they 
were doing, [and ,.ho] have been for the most part . . . little inclined 
for, or capable of, the rather special task of explaining. It may 
have seemed to them too obvious to need explanation'.i6 However, 
it is more likely that Eliot is the exception to this generality. 
His involvement with and understanding of Bradleian aesthetics produced 
in him a reluctance for statements or declarations of principle in 
the realm of aesthetics. Eliot referred to 'Bradley's polemical irony 
and his zest in using it, his habit of discomfiting an opponent with 
a sudden profession of ignorance, of inability to understand, or of 
incapacity for abstruse thought . . .'17 Leavis, in contrast, was . 
concerned to elevate his critical responses into statements of aes- 
thetic principle. 
In common with Richards and Eliot he decribed the poet as an in- 
dividual of unique and unusual abilities. Eliot saw this uniqueness 
in the poet's capacity for experiential assimilation and organisation: 
When a poet's mind is perfectly equipped for its work, it is constant- 
16 Richards, loc. cit. p 31. 
17. 'Francis Herbert Bradley', Selected Essays (1951), pp 444 -5. 
Cf. Kenner's comment: 'What Eliot's readers have frequently taken 
for a mood, The Waste Land tone, . . . is actually Bradley's 
deeply- thought -out metaphysical scepticism . . . . Eliot's strategy 
. . . employs the ironic intimation that other and more ardently 
active people have not been brought to this realisation, of how 
principles invoked in the press of practical disputation thereby 
turn into slogans, losing what little integrity they have. that 
of standpoints in an evasive whole of perception. and how one 
must therefore defend practical judgements by reference to one's 
impressions alone'. 
Hugh Kenner, The Invisible Poet (1960) p 41. 
]y amalgamating disparate experience: . . in the mind of the poet 
these experiences are always forming new wholes'. Leavis's descrip- 
tion, however, involved an abstract terminology of the emotions, a 
terminology that was essentially indefinable and yet contained a com- 
pressed amount of evaluative meaning: the poet, for Leavis, 'is un- 
usually sensitive. unusually aware, more sincere and more himself 
. than the ordinary man can be'.(13) This vocabulary, 'sensitive', 
'aware', 'sincere', indicated a private, incommunicable sense of the 
nature of the poet and the conditions of poetic creativity. Leavis 
did not attempt a definition of his terms; he aimed to make them 
self -defining by virtue of their context. This procedure is not the 
same as that practised by Eliot in his criticism, but it is apparent 
that Leavis borrowed from Eliot not only suggestive ideas but a general 
tone of discursive authority with which to asserthis 'practical judge- 
ments'. Nevertheless, while the intention was the same - to employ 
a critical 'voice' imbued with an authoritativeness that would divert 
the reader's attention away from seeing how purely private and how 
little 'practical' these judgements were - the method was not. Kenner 
noted that 'Eliot has repeatedly evaded quibbles concerning his more 
abstrusely -based positions by claiming amateur status and incapacity 
for pursuing the abstruse', and has remarked 'the disarmingly hesitant 
and fragmentary way in which he makes a point or expresses a convic- 
tion'.19 There is nothing disarming or hesitant in Leavis's declara- 
tions. The polemical aims of the book resulted in a tone of voice 
that hectors and asserts rather than persuades or argues. The 
1S. 'The Metaphysical Poets'. Selected Essays, p 289. 
IG. Kenner, op. cit. p K. 
authority to which Leavis implicitly appealed was one that derived 
from the social polemic which was in the background of the study and 
which provided Leavis with the inspiration for the justification of 
his sense of unequivocal rightness, the sense that 'this must be so'. 
Leavis's insistence on the unassailability of his position was 
the corollary to his insistence on the importance of the social and 
political dimension of criticism's function. This is an emphasis 
that sorts ill with his elevation of Eliot to a key position and one 
which led Leavis into an ambiguous position. In a passage that indi- 
cates the confusing and occasionally contradictory impulses that were 
behind the book, Leavis referred back to this social and political 
dimension. The above -quoted ascription of emotional qualities to 
the 'ideal poet' is followed by a proviso that is something of a 
non sequitur in the local context but which refers back to the opening 
paragraph of the chapter: 
But if the poetry and the intelligence of the age lose touch 
with each other, poetry will cease to matter much, and the 
age will be lacking in finer awareness. What this last 
prognostication means it is perhaps impossible to bring home 
to anyone who is not already convinced of the importance of 
poetry.(14) 
This is slightly confusing. The loss of contact here contemplated 
as potentially imminent ('this . . . prognostication') had previously 
been declared a contemporary fact I'very little of contemporary intel- 
ligence concerns itself with poetry'(5)). Leavis's social pessimism 
had been modified by the preceding idealist description of the latent 
(¡ 
powers of the 'important poet': he was uncertain as to how far ad- 
vanced the present crisis was, his bleaker forebodings having been 
modified by the poetic achievement. of Eliot. The synthesis of the 
political and the social with the literary critical had the effect 
of concentrating Leavis's attention on both the poetry and the crit- 
icism of Eliot. This focusing of attention provided evidence in sup- 
port of a more optimistic attitude and a basis - in terms of both 
ideas and 'tone of voice' - from which to open the discussion of the 
contemporary state of affairs. 
The adaptation involved certain difficulties. Eliot's critical 
'voice' was calculated to be effective in a given context of brief 
studies of various topics which did not pretend to be comprehensive 
or systematic. Leavis's borrowings from Eliot typically entailed 
the development and elaboration of hints and suggestions into more 
extended analyses that did imply both comprehensiveness and system. 
A problem resided in the question of the extent to which the tone 
of assertive authority could be sustained in the more detailed discus- 
sion: whether it tends not to deteriorate into mere stridency and 
artifice. or if it could indeed retain the irtearity of its premises. 
An ancillary problem, relating to New Bearings in English Poetry in 
particular but which has wider implications, concerns Leavis's use 
of Eliot's poetic example as a means of finding a way to understanding 
modern poetry in general. Professor Bilan, in making a claim for 
Leavis's 'originality' in the book, says that in 'attempting to esta- 
blish Eliot as the central modern poet, . . . Leavis obviously could 
not depend on Eliot the critic'.20 In fact, exactly the opposite 
20. Bilan. op. cit. p 8S. 
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is the case: Eliot was the one key Leavis had for understanding Eliot 
and 'establishir' him; and it was through Eliot that Leavis found 
away of formulating an understanding of the new movements in poetry 
and revising the conventional estimates. 
The development of Leavis's awareness of the central significance 
of Eliot's poetry and criticism was a gradual process. The ideas 
that were eventually clarified and systematised in New Bearings in 
English Poetry were the culmination of impressions first adumbrated 
in the early reviews and articles for the Cambridge Review and The 
Bookman. The influence of T.S.Eliot over these writings was even 
more emphatic in some respects than in the later study, where Eliot's 
ideas have been mediated more noticeably through Leavis's critical 
judgement. In the earlier material, it is possible to trace the inti- 
tial ideas that were eventually brought to fulfilment in the later 
book. 
Many of the phrases and paragraphs that later appeared in the first 
chapter of New Bearings in English Poetry were originally published 
as part of an article in the Cambridge Review that defended Eliot 
against hostile criticism that had appeared in the New Statesman21 
21. 'T.S.Eliot - a Reply to the Condescending', Cambridge Review. 
8.2.29: This reply was prompted by a review of Eliot's For Lancelot 
Andrewes ('For T.S.Eliot') in the New Statesman, 29.12.28. This 
review, which was unsigned. was by R. Ellis Roberts and it des- 
cribed Eliot's book as 'a pleasant little volume of essays written 
by a man who is evidently fond of reading'. 
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Leavis acknowledged for the first time his debt to Eliot, thou_h he 
wrote as the spokesman for an unspecified group - 'those of us who 
are aware of our debt to Mr. Eliot have learnt not to be too provoked 
by this kind of condescension' - which gave the commendation of a 
little -known reviewer greater force than it might otherwise have had 
and which indicates the self -image that Leavis had of this group as 
a heterodox enclave promoting the new poetic revolution. The claims 
that were later made for Eliot were first made in this article: that 
'poetry tends recurrently to confine itself by conventions of "the 
poetic "'; that Eliot has 'solved' the problem 'and so done more than 
solve the problem for himself' (the problem being how to write poetry 
under the present conditions), concurrently re- establishing the seven- 
teenth century in the English tradition ('If no serious critic or 
poet now supposes that English poetry in the future must, or can, 
develop along the line running from the Romantics through Tennyson, 
this is mainly due to Mr. Eliot.'); and that Eliot 'never forgets 
that poetry is made of words.' More significantly, Leavis was at 
pains to identify Eliot as the source for all that he saw as valuable 
in contemporary poetry and criticism. He claimed that whilst gathering 
material for a lecture series on modern poetry he himself had 'found 
that the helpful review or critique almost always showed the influence 
of Homage to John Dryden'; and furthermore that the influence extended 
to Leavis's own critical practice: 'Mr. Eliot represents for us the 
essentially critical . . . for no -one has set forth our justifying 
ideas so clearly and cogently.' The idea that this kind of criticism 
- heterodox and challenging - required 'justifying' again indicates 
that Leavis interpreted his position as being minority and unconven- 
tional - and essentially so. 
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in ensuing articles and reviews, Leavis worked from Eliot's example. 
A review of Cambridge Poetry 192922 made the same point regarding 
'the preoccupations of "the poetic" coming down from the last century' 
and saw Eliot as the principal agent for the change that had led to 
the abandonment of those preconceptions. (Hopkins is also said to 
have had some effect.) In a later article on 'The Influence of Donne 
on Modern Poetry' 
23 
the pre- eminence of the seventeenth century 
was asserted ('Those who are seriously interested . . . in modern 
poetry (I might almost say in poetry at all) feel themselves closer 
to the seventeenth century than to the nineteenth') and Donne's impor- 
tance was argued for by comparison with Eliot. The latter aimed at 
defeating the nineteenth century "poetic" conventions in order to 
reassert'the tradition estabished by Donne [in which] it was assumed 
that a poet should be a man of distinguished intelligence.' The two 
were said to be alike 'in exhibiting a complex sensibility.' Later 
still, an article entitled 'This Age in Literary Criticism' 4 made 
the same claims for Eliot as a critic: he was 'the first to see what 
the present problems of poetry were.'25 
22. 'Cambridge Poetry', Cambridge Review, 1.3.29. p 317 -8. 
23. The Bookman, LXXXII, March 1931, pp 346 -7. 
24. The Bookman, LXXXIII, October 1932, pp 8 -9. 
25. Leavis in this article also acknowledged the work of I.A.Richards: 
'His unquestionable achievement . . . has been to provide the 
critic with an incomparably better apparatus of analysis than 
existed before.' In the article 'The Influence of Donne on Modern 
Poetry' there occurred the following phrases: 'Poetry matters 
because of the kind of poet who is more alive than other people 
- more alive in his own age' and 'the potentialities of human 
experience in any age are only realised by a tiny minority. and 
the poet is important because he belongs to this.' Both owe 
much to Richards, but it is clear that while Eliot's influence 
was paramount in Leavis's early development. Richards's 
was peri- 
pheral and ancillary, providing the occasional 
phrase or general 
insight but not a whole system of critical practice. 
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well: it aimed to establish the critical and poetic discoveries of 
Eliot as the basis for contemporary critical practice and poetic ambi- 
tion. The question is what are the consequences of the application 
of an homogeneous critical method to such disparate material? and 
secondly, to what extent has the style, or tone, of Eliot's critical 
discourse been modified and constructively applied by Leavis in the 
course of his own argument? 
With regard to the 'situation at the end of the war', Leavis dis- 
cussed Yeats at length. He also made briefer comments on Hardy, de 
la Mare, Edward Thomas and Edmund Blunden, who were seen as at once 
interesting in a minor way and 'representative' in their lack of 
serious significance. Leavis saw Yeats's peculiar interest as a matter 
partly of his place in history (his origins were in the late nineteenth 
century but he was also witness to modern upheavals) and partly his 
nationality: his Irishness gave 'his dream -world . . . an external 
validation'(34) in that his myths and symbols were part of a known 
cultural heritage still extant, Leavis argued, and so more concretely 
appreciable than, say. William Morris's day- dreams and their 'exquisite 
aesthetic etiolation'.(34) The result was that while the poetry was 
clearly in the conventional 'day- dream' tradition of the Victorian 
period, it was unusually aware of its situation and thus expressed 
overtly the conflict of the age between a tendency to oneiric escapism 
and a recognition of the prevailing forces of disintegration. 
27 
Yeats 
27. This was a conflict that Tennyson, according to Leavis, could 
not reconcile, although he made the attempt: 'L The Victorians 
clearly could not take the day -dream habit seriously, though 
to cut free from the accompanying conventions and techniques 
would not be so easy as one might think. . . . Tennyson did 
his best. But, in spite of a great deal of allusion to scientific 
ideas . . . his intellectual interests . . . have little to do 
with his successful poetry. which answers to the account 
of "the 
poetical" given above.'(14 -151 
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combined 'a fresh unliterary spontaneity', derived from his Irish 
identity, with 'a recognition, implicit in the shifting, cloudy un- 
seizableness of the imagery, that this "reality" must be illusory'.(37) 
The result is that the poetry was 'more subtle and more vital than 
any pure product of Victorian Romanticism'.(38) 
The discussion of Yeats was highly selective. Leavis referred 
specifically to three volumes of Yeats's poetry, The Wind Among the 
Reeds (1899), The Green Helmet (1912) and The Tower (1928). After 
demonstrating the poet's equivocal relationship with his Victorian 
origins, Leavis analysed what he saw as the most significant develop- 
ment in the poetry, the move from the 'dreamy, hypnotic' verse of 
the early period to that of The Green Helmet, which belongs to the 
actual waking world and is in the idiom and movement of modern speech', 
(42) Leavis saw this as a 'disintoxication' from the day -dream habit 
that was combined with an irony and a sense of 'disillusionment' be- 
cause that change had come too late: 'his strength has been wasted, 
and habit forbids readjustment'.(43) The poetry of The Tower rein- 
forced this impression (Leavis neglected the seven intervening volumes) 
expressing a 'kind of ripeness in disillusion'.(45) 
As a critique of Yeats's poetry this was clearly unsatisfactory. 
A selective and limited account, it ignored more than it attended 
to, and the poetry that was discussed was read for examples that an- 
swered to a specific thesis regarding Yeats that Leavis was attempting 
to promote. It was not a comprehensive account of Yeats's poetry 
but a presentation of Yeats as a representative case. as symptomatic 
of a general and prevailing condition of English poetry: 
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What he testifies against is not the poetic tradition, but the general state of civilisation and culture: a state which, he contends, makes waste inevitable for the sensitive. But he implies nothing against holding that if the poetic tradition had been different, as it might very well have been, he might have brought more of himself to expression.(48) 
The possible 'difference' in the tradition that Leavis had in mind 
was one that was related to his description of the changes that mani- 
fested in Yeats's later poetry. Leavis found in this poetry something 
'rather like seventeenth century "wit "' 
28 
and he suggested that 
'if the poetic tradition of the nineteenth century had been less com- 
pletely unlike the Metaphysical tradition Mr. Yeats might have spent 
29 less of his power outside P oetr ' (44) Yeats's significance for 
Leavis was limited and singular. in that it 'illustrates the special 
disability of the poet in the last century, and impressively bears 
out my argument about thepnetic tradition.'(50) 
2S. Leavis quoted the following stanza as an example of this "wit ": 
Plato thought nature but a spume that plays 
Upon a ghostly paradigm of things; 
Solider Aristotle played the taws 
Upon the bottom of a king of kings; 
World- famous golden- thighed Pythagoras 
Fingered upon a fiddle stick or strings 
What a star sang and careless Muses heard: 
Old clothes upon old sticks to scare a bird. 
'Among School- children', ll 41 -48. 
2Q. 'His poetry is little more than a marginal comment on the main 
activities of his life.'(47) 
'Argument' is a loose definition of Leavis's actual procedure. 
He outlined the narrow premises of appraisal, based on Eliot's model. 
and indicated how Yeats failed to match these specifications. This 
method is not the same as proving an 'argument' by reference to a 
prevailing consensus of poetic standards. Leavis's problem was that 
there was no consensus relating to modern poetry and that in asserting 
his heterodox opinions he made himself vulnerable to the accusation 
of excessive concentration on too fixed a standard of poetic achieve- 
ment. Leavis was concerned with analysing the present difficulties 
as he saw them and proposing remedies according to the model provided 
by Eliot. Leavis's social analysis was combined in the literary sphere 
with Eliot's reappraisal of the seventeenth century tradition and 
the application of new poetic techniques derived from it to twentieth 
century problems. Consequently, the poetry of Yeats was secondary 
to these main objectives and therefore became the subject of a super- 
ficial and selective critique. The nature of the approach to Yeats 
indicates the narrow premises and intentions that characterised the 
general strategy of the whole study. 
This impression is further enforced by the terms with which Leavis 
dealt with other minor poets of the post -war era. De la Mare's poetry 
is seen as 'a poetry of withdrawal' (52) in a nineteenth century sense. 
Hardy was 'a Victorian in his very pessimism which implies positives 
and assurances that have vanished' (57) who developed a style that 
was effective for his own purposes: 'but there was little in his tech- 
nique that could be taken up by younger poets, and developed in the 
76 
solution of their own problems.'( S) .30 The 'Georgians' (particularly 
Rupert Brooke) and the 'academics' were dismissed as lacking in 
originality, for finding no way out of the present difficulties. 
Edmund Blunden and Edward Thomas received more favourable attention. 
though again they were both seen as representative cases. Blunden's 
'meditative pastoral' escape from memories of the war could not be 
sustained in the modern context, which is why Leavis found it 
'interesting'.(67 -8) Thomas 'was a very original poet who devoted 
great technical subtlety to the expression of a distinctively modern 
sensibility.'(69) Yet Thomas's awareness of the 'modern disintegration. 
the sense of directionlessness . . implies limitations'(72) and 
his achievement did not displace the 'debilitated nineteenth century 
30. ' [Eliot] has solved his own problem as a poet, and so done more 
than solve the problem for himself.'(25) 
Leavis's analysis of Hardy borrows substantially from that of 
Richards's in Science and Poetry (1926; chapter VIII, pp 68 -83). 
Leavis pointed out six poems of Hardy's for particular attention 
- After a Journey, The Voice, The Self -Unseeing, A Broken Appoint- 
ment. Neutral Tones and During Wind and Rain - the first four 
of which are also cited in Richards's book(p 69). Richards said 
that 'it is in the contemplation of death that the necessity 
for human attitudes, in the fare of an indifferent universe, 
to become self -su p porting is felt most,wignantly.'(70) Leavis 
wrote that Hardy's poems 'are particularly evocations of utter 
loss, the blindness of chance, the poignancy of love and its 
helplessness, and the cruelty of time.'(61) Leavis acknowledged 
the usefulness of Richards's book (see 52n and 57), although 
not at every point where the borrowings are overt. The same ap- 
plies with the acknowIdgement of Richards's help with regard 
to Eliot. Leavis quoted the suggestion regarding the 'musical' 
organisation of The Waste Land(95) that had appeared in Appendix 
B of Principles of Literary Criticism (2nd edition, 1928), yet 
neglected to recognise the same appendix as the source for his 
comment that Eliot's allusions have the effect of 'compression'. 
(107) See Principles of Literary Criticism. Appendix B: 'Allusion 
in Mr. Eliot's hands is a technical device for compression.' 
(D 232 ) 
tradition.'(73) This last point was no more than an expression of 
a private opinion that Eliot's poetry represented a decisive break 
with tradition, while Thomas's did not; the evidence offered in sup- 
port of this contention was minimal and was contained within the boun- 
daries set by Leavis, boundaries which were again drawn from Eliot's 
example. 
A key sentence in the midst of the discussion reveals the singular 
source for Leavis's considerations. He described the 'environment 
of the modern poet' in terms taken precisely from Eliot: 
Urban conditions, a sophisticated civilisation, rapid change, 
and the mingling of cultures have destroyed the old rhythms 
and habits, and nothing adequate has taken their place.(61) 
'Urban conditions, a sophisticated civilisation . . . and the mingling 
of cultures' are the major themes of The Waste Land. ('Rapid change' 
refers to Leavis's social polimic.31) Leavis utilised Eliot's pro- 
posais regarding the outmoded post -Victorian poetic vocabulary and 
the model for new poetic forms that could be found in the Metaphysical 
and seventeenth century tradition; but he also combined the tangible 
31. 'The machine . . . has brought about change in habit and the 
circumstances of life at a rate for which we have no parallel 
. . . It is a breach in continuity that threatens: what has 
been advertently dropped may be irrecoverable or forgotten.' 
'Mass Civilisation and the Minority Culture', in For Continuity. 
pp 16 -17. 
7` 
elements of Eliot's poetical vision with his own social and political 
discourse. The categories quoted above are identical with those per- 
ceivable in The Waste Land, and Leavis so commingled all the elements 
that have been described that the criticism and the poetry become 
almost indistinguishable. The critical observations are simultaneously 
applied to the poetry as they find their source in it, with the result 
that the poetry and the criticism appear interdependent, neither being 
necessarily prior.32 Of The Waste Land Leavis wrote: 
What is the significance of the modern Waste Land ?, The 
answer may be read in what appears as the rich dis- 
organization of the poem. This seeming disjointedness 
is intimately related to the erudition . . . and to the 
wealth of literary borrowings and allusions. These 
characteristics reflect the present state of civili- 
sation. The traditions and cultures have mingled, and 
the historical imagination makes the past contemporary. 
(90 -91) , 
Leavis's argument was thatEliot had made the decisive 'break' with 
'the nineteenth century tradition'(75) with 'Prufrock' and 'Portrait 
of a Lady'. wherein 'the canons of the poetical are forgotten'. He 
thus produced a poetry that 'expresses freely a modern sensibility 
. . of one fully alive in his own age.'(76) This claim summarised 
points made previously and broughtfrom Eliot ('the canons of the 
32. Leavis saw an equivalence between the two activities. regarding 
neither as necessarily prior. The opening chapter discussed 
the problems confronting literature in the modern world. 'those 
conditions which it rests with the poet a.nd critic to modify 
- those which are their immediate concern.'(7)(Emphasis added) 
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poetical') and Richards ('one fully alive in his own age'). Leavis 
went on to discuss 'Gerontion'. where he saw 'the likeness in Mr. 
Eliot's verse to mature Elizabethan dramatic verse'(80), thus expanding 
on Eliot's own predisposition towards the earlier English tradition. 
In his discussion of The Waste Land Leavis continued to follow 
a critical method based on Eliot's example. 'Gerontion', Leavis said, 
had 'the impersonality of great poetry'(83), and 'impersonality' in 
The Waste Land similarly defines 'the mode of consciousness to which 
[the poem] belongs.'(93) Leavis used Eliot's notes to the poem to 
support his own critical appreciation, so that the ascription by Eliot 
of significance to the figure of Tiresias ('What Tiresias sees, in 
fact, is the substance of the poem'33) was used by Leavis to substan- 
tiate his own assertion that the poem represents 'an effort to focus 
an inclusive human consciousness.'(95) Leavis's criticism was a matter 
of exposition rather than close textual analysis, a matter of setting 
out explanatory observations rather than developing a detailed critical 
inquiry. 
The whole approach of New Bearings in English Poetry was designed 
to place Eliot at the centre of an account of contemporary poetry 
that was determined to assertthat poet's primary influence in the 
establishment of 'new bearings'. Therefore, Leavis's social diagnosis 
was subordinated to this prior ambition. Leavis saw the minority appeal 
of The Waste Land as being not historically unique ('how large in 
33. The Waste Land, 1 218n. 
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any age has the minority been that has really comprehended the master- 
pieces?'); and the poem's difficulty as symptomatic of the present crisis. 
The poem therefore had 'limitations in self -sufficiency' in that it 
is dependent on the existence of a literate minority for its own exis- 
tence and validity. Leavis might have concluded from this that Eliot's 
poetry paradoxically represents simultaneously with a radical criticism 
of the 'modern world' in its spiritual aspects, a vested interest 
in maintaining the status quo of minority appreciation so that the 
poetry might still be read. Eliot's poetry, whilst reflecting on 
the current plight, actually militates against any kind of recuperation 
of cultural 'integration' that would undermine this necessary relation- 
,ship between poet and reader. However, Leavis's conclusions are the 
opposite, which indicates how the absolute centrality of Eliot to 
his critical practice clouded Leavis's social perspective and led 
him into an ambiguous position. Leavis argued that the allusions, 
though marked by the occasional weakness because of excessive 
obscurity,34 were nevertheless, for Leavis, generally 'justified 
in the appeal they make to special knowledge'.(106) The 'limitations 
[are] inherent in the conditions that produced [the poem]'(113) but 
the poem, by its appeal to the minority, reinforces those conditions 
This reciprocation Leavis chose to ignore. Leavis's extra -literary 
social and political position was one of committed involvement ('if 
we care at all about the issues we cannot help believing that, 
34. Of the end of 'The Fire Sermon' Leavis said that 'no amount of 
reading of the Confessions or Buddhism in Translation will give 
these few words the kind of presence of "eastern and western 
ascetism" that seems necessary to the poem: they remain. these 
words, mere pointers to something outside.'(105) 
for the immediate future, at any rate, we have some responsibility. 
. . It is for us to be as aware as possible of what is happening.'`') 
but this was compromised by his assertion of Eliot's pre- eminence. 
The comment that the 'special knowledge' required by The Waste Land 
'can fairly be held to be common to the public that would in any case 
read modern poetry'(104 -4) represents a dilution of that political 
engagement, in so far as the phrase 'in any case' indicates a mode 
of resignation alien to the prevailing demand in his writings for 
positive action in response to the present 'state of culture'. 
Leavis's concentration on Eliot's predominance thus fundamentally 
affected his social and political position. It had a similar effect 
on his literary evaluations. Clearly, the essays dealing with Pound 
and Hopkins in New Bearings in English Poetry were concerned primarily 
to account for those poets according to Eliot's model of poetic prac- 
tice. The commendations were derived directly from Leavis's criticism 
of Eliot. Leavis was not writing from an independent point of view, 
but as a critic measuring these poets' achievements against that of 
the poet from whom he has taken his standard of appreciation. That 
this 'indebtedness' had a limiting effect is shown by the fact that 
Leavis's own ideas were obscured and even undermined by Eliot's. As 
a result, Leavis's criticisms of Pound and Hopkins were limited and 
unoriginal. The critical language employed by Leavis was almost en- 
tirely dependent on Eliot's example for its meaning. 
35. For Continuity, p 46. 
Pound, Leavis argued, produced in Huch Se]wyn Mauberlcy 'a re- 
presentative experience of life: . . . throughout there is a subtlety 
of tone, a complexity of attitude, such as we associate with seven- 
teenth century wit'.(141) His technical skill is . . . a matter 
of bringing to precise definition a mature and complex sensibility.' 
(143) Leavis's rejection of the importance of The Cantos explicitly 
referred to Eliot: they dealt with 'the contemporary plight', but 
'to compel significant art out of that plight needed the seriousness, 
the spiritual and moral intensity, and the resolute intelligence that 
are behind The Waste Land .'(156) Hopkins,similarly, expressed poetic- 
ally qualities that were epitomised by and made most effective in 
Eliot's poetry. He was, according to Leavis, 'one of the most remark- 
able technical innovators who ever wrote';(159) his use of the English 
language 'contrasts him with Milton and associates him with Shakespeare ' 
(169): and 'a technique so much concerned with inner division, friction , 
and psychological complexities in general has a special bearing on 
the problems of contemporary poetry.'(193) These phrases - 'inner 
division, friction, . . . psychological subleties' - take their meaning 
in this context entirely from Leavis's discussion of Eliot's poetry. 
Leavis's claim for the reader's acceptance of them as useful descrip- 
tive and evaluative terms depends on a reference back to Leavis's 
claims for The Waste Land. Leavis practised a highly involuted 
critical method, never distancing himself from the argument in order 
to give the terminology objective definition and greater force. 
It is necessary to speculate as to what degree of insight into 
the achievements of these two poets Leavis would have obtained had 
it not been for Eliot, the Eliot who had 'solved the problem. and 
so done more than solve it for himself'. Pound and Hopkins would 
not be so clearly associable as poets - because of their differences, 
both historically and poetically - were it not that Leavis's criticism 
associated them as further examples of poetic possibilities that had 
been made available by the singular example of Eliot.36 The 
terminology of Leavis's appreciation was vague and undefined. It 
achieved its meaning and a local relevance by referring back to Eliot; 
without this referral, the terms become indistinct, clouded by 
imprecision and unhelpful in persuading the reader of the value of 
the poetry under review. The disparate kinds of poetry produced by 
fund and Hopkins were forced into this collocation in order to substan- 
tiate the account of the situation with regard to poetry, post -Eliot, 
that Leavis was attempting to enforce. The consequencefor Pound's 
and Hopkins's poetry was that the criticism was correspondingly limited 
by the narrowness of the viewpoint and, as Leavis later acknowledged 
in the case of Hopkins,37 exaggerated because of the polemical inten- 
tions that lay behind them. 
A further difficulty concerns Leavis's judgements on the contem- 
porary poetry of the period leading to 1932. A revealing comment 
36 'It is owing to Mr. Eliot that Pound and Hopkins can be discussed 
as having the significance here attributed to them, and can be 
associated with him in terms of a revised tradition.'(196) 
37 'In assenting, half -protestingly, to Mr. Eliot's description 
of [Hopkins] as a 'nature poet' one is virtually recognising 
that a significant limitation reveals itself when a poet of so 
remarkable a spiritual intensity . . . gives nature - the 'nature' 
of the 'nature poets' - so large a place in his poetry.' 
'Gerard Manley Hopkins', The Common Pursuit, (1952) p 53. 
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occurs in one of Leavis's early articles: 'One may lament that Mfr. 
Eliot no longer devotes himself to literary criticism, but one sees 
that the development was necessary and waits intently for what he 
may write next'.38 Criticism of Pound and Hopkins was an activity 
sanctioned by prevailing circumstances as well as by the internal 
structure of Leavis's book. Eliot's advocacy of Pound39 was taken 
by Leavis as a challenge to assert Eliot's primacy and an incentive 
to establish Pound's effect on the development of the 'new bearings'. 
Hopkins's poetry was, as the 'retrospect' attests, a matter of con- 
troversy. Leavis promoted him with the aim of displacing the scep- 
ticism of the conventional view of Hopkins40 and 'establishing his 
existence as a challenging fact, of great significance for any critical 
view of the immediate past of English poetry'41 - or, at least, for 
any critical view organised the way Leavis's was. Hopkins's poetry 
was, in this respect, less immediately interesting to Leavis than 
the problem of ensuring that it would be taken seriously. Leavis there- 
fore fitted Hopkins into his (Eliot- centred) conception of modern 
poetic practice by asserting the essentially 'modernistic' (i.e. Eliot - 
like) tendency of his 'technical innovation'. 
38. 'This Age in Literary Criticism', The Bookman LXXXIII, (October 
1932) p 9. 
39. Cf. for example Eliot's introduction to Pound's Selected Poems 
(1928). 
40. '1 can testify that well on into the thirties, Professors of 
Poetry and of English Literature, confident in the support of 
those whose opinion mattered to them were voicing freely their 
scorn for anyone who could take Hopkins seriously.' 
'Retrospect, 1950'. New Bearings in English Poetry (1950) p 237. 
41. Ibid. p 237. 
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However, when it came to dealing with the new writers of the post - 
Eliot period, Leavis was on less solid ground. This was the conse- 
quence of the over -riding centrality of Eliot as a standard for modern 
poetic practice, a standard that was confusingly both specific, in 
the sense that Eliot's poetry existed as a tangible example for others; 
and vague, in so far as the critical terminology used to describe 
Eliot's poetry partook of a highly specialised meaning that was 
difficult to make applicable in general, to other poetry. Leavis 
wrote that poetry would not 'exhibit modernity by mentioning modern 
things, the apparatus of modern civilisation, or by being about modern 
subjects or topics. . . . All that we can fairly ask of the poet is 
that he shall show himself to have been fully alive in our time. 
The evidence will be in the very texture of his poetry.'(24) It is 
impossible to say with any precision what 'fully alive in our time' 
means, or indicates, or how such a condition is manifested in poetry. 
Leavis did not define the phrase; he used Eliot's poetry to do so 
and that was the superimposed standard against which other poetry 
was to be measured. In arguing that Ronald Bottrall was 'a very con- 
siderable poet'(202) it appears that, contrary to the above, it was 
precisely because 'the apparatus of modern civilisation' featured 
in his poetry that Bottrall had his significance. There was little 
more in the stanza quoted by Leavis42 that would otherwise qualify 
42. See, for example: 
Microscopic anatomy of ephemerides, 
Power -house stacks, girder -ribs, provide a crude base; 
But man is what he eats, and they are not bred 
Flesh of our flesh, being unrelated 
Experientally, fused in no emotive furnace. 
This stanza stood as part of the epigraph to the book. 
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it for attention as a particularly 'modern' piece of writing. Leavis 
was led by its vocabulary into regarding it as something innovative 
and original. 
Leavis's enthusiasm for Bottrall is revealing. For while in ac- 
tuality Bottrall's poetry is 'laboriously and eclectically parasitic' 43 
on Eliot, Leavis found it remarkable because it dealt with the'problems 
that Eliot had dealt with, and in a similar way: 'His world is Mr. 
Eliot's; a world in which the traditions are bankrupt, the cultures 
uprooted and withering, and the advance of civilisation seems to mean 
death to distinction of spirit and fineness of living'.(205) Leavis 
followed this with a quotation from one of Bottrall's 'best poems' 
(The Future is not for us) which contains the lines 
We can humanise 
We can build new temples for the body, 
Set our intellect to tilt against the spies 
Of fortune, call the Chance or that Gate, 
Estimate the logical worth of 'it may depend . . 
Leading out of the path 
Which was to be an Amen having neither beginning nor end. 
Leavis overstated the quality of this verse. The resonances from 
Eliot are manifold and the 'originality' that Leavis found is difficult 
to point to except to notice the flat conversational tone and vague 
43. Leavis discussed the 'young intellectuals . . . being laboriously 
and eclectically parasitic upon the various phases of Mr. Eliot's 
poetry'. (197 ) One who exhibited Eliot's influence was Empson, 
but he redeemed himself in Leavis's view by having 'learnt a 
great deal from Donne' in terms of applying intelligence and 
developing technique; although this was an autodidacticism that 
had itself been inspired by Eliot's example. 
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spiritual nostalgia that gives the poetry its peculiar tenor. Yet 
it is clearly not of the same order as The Waste Land. Leavis's judge- 
ment was wrong because it had been suspended in the interest of finding 
proof of his general thesis: 'Mr. Bottrall's work clinches felicitously 
the argument of this book, and sanctions the high hopes for the future'. 
(211) That'argument' was that a 'revised tradition' had been esta- 
blished by Eliot and that poetry in the future would have to follow 
a new line of influence (Shakespeare, Donne) rather than the obsolete 
nineteenth century tradition (Spenser, Milton, Tennyson). Leavis's 
preoccupationwith I polemical impulse of the book - asserting Eliot's 
pre- eminence - resulted in selective and narrow critiques of the par- 
ticular poets and, more significantly, began the development of a 
specialised critical vocabulary. The significance of this can be 
seen in Revaluation, where Leavis's analysis of the revision in poetic 
tradition received its logical fulfilment in an approach to the whole 
canon-of English poetry from the seventeenth century onwards. This 
analysis was based on the same critical standard that Leavis took 
from Eliot and utilised the vocabulary of evaluation developed in 
New Bearings in English Poetry. 
2. Donne versus Milton, Shelley versus Keats 
Revaluation falls broadly into two sections, organised according to 
the antinomies hinted at in the above heading and centred on the 
changes that occurred in English poetry with the rise of the Romantic 
poets. The procedure of the book was complex and involved, a matter 
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of stating relationships, making comparisons, and eliciting hierarchies. 
The substance of the argument was concerned with poetry (there was 
no historical background) and with the outline of a detailed and exten- 
sive 'tradition' of English poetry, focused on a study of the major 
figuresand developments. The emphases forced by Leavis were pain- 
staking and exacting and fell in turn into two distinct but related 
categories. These are not easy to define but can be loosely designated 
as 'criticism' in the sense of writing that is immediately concerned 
with analysis of poetry; and 'judgement' which deals with the rela- 
tions between poetry and other matters, social, cultural, political 
or moral; and with the hierarchy of literary evaluation: the claim 
that one poet is 'greater' or more 'representative' than another. 
This distinction was indicated in Leavis's discussion of 'the problem 
of method'. It was necessary, he said, 'to work as much as possible 
in terms of particular analysis, . . . and to say nothing that cannot 
be related immediately to judgements about producible texts'.(2 -3)44 
This approach was to be carried over into the understanding of 
'tradition': 'One deals with the individual poet in terms of rep- 
resentative pieces of his work; one deals with tradition in terms 
of representative poets'.(3) The criticism was therefore dealing 
with close analysis of particular passages; 'judgement' saw these 
passages as particularly relevant to an appreciation of the poet, 
as 'representative', and also placed the poet in a relative scheme 
of literary value according to how he compared with other poets. To 
the 'tradition', lesser poets 'bear . . . an illustrative relation' 
44. Figures in parentheses refer to page numbers in Revaluation (1936) 
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and the more important 'represent significant development.'(3) Leavis 
was involved, in Revaluation, with two concurrent activities. Critical 
analysis was the first stage, but he was determined to see the 
criticism borne out on a larger scale, chronologically, and so made 
contributory to judgements of relative value. It will be seen that 
the 'important' poets in Leavis's scheme did not in fact in the first 
instance 'represent significant development' (though they may dp so 
incidentally): they were more often seen (as with the Augustans, 
for example) as evidence of a sympathetic relationship between the 
poetic intention and the prevailing moral and aesthetic predispositions 
of the contemporary culture. Or, as in the case of the Romantic poets, 
they signify the impossibility of such a relation and the poet's 
necessary detachment from the prevailing social forces. It was this 
moral background and its connections with 'society' that, combined 
with his examination of the nature of poetic language, was Leavis's 
chief concern in 'revaluing' the history of English poetry. 
(i) The 'ideal community' and poetic language. 
Leavis's discussion of Donne was highly compressed but contained many 
insights even in this abbreviated form. The discussion did not cover 
such issues as the nature of metaphysical imagery or the structure 
of the conceit, but was specifically concerned with the use of language. 
The external constraints to poetic form faced by Donne were seen by 
Leavis as a means to a creative originality: 
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Donne uses in complete dissociation from music a stanza - 
form that proclaims the union of poetry and music. The 
dissociation is positive; utterance, movement, and 
intonation are those of the talking voice. . . . The 
exigencies of the pattern become means to the inevitable 
naturalness.(11 -12) 
Leavis's phrase for Donne's use of language was 'mimetic flexibility' 
(14) and this suggested the relationship, which Leavis saw as essen- 
tial, between form and content. He praised 'Donne's use of the 
speaking voice and the spoken language' and evoked a comparison with 
Shakespeare, though this was not elaborated. One of Leavis's,examples 
of 'mimetic flexibility' was 
The way in which the stress is got on 'Did', and the 
intonation controlled, here: 
I wonder by my troth, what thou, and I 
Did till we lov'd? 
The verse movement and the language are combined to produce a simul- 
taneous verbal and metrical effect of emphasis on the particular word, 
an emphasis that gets its force as equally from this semantic and 
metric pressure as from the particular context, its place in the poem 
as a whole. 
The contrast implicit in this version of the operation of language 
in poetry was with Milton. The significance of Leavis's criticism 
9] 
of Milton has been exaggerated.45 The chapter, 'Milton's Verse', 
constituted the application of Leavis's notion of the nature of poetic 
language to poetry that demonstrably used language in a different 
way and to other ends than, say, Donne. The argument was not compli- 
cated and was based on a comparison of Milton's 'Grand Style' with 
the relationship that Leavis saw as operating in Donne's poetry between 
expression and 'the thing expressed'. In Milton's Grand Style, 
'commonly the pattern, the stylised gesture and movement, has no par- 
ticular expressive work to do, but functions by rote, of its own momen- 
tum, in the manner of ritual'.(46) The poetry contains a separation 
between form and content, between the language and its subject, that 
inhibits the readers' appreciation. The language, in effect, draws 
attention too much to itself and the burden that it is attempting 
to convey is lost in the process - lost, that is, both to the reader 
and to the poet: 
45. 'This essay ['Milton's Verse'] is certainly the most famous in thebook 
and it is perhaps the most controversial essay that Leavis has 
ever written, provoking a heated debate that still goes on'. 
Bilan, op. cit. p 90. 
If this is the case then the debate or controversy must have 
been sparked off not by Leavis's. argument - which is straight- 
forward enough and reasonably refutable (see, for example, Robert 
Boyers, F.R.Leavis: Judgement and the Discipline of Thought (1978) 
pp 10 -17) - but by the unceremonious terms with which he affected 
to dispose of Milton as a relevant influence in the poetic tradi- 
tion. More probably, the 'heated debate' did not get going until 
Eliot's 1949 British Academy paper on Milton was interpreted 
as a renunciation of his earlier position and which prompted 
Leavis's reply, 'Mr. Eliot and Milton' (Sewanee Review, lvii 
(1949)). an altogether more polemical approach to the question. 
92 
the medium calls pervasively for a kind of attention, 
compels an attitude towards itself, that is incom- 
patible with sharp, concrete realisation, just as it 
would seem to be, in the mind of the poet, incompatible 
with an interest in sensuous particularity. (50) 
The significance of Milton's example for the 'English tradition' will 
be seen later. It was the capacity for 'concrete realisation' that 
was the crux here. This, for Leavis, was the primary responsibility 
of a genuinely 'poetic' use of language: that the form should as 
nearly as possible operate to convey its meaning 'sensuously' and 
'concretely' and not merely semantically or symbolically. Where Leavis 
indicated exceptions to the general rule of Milton's 'sensuous poverty' 
it was because the 'heavy rhythmic pattern' became suddenly appropriate 
to the particular subject, as in the "Proserpin gath'ring flow'rs" 
passage (Paradise Lost, IV, 268ff). There, 'the movement of the verse 
seems to be the life of the design, performing . . . something of 
the function of imagery'(63); or it was because in his earlier poetry 
(eg Comus), Milton was still under the influence of Shakespeare, pro- 
ducing poetry of 'comparative sensuous richness'.(48) Generally, 
however, Leavis noted the 'extreme and consistent remoteness of 
Milton's medium from any English that was ever spoken'.(51) It was 
this fact that set him apart from the seventeenth century and which 
made him influential over a later development in English poetry. 
Leavis's point regarding Donne's use of 'the strength of spoken 
English'(14) in his poetry was not simply a critical observation 
relating to the verse. Leavis argued that this usage set Donne at 
the head of a key development of the Metaphysical tradition. This 
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aspect of Donne's poetry was associated with the 'Court culture' as 
represented by Carew and the 'idiomatic naturalness' and 'racy vigour' 
of Jonson's poetry, which evoked 'an ideal community, conceived of 
as something with which contemporary life and manners may and should 
have close relations'.(19) It was this further significance of Donne's 
poetry that gave him his place in the 'tradition'. It was the notion 
of an 'ideal community', in its poetic guises, that instigated and 
sustained the poetic tradition of the seventeenth century. Leavis 
found this notion represented in Jonson's'classicism', a term that 
was applied in The Oxford Book of Seventeenth Century Verse46. The 
development inspired by Jonson was known by Leavis as 'the line of 
wit', which was a system of relationships between various poets that 
had first been suggested by Eliot: 
The poetry of Donne . . . is late Elizabethan, its feeling 
often very close to that of Chapman. The 'Courtly' poetry 
is derivative from Jonson, who borrowed liberally from the 
Latin; it expires in the next century with the sentimental 
witticism of Prior. There is finally the devotional verse 
of Herbert, Vaughan and Crashaw,47 
While Leavis claimed that in Revaluation he was aiming to resist 
Eliot's loose generality, to 'do some disengaging and restressing'(24 -5), 
46. The Oxford Book of Seventeenth Century Verse (ed. H.J.C.Grierson 
and G.Bullough, Oxford 1934). This was the book under review 
when this section of Revaluation was being written originally 
(Scrutiny, V, 3 (1935)). In using the term 'classical', the 
preface made the collocation 'Jonson, Milton. even Herrick' (p 
vi). which, Leavis said, indicated that 'there are ways and ways 
of being classical.'(17) 
47. Eliot, 'The Metaphysca? Poets'. Selected Essays (1951) p 282. 
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his study of the seventeenth century was still nevertheless highly 
derivative, particularly with regard to the wider discussion of the 
nature of 'metaphysical' poetry, as opposed to the weighing and com- 
paring of various poets. 
What Jonson managed in his poetry was a conflation of the 'class- 
ical' with the 'idiomatic'; that is, his imitations and translations 
were an 'effort . . . to feel Catullus, and the others he cultivated, 
as contemporary with himself.' This was not to say that Jonson merely 
modernised the classics by rendering them into the vernacular; it 
was that Jonson aimed 'to achieve an English mode that should express 
a sense of contemporaneity with them'.(19) Jonson, Leavis argued, 
was attempting to recover the social sanctions germane to classical 
poetry in an English idiom. This idiom was 'consciously urbane, mature 
and civilised,. . . expressive, if to a large degree by aspiration 
only,-of a way of living'.(19) The contemporary relevance of such 
an idiom was enforced by Jonson's 'native good sense', his Englishness.48 
It was this conflation of idioms - which gave Jonson's poetry its 
'racy vigour' and 'urbane grace'(21 -22) - that 'initiateld] the tradi- 
tion, the common heritage, into which a line of later poets could 
enter'.(24) The model of the 'ideal community' thus gave the 
Caroline poets an implied measure or standard against which they could 
size their own achievement. It supplied a 'mode' or idiom in which 
they could combine the different impulses of the 'ideal' - erudite 
48. Leavis used Eliot's phrase 'tough reasonableness' ('Marvell', 
Selected Essays, 1951) to suggest the combination in Jonson of 
uncompromising commonsense and Latinate erudition. 
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urbanity and English commonsense - to produce what Eliot described 
as 'a tough reasonableness beneath the slight lyric grace'.49 
This idiom was the principle common amongst the poets in Leavis's 
'line of wit'. The major poets in the line are Donne, Marvell and 
Pope; among those that bore 'an illustrative relation' to it were 
Cowley (1618 -67) and Carew (1598 ? -1639 ?). This notion of the 'ideal 
community' provided Leavis with a means for making these distinctions 
and eliciting this hierarchy.50 Through it he was able to claim, 
for example, that Marvell's 'seriousness is the finer wisdom of a 
ripe civilisation'(28) and allow the, phrase to have some contextual 
meaning, referring back to this idea of the 'ideal community' and 
what it signified in terms of the aspirations of the Caroline poets. 
It allowed Leavis to make the major poets, though different in par- 
ticular ways, associable in terms of, what they represented as a 
'tradition', or line of development; and it allowed him to make the 
finer distinctions between poets of apparently similar achievements, 
such as Cowley and Carew. Leavis considered Carew to be part of this 
genealogy because of the combination of Augustan and Caroline wit 
in 'The Inscription on the Tombe of Lady Mary Wentworth'.51 Cowley's 
achievement indicated that the poetry had moved into a different 
49. Leavis quoted the paragraph from 'Andrew Marvell'.(24) 
50. 'The line, then, runs from Ben Jonson (and Donne) through Carew 
and Marvell to Pope'.(29) 
51. 'The conceit in the second stanza is both Jonson and Donne and 
the third stanza is specifically Metaphysical. After the Augustan 
passage we come to the Caroline wit of "chaste Polygamy "'. 'Note 
A' (37 -38) 
9E, 
historical era: Cowley's 'Of Wit' 
discusses and expounds wit in a manner and spirit quite 
out of resonance with the metaphysical mode - quite 
alien and uncongenial to it. . . . It is a spirit of 
good sense, of common sense, appealing to criteria that 
the coming age will refine into "Reason, Truth and Nature ".(30) 
So two poets who had flourished within a few years of each other52 
were seen to belong to two different schools of poetry. Leavis was 
able to make the distinction between them because he had refined his 
idea of what 'wit' and'metaphysical' meant against this notion of 
'ideal community' until he achieved this capacity for discrimination. 
In that case, and in so far as it allowed for this judging and balanc- 
ing of conflicting claims and achievements, the fact that the 'ideal 
community' received no greater substantiation from Leavis than the 
bare description provided is not a serious handicap. The notion was 
a vague abstraction of an undefined quality said to be common to the 
poetry, but it could be an enabling abstraction, providing a means 
for discriminating amongst a heterogeneous anthology of poetry. 
(ii) 'Augustanism' and decline: concrete and ideal moral orders. 
Two categories emerged from the discussion of the 'line of wit': the 
exploitation of the properties of language in poetry to encourage 
52. Carew's Poems was published in 1640; Cowley's Miscellanies (which 
included 'Of Wit') was published in 1656. 
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'concrete realisation' or 'mimetic flexibility': and the notion of 
the 'ideal community', where poetry was seen to have been written 
within an ethos that aspired to predominate over social and moral 
discriminations. This ethos gave the poets a common literary and 
moral aesthetic to which to refer. Leavis observed that problems 
arose when the 'ideal community' was manifested as a potent actuality, 
when the implicit aspirant virtues became the dominant moral standards 
of society. How could poetry subsist by appealing to a latent con- 
sensus regarding the higher values of 'Reason' and 'Truth' when that 
consensus had already become a convention? For Leavis, one poet solved 
this dilemma of eighteenth century poetry; most of the poets of the 
period failed to so do and thus set in train a process that was still 
having its effect at the turn of the twentieth century and which pro- 
duced other problems for another poet to solve. 
Leavis argued that Pope, uniquely, transcended the dilemma of 
Augustanism; his uniqueness was a combination of 'genius' and timing. 
The essay on Pope was not to be thought of as a full -scale 'revaluation' 
but as an attempt 'to suggest coercively the reorientation from which 
a revaluation follows'.(69) Leavis felt that in the general revival 
of interest in seventeenth and early eighteenth century poetry, in- 
stigated in part by Eliot's Homage to John Dryden (1921), Pope had 
somehow been neglected. What was worse, his 'rehabilitation was left 
to Bloomsbury . . . [and] the post -war cult of the dix- huitiéme'.(68) 
It was this comparative neglect that Leavis hoped to remedy. 
It was essential therefore that Leavis should establish that Pope 
had connections extending beyond the conventional estimate of him 
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as, with Dryden, one of the central figures of Augustan poetry. Leavis 
claimed in his opening chapter that the 'line of wit' culminated with 
Pope, and that Pope was part of a line of continuity and not only 
the archetype of a new poetic development. He bridged the gap between 
the two traditions and was as much the last poet of the seventeenth 
century as the first of the eighteenth'.(71) Pope combined the Meta- 
physical with the 'polite'. The greater part of Leavis's discussion 
of Pope was taken up with the 'Elegy to the Memory of an Untrtunate 
Lady'. Leavis found an admixture in this poem of Metaphysical ele- 
ments and elements of Augustanism and in the whole he saw evidence 
of a unique reconciling poetic genius. However, this one poem was 
a narrow area upon which to basea defence of Pope and one that was 
again conditioned by the limiting objectives of the main argument. 
Nevertheless, this restrictiveness enabled Leavis to produce a convin- 
cing analysis aspect of poetic achievement; but it 
leaves the uneasy feeling that too much perhaps has been omitted for 
it to serve as a wholly satisfactory account. 
The'Metaphysical' element in Pope was manifested as 'subtle com- 
plexity' in the early part of the poem. Leavis quoted the lines that 
had previously been quoted by Murry to indicate Pope's Metaphysical 
aspect.53 The discussion of the poetry was not centred on consider- 
ations of language, however; the characteristic that Leavis wanted 
53. '. . the earlier lines we have quoted from The Unfortunate 
Lady . . . touch the intensity and psychological revelation of 
Donne, and have sustained perfection of phrasing that Donne never 
attained.' Murry, J.M., Countries of the Mind (first series, 
1931) p 59. 
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to emphasise was the interplay of 'disparate tones', of the combination 
of 'seriousness' with the 'ludicrous' that demanded, 'as essential 
to the total effect, an accompanying play of the critical intelligence', 
(71) For Leavis, a sense of the 'ludicrous' was a distinctive feature 
of Metaphysical poetry and the 'polite' was a mode characteristic 
of the eighteenth century. The combination of the two was a mark 
of originality and Pope's connections with the preceding tradition 
allowed him to escape the limiting tendency towards the poetic com- 
placency that undermined the writings of the general Augustan period. 
Paradoxically, the problems of poetry in this period stemmed from 
the same conditions that provided Pope with the means for producing 
work of such originality. Leavis saw the Augustan idiom as the result 
of a correspondence between the implied moral ethos in the poetry 
and the actual moral standards of contemporary society. Thus, on 
the one hand, the poet could make reference to such broad abstract 
concepts as 'Reason' and 'Truth' in the knowledge that the words had 
a meaning and a significance that was sanctioned by society; and yet, 
on the other hand, the presentation of such concepts in readily - 
accepted formulations removed from the poet any responsibility for 
active inquiry into the nature and meaning of the concepts: 'satire' 
in these circumstances became less an implicit critique of social 
mores and more an expression of hostility towards transgressors of 
the 'social code'. 
The correctness of Pope's literary form derives its strength 
from a social code and a civilisation. The Augustans could 
be so innocently unaware of the conventional quality of the 
code - it was 'Reason' and 'Nature' - because they were in 
complete accord about fundamentals. Politeness was not 
merely superficial; it was the service of a culture and a 
civilisation, and the substance and solid bases were so 
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undeniably there that there was no need to discuss them 
or to ask what was meant by 'sense'. Augustanism is 
something narrower, less fine, less subtle, than what 
Marvell stood for, but it has a corresponding strength 
of concentration and singlemindedness.(76 -77) 
What Marvell stood for were 'maturely valued interests' and 'the finer 
wisdom of a ripe civilisation'.(28) It was under these conditions 
that Pope was able to produce poetry of such 'poised and subtle 
variety'(84) and which gave his satire its positive strength: 
Ask you what Provocation I have had? 
The strong Antipathy of Good to Bad 54 
- we may not accept this as suggesting adequately the moral 
basis of Pope's satire, but it is signficant that Pope could 
offer such an account: his strength as a satirist was that 
he lived in an age when such an account could be offered.(84) 
Pope's uniqueness lay in ,the complete correspondence of his moral'. 
values to those of his society. It was this recognition that found 
'concrete realisation'in the poetry,55 since Pope's exploitation of 
the poetic properties of language were very different to Donne's or 
Marvell's. Typical features are 'intensity' and 'sense of order': 
the relation of form to content received a different emphasis in 
Leavis's appreciation of Pope than in his appreciation of Donne. 
In Donne, the significant strength was 'mimetic flexibility' whereas 
54. Pope, Epilogue to the Satires, Dialogue II ,11. 197_8. 
55. 'Pope's peculiar greatness is that he can be a complete Augustan, 
realising in his poetry the strength of that actual concentrated 
civilisation immediately around him.'(33) 
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in Pope, the singular achievement was continually to express the sense 
of moral order almost regardless of the subject- matter. Where Donne 
or Johnson wrote with an abstract vision of an 'ideal community', 
a sense of the moral norms necessary to human society, Pope wrote 
against a background in which those moral standards had become actual, 
forming the basis for order in society as well as for the organisation 
of the verse. The ideal made real supplied the ultimate moral Sanction 
for poetry: 'The order of Augustan civilisation evokes characteristi- 
cally in Pope, its poet, when he is moved by the vision of lit, a pro- 
found sense of it as dependent on and harmonious with an ultimate and 
inclusive order'.(83 -4) 
Pope was the archetypal Augustan poet, in so far as he took as 
his material the morality of his society and responded to it positively 
and poetically to produce 'what is poetry even by Romantic standards'. 
(83) His 'technique was 'the instrument of fine organisation . . 
bring[ing] to bear pressures and potencies that can turn intense per- 
sonal feelings into something else'.(84) The 'community' and its 
idealist moral values had become concrete and objective. Pope's poetic 
talents found a place in history that perfectly suited them; yet 
the necessary entrenchment that this implied, its inherent reactionism, 
had a deteriorative effect on poetic ambition and achievement in the 
period: 'the poetic tradition developed unluckily; unluckily in 
the sense that the prevailing modes and conventions of the eighteenth 
century did not on the whole tend, as those of the seventeenth century 
did, to bring into poetry the vitality of the age'.(101) It was only 
in Pope that the Augustan use of language -for varied satiric effects, 
in its puns and its use of irony of differing degrees of antagonism 
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and in the subtlety of its use of thé scansion of the heroic couplet 56 
- could be elevated into the genuinely poetic. Lesser writers found 
the predominance of the 'polite' mode of Augustanism an obstacle to 
real expression and, as Leavis claimed to demonstrate, the poetry 
went into a decline. 'Vitality' was not a quality that Leavis could 
clearly isolate in Pope; the 'vitality of the age' would seem to have 
resided in the correspondence of the poet's moral ideal to society's 
moral practice, the manifestation of the 'ideal community'. 'Vitality' 
therefore lay in satire, irony, 'wit' and 'order' in the poetry. 
Pope's mastery of the Augustan mode, his complete acceptance of the 
values of his time and his genuine poetic response to them fixed those 
values in the poetic tradition; he established an ideal Augustan 
poetry that represented the central development of the early eighteenth 
century. For practitioners lacking the capability of a Pope the fixity 
of the suffusing moral values of society and the abeyance of the 
poetic- critical reflex towards challenging them inhibited the develop- 
ment of an original and significant art. Poets were either driven 
out of poetry or resorted to a Miltonic 'meditative- melancholic'57 
56. Above every line of Pope we can imagine a tensely flexible and 
complex curve, representing the modulation, emphasis and changing 
tone and tempo of the voice in reading; the curve varying from 
line to line and the lines playing subtly against one another.' 
(31) 
57. 'Yet the influence of Dryden and Pope over the middle of the 
eighteenth century is by no means so great, or so noxious, as 
had been supposed. A good part of the dreariest verse of the 
time is written under the shadow of Milton'. 
Eliot, loc. cit. p 13. 
103 
escapist mode of writing, the prototype of the nineteenth century's 
preoccupation with a 'dream -world' that was 'a by -line from Pope' 
and yet constituted a main development of the century.58 
The positive aspects of the Augustan convention still operated: 
it saved Gray's Elegy from 'the general censure' (106) of Leavis's 
account of the period. However, only Gray's Elegy and Collins'`s Ode 
to Evening gained exemption; on the whole the poetry of the age 
neither made an advance on the Augustan mode nor 'emancipated' itself 
from it through the discovery of new techniques.59 The relations 
of culture and society in the period - 'the age was one in which the 
code of Good Form was in intimate touch with the most serious cultural 
code'(113) - meant that 'Restoration polite culture . . . had no 
serious relations with the moral bases of society'.(113) Only Pope 
demonstrated that the poet, 'using an idiom and forms that insist 
so on- the authoritative reality of the social surface, is not neces- 
sarily confined to that surface'.(114) While 'the Augustan concern 
to be civilised is a concern for human. centrality . . . working in 
the fashionable idiom and conventions, a poet, to achieve the profound 
in poetry would;have to be great indeed . . . to enable him to trans- 
58. Blake was the exception: 'his genius was that he saw no choice 
but to work out a completely and uncompromisingly individual 
idiom and technique.'(124) 
59. This idea had occurred to Eliot: 'In the eighteenth century there 
are a good many second -rate poets: and mostly they are second -rate 
because they are incompetent to find a style of writing for them- 
selves, suited to the matter they wanted to talk about and the 
way in which they apprehended this matter.' 
Samuel Johnson, 'London: a poem' and 'The Vanity of Human Wishes' 
with an introductory essay by T.S.Eliot (1930) 
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cend his age'.(114) To write in praise of 'the virtues of polite 
civilisation' was not appealing and hence the resort to 'meditative - 
Miltonising poetical modes'.(116) 
The absence of transcendent moral insight: this was the distin- 
guishing weakness of this poetry, the lack of a sense of something 
beyond the superficial social values, an orientation that was genuinely 
meta -physical, displaying an awareness of moral significances that 
lie beyond the immediate contemporary valuations. Through this aware- 
ness the poetry does not simply reflect the social values but places 
them in a wider moral context. With the manifestations of the 'ideal 
community' in an actual social ideology, with its consequent fixity 
of ideals and the resultant complacency of its adherents, an abstract, 
extra- temporal idealist moral scheme needed to be reasserted in order 
to recapture the possibilities of a poetic art for an effective 
'criticism of life'. The Arnoldian formula was implicit in Leavis's 
notion of the poet's relations with his age, his insistence on the 
poet's simultaneous correspondence with the material values and his 
transcendence of them. By recovering an idealist moral perspective, 
Johnson.Leavis claimed, attained this simultaneity of impulses and 
escaped the debilitating complacency of the lesser Augustan poets: 
living as much in an ideal world of letters as in the 
actual society of his friends and associates, he 
transmitted no pressure of Good Form, no polite social 
code, through his pen. His sense of form was a sense 
of a traditional morality of his craft, enjoying an 
artistic and intellectual discipline. (116 -117) 
Johnson's 'moralising' depended on exactly the attitude of critical 
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antagonism that had been absent from his predecessors' poetry, where 
'a perceptive and responsive organisation ha[d] ceased to function' 
(112). Leavis identified this attitude in Johnson's imagery and his 
use of 'wit'. It was wit that lightened Johnson's'declamatory weight' 
and it had undergone noticeable changes since the mid -seventeenth 
century. Leavis thought of Metaphysical wit as a reconciliation of 
humour and 'solemnity': in Pope it was more than the 'interplay of 
disparate tones'; whilst with the post -Augustans it had 'ceased to 
function'. In Johnson it appeared 'as a conscious neatness and pre- 
cision of statement tending towards epigram. It meant a constant 
presence of critical intelligence'.(119) This presence of 'intelli- 
gence' produced 'a characteristic kind of imagery' that was both 
'generalised and unevadably concrete'.(118) It contrasted with 
Milton's'complete incapacity to question or explore' his sense of 
righteousiess: a 'defect of intelligence [that was] a defect of 
imagination'.(58) 'Intelligence' for Leavis implied a critical pre- 
disposition in the poet to be aware of the nature and kind of attitude 
that he was attempting to express, an awareness that was an essential 
part of the poet's perception: as such it was a function of the 
imagination. The absence of intelligence weakened the poetry, but 
also, as shall be seen in the case of Shelley, pointed to weaknesses 
in the poet. 
Intelligence worked to produce a correspondence in the poetry 
between the subject matter and the use of language. Johnson's 
moralising was balanced by a consciousness of the formal properties 
of language that gave his moral values the same kind of 'concrete 
realisation' that Leavis found in the Metaphysicals. Where this 
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correspondence failed to materialise, as in Cowper. the result was 
an inferior kind of poetry. Comparing Cowper's The Castaway with 
Johnson's On the Death of Robert Levet Leavis found Cowper's poem 
'very fine' but 'susceptible to caricature by unsympathetic rendering'. 
This was because the language (the 'mode') of the poem was not com- 
pletely commensurate with its subject (its 'purpose') and there 
appeared to be a 'discrepancy' between the 'emotion' and 'the prose 
rationality and critical balance' of its expression.(12Ò -121) This 
is a materially different kind of weakness to that demonstrated by 
Milton when he 'exhibits a feeling for words rather than a capacity 
to feel through words'.(50) In Leavis's criterion for poetic strength, 
language in poetry must perform the task of 'concrete realisation' 
rather than merely aim for 'mellifluousness'; Cowper at least 
attempted such a realisation, even though he failed fully to reconcile 
subject and form, to make the form 'realise' or 'enact' its subject. 
The association of language and 'intelligence' as the main elements 
of poetry that qualified for serious attention was central to Leavis's 
aesthetic. 'Language' in its poetic guise must, in this aesthetic. 
bear a reciprocal relation to the matter of the poetry: there must 
be an equivalence between the expression and the thing expressed. 
However, this aesthetic had a further dimension, developed from the 
abstract notion of 'the ideal community' around which Leavis organised 
his discussion. This notion had for Leavis an essential moral aspect, 
in a Johnsonian sense, requiring of'the poetry a fundamental 'concern 
for human centrality', improving, critical ('intelligent') and dealing 
in its relations to society in a mode of optimistic humanism. This 
was the function of the 'ideal community' as it occurred in Johnson's 
107 
verse: as an attempt to express the moral ideal as 'something inti- 
mately bound up with contemporary life and manners'.(17) In Pope 
it manifested as a complete identification of the poet with his age, 
a poetic propagandism for 'Reason, Truth and Nature'. Johnson re- 
vitalised the ideal by releasing it from the narrow complacency of 
Augustanism and asserting it in a wider moral and historical context. 
Leavis's approach to poetry was typified by this attempt to isolate 
the moral basis operating in the creative process. The 'tradition', 
the line of development that he drew, was centred on an implicit moral 
sanction present either ideally - as in the case of Johnson and the 
Metaphysicals - or concretely. as in Pope. Decline, Leavis asserted. 
was the consequence of a disruption of the operation of this moral 
imperative. Thus, the 'decay of the Caroline courtly tradition'(34) 
after the Restoration was the result of the inability of the tradition 
to survive the hiatus, the displacement of the guardians of 'Court 
culture' and the eventual change of allegiance of the Court from the 
traditional rural power -bases to the new metropolitan centres: from. 
as Leavis described it. 'the country- house' to 'the coffee- house'.(34) 
The consequence for poetry was exemplified by Rochester, whose 'few 
best lyrics are peculiarly individual utterances, with no such relation 
to convention or tradition as is represented by Carew or Marvell'.(35) 
This view is Leavis's version of the 'dissociation of sensibility' 
and it relates in a direct way to his account of the decline of the 
organic community in the face of technological and utilitarian advance 
that he saw as having a continuing effect in the twentieth century. 
No matter the kinds of skill or ability evinced by the poetry: if 
loS 
the poet offered no evidence of this fundamental moral imperative 
he was irredeemably secondary in Leavis's estimation. Dryden, for 
example, was, despite having been promoted by both Eliot and Hopkins.60 
inferior to Pope, in that Pope's 'stricter versification' produced 
'a much greater fineness and profundity of organisation, a much greater 
intensity of art'. Leavis suggested a comparison of a passage from 
the Dunciad with MacFlecknoe. One commentator, reviewing Revaluation 
on its publication, noted 'an inhibition' with regard to Dryden in 
Leavis's discussion, and complained of the comparison of 'immature 
Dryden with fully -fledged Pope'.61 Yet it was not essentially a 
difference of poetic achievement that Leavis wanted to expose, but 
rather Dryden's inferiority in terms of a normative, moralist 
aesthetic. Unlike Jonson, Dryden had no sense of the 'ideal community', 
no sense of the ways in which poetry could offer to society a moral_ 
perspective by means of which it could objectify its own moral code: 
'the community to which Dryden belongs as a poet is that in which 
he actually lives, moves, eats and talks; and . . . it is so com- 
pletely engrossing that he has no ear, no spiritual antennae, for 
the other community'.(32 -3) That is, Dryden was disadvantaged as 
a poet by a moral inadequacy. a lack of 'spiritual antennae', or the 
capacity for awareness of the wider issues and the larger possibilities. 
This moralist aesthetic, with its implicit norms of the relationship 
60. Leavis quoted Hopk +AS,Letter CLV, to Robert Bridges. Cf. 
Revaluation, p 31. 
61. Bonamy Dobrée, The Spectator, 23.10.36. Dobrée suggested that 
a better comparison might have been Religio Laici. 
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between poetry and morality, provided Leavis with the means for struc- 
turing his hierarchy of the English tradition. However, unlike the 
concept of the 'ideal community', this aesthetic was an abstraction 
that had more than a temporary practical usefulness. It left its 
underlying criteria undisclosed, and produced a sense of unease in 
some readers by intimating that the ostensibly literary criticisms 
are in some degree predetermined by this covert set of moral criteria. 
Judgements of relative value and significance then appear precarious 
and unconvincing. The main testimony to this dissatisfaction was 
Wellek's request to Leavis for enlightenment regarding his underlying 
critical premises, but it was echoed elsewhere.62 
Notwithstanding the perplexity that may result from Leavis's deter- 
mination not to discuss his assumption about the relationship of the 
moral to the aesthetic, it is necessary to recall that, as in his 
critique of Milton, he was exploiting and adumbrating an individual 
and refutable approach to the history of English poetry. He imposed 
an order on that history and developed a means of understanding the 
various shifts that he found within it by the application of this 
undefined aesthetic to the problem, which helped Leavis to fulfil 
the programmatic ambitions of the book as a whole. It is significant 
that the title of the book is in the singular, suggesting a comprehen- 
sive and inclusive analysis rather than (as 'Revaluations' might have 
indicated) a series of separate reappraisals of individual authors 
or periods (the subtitle of the book is 'Tradition and Development 
62. Cf. Wellek, 'Literary Criticism and Philosophy'. Scrutiny. V, 4, 
(1936) 
The reviewer in the TLS (ie J.M. Murry) wished that there had 
been a chapter discussing the 'critical presuppositions' of the 
author of Revaluation. 
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in English Poetry'). The programme of the book was a new understanding 
of a 'history' in which individual poets were essential constituent 
parts inseparable even in their uniqueness from the historical whole. 
Leavis's general critical principle, on which was based his under- 
standing of the relatedness of these parts, was his moralist aesthetic, 
his own developed sense of the evaluative criteria that are indispens- 
able to great art. This aesthetic bore the same relation to 
Revaluation as T.S.Eliot did to New Bearings in English Poetry: it 
provided the essential organising principle and the criteria from 
which to elevate 'criticism' into more widely -based 'judgement'. 
A key part of Leavis's ambition was to elaborate his criticisms of 
particular poetry within the broader categories of history, tradition 
and morality. 
(iii) The Romantics: morality and literary evaluation. 
Johnson's critical writings exhibit very notably the 
characteristic wisdom, force and human centrality 
of the great moralist, but they have also a value that 
is peculiarly of and for literary criticism - their 
specific interest is in and of that field.63 
Leavis's critical writings, particularly in the later chapters of 
Revaluation, exhibit very notably a concern for human centrality that 
is peculiarly of and for literary criticism: that is, the subject 
63. Leavis, 'Johnson as Critic'. Scrutiny XII, 3, 187. 
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of critical attention (poetry) is examined against the background 
of moral values which the poetry is seen to reflect or involve.64 
The key terms of this criticism are organisation, impersonality, in- 
telligence, realisation, normality, and discipline. 'Morality' under- 
lies all these terms as the unifying conceptual abstraction to which 
they all refer. Those terms which Leavis had taken over from Eliot 
('impersonality', 'intelligence') have been subsumed into this larger 
moral scheme so that they have gradually shed their obvious Eliotic 
connotations and have become assimilated into Leavis's own critical 
grammar. Leavis's critical writings typically utilised these terms 
as a means for elevating the straightforward literary analysis of 
the language and subject- matter of poetry into a wider context of 
extra -literary judgement. The declaration at the beginning of the 
chapter on Shelley - 'when one dissents from persons who, sympathising 
with and with his idealistic ardours 
and fervours - with his beliefs, exalt him as a poet, it is strictly 
the poetry one is criticising'(204) - is difficult to square with 
the later condemnation of Shelley's 'viciousness and corruption, 
. . disabilities and perversions'(216): terms of indictment that 
imply judgements very much outside the realm of the poetry. Leavis's 
criticism was an idiosyncratic extension of expressionism. Poetry 
in this sense became the infallible expression of the poet's person- 
ality, including his 'sensibility' and his moral capacity. Weaknesses 
and strengths in the poetry were regarded as originating in corres- 
64. 'Leavis's . . . mental habitation is a world not of what poetry 
but of what criticism ought to be. . . . A world in which the 
existence of all values in poetry is made to depend on what is 
said about it.' Spender. Criterion. January 1937. 
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ponding weaknesses orstrengths in the poet. This was because of the 
position that the poetry holds in relation to the criticism: the 
Johnsonian moral imperative had a normative pressure behind it and 
it saw the ideal poet as essentially concerned with a positive moral 
impulse. The critic, in this scheme, aimed to expatiate on the moral 
significance discoverable in the poetry, to elicit from the poetry 
its fundamental ethical structure. The poet, therefore, could not 
be seen as aloof from the moralising creative process: there had 
to be a human figure behind the art that was concerned with 'human 
centrality'. Similarly, the critic placed himself - in his elucidation 
of the moral absolutes that are, or ought to be, present in the poetry 
- at the centre of a critical and moral exchange between poet and 
reader that takes place via the poetry. Leavis said of Wordsworth: 
'What he had for presentment was a type and a standard of human 
normality, a way of life: his preoccupation with sanity and spon- 
tanei -ty65 working at a level and in a spirit that it seems appropriate 
to call religious'.(164) It was the responsibility of the critic 
- such was the implication - to identify the 'standard of human 
normality' with which the poet was said to be dealing. There is no 
way of discovering it without the critic as intermediary, since there 
can be no one fixed standard of 'normality', neither generally nor 
in the particular poetry. So the critic delineates a moral standard 
that is ostensibly derived from the poetry but which must ultimately 
originate within himself. In order to avoid appearing to express 
a merely partial, individual opinion, the critic must requisition 
65. 'Spontaneity' in Wordsworth was. as shall be seen. not the same 
as the spontaneity in Shelley. 
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the poet as additional support for his version of the supposed moral 
standard. Leavis was in the position of saying, in effect, that the 
moral implications of the poetry are not merely constituent elements 
of a particular creative process, but actually represent a 'concern' 
for or 'preoccupation' with this morality in the poet himself. The 
nature, or character, of the poet becomes an essential component of 
the critical discussion. 
It is necessary to distinguish between the areas in Leavis's 
criticism which were concerned with, respectively, critical analysis 
in terms of use of language, imagery, subject- matter and form, and 
the more complex problem.of morally -based literary evaluation. Organi- 
sation, impersonality, intelligence, realisation, normality, and dis- 
cipline: these basic terms can be seen to have specific definitions 
as they function in the criticism, relating to the two categories, 
'criticism' and 'judgement', outlined above. 'Organisation' and 
'realisation' can be said to relate directly to the procedure of close 
analysis; 'impersonality', 'normality' and 'discipline' belong in 
the less clarifiable area of literary evaluation. 'Intelligence'. 
either native or critical, mediates unspecifically between the two 
overlapping practices. All the terms were made by Leavis eventually 
to refer back to the moral abstract that lies behind the critical 
procedure; they are not neutral terms, nor do they function as such. 
For Leavis, there was no such thing as a neutral term beyond the purely 
descriptive, such as 'rhyme' or 'metre'. 
It is noticeable that these terms were for Leavis more easily 
applicable to Shelley (on the negative side) and Keats (on the 
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positive) than to Wordsworth. With Wordsworth, Leavis, while he 
focused on the 'patriotic sonnets' in order to illuminate the problem 
of Wordsworth's 'decline', was more generally concerned with the 
'religious' dimension that he saw supervening in the early poetry. 
He dealt with the question of Wordsworth's 'philosophy' and tended 
to view the poet in specifically Johnsonian terms: 'He stands for 
a distinctly human naturalness; one, that is, consummating a 
discipline, moral and other'.(170) Certainly Leavis did not see in 
Wordsworth a typical Romantic poet: 'he may have been a "Romantic" 
but it would be misleading to think of him as an individualist'.(171) 
With regard to Keats and Shelley the issues were more clear -cut 
and were concerned (in the first instance) with immediate problems 
of the poetry. The 'revaluative' aspect of the two essays involved 
a response to current issues in Keats /Shelley studies. Leavis was 
making a personal point when he insisted that these problems might 
be eased by 'a recall . . . to strict literary criticism'.(241) He 
disputed that difficulties relating to Shelley were a matter of "the 
question of belief or disbelief "66. all that was required was atten- 
tion to the poetry. And Leavis aimed to rescue Keats from approp- 
riation by the aesthetes of the 1890s and the consensus that assumed 
his greatness to be a matter of 'promise and potentiality rather than 
achievement'.(241) 
66. Leavis quoted the following: 'It is not so much that thirty years 
ago I was able to read Shelley under an illusion which experience 
has dissipated, as that because the question of belief or dis- 
belief did not arise I was in a much better position to enjoy 
the poetry.' 
Eliot. The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (1933) 
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On the positive side, Leavis's critical terns were applied to 
Keats's poetry in a direct way, which minimised the degree of specu- 
lation regarding the author's personal capacities, moral or otherwise. 
The fact that the poetry was generally 'successful' in these terms 
meant that Leavis had less need for appealing to the poet's psyche 
for an explanation of the condition of his poetry. When the poetry 
is successful, no further explanation is necessary; the criticism 
simply culminates in a general proposition regarding the poet's moral 
health. In Keats's case this was revealed by his 'characteristic 
vitality'; his 'joy in life' - as opposed to the pre -Raphaelite 'joy 
in art'.67 This meant that any opinion in this regard could be read 
as simply an extention of the approbation given to the poetry. Only 
when negative moral judgements on a poet's character are extrapolated 
from his poetry does the question of the legitimacy of such a procedure 
seem to become urgent. 
The Ode to a Nightingale exhibited Keats's particular qualities 
as a poet and supplied evidence of his capacities as an individual: 
The rich local concreteness is the local manifestation 
of an inclusive sureness of grasp in the whole. What 
the detail exhibits is not merely an extraordinary 
intensity of realisation, but also an extraordinary 
rightness and delicacy of touch; a sureness of touch 
that is the working of a fine organisation.(245) 
'Concreteness' and 'realisation' operated in the ode in the 'extremely 
67. This was only a convenient shorthand: 'The difference between 
joy in 'art' and joy in 'life' is, of course, not so plain as 
the antithetical use of the two terms would suggest.'(257) 
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subtle and varied interplay of motions, directed now positively, now 
negatively'.(246) Leavis traced the fluctuations of mood and tenor 
in the imagery of the poetry and the verse movement: In the first 
stanza, the 'heavy drugged movement ( "drowsy ", "numb ", "dull ")' gives 
way at lines 5 and 6 and 'moves buoyantly towards life . . . ( "shadows 
numberless ")'.(246) The fourth stanza evinces a positive 'motion': 
Away', away! for I will fly to thee, 
Not charioted by Bacchus and his pards, 
But on the viewless wings of Poesy 
- It points now, not to dissolution and unconsciousness 
but to positive satisfaction, concretely realised in 
imagination.(248) 
The movement suggested by the "away!" of this stanza towards something 
positive is what Leavis designated as 'concrete realisation'. The 
force of this 'realisation' is effected by both the physical nature 
of the word and its conceptual implication. Movement and imagery 
are combinedto produce a simultaneous mimetic presentation of idea 
and feeling that in turn relates, either synthetically or anti- 
thetically with the other constituent parts of the whole poem. Leavis's 
term for this is 'organisation', although he used the same term when 
discussing the imaginative capacity of a poet and his capacity for 
reacting to desparate experience with a homogeneous artistic response. 
Thus, in Wordsworth, 'the poetic process engaged an organisation that 
had, by his own account, been determined by an upbringing in a con- 
genial social environment'.(171) The subtlety of this 'organisation', 
the metrical and verbal commensurateness of its parts, was what made 
the poem valuable and successful for Leavis. The subject matter was 
a different problem. 
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Keats had been praised by Symons and Murry for, respectively, in- 
venting the principle of 'art for art's sake' and being comparable 
only to Shakespeare.ó8 Leavis dismissed both claims in characteristic 
terms. The Ode was 'incomparably better art' than the 'art for art's 
sake' principle implied: 'it is better in a way involving a relation 
to life'.(251) Yet the poetry was not of the same order as 
Shakespeare's mature poetry.69 
It is as if Keats were making major poetry out of minor - 
as if, that is, the genius of a major poet were working 
in the material of minor poetry. . . . The pain with 
which his heart aches is not that of a moral maturity, 
of a disenchanted wisdom born of a steady contemplation 
of things as they are.(251 -52) 
Or 
What made Keats's poetry seem to Leavis to be irretrievably 'minor' 
was its subject matter. Keats was an 'Aesthete', although, contra 
Symons, he does not indulge in the escapist aestheticism of the 1890s; 
and 'the one Aesthete of genius'. He had 'unique vitality and creative 
power'(2S9) but what he lacked was, crucially, the kind of 'pre- 
occupation . . . with a distinctively human naturalness, with sanity 
and spiritual health'(165) which, according to Leavis, Wordsworth 
had. Keats avoided the 'religious unction'(259) of Paterian 
68. Leavis referred to Murry, Keats and Shakespeare (1925) and Symons, 
The Romantic Movement in English Poetry (1909) 
69. Murry had said that theOdes were 'poems comparable to nothing 
in English literature.. save the works of Shakespeare's maturity.' 
Cf. Revaluation, p 242. 
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aestheticism (in the Ode on Melancholy for example) through a para- 
doxical mixture of indulgent soulful anguish and 'characteristic 
vitality'(260): 
His souls shall taste the sadness of her might, 
And be among her cloudy trophies hung. 
The sudden burst of freshness is, as it were, the 
vitality behind Keats's aestheticism breaking 
through(261) 
The 'vitality' that thus emerges in imagery and metre in the poetry 
Leavis saw as deriving from the presence of another key term, 'critical 
intelligence', manifested, as it had been manifested in Johnson, in 
the poetry's 'sureness of touch' and 'the relation between the firmness 
of the art and the firm grasp on the outer world'; Keats 'never takes 
his dreams for reality'.(262) 
Keats's poetry, then, evinced a strong capacity for the exploitation 
of poetic language and an ability to 'organise' its material into 
a coherent whole, presided over by a self- judging and self- discriminat- 
ing 'intelligence'. The 'intelligence' prevented the inherent 
aestheticism from residing too completely in a romantic void which 
was a 'strength' Leavis said, that 'makes him put La Belle Dame sans 
Merci aside'.(262) Its weakness was its inwardness, its inability 
to encompass wider, essentially moral, concerns.70 Where these wider 
concerns became more germane to the poetry was in the revised Hyperion. 
70. 'A focusing of the vision so as to shut out the uncongenial, 
is essentially the purpose of Keats's worship of Beauty - a 
purpose such as, uncountered and persisted in, must, we feel, 
necessarily result in devitalisation'.(257) 
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It is significant that at this point Leavis turned to Keats's letters 
for evidence to augment his case. In trying to discover Keats's 
'maturer moral self' Leavis had increasingly to consider directly, 
without the mediation of poetry, Keats's personal experiences and 
responses. The first Hyperion, though an attempt at expressing 'his 
profoundest moral and philosophical concerns'(266), failed because 
of its Spenserian -Miltonic mode, as Keats himself acknowledged ?' 
In the revised version of the introduction, Leavis saw Keats dealing 
with 'the blows of fate'(270) with an 'impersonality' that transcended 
the personal suffering and turned it into 'tragic' art. The qualities 
of 'concrete realisation' that made the Ode to a Nightingale more 
than merely indulgent ('the grasp of the object, the firm sense of 
actuality, the character and critical intelligence implied') now 
emerged 'in the field of tragic experience'.(271) The ode To Autumn, 
71. Leavis quoted Keats's letters to Reynolds (22 Sept 1819) and 
his brother George (21 Sept 1819). From theletter to Reynolds 
Leavis quoted, inter alia, the following: 'I have given up 
Hyperion - there were too many Miltonic inversions in it.'(266 -67) 
Leavis regarded this as'Keats's own judgement upon the first 
Hyperion'.(266) However, the original version of Hyperion had 
been 'abandoned in April, 1819' (Allott, ed.. The Poems of John 
Keats (1970) p 655): the Hyperion to which Keats referred in 
September 1819 was in fact the revised version, 'largely completed 
in its present form by 21 Sept 1819' (Allott, 655) which was 
the day preceding the letter to Reynolds which Leavis took to 
be referring to the first version. Keats clearly felt that even 
in the new version Milton's influence was too predominant, an 
opinion that was shared by Leavis, who found only the mode of 
the introduction to be materially different: 'the ensuing narra- 
tive . . . remains, but for some mechanical changes in phrasing 
and word -order, what it was'.(268) If Leavis had been clearer 
about the dates of composition he could have been able to attest 
Keats's opinion in support of his own, which was the reason for 
referring to the letters in the first place. 
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written after the second Hyperion had been put aside, exhibits what 
was for Leavis the central change that had taken place in Keats's 
art, the poetry having been suffused with 'a moral and spiritual dis- 
cipline'.(272) 
It was in this manner, by a shift from the procedures and 
terminology of 'criticism' to those of 'judgement', that Leavis struc- 
tured his approach to poetry. In the chapter on Keats the discussion 
moved, by means of changes of emphasis and the introduction of a voca- 
bulary with an extra -literary dimension, from a consideration of the 
techniques of the poetry (language, imagery, the mimetic relationship 
between form and content72) to an evaluation of the moral condition 
of the poetry and of the poet. In the discussion of Keats this last 
manoeuvre was only marginally explicit; to see to what degree it was 
an inevitable part of Leavis's procedure it is necessary to examine 
the essay on Keats's antithesis, Shelley. 
This essay began with a close analysis of lines from Shelley's 
Ode to the West Wind and questioned the appropriateness of the 
imagery: 'In what respect are the 'loose clouds' like 'decaying 
leaves' ?'.(205) Leavis wanted to point out 'an essential trait of 
Shelley's: his weak grasp upon the actual'.(206) Shelley failed 
the test of 'concrete realisation': his imagery does not function 
72. And sometimes like a gleaner thou dost keep 
Steady thy laden head across a brook . . . 
In the step from the rime -word 'keep'. across, so to speak, the 
pause enforced by the line division, to 'Steady', the balancing 
movement of the gleaner is enacted'.(263 -64). 
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to bring its subject into clear focus but, on the contrary, 
deliberately keeps it blurred so that the metaphors become 'autonomous' 
and unrelated to the initiating perception. This blurring is the 
converse of 'concrete realisation' and it demands of both the reader 
and the poet an abeyance of 'critical intelligence'(207): 'feeling, 
for Shelley as a poet, had . . . little to do with thinking'.(208)73 
Leavis's indictment went further than this; his expatiation on 'this 
aspect of Shelley's poetry was couched in terms that contain an im- 
plicit moral judgement, largely as a result of the force that 
'intelligence' now has as an evaluative term in Leavis's vocabulary: 
The effect of Shelley's eloquence is to hand poetry 
over to a sensibility that has no more dealings with 
intelligence than it can help; to a 'poetic faculty' 
that . . . demands that active intelligence shall be, 
as it were, switched off.(210) 
Shelley's Romanticism was of a different order than Wordsworth's, 
which had been essentially a reaction against 'Augustan rationality'. 
Wordsworth's spontaneity was correlated with an internal organisation 
that placed the poetic emotions within a context with a 'social -moral 
centrality'. Shelley's spontaneity was that of the 'egoist' and can 
have 'nothing to do with any discipline'.(210) 
Shelley's poetry was measured by Leavis against the standard rep- 
resented by his terminology. It failed to demonstrate any of Leavis's 
73. For the reader, 'the imagery feels right, the associations work 
appropriately, if (as it takes conscious resistance not to do) 
one accepts the immediate feeling and doesn't slow down to think'. 
(207) 
122 
predicated qualities of realisation, organisation,74 intelligence 
or discipline and was therefore declared by Leavis to be 'bad poetry'. 
(216) In the analysis of Shelley's weaknesses, Leavis kept reasonably 
clearly within the bounds of 'literary criticism': that is to say, 
he dealt directly with the poetry in terms familiar to poetry 
criticism. It was with the introduction of a term such as 
'intelligence' with its implications of a judgement of the poet's 
creative habits that the 'criticism' shifts from a purely literary 
sphere to one involving extra -literary standards and generating moral 
evaluations. This was an inevitable development because of the fore - 
grounding of the poet's own personality that was a main element of 
Leavis's critical procedure. 'Criticism of Shelley has something 
more important to deal with than mere bad poetry; or, rather, there 
are badnesses inviting the criticism that involves moral judgements'. 
(216) Why? because Shelley's 'surrendering to inspiration cannot 
. . -have been very distinguishable from surrendering to temptation'. 
His 'favoured vocabulary' exemplified 'a wrong approach to emotion'; 
'the viciousness and corruption are immediately recognisable.'(216) 
Can poetry be immoral? It is clear from the unrestrained vocabulary 
of Leavis's indictment of Shelley - 'viciousness and corruption', 
'radical disabilities and perversions' - that Leavis believed that 
it could. Yet morality and moral judgements cannot be sustained in 
an intellectual void; there has to be some kind of conceptual frame- 
work to give such judgements meaning and form - and even then moral 
74. ' "Inspiration ", there not being an organisation for it to engage 
. had only poetical habits to fall back on.'(214 -15) 
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precepts do not partake of an objective impartiality. Leavis had 
clear ground for interpreting Shelley's poetic failings as moral 
depravity, because he saw the key weakness as 'a radical lack of self - 
knowledge' witnessed by 'the antipathy of his sensibility to any play 
of the critical mind'.(221)75 This judgement arose naturally from 
his discussion of the poetry. It was a logical step, from finding 
the poetry lacking in 'discipline' to seeing the poet's creative pro- 
cess as a form of turpitude. It is not the logic of this extension 
but its value that is in question. The essay aimed at a 'revaluation' 
of Shelley's poetry and was determined to demonstrate that the problems 
were not problems of 'belief'. In Leavis's version, they became prob- 
lems regarding the moral character of the poet. It raises a different 
set of difficulties when one approaches the poetry through judgements 
on the poet rather than when one demurs, like Eliot, at what the poet 
purported to believe.76 In the first instance, it requires the critic 
to be precise about his own moral standard and its source; and 
secondly, it raises the complex matter of the relation between poetry 
and moral responsibility. The terms of Leavis's commendation of The 
Mask of Anarchy - 'no suspicion of indulgence, insistence, corrupt 
will, or improper approach'(229 -30) - indicate the perplexity that 
exists for the reader of this criticism. It is possible to accept 
the notion that in this poem 'the emotion seems to inhere in the vision 
communicated, the situation grasped', to agree that the mimetic 
potential of language in poetry has been valuably exploited; but 
it is another matter accede to the proposition that the opposite 
'emotionalism' that Shelley's failures evince is necessarily 'corrupt' 
73. Leavis discussed 'When the Lamp is shatter'd'. (216 -22) 
76. See note 66 above. 
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or 'improper', even supposing that it is possible to reach an agreement 
as to the meanings of those terms. Leavis's position in relation 
to Shelley's poetry was extreme (witness the intemperate vocabulary) 
but it was inevitable. Given the proposition that the poet is not 
separable from the poetry, that, indeed, the poet is essentially 
knowable through the poetry, and accepting that one's literary critical 
terms are also morally prescriptive terms, it follows that negative 
criticism of specific poetry must develop into negative moral judge- 
ments about the poet. The less successful the poetry, the more wicked 
the poet: this is the force of Leavis's critical procedure. The 
difficulty is not with Leavis's practical analysis but with the judge- 
ments made outside the immediate realm of criticism or poetry. 
3. 'Judgement and Analys s':a critical terminology and its practical 
applications. 
The exchange between Wellek and Leavis following the publication of 
Revaluation77 failed to raise the issue of 'immoral' poetry and was 
diverted into an unyielding argument about hidden assumptions and 
Platonic idealism in Wordsworth. Wellek was inhibited by his pre- 
occupation with theory and systems: 'I could wish that you had stated 
77. See Wellek, 'Literary - Criticism and Philosophy'. Scrutiny V. 
4 pp 375 -83, and Leavis, 'Literary Criticism and Philosophy: 
a Reply', Scrutiny VI. 1 pp 59 -70. Wellek's response to Leavis's 
reply appeared in Scrutiny VI, 2 pp 195 -6. 
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your assumptions more explicitly and defended them systematically. 
. . I would have misgivings in pronouncing them without elaborating 
a specific defence or a theory in their defence'.78 The second part 
of this might be seen as the intuitive reflex of a philosophically - 
orientated mind (it does not seem to matter whether the 'defence' 
is practical or theoretical). It is the preceding request that is 
interesting, because of the response it elicited from Leavis: ' I 
knew I was making assumptions . . . and I was not less aware than 
I am now of what they involve'.79 
Leavis's argument was that while it was clearly possible to extract 
general principles of criticism from his discussion of poetry, he 
denied that such activity would serve any useful purpose relative 
to the intention of that criticism - which was a matter of judging 
and 'placing' specific poetry and individual poets. Leavis said of 
Blake, replying to another of Wellek's points, 'his symbolic philosophy 
is one thing, his poetry another'.80 In his own writing, the abstract 
principles were certainly inherent, but it was the particular 
criticisms, the specific system of relations that he established, 
that he claimed were of primary importance. A similar kind of 'organi- 
sation' was required in the critic as Leavis had stipulated as a 
prerequisite in the poet. The critic makes a judgement of the poetry's 
relative value, he 'places' it: 
78. Wellek, loc. cit. p 375 
79. Leavis, loc. cit. p 59. 
80. Ibid p 65. 
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And the organisation into which it settles as a constituent 
in becoming 'placed' is an organisation of similarly 'placed 
things, things that have found their bearings with regard to 
one another, and not to a theoretical system or a system 
determined by abstract considerations. . . . My whole effort 
was to work in terms of concrete judgements and particular 
analyses: 'This - doesn't it? - bears such a relation to 
that; this kind of thing - don't you find it so? - wears 
better than that', etc. 61 
The central part of Leavis's reply to Wellek was based on this claim 
that he was making 'concrete judgements and particular analyses'' and 
his insistence that unlocated 'theorising' was at best an irrelevance 
and at worst a limiting distraction. The discussion thus avoided com- 
pletely any approach to the serious questions raised by Leavis's attack 
on Shelley. The point is that whilst engaged, as he claimed, in for- 
mulating 'concrete judgements and particular analyses', the nature 
of the evaluative grammar, the burden carried by terms such as 'in- 
telligence' or 'discipline', meant that the criticism of particular 
poetry was inevitably elided with extra -literary moral judgements, 
which of their nature could not be represented as 'concrete' or 
'particular'; the criticism was set against this background of moral 
specifications. A debate might ensue from the 'particular analysis' 
of a poem. but it is difficult to see how the collaborative process 
can be made anything but redundant in the context of such a compre- 
hensively negative moral judgement as that which Shelley attracted. 
What Wellek's critique of Leavis failed to raise was the whole problem 
of the origin of Leavis's moral principles as they emerged in his 
study of Keats and Shelley. The implications of those statements 
regarding 'perversity' and 'corruption' indicated an ethical background 
81. Ibid pp 61, 63. 
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to literary evaluation, which was not questioned by its purveyor. 
This background was neither defined by a context of 'concrete judge- 
ments and particular analyses', nor elucidated by any clear conceptual 
context into which the notion of 'moral' could be seen to fit. 
The 'assumption' that logically tended towards the moralist 
aesthetic was clearly present in Leavis's statements of intention: 
By the critic of poetry, I understand the complete 
reader: the ideal critic is the ideal reader. . . . 
The critic's aim is, first, to realise as sensitively 
as possible this or that which claims his attention; 
and a certain valuing is implicit in the realising. 
. . . The business of the literary critic is to 
attain a peculiar completeness of response and to 
observe a peculiarly strict relevance in developing 
his response into comentary.82 
The critic's skill or achievement was to be measured against the same 
standard as the poet's, that is, his capacity for 'realisation' as 
revealed in his writing. For the poet this capacity was ascertainable 
by reference to the effectiveness of the relation in his poetry between 
language and subject matter, with the greater poet achieving a form 
intricately related to its content. The critic's powers of 'reali- 
sation' are defined by the extent of his ability 'to observe a 
peculiarly strict relevance in developing his response into commentary' 
or by how effectively (and relevantly) he translates his essentially 
personal reactions into a cogent and coherent critique. However, 
82. Loc. cit. p 61 
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despite the blurring use of a similar vocabulary, it is difficult 
to sustain the implied equation between poetry and criticism. For 
while it isfessible, 'by choice, arrangement and analysis of concrete 
examples',83 to investigate the success or failure of particular 
poetry, the same is not true for criticism. A critical 'commentary' 
stands or falls according to the degree to which it is convincing 
- this much is implicit in Leavis's version of the collaborative'dia- 
logue between a critic and his reader. A critique's ability to con- 
vince depends on internal logic, the pertinence of quoted material, 
the ccgency of its terms of analysis and the extent to which that analy- 
sis and succeeding judgement are observably cognate. In Leavis's 
criticism, these criteria are generally satisfied until the problem 
of the unspecified and undefined moralist aesthetic is encountered. 
The judgements whose commission are dependent on this aesthetic are 
fundamentally extra- literary judgements elaborated according to a 
scale.of implied moral values that is not immediately relatable to 
a set of literary values. In this respect, Leavis was making a similar 
type of non -legitimate appeal to an outside authority as he had high- 
lighted in Wellek: where Wellek had referred to a general history 
of ideas as if for sanition for his literary judgements, Leavis was 
invoking a similarly abstract moral scheme in support of his. The 
question then is: what is the nature of the critical impulse in Leavis 
and how does it relate to his idea of the importance of literature? 
and to what extent is the moralist aesthetic implicit in his conception 
of the function of criticism? 
83. Ibid pp 63-4 
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A clear sense of Leavis's conception of the character and ability 
of the critic and his responsibilities can be derived from his dis- 
cussion of Johnson (and, to a lesser extent, Arnold) 'as critic' 4 
That Leavis aligned himself to a considerable degree explicitly with 
Johnson's critical attitude is hinted at by the presence of the quota- 
tions from Johnson that occur in Revaluation and The Great Tradition 
as epigraphs ('not dogmatically, but deliberately'). The account 
in 'Johnson as critic' enforces the identification explicitly: 
Johnson is not invariably just or complete; but the 
judgement - and he never fails to judge - is always 
stated with classical force and point, and based 
beyond question on strong first -hand impressions. 
He addresses himself deliberately and disinterestedly 
to what is in front of him; he consults his experience 
with unequivocal directness and always has the courage 
of it. Concerned as he is for principle, he refers 
with characteristic contempt to "the cant of those 
who judge by principles rather than by perception" 
(Life of Pope). 85 
A similar description could be applied with little variation to Leavis. 
The key points are the emphases on 'judging', 'first -hand impressions', 
the 'disinterested' bearing and the referral to personal experience. 
These factors, together with the subordination of 'principle' to 
'perception', summarise Leavis's own version of the function of the 
critic. The critic is actively engaged in the understanding of 
creative art; he is not a passive observer. The strength of his 
criticism depends wholly on his own personal capacities for integrity 
of response and intelligent perception. The critic, no less than 
the poet, must exhibit a competent intelligence and an alert 
84. See 'Arnold as Critic', Scrutiny VII, 3; and 'Johnson as Critic'. 
Scrutiny XII, 3. 
85. Scrutiny XIL, 3 p 199. 
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'sensibility'. Leavis said of Arnold that his criticism was marked 
by 'an intelligence that is informed by a mature and delicate sense 
of the humane values and can manifest itself directly as a fine sen- 
sibility'.86 With regard to Johnson, Leavis had to reinterpret those 
aspects of the criticism that most overtly contradicted his own prac- 
tice, accounting for an apparent perversity of judgement by citing 
the distorting effect of historical circumstances. Johnson's dismissal 
of Lycidas, for example, could be explained 'by reference to the cul- 
tivated predilection, the positive "ear ", with which they are cor- 
related'.87 That is, Johnson's judgement had been unbalanced by the 
operative standards of taste of his contemporary period, and despite 
the negative conclusions, the critical approach was based on sound 
principles: 'The taste that matters is the operative sensibility, 
tthediscriminating 'touch', through which, in exploration and critical 
response, a fine and exclusive organisation engagas'.88 This avoided 
the problem raised by the fact that Johnson saw Lycidas as 'impious'.89 
Leavis was prepared to explain Johnson's finding 'the dictions harsh, 
86. 'Arnold as Critic', loc. cit. p 323. 
87. Loc. cit p 190. 
88. Ibid. p 188. 
89. Cf. Johnson: 'With these trifling fictions are mingled the most 
awful and sacred truths, such as ought never to be polluted with 
such irreverent combinations. . . . Such equivocations are always 
unskilful: but here they are indecent, and at least approach 
to impiety'. 
'Milton', The Lives of the English Poets, (ed.. S.C.Roberts) 
(1965) p 124. 
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the rhymes uncertain'90 in terms of the nature of contemporary taste, 
but ignored the moral disposition of Johnson's criticism, perhaps 
because it would have entailed greater explicitness on his part about 
the derivation of his own morality. 
An 'operative sensibility' and 'a fine and exclusive organisation' 
are as equally the qualities of a poet as of a critic; Leavis made 
no distinction. He posited a concept of perception in the poet and 
the critic which stated that great poetry demanded an intense effort 
of 'realisation' on the part of the critic who wanted to understand 
it, just as the production of great poetry demanded an equal effort 
of concentration, organisation and intelligence on the part of the 
poet. Failure of critical acumen becomes then a personal failure 
in the critic, a neglect or betrayal of his essential responsibilities 
to the text and the revelation of a personal failing with regard to 
the subtlety and capacity of his sensibility. Such a failure was, 
for Leavis, equivalent to weakness of character because of the under- 
lying 'moral' basis of his critical perspective. The corollary to 
this was that the critic was entitled, under these conditions, to 
elicit from his perception of weaknesses in the poetry weaknesses 
in the poet. The personal integrity of both poet and critic were 
thus engaged in the critical exchange; 'disinterested' applied to 
the criticism only in the narrower sense of an absence of overt bias 
or partiality. This explains the process through which Leavis was 
able to extend his critique of Shelley's poetry into a condemnation 
of Shelley's moral character. It does not explain the way in which 
90. Ibid p 123. 
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Leavis's critical practice brought to bear on the poetry his sense 
of moral obligation. To understand this it is necessary to turn to 
'Judgement and Analysis: notes in the analysis of poetry'.91 
The principles regarding the criticism of poetry that are outlined 
in these articles develop inevitably into a formu]ationof a moralist 
aesthetic - it is fundamental to the logic of the procedure. This 
procedure itself developed out of a proposition that was absolutely 
central to Leavis's conception of 'the function of criticism', which 
was an exploration of the significance of the Arnoldian premise that 
poetry should be a 'criticism of life'. In attempting to enforce 
this predicate in the modern period, Leavis was required by circum- 
stances to elaborate more substantially what this responsibility 
entailed. 
92 
He was not able simply to approach the matter via the 
poetry, by example; some explanation of the nature of his criticism 
was needed. 'Criticism' thus became as much a key element as 'poetry', 
See ' "Thought" and Emotional Quality: notes in the analysis of 
poetry', Scrutiny XIII, 1 pp 53 -71. The two succeeding articles 
carried the same subtitle: 'Imagery and Movement', Scrutiny XIII, 
2 pp 119 -34; and 'Reality and Sincerity', Scrutiny XIX, 2 pp 
90 -98. These articles were reprinted as the middle section of 
The Living Principle (1975) under the title 'Judgement and 
Analysis'. 
92. 'For Matthew Arnold it was in some ways less difficult. I am 
not thinking of the much more desperate plight of culture today, 
but (it is not, at bottom, an unrelated consideration) of the 
freedom with which he could use such phrases as "the will of God" 
and "our true selves ". Today one must face problems of definition 
and formulation where Arnold could pass lightly on.' 
Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture, p 1. 
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Leavis's critical practice brought to bear on the poetry his sense 
of moral obligation. To understand this it is necessary to turn to 
'Judgement and Analysis: notes in the analysis of poetry'.91 
The principles regarding the criticism of poetry that are outlined 
in these articles develop inevitably into a formulation of a moralist 
aesthetic - it is fundamental to the logic of the procedure. This 
procedure itself developed out of a proposition that was absolutely 
central to Leavis's conception of 'the function of criticism', which 
was an exploration of the significance of the Arnoldian premise that 
poetry should be a 'criticism of life'. In attempting to enforce 
this predicate in the modern period, Leavis was required by circum- 
stances to elaborate more substantially what this responsibility 
entailed.92 He was not able simply to approach the matter via the 
poetry, by example; some explanation of the nature of his criticism 
was needed. 'Criticism' thus became as much a key element as 'poetry', 
91 See ' "Thought" and Emotional Quality: notes in the analysis of 
poetry', Scrutiny XIII, 1 pp 53 -71. The two succeeding articles 
carried the same subtitle: 'Imagery and Movement', Scrutiny XIII, 
2 pp 119 -34; and 'Reality and Sincerity', Scrutiny XIX, 2 pp 
90 -98. These articles were reprinted as the middle section of 
The Living Principle (1975) under the title 'Judgement and 
Analysis'. 
92. For Matthew Arnold it was in some ways less difficult. I am 
not thinking of the much more desperate plight of culture today, 
but- (it is not, at bottom, an unrelated consideration) of the 
freedom with which he could use such phrases as "the will of God" 
and "our true selves ". Today one must face problems of definition 
and formulation where Arnold could pass lightly on.' 
Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture, p 1. 
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requiring an equal amount of discussion and illumination, so that 
the convention of the priority of the one over the other was negated 
and the two became factors of parallel importance in the discourse 
on society. Criticism, and the nature of the critic, were not to be 
divorced from wider moral considerations relating to extra -literary 
obligations. The clearest and most emphatic formulation of this 
equality of responsibility was Education and the University (1943). 
This book was primarily a 'sketch' of the possibilities for an 'English 
school' that would facilitate the advancement of such a school's 
primary aim, the 'training of the sensibility', whilst maintaining 
its connections outside the realm of the purely literary: 
The more advanced the work the more unmistakably is 
the judgement that is concerned inseparable from that 
profoundest sense of relative value which determines, 
or should determine, the important choices of actual 
life.94 
The serious critic derives from the study of literature a 'sense of 
relative value' that must be equally operative in 'actual life' as 
in the domain of the literary- critical. This premise was basic to 
Leavis's criticism. The writings of the period after Revaluation 
represent a movement towards this more overt explication of the moral 
dimension that had been implicit in the earlier work. 'Notes in the 
analysis of poetry' was the practical elucidation of this general 
93. ' . . . there must be a training of intelligence that is at the 
same time a training of sensibility; a discipline of thought 
that is at the same time a discipline in scrupulous sensitiveness 
of response to delicate organisation of feeling, sensation and 
imagery.' Education and the University, p 38. 
94. Ibid. p 35 
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thesis. 
The three essays demonstrated the interrelation of three aspects 
of the nature of poetry. 'Thought', or intelligence, the use of 
language ('imagery') and the genuine emotional response to a given 
situation ('reality and sincerity') were the main elements in Leavis's 
analysis. They connect in ways that provide a clear illustration 
of Leavis's notion of the moral dimension of poetry and criticism. 
Intelligence manifests in poetry as an 'attitude towards' its 
,subject matter. That is, the poet, concurrent with his expression 
of the material, expresses an opinion about it: he simultaneously 
'places' the experience as he evokes it. This process Leavis called, 
variously, 'impersonalisation' and 'disinterested valuation'.95 The 
'antithesis is emotional 'indulgence'. 'Intelligence' reveals itself 
through the language that the poetry exploits, semantically and 
metrically, to achieve its effects. The conviction with which this 
is accomplished depends in part on the genuineness of the original 
experience, on the poet's 'sincerity'. Leavis made a subtle differen- 
tiation of the degrees of sincerity that are available to the poet 
in a comparison of Emily Bronte's 'Cold in the earth' with Hardy's 
'After a Journey'. 
Leavis's analysis of the poetic use of language has been described 
through his discussion of Donne and the Metaphysicals. In 'Imagery 
95. Cf. A Selection from 'Scrutiny', (2 vols., 1968). vol. I p 215 
ff. (Figures in parentheses in the following passage refer to 
this source.) 
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and Movement' this analysis was developed further and Leavis saw meta- 
phor in a poem as the reflection of the overall linguistic effects. 
These effects are matters of 'complex verbal organisation'(231) and 
the metaphor, at its most effective, involves both the collocation 
of 'the disparate, the conflicting, or the contrasting'(233) and the 
evocation of a wider context, so that the reader, 'in pronounc[ing] 
the organised words, . . . performs in various modes a continuous 
analogical enactment'(237) of the meaning. The metaphor exhibits 
the poet's 'attitude towards' his subject, and is the means whereby 
'intelligence' or 'thought' manifests locally its general presence. 
'Intelligence' in poetry is ultimately dependent on the reality 
of a poet's response to a real experience: Leavis's term is 'sincerity'. 
It is indicative of the peculiar idiom of Leavis's criticism that 
a potentially unspecifiable quality can be made to work towards an 
explicit definition of itself. Brontë's 'Cold in the earth' is a 
less 'sincere' poem than Hardy's 'After a Journey' because of 'the 
absence of any convincing concreteness of a presented situation'.(252) 
The poetry has a 'declamatory generality', whereas 'After a Journey' 
'conveys a quite complex attitude that entails a weighing of con- 
siderations against one another and leaves them in a kind of poise 
It could . . have been written only by a man who had 
the experience of a life to remember back through'.(255) Brontë's 
poem, on the other hand, was a 'disciplined imaginative exercise'. 
'After a Journey', in comparison, 'is seen to have a great advantage 
in reality'.(252) One of the strengths of Leavis's critical procedure 
is that it was able to recuperate a word astinspecific as 'sincerity' 
and make it useful as an evaluative term. Intelligence, manifested 
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as an objectifying appraisal of the emotion of the poem, and 'sincerity' 
are reflected in the language of the poetry, in its power to produce 
an 'analogical' (tactual, physical, intellectual) reproduction of 
the original creative impulse. In Education and the University, Leavis 
described analysis as 'a constructive or creative process'.96 The 
full significance of this formulation only emerges in Leavis's discus- 
sion of the poetry that fails to satisfy these predicates. 
'Imagery' is a matter of 'particularity, intensity and emotional 
sincerity'(240) as Leavis demonstrated in his analysis of Wordsworth's 
'Surprised by joy'. When it fails to involve these qualities, the 
resultant poetry prohibits 'strong realisation', as in Wordsworth's 
'Calais Beach', and 'there is nothing to qualify the sweet effusion 
of solemn sentiment'.(243) Leavis was not able to let this stand 
as a culminating observation on the weakness of the poem. Even the 
terms of the disparagement convey a tone of disapprobation, but this 
is made explicit in the summary. The poetry is described as 'cloying' 
and the sestet 'adds saccharine to syrup and makes the sonnet positive- 
ly distasteful'.(243) Despite the metaphor, 'distasteful' does not 
mean merely 'unpalatable'; it involves a more fundamental value - 
judgement. Similarly, Housman's poem(245), which might (Leavis said) 
be defended on the grounds of its 'hunger after beauty', is condemned 
by him in terms which also invoke an ethical, rather than merely aes- 
thetic, judgement: 'the kind of beauty offered values itself 
implicitly at a rate that a mature mind can't endorse'.(246) 'Mature' 
clearly has a pressure of moral evaluation behind it. 
96. Cf. p 70. 
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Leavis's analysis of poetry does not work only positively, in the 
sense of suggesting the ideal relations between 'thought', 'imagery' 
and 'sincerity' and measuring the poetry according to that standard. 
In the negative sense, poetry that does not attain to the standard 
proposed is seen as a failure not only in terms of its poetical short- 
comings but also, more importantly, in the broader terms of 'moral 
value'. Tennyson's 'Break, break, break' Leavis described as 'inferior 
in kind'(213) to Wordsworth's 'A slumber did my spirit seal': 
"Inferior in kind" - by what standards? Here we come 
to the point at which literary criticism, as it must, 
enters overtly into questions of emotional hygiene and 
moral value - more generally (there seems no other 
adequate phrase), of spiritual health(214) 
Literary criticism has to deal with 'questions of emotional hygiene 
and moral value' because 'judgement . . . [is] inseparable from that 
profoundest sense of relative value that determines . . . the important 
choices of actual life'.97 A poet of Tennyson's 'emotional habit' 
'we should expect to find . . . noticeably given to certain weaknesses 
and vices'.(213) Not just weaknesses, but 'vices'; and these phrases 
do not apply only to the poetry, but to the poet as well. A similar 
logic allowed Leavis to expand a criticism of Shelley's poetry into 
a denunciation of Shelley's 'viciousness' and 'corruption'. For poetry 
and criticism in Leavis's view have an ultimately moral obligation 
to be responsible for 'habits' and attitudes that operate in 'actual 
life', not merely in the poetic or literary- critical realms: 
97. Ibid. p 35. 
137 
. . . in the examination of [Shelley's ]poetry the 
literary critic finds himself passing, by inevitable 
transitions, from describing characteristics to making 
adverse judgements about emotional quality; and so to 
a kind of discussion in which, by its proper methods and 
in pursuit of its proper ends, literary criticism becomes 
the diagnosis of what, looking for an inclusive term, we 
can only call spiritual malady.(219) 
The key phrase is, of course, "by its proper methods and in pursuit 
of its proper ends'. The 'methods' are those of close verbal analysis 
of specific poetic examples. The 'ends' determined what that analysis 
should be directed toward discovering and how its conclusions should 
be extended into evaluative judgements. The 'ends' are ultimately 
to formulate a 'sense of relative value': that is, 'value' in the 
poetry, the poet, the critic and the criticism, 'relative' to a moral 
standard operating in 'actual life'. Failure according to these speci- 
fications is therefore identified as indulgence, lack of intelligence, 
immaturity, insincerity: 'spiritual malady'. The moralist aesthetic 
derives inevitably from Leavis's critical method and his version of 
the ultimate purpose of literary judgement. 
The revealing term in the above paragraph is 'diagnosis'. It was 
because of the diagnostic /analytical impulse that existed in the back- 
ground of Leavis's literary critical endeavour that his critical judge- 
ments were extended into a set of valuations that took their substance 
from a set of moral standards which were said to operate in 'actual 
life'. For Leavis, the literary critical and the social were not 
discrete fields of intellectual inquiry: literary criticism was a 
means of analysing not just literature but its cultural context. 
With regard to the individual writer, therefore, literary criticism 
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represented a means of analysing his poetry and, by extension, that 
poetry's personal (moral) context. The problem for a reader of Leavis's 
criticism lies in the extent to which its literary evaluations require 
him to accede to the reciprocal moral judgements. Problems of 
'morality' do not trouble all readers of poetry and Leavis's criticism 
therefore retains its validity whilst its vocabulary of evaluative 
terms (for example, 'sincerity' as applied to Hardy) do not necessarily 
collude with the moral perspective to make the literary and moral 
judgements synonymous. Where the terminology does effect this elision 
between critical and moral positions ('intelligence', 'discipline') 
- as in the essays on Keats and Shelley - the criticism, for all its 
analytical rigour, becomes disablingly restrictive in its fundamental 
approach. 
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3. 'The Great Tradition' (1948) 
1. Criticism of the Novel: Leavis's organising principles 
The 'diagnostic' orientation of Leavis's literary criticism manifested 
itself in the terminology of evaluation that he employed. In his 
study of poetry, the value -terms Leavis made use of in the analysis 
of poetic achievement were linked - in his own overall system, though 
not ineluctably - with moral values. The same value -terms that were 
used in the discussion of lyric poetry were taken up again by Leavis 
for his study of the novel. A wholesale transference of the evaluative 
terminology was made between the poetry criticism and The Crcat 
Tradition(1948). This book was Leavis's synoptic introduction to 
the English novel, in the same sense that Revaluation represented 
his survey of the development of English poetry according to the 
historical changes he himself saw as significant. This viewpoint 
in turn was governed by Leavis's perceptions, influenced by T.S.Eliot, 
of what constituted significant poetic achievement. Leavis formulated 
his sense of this significance in his critical terminology. Similarly, 
with regard to the novel, Leavis's study was organised according to 
the requirements of two basic concepts, of 'tradition' and 'moral 
responsibility': 
the major novelists . . . count in the same way as the 
major poets, in the sense that they not only change the 
possibilities of the art for practitioners and readers, 
but that they are significant in terms of the human 
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awareness they promote; awareness of the possibilities 
of life.(2)1 
.[the great English novelists] are all distinguished 
by a vital capacity for experience, a kind of reverent 
openness before life, and a marked moral intensity.(9) 
The stipulation that a great writer should promote 'human awareness 
. of the possibilities of life' was derived directly from Leavis's 
sense of what attitudes and habits would be central to the appropriate 
remedial response to his own diagnosis of contemporary social and 
cultural conditions. His literary criticism was directly modelled 
on the diagnostic /remedial pattern of the early writings. The 
polemical substance of that diagnosis emerged in the criticism in 
the shape of this moral connection. The study of the novel was set 
in the context of the ameliorative remedial programme upon which 
Leavis's critical enterprise was founded. 
'Tradition' and the 'moral intensity' of the novelist were principal 
themes around which Leavis's criticism of the novel was organised. 
The approach was thus doubly selective. The attempt to designate 
a particular 'tradition' implies the selection of material on grounds 
not of literary judgement alone but because of perceived causal links 
between respective parts. That which is excluded finds itself so 
because it has qualities, which may from another point of view be 
equally significant, alien to the class of similarities and connections 
that characterises the particular major line. Secondly, the 'moral' 
1. Figures in parentheses refer to page numbers in The Great Tradition 
(1948). 
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prerequisite itself limits the material available for consideration 
to certain types of literary work. It immediately places 'outside' 
the tradition types of literature said not to express a certain kind 
of 'moral intensity' - a concept in itself formulable only by means 
of a specialised evaluative vocabulary - and to be excluded from the 
major line of development is to be downgraded in terms of valuation. 
The principles of Leavis's novel criticism were thus limiting and 
restrictive by virtue of the nature of their orientation towards the 
literature. The criticism may nevertheless make some contribution 
to an understanding of the selected material, with the proviso that 
an agglomeration of critically evaluated authors and works can be 
taken as the 'great' or supervening 'tradition' only in terms of 
the preliminary qualifications established by Leavis's approach. 
(i) 'Tradition' 
Implicit in the title of The Great Tradition is the notion of 
'tradition' as an applicable term in the realm of 'lesser' writers 
and artists: it implies the idea of a minor 'tradition' or traditions. 
Minor novelists are not excluded from the discussion of the major 
authors, but by their very nature contribute to a definition or de- 
lineation of the qualities that make, a contrario, the 'great' 
novelists 'great'. Throughout the introductory chapter of the book, 
in a series of footnotes and asides, Leavis sketched the outline of 
an underlying minor tradition in the development of the English novel. 
This outline proceeded by contrast with negative examples, although 
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its sketchiness prohibited detailed exposition or analysis. The lines 
of development that Leavis postulated can be clearly indicated and 
the key categories under which he classified areas of relative value 
begin to emerge. 
'Tradition' for,Leavis was in part a matter of 'influence', although 
the identification of links between authors was as much a matter`of 
dispelling the prejudices of fashion as illustrating definite con- 
nections. Many essentially minor novelists have been overvalued by 
fashionable popularity. The 'present vogue of the Victorian age' 
meant that 'one after another the minor novelists of that period are 
being commended to our attention . . . and there is a marked tendency 
to suggest that they not only have various kinds of interest to offer 
but that they are living classics. (Are they not all in the literary 
histories ?)'.(1 -2) The minor authors ('Trollope, Charlotte Yonge, 
Mrs. Gaskell, Wilkie Collins, Charles Reade, Charles and Henry Kingsley, 
Marryat, Shorthouse') are ranked in this estimation alongside the 
genuinely 'classical novelists.'(2) Leavis aimed to restore a hier- 
archy of valuable texts, with the great number of minor works falling 
somewhere in the middle ground, between the great 'classics' and the 
negligible failures; they all 'have various kinds of interest to 
offer', without aspiring to greatness. Thus Peacock's books 'have 
a permanent life as light reading . . . for minds with mature 
interests' (18); Walter Scott, 'a kind of inspired folk -lorist, 
. . was a great and very intelligent man' but he lacked 'the creative 
writer's interest in literature'.(14) This vocabulary is revealing, 
as the pressure of meaning and implied value noticeably begins to 
accrete to a word as apparently unambiguous and innocuous as 'interest'. 
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From being a neutral descriptive term the word is increasingly burdened 
with responsibilities as a key evaluative term, even though the de- 
finitive characteristics that constitute its significance as such 
are never expounded. Similarly, Leavis's use of the word 'mature' 
conceals a large amount of pre- conceived valuation. This word fre- 
quently recurs throughout this study with an increasing weight of 
judicial assessment relative to its occurrence. What it implies, 
though, is never more than vaguely apparent and 'mature' gradually 
becomes part of the obscure vocabulary of evaluation - along with 
'discipline', 'intelligence' -which Leavis employed to formulate his 
main critical judgements. The meaning of this vocabulary only becomes 
effective if the reader tacitly accedes to each component's apparent 
force as a term in a coherent system of evaluative judgement. 
The figures peopling the ' minor tradition' have a bearing on their 
successors. 'Out of Scott a bad tradition came' which 'spoiled Fen; 
more Cooper' and produced in Stevenson ' "literary" sophistication 
and fine writing'.(5n) Conversely, of the Brontës, Charlotte 'had 
a remarkable talent' and has 'a permanent interest of a minor kind'. 
while Emily was 'the genius'. She 'broke completely' from the pre- 
vailing traditions of Scott and the eighteenth century 'in the most 
challenging way.. . . Out of her a minor tradition comes, to which 
belongs, most notably, The House with the Green Shutters.'(27) 
Thackeray, for his part, remains 'minor' because 'his attitudes and 
the essential substance of his interests are so limìted'.(21) However, 
for Leavis,the most interesting group of 'lesser' novelists was that 
represented by Fielding, Richardson and Fanny Burney, the trio of 
significant influences on Jane Austen. 
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Leavis's description of the relationship between these three writers 
and Jane Austen, and between each other, is complicated and partially 
obscured by a confusion of qualified evaluations and imprecise desig- 
nations of influence: 
Fielding deserves the place of importance given him in 
the literary histories . . . because he leads to Jane 
Austen.. . . He made Jane Austen possible by opening 
the central tradition of English fiction.(11) 
. . . the conventional talk about the 'perfect 
construction of Tom Jones . . . is absurd. There can't 
be subtlety of organisation without richer matter to 
organise, and subtler interests, than Fielding has to 
offer.(3 -4) 
'Richer matter' and 'subtler interests': these phrases are consonant 
with the term 'mature'. In his arbitrary dismissal of Tom Jones, 
Leavis seems to have had in mind only the bawdy and picaresque elements 
- although the nature of Leavis's comment means that his can only 
be a speculative supposition. What is interesting about this statement 
is the implication that the form of a novel (its 'organisation') 
reflects its content or presented themes (its 'interests') directly, 
without qualification. What Leavis was arguing was that the technical 
or formal achievement of a work of art was entirely dependent upon 
the nature of the treated material or subject matter. His version 
of the form /content relationship was that 'great' art could not be 
wrought from material lacking in 'richness' or 'subtlety' - in a word, 
'maturity': 'Fielding's attitudes, and his concern with human nature, 
are simple, and not such as to produce an effect of anything but 
monotony'.(4) 
The way Fielding, Richardson and Burney exerted an influence over 
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Austen was, as Leavis described it, an intricate process. In contrast 
to Fielding's 'external action', he argued, Richardson offered 'a 
more inward interest' and dealt more effectively with 'emotional and 
moral states'.(4) Nevertheless, his interests are also 'extremely 
limited in range and variety'. The qualifications attend immediately 
upon the praise, approximating a sense of the actual value of the 
writing. This approximation is defined by' further comparison, ih 
this case with Fanny Burney, seen in this context as a kind of filter 
between Richardson and Austen. For while Richardson is 'a major fact 
in the background of Jane Austen' - which periphrasis we take to mean 
that Richardson had some kind of 'influence' on Austen - his dealings 
with characters on an elevated social scale are too 'immitigably vulgar' 
to be of direct value to Austen; Fanny Burney 'transposed' Richardson 
'into educated life'(4) and thus made him accessible to Austen. This 
is a point where the lesser tradition intervenes in the major line 
of development. The significance of Richardson and Burney as novelists 
is that they allowed for and facilitated Jane Austen's achievement. 
The 'tradition' described at this secondary level is inconsequential 
except at such moments of direct intervention in the major line. 
'Tradition', therefore, stands as something more than a collective 
noun for separate groups in a hierarchy of authors: 
To distinguish the major novelists in the spirit proposed 
is to form a more useful idea of tradition (and to 
recognise that the conventionally established view of the 
past of English fiction needs to be drastically revised). 
It is in terms of the major novelists, those significant in 
the way suggested, that tradition, in any serious sense, has 
its significance.(3) 
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The value of such a notion of 'tradition' is to enable the critic 
better to formulate his impressions, aiming to provide a new grammar 
of ideas with which to articulate his perceptions. Its legitimacy 
as an organising principle depends on the terms under which the concept 
is defined and the justifications for its exclusiveness. That it 
must be exclusive in order to have a function is clear; too great 
a level of generalisation would be of little use in identifying what 
is valuable: 'There is habit nowadays of suggesting that there is 
a tradition of "the English novel" and that all that can be said of 
the tradition (that being its peculiarity) is that the English novel" 
can be anything you like.'(3) But the principles governing exclusion 
must be coherent. T.S. Eliot's version of 'tradition', expressed 
with characteristic hyperbole, attempted to impose it as a concept 
over the whole history of literature and to use it as a means for 
referring to all existing literature as a holistic entity. New work 
effected an alteration of that entity that both redefined the whole 
and gave a context to the new: 
The existing order is complete before the new work 
arrives; for order to persist after the supervention 
of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever 
so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, 
2 values of each work of art towards the whole are adjusted. 
The relativity of Leavis's evaluations, the greater and lesser 
'traditions', illustrates that it was his particular concern to dis- 
criminate between the parts that comprised the whole and not to 
2. T.S.Eliot Selected Essays (1951) p 15. 
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envisage the whole as having a separate, superior existence. The 
'adjustment' of historical sequences by the 'supervention of novelty' 
was the idea that Leavis took from Eliot. It is this idea that informs 
his conception of the nature and function of 'tradition'. Those 
writers who are subordinate to the major line, Fielding, Richardson, 
Fanny Burney, constitute, despite their inferiority, a tangible 
tradition of their own, which was more influential the nearer in time 
those they influenced were. Tradition has an historical aspect: 
Tom Jones found favour with 'Scott, and Coleridge' because 'standards 
areformed in comparison, and what opportunities had they for that ?' 
With regard to Jane Austen, 'if the influences bearing on her hadn't 
comprised something fairly to be called tradition she couldn't have 
found herself and her true direction'.(S) Not only do the influences 
exist, they make themselves felt as a 'tradition', as a tangible cul- 
tural phenomenon that is substantial and not merely the consequence 
of ephemeral fashion. The problem here is that Leavis also seemed 
to insist on the inversion of this relationship and to argue that 
the 'influences' would not have been so potent, in the sense of pro- 
ducing an effect in Jane Austen, had they not constituted 'something 
fairly to be called tradition'. The emphasis changes according to 
the situation of the point of view in time. From Jane Austen's 
position, the immediate past developments of the novel were visible, 
Leavis argued, as the 'tradition' established by Fielding and 
Richardson, the latter mediated through Fanny Burney. From the point 
of view of a reader coming after Jane Austen, her emergence has a 
significance that projects both backwards in time and into the future: 
her work has a 'retroactive effect': 
as we look back beyond her we see in what goes before, 
and see because of her, potentialities and significances 
14 
brought out in such a way that, for us, she creates 
the tradition we see leading down to her. Her work, 
like the work of all great creative writers, gives 
a meaning to the past. 
That is, the group of writers pre- eminent in Austen's immediate past 
(Fielding, Richardson, Burney) only coalesces into a 'tradition' when 
their creative endeavours achieve a transformation in the writings 
of an author in the main line of development. 'Her work . . gives 
a meaning to the past': not in itself, but in the critic's reading 
of it, which also involves a predisposition to interpreting the past 
in a certain way. Leavis's statement here is not as philosophically 
profound as it might appear. What he was saying, in effect, was that 
the influence - in terms.of adjusting and expanding the possibilit.ies 
of the novel form - of the preceding novelists can be indicated in 
Jane Austen, who can therefore be seen as the epitome or consummation 
of the creative efforts óf her predecessors. Their mutual association 
in Austen thus gives the collocation 'Fielding, Richardson, Burney', 
a renewed significance and may change the reader's perception of the 
importance of their respective achievements. 'Tradition' in this 
sense is merely a convenient shorthand for expressing this kind of 
relationship. 
In another sense, 'tradition' for Leavis simply refers to dis- 
cernible groups of related works or authors and their own limited 
range of influence: for example, the 'bad tradition' that came out 
of Scott, or the 'minor' one that sprang from Wuthering Heights. 
The looseness of the term at this level produces an occasional 
tautology - 'by great tradition I mean the tradition to which what 
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is great in English literature belongs'(7) - which is more a matter 
of style and less a problem of method. Thissimpler usage of the word 
has necessarily a less firm grasp on the historical context of a 
particular work. Groups ('traditions') of writers are aligned in 
a similar ranking in terms of relative value and the historical 
differential is effectively erased. Bunyan is thus classified accord- 
ing to the same terms as James Joyce. Bunyan 
counts immeasurably in the English -speaking conscious- 
ness; . . . his influence would tend strongly to 
reinforce the un- Flaubertian quality of the line of 
English classical fiction . . . as well as to cooperate 
with the 2 onsonian tradition of morally significant 
typicality in characters.(2n) 
In Joyce 
there is no organic principle determining, informing 
and controlling into a vital whole, the elaborate 
analogical structure, the extraordinary variety of 
technical devices, the attempts at an exhaustive 
rendering of consciousness, for which Ulysses is 
remarkable(25 -26) 
However, Bunyan's 'organising principle' - the integrity of his moral 
concerns - must be seen as resulting in part from his historical 
context. Moral preoccupations adopt the forms of the prevailing 
cultural milieu; and if in the 'modern' period an equally firm corres- 
pondence between literary and moral enterprise cannot always be 
identified (Leavis found it in Lawrence) this is because the forms 
of moral preoccupation in this period have altered and the literature 
has altered in reflecting that change. Comparison with the seventeenth 
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century may serve to illuminate those changes and propose some notion 
of the way such changes develop. However, it does not seem wholly 
legitimate to establish the forms and preoccupations of an earlier 
period as criteria for the evaluation of incommensurable preoccupations 
in the literature of the more immediate past. This tendency to make 
comparisons between heterogeneous elements is repeated in the essay 
on George Eliot and Henry James. It reveals the way in which Leàvis 
formulated a critical perception in one field and then attempted to 
assert its universal applicability; this reflects the restricted 
nature of the effort to establish such a thing as a 'great tradition'. 
Notwithstanding the drawbacks of Leavis's use of the term, the 
concept of 'tradition' provides a flexible framework for profitable 
discussion because it is at a level of generalisation that makes it 
unnecessary to go outside its framework for excluded but relevant 
material. All literature is discussable within this framework, which 
is not of itself exclusive and therefore has no need to justify acts 
of selection. It is when Leavis begins to discuss single entities 
and their relationships that relative evaluations appear and a process 
of selection is involved. The general usage of the term supplies 
the stable pattern for the whole design within which the details are 
matters of constant re- assessment. The crux is the degree to which 
the substance of Leavis's version of the details, which is de endent 
on the legitimacy of the definition and operation of his key value - 




Leavis's value -terms are never stated directly but arise from the 
increasing pressure of significance that gradually attaches to certain 
repeated words and phrases. Significance accrues with incremental 
repetition and plain words of apparently straightforward sense are 
made to bear an unusual burden of meaning - a burden that is inten- 
sified by the deliberate avoidance of an overt exposition of this 
meaning. The vocabulary gestures obliquely towards an unstated 
referent that lies at a more generalised level behind the.immediate 
argument; cognition depends on the correct interpretation of these 
gestures and on drawing conclusions in the abstract about the under- 
lying formulation. Leavis's avoidance of theoretical analysis is 
in a way irresponsible, as well as tending to obscure the principal 
features of his argument. For conclusions must be drawn about the 
underlying assumptions in order to give the overloaded vocabulary 
more than a vaguely impressive weight of significance, and to approach 
a generalisation in the abstract about what constitutes value in 
literature; which is, after all, Leavis's prime concern. 
For Leavis, the relationship between form and content has a funda- 
mentally moral dimension: 
when we examine the formal perfection of Emma, we find 
that it can be appreciated only in terms of the moral 
preoccupations that characterise the novelist's peculiar 
interest in life.(8) 
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It was James who put his finger on the weakness in 
Madame Bovary: the discrepancy between the technical 
('aesthetic') intensity, with the implied attribution 
of interest to the subject, and the actual moral and 
human paucity of this subject on any mature valuation.(12 -13) 
The two categories of critical appraisal that in Leavis correspond 
respectively to the form of the novel and its subject- matter are the 
analysis of moral values, or 'preoccupations', and the appreciation 
of literary technique. At the time of publication of The Great 
Tradition one reviewer, discussing Leavis's 'moral or quasi -moral 
judgements' made the point that 
Leavis nowhere goes into the question of whether these 
judgements are of the same logical type as those made 
in purely "technical" criticism, or how they are 
derived from the latter if they are not.3 
Leavis would argue that the question does not arise, since in his 
scheme moral interestcannotbe separated from technique, as the 
criticism of Flaubert revealed. There is obviously a way of 
approaching literature which is able to see a distinct separation 
of formal attributes and subject- matter - between aesthetics and 
morality - and it is this approach which raises the question of their 
relationship as types. However, the structure of Leavis's argument 
is such that it did not allow for such a separation to be acknowledged 
and he thus escaped the problem by ignoring it. 
3. W.W. Robson, Review of English Studies, new series, I (1950) 
p 378. 
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Whether or not Leavis will acknaaledge it, the question of the compara- 
bility of "technical" and moral types of criticism does arise and 
it is relevant to the general matter of his critical method. The 
analysis of literary technique is fundamentally an objective procedure, 
insofar as it sustains its own definitive terminology that relates 
to stateable facts about the text (properties of rhyme and metre) 
and requires no external referent - no appeal to another authority 
or orthodoxy, moral or otherwise - to validate its conclusions. With 
the discussion of moral values, judgements of an essentially subjective 
nature are a necessity. Discussing F.W. Bateson's notion of the prac- 
tice of 'literary history', Leavis said that the material of literary 
history must be analysed critically, 
by an appropriate and discriminating response; a response, 
that is, involving the kind of activity that produces value 
judgements. And these judgements are not, in so far as 
they are real, expressions of opinion on facts that can be 
possessed and handled neutrally (so to speak).4 
The relationship of the subjective to the objective process is simple 
in the sense that all literature is a matter of words; but once the 
objective facts about a tct have been mediated through the individual 
reader into a series of subjective judgements, it can be seen that 
the relationship is neither simple, nor logical in the sense of fixed 
and constant. 
4. 'Criticism and Literary History' [review of F.W.Bateson, English 
Poetry and the English Language (1934)] , Scrutiny IV, 2 pp 
186 -7. 
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Subjective judgement is dependent on responses that relate to a 
structure of values derived from the individual's private experience. 
It therefore invites considerations on the text that are not neces- 
sarily inherently appropriate, but are 'accidents of personal 
association'.5 C.H.Rickword wrote that 
though it may be that the critic's ultimate concern is 
with the conception of life (the 'values') of which the 
novel is a vehicle, yet he is only so concerned in as 
far as that conception is made active through art. . . . 
That conception . . . cannot be known apart from the 
form in which it becomes manifest. Obviously, a right 
apprehension of that 'form' depends on a right 
apprehension of its elements.6 
Leavis's assumption of an inevitable rather than a potential connection 
between morality and aesthetics means that evaluative judgements that 
he made carry an air of specious objectivity where they ought to 
acknowledge their subjective tendencies. Leavis's argument in The 
Great Tradition is problematic because it rested on abstract value - 
terms that were required to perform a concrete evaluative function. 
The terminology of the detailed critical analysis (words such as 
'intelligence' and 'maturity') itself referred back to the underlying 
5. 'The sentimental person in whom a work of art arouses all sorts 
of emotions which have nothing to do with that work of art whatso- 
ever, but are accidents of personal association, is an incomplete 
artist.' 
T.S.Eliot, The Sacred Wood (1920) p 7. 
6. C.H.Rickword, 'A Note on Fiction' (1926); reprinted in Edgell 
Rickword, Essays and Opinions 1921 -31, ed. Alan Young (1974). 
Leavis published this essay in his anthology of articles from 
The Calendar of Modern Letters, Towards Standards of Criticism 
(1933). 
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moral component in Leavis's account of the relationship between form 
and content. The concepts of 'morality' and 'tradition' have no 
essential or objective significance other than that generated by 
Leavis's dependence upon them as organising principles on which he 
could proceed in the matter of discriminating amongst the heterogeneous 
material of 'the English novel'. As with the criticism of poetry, 
Leavis's commentary on the novel is more valid the more its value -terms 
are independent of the elision between literary and moral judgements. 
With the novel, however, this problem becomes more acute because of 
the implied evaluative bearing that the realist narrative has towards 
its represented material. 
2. George Eliot and Henry James: some problems of method. 
Classic realism requires the narrative voice to evaluate., 
the events it recounts as well as to make sense of them. 
For the practice of literary criticism one of the fundamental 
differences between poetry and narrative prose of the nineteenth 
century organic- realist genre is that the critic encounters in the 
narrative a simultaneous or concurrent critique of the characters 
it represents and the events and exchanges it relates. The critic 
7. Catherine Belsey, 'Re- reading the great tradition', in Re- reading 
English, ed. Peter Widdowson (1982) p 125. 
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of lyric poetry aims to wrest a meaning from enigmatic poetic language. 
The critic of the novel intervenes or mediates between the content 
of the narrative and the author's apparent evaluation of it. The 
relationship between form and content has this other aspect: the form 
(narrative structure, language, imagery, tones of voice) reflects 
its subject- matter in the direct sense; it is also modified, though, 
according to the author's own predisposition towards the content, 
which is inevitably subjective. The critic intervenes in this relation 
and a critical account of the narrative involves a reconstruction 
and assessment of the author's evaluative intention - which has to 
be derived from the formal characteristics that contain it. 
Leavis's critical terminology recognised no formal difference 
between poetry and prose. However, the nature of the criticism of 
narrative prose meant that Leavis was able to engage more fully in 
a debate with the novelist regarding the 'moral responsibilities' 
evinced in his writings. In the criticism of poetry the moral issues 
were raised only speculatively; with the novel, Leavis was able to 
pinpoint exact moments of what he saw as authorial aberrancy: these 
he could represent as failures, using literary terms which had an 
inescapable moralist implication. The difficulties that this kind 
of critical practice generates can be seen in Leavis's discussion 
of George Eliot and Henry James. 
A simple formulation of Leavis's approach to Eliot and James is 
to say that in each he identifies the 'great', the mediocre and the 
negligible, although each category is marked by various qualifying 
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clauses and each novel has its place in the hierarchy of an evaluation 
of the artist's whole oeuvre. Thus. Adam Bede, whilst 'conventional' 
is nevertheless a 'classic' and Silas Marner, despite its limitations, 
is a 'minor masterpiece'. The gradations referring to 'minor' examples 
proceed from criteria identical to those which are used to signify 
what is 'great' in an author's work. A similar approach is applied 
to both the lesser and the major works. The designation of items 
of relative value is not confined to a comparative analysis of complete 
novels. Leavis was not protective of the integrity of the novel as 
a single unit and he dissected and dismantled the texts in an effort 
to gradate areas of interest within the single novel. The famous 
example is his separation of 'Gwendolen Harleth' from Daniel Deronda; 
but Leavis practised similar separations elsewhere. The effect is 
to represent George Eliot's achievement not as a series of complete 
novels of varying degrees of value and interest but asa collocation 
of passages - themes, dialogues, characterisations - that constitute 
the best part of the artist's achievement. The two elements of the 
approach are the practical analysis of passages that are seen as 
successful and the diagnosis of areas that are deemed to have failed. 
The two approaches are substantially different. Practical analysis 
remains largely in the realm of literary criticism. The diagnostic 
impulse tends to look beyond the immediate text to biographical details 
and speculations about the author, as well as the teleology of literary 
production. In the case of Henry James the problem becomes 
particularly acute, as the novelist's life was seen as responsible 
for the failure of the later novels. Leavis made a direct moral con- 
nection between biography and creativity. The analysis moved away 
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from specifically identifiable features of the texts into a realm 
of unverifiable speculation. This was an abstraction that was com- 
pounded by his judging James's novels by the standards set in Eliot, 
a novelist with different creative intentions. In order to gain a 
clear impression of the way Leavis's critical method dealt with the 
second -order novels of these writers it is necessary to reconstruct 
Leavis's discussion of them. In this way, the dominant categories 
of appraisal become apparent and his key value -terms emerge. 
'The appreciation of George Eliot's oeuvre has not been put on 
a critical basis and reduced to consistency'. The 'accepted view'8 
of George Eliot's achievement separates her work into the novels of 
'reminiscence' and the novels that are the work of the intellectual; 
the implicit valuation is that where the intellect intrudes the novel 
suffers. By this convention, Scenes of Clerical Life, Adam Bede, 
The Mill on the Floss and Silas Marner are her 'classics' and Romola, 
Felix Holt, the Radical and Daniel Deronda represent the work of 'the 
distinguished intellectual rather than the great novelist'.(34) This 
leaves Middlemarch aside, as generally recognised as 'one of the great 
masterpieces of English fiction.'(34 -35) Leavis quoted from The Common 
Reader (1925 first series) Virginia Woolf's judgement that Middlemarch 
'is one of the few English novels written for grown -up people'. Leavis 
saw this convention as one of the reasons for the novel's 'established 
recognition'.(35) The problem with the convention, he argued, was 
8. Leavis referred to Elton, A Survey of English Literature 1830 -80 
vol II (1920); cf. The Great Tradition p 124. 
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its inconsistency: 'For if you think so highly of Middlemarch, then, 
to be consistent, you must be more qualified in your praise of the 
early things than persisting convention recognises. Isn't there, 
in fact, a certain devaluing to be done ?'(35) The 'devaluing' that 
Leavis did was a mixture of diminishing theimportance of recognisedly 
successful works and of identifying representative and significant 
areas of weakness in others. Scenes of Clerical Life is a 'remarkable' 
book, he said, which revealed the 'promise of a great novelist'; 
but while it is so, the predominant quality of the book is 'charm' 
and the fact that the material is based on recollection indicates 
that this was the author's 'prentice- work'.(36)9 Adam Bede, similarly, 
offers 'genuine attractions', though the book has been over -praised. 
The weakness lies in an absence of a unifying creative impulse at 
the centre of the novel, so that 'it is too resolvable into the 
separate interests that we can see the author to have started with'.(49) 
The depiction of rustic life is also 'charming' but much of the book 
is 'idealised' as well, as a comparison between Adam and Caleb Garth 
of Middlemarch reveals. Recognising the idealising element in this 
comparison 'involves limiting judgements for the critic'.(37) The 
limitation has to do with the seriousness of the subject- matter of 
the novel and the interference of merely 'artistic' conventions. 
An organised unity is achieved, but some of the dramatic elements 
are imposed by the author on the structure for the sake of convention 
and 'there is not at work in the whole any pressure from her 
9. In the slightly revised edition of The Great Tradition (Harmonds- 
worth 1962) Leavis rewrote this paragraph, concluding: 'Her 
histories are straight from life: she doesn't invent - she hasn't 
arrived at a sense of her art that prompts her to do so.'(p 49) 
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profounder experience to compel an inevitable development'.(37) That 
is, the dynamic of the novel is part genuine, part artificial; the 
combination makes the novel 'satisfactory' but the artifice 'means 
an abeyance of the profounder responsibility' and the result is con- 
ventional rather than original. 
The vocabulary of these assessments indicates the way in which 
Leavis's criticism of the particular novels took the form of a response 
based upon his assertion of the moralist relation between form and 
content. 'Perfection of form' is directly dependent upon the nature 
of the 'moral preoccupations' of the particular narrative. Scenes 
of Clerical Life and Adam Bede lacked the prerequisite kind of 'pre- 
occupations' that this moralist critique demanded. Their content 
was not adequate to the stipulated seriousness of interest that Leavis 
required for the greater artistic achievements. What Leavis seems 
to have missed in these novels is originality and profundity. They 
therefore occupy a lower rung in his estimation than Middlemarch; 
but these novels are generally regarded as lesser works in the Eliot - 
canon and Leavis's categories have demonstrated only this convention. 
Leavis articulated his reasons for placing them thus in relation to 
Middlemarch in order to introduce into the discussion the value -terms 
and concepts that would enable him to argue against the conventional 
valuation of the 'intellectual' novels, hitherto commonly disparaged. 
For this reason Leavis introduced at this point phrases such as 'pro- 
founder experience', 'inevitable development', 'an abeyance of the 
profounder responsibility'. The assumptions behind this vocabulary 
made themselves felt more strongly with regard to The Mill on the 
Floss. 
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The weakness that Leavis pointed to in The Mill on the Floss is 
more radical and has bearings on all the subsequent fiction that Eliot 
produced. The writing in this novel is of a different order from 
that which preceded it. The recollections of the novel are not 
idealised or 'soften[ed] with a haze of sentiment'; Mrs. Poyser, Dinah 
and Adam could not exist here, they 'belong to a different world'.(38) 
The change is a consequence of greater application on the author's 
part: a combination of intelligence and 'feeling and remembering'. 
This, for Leavis, is an 'obvious' fact, but one which is not generally 
acknowledged. Yet a great deal of the strength of the novel has to 
do with 'the strong autobiographical element': this is a crux for 
Leavis. The fact of 'the poignantly immediate presence of the author' 
produces the 'vividness', and its associated qualities, of the book; 
yet it also contains the key to its fundamental limitation. Maggie 
Tulliver is too closely identified with the author, and the auto- 
biographical element causes Eliot to suspend her intelligence and 
her judgement to produce a fiction that has a self -idealisation as 
heroine. The result is that Maggie's spiritual nature is accepted 
without criticism - by both the author and reader - and her immaturity, 
though presented with 'great sympathy' is not 'placed' by 'relating 
it to mature experience'.(42) With regard to Maggie, Eliot's 
intelligence is supervened by emotion; this in turn produces a 
dramatic artifice, of a kind with that noticed in Adam Bede, that betrays 
George Eliot's real talent. The ending, for example, partakes of 
this artificiality and represents significant failure on the author's 
behalf: 
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. . . something so like a daydream indulgence we are 
all familiar with could not have imposed itself on 
the novelist as the right ending if her mature 
intelligence had been fully engaged, giving her full 
self- knowledge.(45) 
Leavis objected further that 'the soulful side of Maggie' was 'offered 
by George Eliot herself . . . with a remarkable absence of criticism'. 
(41) 
The authorial evaluation of the character of Maggie and the critical 
evaluation, which aspires to greater objectivity, were in dispute 
at this point. Leavis's critique interposed itself between the text 
and the author and challenged the values the author is seeking to 
promote. The climax of The Mill on the Floss is seen as 'daydream 
indulgence', a resolution of narrative events that is an 'artificial' 
imposition rather than 'inevitable' dramatic development. We might 
agree -that the end of the novel is melodramatic and primitively 
symbolic. Leavis's criticism formulated his unease with this part 
of the narrative in terms that invoked his moralistic aesthetic: 
'mature intelligence' and 'self -knowledge'. In inverting the conven- 
tional valuation that applauded Eliot's personal reminiscence and 
deprecated her intellectuality, Leavis employed value -terms that had 
implications beyond literary criticism. His adjustment of the conven- 
tion was a judgement upon it, implying that mature intelligence and 
self -knowledge were in abeyance in the habit of the conventional 
estimate. The forms that the moralist aesthetic took in its inter- 
vention in literary study can be seen in the discussion of the early 
novels of Henry James, where 'early' was approximately defined as 
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'before The Portrait of a Lady'(1888). This passage of The Great 
Tradition follows the comparison of that novel with Daniel Deronda 
and its main aim was to elucidate 'the conditions that enabled [James] 
to make a variation on 'Gwendolen Harleth' . . . something so different. 
positively, from that work. . . By conditions I mean the inner 
conditions - largely determined as they are by the outer. I mean 
the essential interests and attitudes that characterise his outlook 
on the world and his response to life'.(126) 
Leavis obviously felt that 'the essential interests and attitudes' 
of the author were a main source of interest for the critic.10 They 
are onlydeterminable by means of an examination of the implicit evalu- 
ative bearing of the author towards his narrative. Leavis's criticism, 
therefore, concentrated on this aspect of the novels in the process 
of discriminating amongst them. Their relative qualities were assessed 
according to the nature and type of the orientation of the author 
to the presented material. Leavis was less concerned with the formal 
characteristics and thematic developments of the narrative than with 
this area of intervention between author and text. Again, Leavis 
was only able to discuss the moral orientation of the author by means 
of the loaded vocabulary of value -terms that was emerging from the 
repetitively suggestive use of certain words and phrases. On the 
other hand, this terminology was itself dependent for its meaning 
10. 'By "interests" I mean the kinds of profound concern - having 
the urgency of personal problems, and felt as moral problems, 
more than personal in significance - that lie beneath Jane 
Austen's art, and enable her to assimilate varied influences 
and heterogeneous material and make great novels out of them.' 
(1_, ) 
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upon the inclusive moralistic aesthetic concealed in the background 
of the whole critical practice. 
The novels of James that Leavis favoured were Roderick Hudson, 
The Bostonians, Washington Square, The Europeans, The Awkward Age, 
What Maisie Knew and above all The Portrait of a Lady. Their virtues 
were maturity, intelligence, irony, wit, seriousness. Leavis admitted 
to the reductive tendency of his essay - 'the impossibility of being 
fair to James in any directed and limited survey' - and declares that 
he has 'a given exploratory line in view'(139) The exploration was 
a matter of tracing the influence of the qualities listed above as 
it was revealed in the novels. 
The circumstances of James's life, his experience of New England 
and Europe, produced in him 'a bent for comparison, and a constant 
profound pondering of the nature of civilised society and of the 
possibility of imagining a finer civilisation than any he knew'.(128) 
Leavis called this James's 'international theme', seeing the com- 
parative process functioning in novels that are not, like The Europeans, 
explicitly preoccupied with this theme. James also had his influences, 
most notably, in Leavis's view, that of Hawthorne, from whom James 
inculcated a sense of the 'poetic' possibilities of prose fiction. 
This 'poetry' is described in terms of 'the profound seriousness of 
[James's] interest in life.'(129) Another influence seen by Leavis 
is that of Dickens: James 'was helped by him to see from the outside, 
and critically place, the life around him', although James 'give[s] 
the Dickensian manner a much more formidable intellectual edge'.(132) 
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James's ironic detachment. learnt from Dickens. develops an 'un- 
Dickensian subtlety' which is a matter of 'mature standards and 
interests'(132), of a kind not evinced in Dickens's own work. The 
Bostonians 'gives us Martin Chuzzlewit redone by an enormously more 
intelligent and. better educated mind'.(134) The novel also displays 
a quality that has no kinship with anything in Dickens, 'the kind 
of knowledge of individual humans and concrete societies that we expect 
of a great novelist'.(135) Witness to this is James's treatment of 
Basil Ransom, and Olive Chancellor and her relationship with Verena 
Tarrant. Leavis punctuated these comments with a generous amount 
of quotation that was made to speak for itself. For example, the 
visit of Olive Chancellor and her scion to Henry Burrage's rooms is 
quoted extensively, as evidence of James's psychological acuteness. 
The reader of these passages of quoted extracts must decide for himself 
as to the attributes of the text in which James's 'fine psychological 
comedy' inheres. Leavis attempts no close analysis of the workings 
of James's prose; the qualities Leavis is describing are simply said 
to be there, to be self -evident. He is not concerned to examine in 
any greater detail the precise ways in which these effects are con- 
trived. The argument proceeds from the general to the general; there 
is no serious endeavour to achieve 'convincing particularity'. 
This generalising is not a result of the atteñuated nature of 
Leavis's discussion of James, it is an inherent characteristic of 
his critical procedure. Leavis's discussion of The Bostonians began 
with the proposition that this novel is Martin Chuzzlewit 'redone' 
with greater subtlety and intelligence. This assertion was supported, 
though not immediately confirmed, by examples such as the description 
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of Miss Birdseye.(133 -4) Olive Chancellor is seen as evidence of 
James's 'understand[ing]of the finer civilisation of New England' 
(134): she is dealt with by James in 'a very remarkable piece of 
psychological analysis'.(135) Leavis also quoted the visit to Burrage, 
and Olive's vision of 'ideal happiness' (evenings with Verena reading 
Goethe). This 'refinement' receives an ironic contrast in the 
'vulgarity' of Mathias Pardon and this irony is described as 'tyìpical' 
of James. Leavis then summarised the novel: 
The Bostonians is a wonderfully rich, intelligent, and 
brilliant book. . . . Tt is an acknowledged masterpiece, 
but I, don't think that it has anything like the 
reputation it deserves. . . . It has an overt richness 
of life, . . . it is incomparably witty and completely 
serious. . .. It is one of James's achieved major 
classics, and among the works that he devoted to 
American life it is supreme.(138) 
This account borders on the hyperbolic; but its major weakness is 
the extent to which it is all so much a matter of assertion. It is 
a summary in a generalised form of what are essentially general obser- 
vations. This is the logic of Leavis's critical practice. James's 
qualities as a 'great novelist' are asserted a priori; the criticism 
proceeds on this basis and works to produce evidence to confirm the 
presence of these pre- existent characteristics. The criticism is 
affirmative rather than 'exploratory' or analytical. The possibilities 
for radically dissenting alternative observations of the quoted 
extracts are multifarious; but they are prohibited by Leavis's primary 
assertions of James's distinction as a creative artist. Dissent from 
his judgements regarding the quoted extracts is in effect dissent 
from the initial valuation, so that to quarrel with Leavis's judgement 
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on a certain novel is to argue with the general assertion of James's 
'greatness'. This places the dissenting voice outside the boundaries 
of Leavis's discourse. This is not to say that one would wish to 
declare that James is not a great novelist: nor that Leavis's general 
observations regarding James's novels are all invalid. His analysis, 
through both its positive and negative manifestations, of James's 
'international theme' is concise and illuminating. The summary,.which 
is what the whole discussion essentially is, of the theme's complexity 
provides some insight into the nature of James's art. However, the 
asserted propositions about James do not emerge from a close or 
detailed discussion of any of the novels. Leavis ramified a 
complicated sequence of comparisons and suggested relations of value 
between texts in the canon and with other authors; but ultimately 
the judgement on James that is offered to the reader demands that 
he accedes to the moralist implications of the main value- terms, with- 
out which Leavis's commentary is more or less negated. Close textual 
analysis was not part of Leavis's procedure in The Great Tradition; 
the focus of his interest lay in the region of the evaluative subtlety 
of the particular author. This feature could only be transmitted via 
the specialised vocabulary, whose meanings were not adumbrated by 
Leavis but were left undefined, as if self -explanatory. The import 
of the extended passages of quotation were, such was the implication, 
equally self -evident. In a sense, for Leavis to have attempted to 
unravel the significances of these passages would have been for him 
the equivalent of making explicit the presupposed meaning of a word 
such as 'mature' or 'intelligent', an activity he regarded as in- 
essential, as the meaning was 'plain'. 
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After quoting 440 words from Roderick Hudson and 360 from The 
Bostonians Leavis said of the latter passage: 'This, in itself, would 
perhaps not have suggested a relation to Dickens, but when it is 
approached by way of the passage from Roderick Hudson the relation 
is plain'.(133) Some 800 words of quoted material received only this 
comment. Like the value -terms that were so crucial to this criticism, 
its significance was 'plain'. This example is typical of Leavis's 
practice and it means that, because of the possibilities for alter- 
native views to be developed from the passages, Leavis's own asserted 
propositions have an insubstantial validity. It was a critical commen- 
tary that aimed to confirm presuppositions which had their source 
in an extra -literary sphere rather than to discover, in the particular 
texts, literary values. The study of James was subordinated to the 
main impulse of The Great Tradition, of establishing a coherent line 
of development, which was in turn part of a larger exercise in produc- 
ing a-set of moral values derivable from literature for use in the 
remedial polemic against the prevailing cultural decline. 
The first creative achievement of real substance that Leavis found 
in George Eliot is in the 'Transome theme' of Felix Holt; he quoted 
a long passage 'where the dialogue is so different in quality from 
that in which Felix Holt figures. and the analysis of so different 
an order (and in so different a prose) from that characteristic of 
Romola'.(52) Leavis found Felix's dialogue 'unconvincing' and the 
study of Romola an 'idealisation'. The difference manifested in 
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Jermyn's exchange with Mrs. Transome11 is 'that the theme it handles 
is profoundly felt and sharply realised'.(54) The antithesis between 
George Eliot's 'reminiscences' and her intellect (the first producing 
Adam Bede, the second Romola) is here made redundant and translated 
into something new. The 'perceptive' and 'reflective' modes12 are 
synthesised in this writing: 'the perceiving focuses the profound 
experience of years - experience worked over by reflective thought, 
and so made capable of focusing'. The artist and intellectual in 
Eliot combine to produce 'a new impersonality' in the Transome theme. 
(54) 
Leavis quoted T.S.Eliot's tag regarding 'impersonality': 'the 
more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will 
be the man who suffers and the mind which creates'.13 He explained 
George Eliot's inability to identify with Mrs. Transome as the key 
to the difference of treatment. The difficulties of presenting the 
history of Mrs. Transome were analysed by Leavis; George Eliot's 
achievement is to have presented the situation 'with complete 
objectivity'.(55) This objectivity extends to the moral issues arising 
out of Mrs. Transome's status and condition. There is 'nothing of 
the Victorian moralist' in the treatment of this theme; nor anything 
explicitly 'moralising' in any degree: 'although [Mrs. Transome's] 
case is conceived in an imagination that is profoundly moral, the 
11. The Great Tradition pp 52 -54. 
12. This distinction comes from James, Partial Portraits (1888) p 
51, quoted by Leavis pp 33 -34. 
13. T.S. Eliot Selected Essays (1951) p 18. 
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presentment of it is a matter of psychological observation'.(56) 'There 
is . . . an intently matter -of -fact directness: this is human nature, 
this is the fact and these are the inexorable consequences-1(57) 
The 'inexorability' is a key mechanism. Quoting an extract describing 
Mrs. Transome's 'agonised helplessness'(74) during the crucial exchange 
between Jermyn and Harold, Leavis describes the passage as 'dramatic 
constatation, poignant and utterly convincing, and the implied mòral, 
which is a matter of the enacted inevitability, is that perceived 
by a psychological realist'.(59) The concept of morality invoked 
here has nothing to do with homiletic platitudes inserted in the 
narrative but concerns George Eliot's whole attitude towards her. theme. 
This attitude is contained in all the component elements of the novel, 
including dialogue, authorial commentary and the whole narrative 
structure. These elements are interrelated in a way that enhances 
the 'realist' ambitions of the narrative at the level of 'psychological' 
probability. By this phrase Leavis meant that the characters acted 
according to a cogent inner compunction rather than simply because 
of an externalised dramatic relation with other characters and events. 
The idea of 'enacted inevitability' is associated with the inclusive 
artistic structures of the 'moral fable', where the organisation of 
the parts is determined by the 'moral' intention of the whole. This 
'inevitability') together with the objective 'impersonality', makes 
the study of Mrs. Transome's predicament 'so astonishingly finer and 
maturer than anything George Eliot had done before'. Yet the moral 
'inevitability' and the 'impersonality' are observed characteristics 
only; they are not analysed by any of the means available to Leavis. 
There is no close analysis of the language, nor a wider investigation 
into the nature of Eliot's implied 'morality' and the reason for 
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the 'inevitability' of the inevitable. This is not to deny that these 
two categories of critical appraisal do not operate to emphasise 
specific qualities of the text. The question is whether the 
observation of them is enough, whether these categories ought to 
be made to carry the additional responsibility of having to act as 
value -terms. This is a question, in essence, of to what degree this 
kind of analysis contributes to an understanding of George Eliot's 
art. 
Middlemarch was, for Leavis, Eliot's most substantial achievement. 
The critical categories into which its main characteristics were 
organised are as follows: 
sociological interest: in the novel's 'study of provincial 
life; 
intellectual understanding: 




in 'the pathos of Dr. Casaubon's predi- 
cament'(61) - which is treated with 
irony but also 'compassion'; and 
Lydgate's 'intellectual idealism'(66); 
seen in Lydgate's attitude towards 
women (producing the 'poetic justice' 
of his marital relations) and Rosamund's 
'destructive' egoism; 
for example the dialogue between 
Rosamund and Mary Garth, and the 
conversation, amongst others, between 
Mrs. Bulstrode and Mrs. Plymdale; 
of Bulstrode's 'peculiar religious 
world'(69) - also a blend of satire 
and compassion; 
14. I.e., 'of the "merciless" kind that only intelligence lighted 
by compassion can attain'.(70) 
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'creativeness': for example, the 'peculiar quality 
of life' of the minor characters15 
together with the 'self -identification' and 'idealisation' that combine 
to produce the 'weakness' of the novel. This combination 'betrays 
a radical disorder'(78) in George Eliot's art, which resulted in the 
presentation of the character of Dorothea and the 'immaturity' 
the valuations that she, and Ladislaw, represent. 
Classic value -terms are here mixed with those which have a meaning 
peculiar to Leavis. The sociological interest of the novel, its comic 
and ironic aspects, its objective and compassionate analysis and the 
creative vitality of the minor characters are categories of appraisal 
that have a conventional evaluative function. The operation of the 
constituent parts is demonstrable and the relation between the critical 
term and its evaluative capacity is a direct one. For example, the 
'creativeness' evinced in the presentation of the minor characters 
is textually verifiable by means of quotation. That this 'vitality' 
is an advantage to the novel is not arguable. Similarly, Leavis's 
examination and assessment of Eliot's treatment of Casaubon brings 
direct textual evidence to bear on the evaluative judgements that 
are made. To contest these judgements it would be necessary to 
provide a judgement equally evidenced that countered or undermined 
Leavis's assessment. There is nothing in the structure of Leavis's 
argument in this regard that prohibits, through aprioristic assertions 
of value, the dissenting voice from presenting an alternative case 
15. For example: '... the Garths,... the Vincy family, Mr. Farebrother, 
the Cadwalladers, and also in the grotesquerie of Peter Feather- 
stone and his kin'.(72) 
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to the one being argued. The value -terms are concretely determinable, 
and not asserted in the abstract. In utilising the categories in 
this way Leavis is engaging an orthodox critical practice in a way 
that will concede to attempts at a refutation of its conclusions; 
its orientation is collaborative rather than dogmatic. 
The diagnostic element of Leavis's approach is revealed in the 
discussion of Dorothea as the source of the novel's 'weakness'(72). 
The problem lies in the theme that Dorothea develops, described in 
the Prelude as 'a certain spiritual grandeur ill -matched with meanness 
of opportunity'. Leavis calls this 'a dangerous theme for George 
Eliot'. It is a danger that is avoided in the early chapters, Dorothea 
not being exempt from the ironic tone that generally pervades there. 
Gradually, however, the presentation of Dorothea begins to show signs 
of an unqualified self- identification'(74) by the author with her 
heroine, marked by an abeyance of this ironic tenor. The weakness 
is further manifested in Will Ladislaw, who is meant to mediate the 
author's version of Dorothea to the reader; but Ladislaw 'has no 
independent status of his own' and 'represents' certain of George 
Eliot's 'intentions' which she has failed to 'realise creatively'.(75) 
The reader is asked to accept Ladislaw's valuation of Dorothea, and 
Dorothea's of Ladislaw - both of which are the valuations of the author.. 
Dorothea is another 'day -dream ideal self' for George Eliot and the 
novel 'alternat[es] between the poised impersonal insight of a finely 
tempered wisdom and something like the emotional confusions and self - 
importances of adolescence'.(75) 
There are two consequences of this idealisation. The first is 
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a failure of 'creative realisation', a lapse of authorial objectivity 
which is accompanied by loss of judgement, or self -critical analysis. 
The reader is asked to take seriously something that is manifestly 
preposterous. For instance, the final scene between Dorothea and 
Lydgate (chapter LXXVI) is demonstrably 'a failure in touch [that,] 
in so intelligent a novelist, is more than a surface matter; it betrays 
a radical disorder'.(78) The second consequence is more involved 
and concerns this 'radical disorder'. Seeing George Eliot identifying 
herself so completely with Dorothea, Leavis feels entitled to interpret 
the author's creative 'disorder' as it is revealed in the novel's 
,flawed characterisation: to conflate, that is, the authorial voice 
with the historical figure. Leavis used extracts concerning Dorothea 
as if they were direct statements about George Eliot. The 'radical 
disorder' is the 'extraordinary' coexistence in the novel of an im- 
;mature 'self -indulgence' with the 'objectivity' and 'vigour of 
illusion'.(79) Yet this 'self- indulgence' and the 'impersonality' 
are terms which are applied by Leavis to George Eliot, not Dorothea. 
Leavis found the weakness of the novel in the author's attitude towards 
her subject. His formulation of the significance of this weakness 
is based on his criteria regarding the evaluative moral bearing 
required of an author. In this way, Leavis's criticism asserts its 
moralist aesthetic. Leavis did not analyse Dorothea's character 
according to her circumstances within the narrative; nor did he accept 
the motives and valuations represented in the narrative at their face 
value. He regarded all these features, in the manner typical of 
most modern literary criticism, as reflections of the valuations of 
the author. For Leavis, the author was as much a part of the text 
as any major character. In a sense, George Eliot was the 'main 
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character' of her novels, since it is in terms of her implied moral 
valuations that Leavis discusses the achievements of her work: this 
is the distinguishing feature of his criticism. By intervening in 
the narrative at those points where the authorial evaluation obtrudes, 
Leavis can assert his own system of moral criteria. The more closely 
identified were his and the author's moral values, the greater the 
significance of the achievement. By this means the novel finds its 
place in the particular Leavis hierarchy. 
The coexistence of weakness and strength recurs in a more extreme 
form in Daniel Deronda. By now the critical categories under which 
these elements are to be classified are familiar. Leavis saw The 
Portrait of a Lady as a variation on 'Gwendolen Harleth', the 'good 
part' of Eliot's novel. (85 -6) He made some idiosyncratic claims 
for the similarities between these novels: 'Henry James wouldn't 
have written The Portrait of a Lady if he hadn't read 'Gwendolen 
Harleth'.' This was offered as 'an assertion of fact and a critical 
comparison', as was his declaration that the earlier novel 'is decided- 
ly the greater'. Leavis was not prepared to argue this point. 'The 
fact, once asserted, can hardly be questioned.'(85)16 The reader's 
perplexity when faced with these 'assertions of fact' arises out of 
the difficulty of pointing to the rationale behind the comparison and 
the reason why it is pursued at such length. 
16. This statement parallels the earlier declaration regarding the 
relationship between the two novels: 'That relation demonstrated 
nothing more is needed in order to establish the general relation 
I posit between the two novelists.'(14) 
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In fact. it is George Eliot's novel that benefits from the com- 
parison, at James's expense. The bulk of the essay is taken up by 
Daniel Deronda, with James's novel offering a pragmatic example of 
how and why a similar creative impulse (Leavis is inclined to think 
James's borrowin g was 'unconscious' 17 ) could produce dissimilar 
results. The crucial distinction rests on the 'completer' and more 
'real' presentation that George Eliot is able to achieve. This 'dis- 
tinction is a matter of measuring the representations of character, 
incident and circumstance against the actualities of real life, and 
establishing the substantiality of each novel's respective moral pre- 
occupation. These two aspects are not separable in Leavis's scheme 
but have an inevitable correlation. This correlation between art 
and morality, and Leavis's sense of its ineluctability, is fundamental 
to The Great Tradition. It is not encountered in the discussion of 
the early and minor work of these novelists and it takes a different 
form when applied to Hard Times in its guise as a 'moral fable'. 
It is most apparent with regard to those novels that Leavis ranks 
as of the highest order. The lesser novels are not, as one might 
expect, 'lesser' because the problem of morality fails to arise. 
The implication of Leavis's criticism is that a preoccupation with 
the relationship between art and morality is what makes a novel 
'serious' and that a successful synthesis of it is a condition of 
a novel's 'greatness'. The absence of this preoccupation is precisely 
the condition that determines a novel's second -order status; judgements 
17. '... that he had [Gwendolen] in mind at all consciously, so that 
he thought of himself as attempting a variation of George Eliot's 
theme, seems to me very unlikely. The inspiration, or challenge. 
he was conscious of was some girl he encountered in actual life'. 
(86) 
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and observations on what it otherwise achieves are not inhibited by 
this fact, but they can make no essential difference to the primary 
valuation. Moreover, this posited ideal relation is essentially 
unprovable: it is a fundamental contention that was basic to the 
critical discourse, not one that emerged from literary analysis; 
its source lay outside the realm of literary criticism. 
The key to the whole structure of Leavis's critical method is 
contained in a question put by Leavis himself at the beginning of 
the chapter on George Eliot: 
Is there any great novelist whose preoccupation with 
'form' is not a matter of his responsibility towards a 
rich human interest, or complexity of interests, profoundly 
realised? - a responsibility involving, of its very nature, 
imaginative sympathy, moral discrimination, and judgements 
of relative human value ?(29) 
For Leavis, Flaubert embodied the antithesis to these criteria. He 
represented, for Leavis and other Scrutiny writers,i8 'the incarnation 
of formalism and moral anomie in the modern novel'.19 Leavis had 
earlier freely adapted James's comments on Flaubert to indicate the 
latter's failure to attend sufficently to 'mature' moral and human 
interests.20 Leavis claimed that James found Madame Bovary 'an 
18. For example, Martin Turnell, who published two essays on Flaubert 
alongside Leavis's 'Revaluation' of George Eliot: 'Flaubert - 
(i) and (ii)', Scrutiny, XIII, 3 and 4. 
19. Francis Mulhern, The Moment of Scrutiny, (1979) p 279. 
20. 'It was James who put his finger on the weakness in Madame Bovary: 
the discrepancy between the technical ('aesthetic') intensity, 
with the implied attribution of interest to the subject, and 
the actual moral and human paucity of this subject on any mature 
valuation.'(13) This was not a quotation but a paraphrase. 
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instance of a preoccupation with "form" that is insufficiently a pre- 
occupation with human value and moral interest'.(29) What James 
actually says about MadameBovary is more direct and qualified than 
Leavis's account suggests: 
The form is in itself as intereting, as active, as much 
of the essence of the subject as the idea, and yet so 
close is its fit and so inseparable its life that we 
catch it at no moment on any errand of its own.21 
James's objection to the novel is directed at the character of Emma, 
which he finds 'in spite of the nature of her consciousness . . 
is really too small an affair.'22 This comment is made in association 
with similarr remarks on L'Education Sentimentale: James condemns. 
Flaubert's characters for their 'inferiority' but exempts Emma for 
her 'perfection'.23 It is difficult precisely to pinpoint the 
antimony that Leavis discovered. It is significant that immediately 
before the comment on Flaubert (the passage leads to the quotation 
given above) Leavis had rejected the 'misleading antithesis' that 
James presented for the novel - that is, as either a 'picture of life' 
or a 'moralised fable'.24 Leavis found hints and indications in James's 
criticism that suited his purpose, after the necessary adaptation, 
of establishing normative criteria for his own treatment of the novel. 
21. James, Notes on Novelists, (1914). p 63. 
22. Ibid. p 64. 
23. Ibid. p 65. 
24. 'Moralised fable' is James's phrase. See Partial Portraits. 
p 51, quoted by Leavis, p 28. 
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James's assertion of the formal achievement of Madame Bovary is 
emphatic; the qualification that succeedsitis more reticent, and more 
concerned with Frédéric Moreau than with Emma Bovary. Yet in Leavis, 
this was rendered in terms of the inseparable elision of 'formal per- 
fection' and 'moral superiority'. Flaubert is exactly the novelist 
whose 'preoccupation with "form" is not a matter of his responsibility 
towards a rich human interest'(29); and he is a novelist in receipt 
of the highest acclaim from one of the constituents of,the 'great 
tradition': so Leavis's version of James's critique, never fully 
quoted, emphasised the admonitory rather than the approbative clauses. 
Leavis's treatise on the novel had this insistence on the moral 
aspect of the form /content relationship at its centre. Its presence 
was a matter for discussion in respect only of the 'great' novelists, 
but there its authority is absolute. This was the organising principle 
for the comparison between James and Eliot. Before that it served 
to account for the formal inadequacies of that half of Daniel Deronda 
that Leavis wished to set aside. There were similarities between 
the weaknesses of all Eliot's novels. Maggie Tulliver, Felix Holt 
and Romola were all examples of a tendency to self -identification 
by the author that derived from an unguarded 'inspirational' source. 
They undermine George Eliot's capacity to judge objectively and con- 
textually the valuations she implies for her characterisations. 'In 
these inspirations her intelligence and real moral insight are not 
engaged', with the result that 'all in the book that issues from this 
inspiration is unreal and impotently wordy'.(8S) Leavis quoted several 
examples of this and thus terminated his discussion of the 'bad half' 
of the novel; he then embarked on an appraisal of 'the astonishingly 
contrasting strength and fineness of the large remainder'. George 
180 
Eliot here overcomes ('transcends') the weakness, as well as 'what 
are commonly thought to be her limitations'. To enforce this claim 
Leavis adduced James's debt to 'Gwendolen Harleth'. The comparison 
of the two novels serves to show, in effect, how much better George 
Eliot was with the same material. This is an observation that may 
be argued for or contested in many ways. What is crucial is the set 
of terms germane to Leavis's particular demonstration of it. 
Two quotations juxtaposed will give the essence of the argument 
and will introduce into a literary critical sphere the criteria adum- 
brated in Leavis's question about the responsibility of the great 
novelist. James's presentation of Isabel Archer is 'partial in both 
senses of the word, . . . both incomplete and indulgent'.(86) It 
is therefore less 'real' than George Eliot's portrait of Gwendolen 
because it is less detailed and less objectively critical. George 
Eliot's critical stance towards Gwendolen is not merely 'animus'. 
It is that 
simply, as a very intelligent woman, [ George Eliot] is 
able, unlimited by masculine partiality of vision, and 
only the more perceptive because a woman, to achieve a 
much completer presentment of her subject than James of 
his. . . . It isn't that she doesn't appreciate the 
qualities that so appeal to Henry James: she renders 
them at least as well as he - renders them better, in 
the sense that she 'places' them.(87 -8) 
To underline this point Leavis quotes a long passage from the interview 
between Gwendolen and the Reverend Gascoigne (chapter XIII). Gascoigne 
illustrates in the particular Eliot's general capacity for representing 
the world with which she is concerned with 'complexity and completeness' 
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and a 'fullness of vision and response.'(91) In contrast, 
James's presentment of what is essentially the same world 
is seen, in the comparison, to have entailed much excluding 
and simplifying. His is a subtle art, and he has his irony; 
but the irony doesn't mean inclusiveness - an adequacy to 
the complexities of the real in its concrete fulness; it 
doesn't mark a complex valuing process that has for upshot 
a total attitude in which all the elements of a full 
response are brought together. 
His world of 'best society' and country house is, for all 
its life and charm, immeasurably less real . . . than 
George Eliot's. He idealises, and his idealising is a 
matter of not seeing, and not knowing (or not taking into 
account), a great deal of the reality.(91) 
In these judgements are involved all the criteria of Leavis's initial 
question, which presented 'complexity of interests, . . . imaginative 
sympathy, moral discrimination, and judgements of relative human value' 
(29) as the prerequisite ingredients of 'responsible' creativity. 
The key word of the question is 'responsibility'; 'irresponsibility' 
is the quality represented by Flaubert's antithetical formalism. 
It is a subjective term: the question as to what the responsibility 
is owed can only be answered preferentially. Flaubert's 'responsibility ', 
one might argue, is manifested in his dedicated formalism; it does 
not lay claim to any part of Leavis's metaphysical 'complexity of 
interests, profoundly realised'. Leavis is making a subjective moral 
judgement by insisting on the inevitableness of the relation between 
'technique' and the moral valuations of the author. 
There are two issues involved, one relating to Leavis's analysis 
of the moral dimensions of the two novels, and the other to his 
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examination of their formal ambitions. In the two novels the moral 
circumstances of the respective heroines are different in each case, 
but both are eventually concerned with dealing with the consequences 
of choices freely made. Gwendolen's situation is dealt with by Eliot 
in terms of 'the complexities of inner constitution and outer conditions' 
that make her 'amenable to moral judgement'. This is achieved through 
'speech and action' and 'a kind of psychological notation'.(102) 
Compared to this, James's representation of Isabel is suspect: there 
is something 'equivocal about his indirectness', she is not inter- 
nalised in the way Gwendolen Harleth is. 'The difference between 
James and George Eliot is largely a matter of what he leaves out.'(110) 
So far, Leavis has explored what are essentially differences in 
artistic ambitions. Confusion sets in with the reference to James's 
'positive art' as 'compensation' for the omissions. That is to say, 
the omission was not regarded by Leavis as a matter of artistic inten- 
tion but as a failure: 'he fails to produce the fable that gives 
inevitability and moral signìficance'.(111) He sees Isabel's choice 
of Osmond in the face of unanimous opposition and the picture of her 
'enjoying . . the admiring pity due to a noble victim who is above 
criticism' as examples of 'inconsistencies' and 'moral incoherences'; 
(112) and yet, in the chapter on James, Isabel's rejection of Warburton 
was seen as 'an act of radically ethical judgement'.(148) The novel 
as a whole is described, in direct contradiction to the above, as 
one that, although 'on so much a larger scale than The Europeans, 
and [which] because of its complexity doesn't invite the description 
of'moral fable', . . is similarly organised: it is all intensely 
significant'.(152) 
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' The source of this contradiction lies in Leavis's critical procedure. 
Leavis denied James any conscious borrowing from Eliot, 5 yet that 
there are similarities was not in doubt. Leavis felt that James was 
aiming to reproduce 'the irony of Gwendolen's married situation'. 
However, Isabel has none of Gwendolen's 'moral significance' and James 
is presenting 'a valuation of Isabel that is incompatible with a really 
critical irony'.(111) He does not 'place' the 'American idealism' 
that produces her naivety in extenuation of this. The comparison, 
therefore, allows Leavis to illustrate what he sees as failure in 
James that would not otherwise have been obvious; that is, a failure 
to reproduce an ethical structure unconsciously taken from George 
Eliot. This is a failure that, taken in isolation, is less pressing, 
and Leavis's discussion becomes contradictory. He sees in Eliot a 
relationship between art and morality that conforms to his expectations 
of what constitutes 'responsible' creativity. Daniel Deronda 
represents a set of criteria that are not fulfilled by The Portrait 
of a Lady; the status of the former novel was established by Leavis 
as a standard by which to assess other works and the criticisms of 
James were organised around it. 
James's art had not for Leavis the commensurate realistic force 
of evocation required by this standard of novelistic achievement. 
The connection of this evaluation to an assertion of a moral 
'irrespoñsibility' is the source of conflict in the critical practice. 
25. See note 17 above. 
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George Eliot's attitude to Gwendolen is described by Leavis as 'that 
of a great novelist, concerned with human and moral valuation in a 
way proper to her art'.(109) The background of implied orthodoxy 
that is contained in the generalisation is asserted without further 
exposition, as if the qualities of Eliot's art were proof in themselves 
of the autonomy of Leavis's implied normative criteria. A similar 
logical fault is made plain in the discussion of 'the later James'. 
This introduces the second issue arising from the intervention of 
Leavis's version of the relationship between form and content, namely 
the question of formal 'intentions': 
The trouble with the late style is that it exacts so 
intensely and inveterately analytic an intention that 
no sufficient bodies response builds up: nothing 
sufficiently approaching the deferred concrete im- 
mediacy that has been earned is attainable.(168) 
The reply to this is that 'concrete immediacy' was never part of 
James's purpose, that 'analysis' is the formal preoccupation with 
which he is engaged. Leavis asserts that this deficiency produces 
'moral unsatisfactoriness': for example, the attitude towards the 
main characters in The Golden Bowl 'isn't meant to be ironical' and 
this necessitates a corruption of the reader's 'finer moral sense'. 
(158) 
The premises of this comparison encapsulate the main principles 
of Leavis's approach to the novel. The differences between George 
Eliot and Henry James were essentially differences relating to their 
critical bearing in relation to their represented material and their 
contrasting formal ambitions. In both respects. Leavis found George 
Eliot the more congenial and he' based his criticism, of both James 
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and of Conrad and Dickens, on the values he derived from her work. 
'Complexity of interests', or plenitude in the material of the 
novel, and 'concrete immediacy' were the basic evaluative terms. 
Leavis felt that the greater the inclusivity and completeness to which 
the novel aspired the greater was its potential achievement. 'In- 
clusiveness' meant an 'adequacy to the complexities of the real In 
its concrete fulness'.(91) That is, the narrative should aim to be 
as close an analogue to 'real' life as possible; reality is extremely 
complex, so 'complexity of interests' in the novel denotes an as- 
piration towards 'realism'. Eliot, Leavis argued, was capable of 
a 'much completer presentment of her subject' than James. This is 
a matter of authorial intention. Leavis excluded without argument 
the possibility of an alternative artistic ambition, one that aimed 
to simplify its representations of reality to generate metaphoric 
truths about 'real life' rather than producing a complex analogue 
of it. James's method was less 'direct' than Eliot's; for Leavis, 
this meant that he was being 'equivocal'. 
Leavis deprecated this 'indirectness' because of his prerequisite 
of 'concrete immediacy', a value he had employed in the criticism 
of poetry. There it was contrasted with 'vague abstraction' as in 
the contrast between Shelley's imagery and Keats's 'sensuous immediacy'. 
In the novel, it appears to mean the dramatic impression of a given 
passage, together with the analogous complexity of 'reality' that 
it pursues. At any rate, it condemns anything oblique, 'indirect' 
or analytic, on the grounds that 'no sufficient bodied response builds 
up'(168) during passages marked by those characteristics. The prose 
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style of the later James is a problematic crux for literary criticism; 
but it is not one that will be illuminated by the introduction of 
alien categories of evaluation that are based on an analysis of the 
achievements of another author. Moreover, as far as Leavis was con- 
cerned, the absence of 'concrete immediacy' was allied to failings 
in terms of the author's moral orientation. The lack of a sufficiently 
'ironical' or critical bearing towards the presented material was 
an artistic failure and one that Leavis saw as being the result of 
the 'analytic' or oblique prose style. However, the formal intentions 
of the narrative cannot be held absolutely responsible for weaknesses 
in authorial detachment and moral disinterest. James may have been 
'self- indulgent' in regard to the characters in The Golden Bowl in 
his inadequate ironic 'placing' of them (in relation to what criterion 
of moral behaviour ?): but Leavis is not convincing in his attempt 
to blame the prose style for a weakness of moral orientation in the 
author.because the thrust of his argument depended to such an extent 
on asserted critical principles supported by the turbid vocabulary 
of value- terms, rather than emerging from a heuristic literary 
critical or analytic process. 
Leavis contrasted James's imagery of the 'early' with that of the 
'late' style. The earlier figurative effects have a 'poetic immediacy' 
where in the 'developed Jamesian style [there] is a more deliberate 
and elaborated kind of figure, . . . the imagery is not immediate 
and inevitable but synthetic. It is diagrammatic rather than poetic'. 
(167) This according to Leavis is further evidence that James's 
'technical preoccupation . . . took his intelligence out of its true 
focus and blunted his sensitiveness'.(165) The proof of that claim 
depends on the status of Leavis's preconceptions about the nature 
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and function of the figurative elements in a literary text. Those 
preconceptions were based on Leavis's conviction that literature has 
a 'responsibility' to produce 'concrete immediacy' in its metaphoric 
and analogous modes, which in turn derived from the larger generalisa- 
tion concerning his assertion of the novelist's responsibility to 
something called 'life'. 
The word 'life' had a typically idiosyncratic function in Leavis's 
account of James. The early novels had 'the abundant, full -bodied 
life of well- nourished organisms'; the later work showed 'an unhealthy 
vitality of under -nourishment and etiolation'.(165) This phraseology 
was designed to suggest that 'life' has a substantial rather than 
a metaphorical existence in the work of art: it suggests that 'the 
work really possesses a form of life which is a kind of counterpart 
of its author's'. 26 Leavis's intention was thus to close the gap 
between the author and his work so that the authorial irony (or lack 
of it) was a direct index of his personal capacities and experience 
of life, which then become more vital to his ability to produce a 
work of art than the capacities of his sensibility. Leavis's critical 
method was capable of intense critical awareness of the textual 
problems and attributes of the novels but this was combined with a 
limiting subjectivity with regard to the considerations he brought 
to bear on the texts from outside the realm of strictly literary 
criticism. 
26. John Kilham, 'The use of "concreteness" as an evaluative 
term in F.R.Leavis's great tradition', British Journal of 
Aesthetics, V, 1 (January 1965). pp 14 -24. 
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3. Conrad and Dickens: success and failure of critical method 
The cogency of Leavis's essay on Conrad is especially striking in 
its context, following the chapters on Eliot and James. The criticism 
is different because of the nature of the author and his work and 
because the concept of 'morality' appears in a more obvious guisè 
and partakes much less of the abstract philosophical considerations 
that preoccupy Leavis's discussion of the preceding novelists. 
The notion of 'impersonality' helped Leavis to differentiate between 
George Eliot and Conrad: the latter 'is more completely an artist' 
because 'he transmutes more completely into the created work the 
interests he brings in'.(32) Eliot's work is marred by the 'direct 
(and sometimes embarrassing) presence of the author's own personal 
need',- whereas Conrad's personal experience emerges 'out of the complex 
impersonalised whole'.(33) The material of personal experience that 
Conrad employs is more of an ethos ('the Merchant Service') than direct 
historical occurrences: there is nothing of the 'reminiscence' typical 
of George Eliot. Moral problems are correspondingly much simpler 
in their presentation, success or failure in Conrad being more directly 
dependent on the adequacy or inadequacy of form to content. This 
was examined according to T.S.Eliot's suggestion regarding the logic 
of the expression of 'emotion' in literary form: 
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is 
by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words, 
a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which 
shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such 
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that when the external facts, which must terminate in 
sensory experience, are given, the emotion is 
immediately evoked. . . . The artistic 'inevitability' 
[of Macbeth's response to his wife's death] lies in 
this complete adequacy of the external to the 
emotion . . . 27 
Leavis claimed that Heart of Darkness 'achieves its over -powering 
evocation of atmosphere by means of "objective correlatives "': the 
'sinister and fantastic' atmosphere is evoked by the presentation 
of sinister and fantastic occurrences, images, surroundings. When 
this metonymic correlation is defective, Conrad resorts to mere 
'adjectival insistence': 'the vague and unrealisable, he asserts with 
a strained impressiveness, is the profoundly and tremendously sig- 
nificant.'(180) 
The criticism thus remained within the boundaries of literary 
criticism, utilising classic critical categories and conventional value - 
terms. This is clearest in Leavis's analysis of Nostromo: 
The impressiveness [of Nostromo] is not a matter of 
any profundity of search into human experience, or any 
explorative subtlety in the analysis of human behaviour. 
It is a matter rather of the firm and vivid concreteness 
with which the representative attitudes and motives are 
realised, and the rich economy of the pattern that plays 
them off against one another.(195) 
Leavis analysed the main characters according to their representative 
significance in the dramatic structure of the novel; he was dealing 
27. T.S.Eliot, 'Hamlet', Selected Essays(1951) p 145. 
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with literary figures in a literary landscape and their moral 
attributes were defined in terms of the configurations of dramatic 
action or their shared relations with the dynamic of events. The 
novel is not a 'moral fable' and its formal achievement cannot be 
classified as 'poetic'. It is, rather, 'melodrama . . . completely 
controlled to the pattern of moral significance.'(198) 
The terms of this appreciation would appear to contradict those 
that formed the basis of the critique of George Eliot: 'psychological 
realism' and 'complexity of interests'; or even that of Jane Austen, 
whose art, Leavis said, evinced 'kinds of profound concern - having 
the urgency of personal problems, and felt as moral problems, more 
than personal in significance'. Conrad's novels were classified as 
novels of 'pattern'; Eliot's were commended for their convincing 
psychological analysis. The term common to both types is Leavis's 
'concreteness'. However, this adaptability means the word could only 
function as a descriptive rather than an analytical term.28 The 
search for passages of 'vivid concreteness' in Leavis's meaning - 
which led to statements about Conrad rather than an understanding 
of him - had the result of turning up a different Conrad to the one 
of conventional estimation. The emphasis on the design or 'pattern' 
of the novels at the expense of the 'poetic' qualities of the prose 
- Leavis specifically denied the attribution of the term - ignored 
the Conrad familiar as the great exploiter of the 'poetic' resources 
of the English language. Leavis placed the emphasis thus because 
for him 'concreteness', far from having a simple descriptive function, 
was synonymous with 'moral seriousness'. The uncomfortable fact 
28. Cf. Kilham loc. cit. p 17. 
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about the criticism, though, is that this synonymity was only statable, 
rather than demonstrable. The prose style of the later James was 
condemned by Leavis for its lack of 'immediacy', which was a hindrance 
to a representation of the appropriate moral judgements on the prof- 
fered material. What Leavis sought in Conrad was the kind of 'moral 
seriousness' that early James and the best of George Eliot had 
achieved; hence the emphasis on 'concrete immediacy' and the search 
through Conrad for passages of impressive dramatic realism. 
Notwithstanding his setting aside Conrad the 'prose -poet', 
Leavis's study of the novels presented a coherent account from a recog- 
nisable viewpoint, unencumbered by the interpolation of undefined 
value -terms deriving from an exclusive concept of the moral basis 
of literary form. Conrad's creative 'consciousness' is marked by 
a 'radical scepticism' similar, in Leavis's view, to that embodied 
by Decoud and this accounts in part for the recurrence of the theme 
of 'isolation' in the novels and the drama of the recuperation of 
human relations that is the substance of the 'victory' in Victory. 
This was as far into abstract speculation regarding the relations 
between authorial creativity and the actual figure of Conrad as an 
historical individual that Leavis needed to go. Weaknesses in Conrad's 
work are artistic lapses, not moral derelictions; conversely, 
'significance' is a matter of the depiction in the concrete of the 
moral consequences of human action and involvement. The structures 
of the novels were organised around identifiable moral concepts and 
a stable moral ethos. .Consequently, Leavis's criticism remained solidly 
in the realm of textual analysis. 
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Leavis's criticism of Conrad was governed by the kind of narrative 
technique that is employed in the novels. There is no 'psychology' 
or 'philosophy' in Conrad - at least there is nothing of the order 
of Eliot's 'psychological notation' or profound moral philosophy. 
The narrative is dramatic, dealing with the representation of 
characters in a metonymic landscape ('the interaction of the particular 
incidents, actions and perceptions' (177)) that presents a cogent 
'pattern . . . of moral significances'.(191) The criticism is commen- 
surately concrete and exegetic, revealing intrinsic meaning. 
With Hard Times, however, an uncertainty of critical motive re- 
appeared, allied to a confusion of critical intentions and value - 
terms. Here, Leavis's judgement was sabotaged by the underlying moral 
absolutism of his version of the form /content dialectic, as well 
as by the subordination of the particular valuations to the general 
theme of 'tradition'. As a result, the text receded from the fore- 
ground of the argument and was subsumed by the introduction of extra - 
literary categories and extrinsic meanings. The extra -literary consid- 
erations that enter the discussion are not those advocated by Leavis 
as being of relevance to a study of Hard Times in his preface to Mill 
on Bentham and Coleridge 
29. 
Hard Times is there described as 'the 
supreme document in creative literature, where Victorian Utilitarianism 
and its part in Victorian civilisation are in question' and one which 
invites 'close relations between literary criticism and extra -literary 
29. First published in Scrutiny, XVI, 2,(1947), pp 104 -26. 
studies',30 The extra -literary material that actually intervenes 
193 
has to do with narrative technique and the asserted moral dimension 
of its relation to subject matter. Leavis decribed the novel as a 
'moral fable',31 a designation which derived from a perception of 
the relations between creative intention and expression. In a 'moral 
fable' 'the intention is peculiarly insistent, so that the represen- 
tative significance of everything in the fable - character, episode, 
and so on - is immediately apparent as we read'.(227) This is a 
cryptic variation on the form /content relationship, since it is 
ambiguous about the determination of the nature of the 'intention'. 
That is, either the intention is primarily assumed via an inter- 
pretation of authorial ambition through external evidence, or it is 
revealed in the text in a process of critical exegesis. Leavis's 
emphasis seems to rest on the latter procedure, although in the preface 
to Mill on Bentham and Coleridge he says that the critic of Hard Times 
'finds himself considering those aspects of the Victorian world which 
exercised so strong a compulsion upon Dickens's creative powers and 
controlled them,for once, to a profound and sustained seriousness 
of response'.32 Unlike his social criticism in the other novels 
('casual and incidental'), here he is possessed by 'a comprehensive 
vision' of the sources and sanctions of the 'inhumanities of Victorian 
civilisation'.(228) 
30. Loc. cit. p 124. 
31. The essay originally appeared under the rubric 'the Novel as 
Dramatic Poem'; in Dickens the Novelist (1970), it is subtitled 
'The World of Bentham'. 
32. Loc. cit. p 124. 
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The 'moral fable' is a novel wherein the relations between form 
and content have achieved an ideal and complete synthesis: the 
relation of the parts to the whole is one of total inclusivity, so 
that there is in the novel nothing that does not bear a significant 
relation to its central thesis. This is to say more than that Hard 
Times is a roman à thèse:33 it insists that the entire content of 
the novel is subordinate to the abstract conception governing it 
creation, and that its whole structure - its form - is aimed at re- 
producing in the narrative technique the material of this imposed 
content. The implication is that the authority of the 'thesis' over 
subject- matter and form is absolute. 
This claim in respect of Hard Times is exaggerated; and it may 
be that it is theoretically unsustainable except with regard to highly 
eccentric novel forms.34 The revealing flaws of the argument concern 
an over- evaluation of narrative achievement entailing an avoidance 
of the artistic weaknesses in the narrative and an overestimation 
of the novel as a whole. 
Leavis quoted a passagefrom the scene in the school -room which 
describes Sissy Jupe and Bitzer caught in the same shaft of sunlight. 
which irradiates the former with light and washes out the colour of 
the latter.35 The symbolic substance of the passage is clear and 
33. In 1970 a 'moral fable' was described as 'an essay turned into 
art': Dickens the Novelist (1970) p 209. 
34. Leavis describes Silas Marner as a 'moral fable'(46): in this 
context, his usage was only beginning to develop, and 'moral' 
here has fewer resonances than attach to it at a later stage. 
The essays on What Maisie Knew (Scrutiny, XVII) and The Europeans 
(Scrutiny, XIV) reveal how the notion of the completely formalised 
moral intention in a novel organises its containing structure. 
35. Hard Times (Harmondsworth 1966) pp 49 -50. 
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the expression of it requiresno analytic subtlety. Leavis gave it 
high praise, noting 'the force . . . with which the moral and spiritual 
differences are rendered here in terms of sensation' and he saw the 
passage as 'representative of Dickens's art in general in Hard Times'. 
(230) It goes with the horse -riding of the circus in illustrating 
the 'poetic- dramatic nature of Dickens's art'.36 The enthusiasm Leavis 
showed for this aspect is symptomatic of the general feeling he has 
for the novel. Even his own prose style - the sentences uncluttered 
by qualifying clauses - reflected his energetic promotion of its 
achievement. He spoke of 
the astonishing and irresistible richness of life that 
characterises the book everywhere. It meets us everywhere, 
unstrained and natural, in the prose. Out of such prose 
a great variety of presentations can arise congenially 
with equal vividness. They are, unquestionably, 'real'. 
It goes back to an extraordinary energy of perception and 
registration in Dickens.(234) 
This is followed by a quotation from Santayana37 anda note on the 
nature of 'realism' in Dickens: it is not mimetic, but a 'richly 
poetic art of the word, . . . he writes with a poetic force of evoca- 
tion'.(234) Finally there is the summarisation that 'the confutation 
of Utilitarianism by life is conducted with great subtlety'.(236) 
This is clearly overstated. The descriptive terms - 'astonishing' 
36. Cf. p 263 in the revised 1962 edition of The Great Tradition 
37. 'When people say that Dickens exaggerates it seems to me that 
they can have no eyes and no ears. They probably only have notions 
of what things and people are: they accept them conventionally, 
at their diplomatic value.' Soliloquies in England (1921) p 65. 
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'irresistible', 'unquestionably', 'extraordinary' - present an 
exaggerated appreciation of one aspect of the novel. It appears that 
the dispassionate objectivity of the critic has been set aside. Leavis 
did not expand on the phrase 'a richly poetic art of the word': it 
was made to stand as if self -explanatory and defined by its context, 
but this still leaves it as unreasonably vague and unilluminating. 
Further, the term 'subtlety' is much more dubiously applied. If the 
criticism is operating within the limitations of a method that has 
established the inclusive 'moral fable' as its organising principle 
it is very difficult then to point to major weaknesses in the 
particular for,fear of undermining the legitimacy of the claims made 
for the whole. The presupposition of authorial intention presents 
the critic with the necessity of having to account for or ignore 
elements that are not so clearly commensurate with the central thesis 
as might be desirable. 'Subtle' is a generous description of 
Gradgrind's process of self- discovery.38 The general level of over- 
statement must be explained by the interference of the primary notion 
of the novel as a 'moral fable' and the way in which this notion 
operates. 
38 'As a moral fable, Hard Times is a vigorous and goodhearted book, 
but if 'shallow' is unduly severe with regard to the level of 
insight with which it proceeds, Dr. Leavis, in writing that here 
'creative exuberance is controlled by a profound inspiration' 
has conceded just the word which requires to be withheld.' John 
Holloway, 'Hard Times, a criticism and a history', The Dickens 
World. eds. Gross and Pearson (1962) p. 172. 
. . . the creative exuberance is controlled by a profound in- 
spiration". I cannot take this in the spirit in which Dr. Leavis 
meant it, because the control seems to me skilfully chosen by 
a professional arguer rather than irresistibly compelled by a 
profound inspiration.' Robert Garis, The Dickens Theatre (1965) 
p 160. 
197 
A related symptom of the interference in the critical perspective 
of this preconception is the interposition of extra- literary value - 
terms. One example illustrates particularly how Leavis utilises an 
esoteric grammar of critical terms that have been established in 
earlier discussions. The description of Sissy Jupe in the shaft of 
sunlight as 'the dark -eyed and dark -haired' girl receiving an added 
lustre from the sun which imbues her with symbolic energy is, Leavis 
claimed, 'an essentially Laurentian suggestion'.(231) 
This has a particular and a general significance. In general, 
the recourse to what is in essence a critical term that has a meaning 
unique to Leavis, without expanding on this implicit meaning, makes 
the criticism obtuse and imprecise. By refusing in this way to ex- 
patiate on the symbolism in the narrative, the criticism conspires 
to make that symbolism more mysterious and vaguely evocative, rather 
than exposing its hidden meaning and literary effect. Furthermore, 
'Laurentian' has a meaning only for this critic; the reader must 
determine its significance from the context in which it is encountered 
- but this renders the term pleonastic. Specifically, the application 
of the term 'Laurentian' is not appropriate - as has been shown else- 
where39 - in the case of Sissy Jupe, since she is not presented by 
the usual Dickensian symbolic strategy of repetition (her 'dark eyes' 
and 'dark hair' never reappear). Leavis's use of the passage as a 
key one in his appreciation is undermined this fact: 
39. Cf Garis op. cit. pp 150ff. 
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. . . the description of this metaphor poses the 
question of the difference between Lawrence's 
characteristic symbolic and structural habits and 
Dickens's, a difference so great as to make the. 
word Laurentian in Dr. Leavis's usage extremely 
questionable. 40 
The use of the term is further evidence of the inherent limitations 
in this critical method. The final commentary on Dickens emphasises 
the subjective propensity of these assertions of value made without 
due regard for textual analysis or their iipications in a theoretical 
domain. The methodological limitations of The Great Tradition that 
have been discussed here will become more apparent with regard to 
the succeeding work by the Leavises on Lawrence and Dickens. 
40. Garis loc. cit. p 153. 
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4. The 'Case' for D.H. Lawrence 
1. Claims and Refutations: the background to Leavis's criticism of 
Lawrence 
D.H. Lawrence: Novelist is not an analytical book. Leavis had a set 
of claims regarding Lawrence that he wished to enforce. Part of this 
enforcement was inevitably to be attempted in the face of opposition 
from prevailing preconceptions regarding Lawrence and this meant that 
Leavis was going to be involved with making a 'case' for Lawrence 
that would defeat these oppositional forces. Leavis said in the book 
1 that Lawrence was a 'case for literary criticism'(146) , but this 
was intended to distinguish his own approach to Lawrence from that 
of J.M.Murry's in Son of Woman (1931). In fact, the 'case' - the 
combination of claims and assertions and the dissertations on 
Lawrence's significance - that Leavis wished to make was more than 
a simple contrast with Murry's 'psychological documentation' attitude 
to the novels. It involved Leavis in a discourse on the nature of 
art, on the condition of contemporary civilisation and on the respon- 
sibility of art (and, by implication, criticism) to establish remedial 
norms with which to counteract the general decline. 'Analysis' in 
a technical sense had a radically diminished part to play in this 
critical exercise. What Leavis was more concerned to do was to present 
1. Figures in parentheses refer to page numbers in D.H.Lawrence: 
Novelist (1955) 
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'Lawrence' as a cultural fact, essential to the healthy state of con- 
temporary civilisation. A discussion of the dynamics of the Lawrentian 
text was not his main aim; he wanted rather to expatiate on the sig- 
nificance of the essentially diagnostic and remedial insights that 
he saw Lawrence as proclaiming: 
Any great creative writer who has not had his due is 
a power for life wasted. But the insight, the wisdom, 
the revived and re- educated feeling for health, that 
Lawrence brings are what, as our civilisation goes, 
we desperately need.(15) 
It is also significant that D.H.Lawrence: Novelist was the first 
major study of Leavis's to concentrate on a single writer. The 
previous major projects had been attempts to draw diverse and eclectic 
examples together and to present them as an homogeneous collection 
answering to the general claims of Leavis's argument about literature. 
The study of a single author had this previous endeavour - and parti- 
cularly The Great Tradition - behind it, so that Lawrence was seen 
by Leavis in part as the culminative figure of the developing structure 
of his history of the English novel.2 Furthermore, Leavis's study 
of Lawrence was begun in 1950, by which time Leavis had established 
fairly clearly the terms and methods of his own critical practice. 
Developed from his criticism of English poetry and his formulation 
of the place of criticism in the university, Leavis's critical practice 
expanded its theoretical sense of the relationship between language, 
poetry, art and 'life' (or, in a general sense, morality) in his study 
of'the great tradition'. 'Greatness', the measure of relative value. 
'This book carries on from The Great Tradition.' (9) 
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was there defined according to the same terms as poetry had previously 
been evaluated: that is, according to how and to what degree the 
literary work was faithful to the conditions of actual life and, more 
importantly, to what extent it contained within its mimetic represen- 
tations of the world a positive moral attitude. This was the back- 
ground to D.H.Lawrence: Novelist and the later study had no need to 
be burdened with considerations on the general theory of the function 
of literary criticism and the nature of the achieved literary work. 
When Leavis said that 'any great creative writer who has not had 
his due is a power for life wasted' the terms were to be understood, 
to be defined, by reference to the earlier critical vocabulary and 
procedures. Leavis's book on Lawrence was not to be concerned with 
problems of theory or of the relations between criticism, art and 
life. It was aimed at representing Lawrence as the epitome of all 
the assertions that Leavis had previously made on these matters and 
this ambition was to be related to his main claims for the place of 
literature in the structure of social relations. The study of Lawrence 
was a culmination the advanced expression of Leavis's developed pro- 
posals regarding literature and criticism: 
The more advanced the work the more unmistakably is 
the judgement that is concerned inseparable from that 
profoundest sense of relative value which determines, 
or should determine, the important choices of actual 
life. 3 
3. Education and the University (1943), p 35. 
202 
The study of Lawrence could not be a 'closed' discussion, dealing 
only with the immediate problems of the novels. Arising out of this 
discussion would be a commentary on the wider topics central to 
Leavis's fundamental ideas. 
It was on this criterion - the need to make the value judgements 
gained from literature operative in actual life - that Leavis based 
his argument for making a choice between the aesthetic represented 
by Lawrence and that represented by Eliot. This was a distinction 
fundamental to Leavis's conception of literary value: the two aes- 
thetics were antithetical and a predilection for one necessitated, 
in his eyes, the derogation of the other; the two were mutually ex- 
clusive.4 Leavis saw Eliot as representative of an order of literary 
endeavour inimical to Lawrence's artistic achievement. He further 
felt that Eliot had deliberately conspired to disadvantage Lawrence's 
literary reputation. The 'case' for Lawrence was thus organised 
according to ideas derived from opposition both to Eliot's artistic 
method and to what Leavis saw as his campaign against Lawrence's 
justified recognition. 
In the broadest sense, Lawrence and Eliot stood for sets of artistic 
aims and methods that were inherently incompatible. Leavis depended 
on Eliot as a source for his initial considerations on the function 
4. '[Lawrence and Joyce] it seems to me, were pre -eminently the 
testing, the crucial authors: if you took Joyce for a major 
creative writer, then, like Eliot, you had no use for Lawrence, 
and if you judged Lawrence a great writer, then you could hardly 
take a sustained interest in Joyce.'(10) 
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of criticism and as a model for the means whereby a contemporary poetic 
could have a diagnostic purpose in relation to society in general. 
Therefore, when he turned his attention to understanding Lawrence's 
significance he was faced with a conflict of interests; he was pre- 
sented with the necessity of choosing between the two literary figures, 
and of substantiating and justifying his choice. Leavis overcame 
the difficulty by adjusting the terms of the comparison somewhat: 
for example, he referred in general to the work Eliot produced after 
Four Quartets, that is, the plays. He concentrated his repudiation 
of Eliot on the poet's 'failure' to recognise Lawrence for what he 
was - indeed, this failure was adduced by Leavis as symptomatic of 
a deeper inadequacy at the heart of Eliot's psyche. In this sense, 
Leavis's choice was made for him, Eliot having failed to come up to 
the mark in his dismissal of Lawrence's ambitions and achievements, 
which were now Leavis's adopted standard measure. 
The contrast was centred on a matter of definition: the question 
of the particular emphasis placed by the antagonists on differing 
concepts of 'intelligence'. The notion of 'intelligence' as a key 
factor in the creative endeavour Leavis had originally taken from 
Eliot: he had adapted it into various guises that each suited the 
respective context of a particular line of argument. Eventually, 
his developed definition, or applied sense, of what 'intelligence' 
was. found its consummate exemplar in Lawrence. By this time the con- 
cept had a meaning diametrically opposed to that for which it was 
employed by Eliot: 
It is Lawrence's greatness that to appreciate him is 
to revise one's criteria of intelligence and one's 
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notion of it. Eliot's finding him incapable of 
thinking is a failure of intelligence in himself.(2) 
'Intelligence' was for Leavis a word that had different nuances 
depending on the context. Eliot, in contrast, avoided weighting 
the notion with abstruse implications: for him, with regard to Lawrence, 
intelligence was (or was not) manifested as the power of rational 
thinking. It was for Lawrence's apparent inability to engage in 
rational thought that Eliot primarily disparaged him: he described 
Lawrence as 'a man of fitful and profound insights, rather than of 
ratiocinative power'5- and as exhibiting 'an incapacity for what we 
ordinarily call thinking'.6 He had an 'extraordinarily keen sensibility 
and capacity for profound intuition - intuition from which he commonly 
drew the wrong conclusions.'? This was connected to the question 
of his 'education', which was not a question of whether Lawrence ought 
to have gone to Cambridge; 'educated' in Eliot's sense meant 'having 
such an apprehension of the contours of the map of what has been 
written in the past, as to see instinctively where everything belongs, 
and approximately where anything new is likely to belong'. This 
was not a matter of 'information' so much as of 'the critical faculties 
which education should give'9. combined with 'a lack of intellectual 
5. Fr William Tiverton[ ie Fr Martin Jarrett -Kerr] , D.H.Lawrence 
and Human Existence (1951) p vii. (Introduction by T.S.Eliot) 
6. After Strange Gods (1934), p 58. 
7. Ibid. p 58. 
8. T.S.Eliot in Bailli e. J and Martin, H.Revelation: a symposium 
(Edinburgh, 1937), p 29. 
9. After Strange Gods p 58; although Eliot also said that 'Lawrence 
was an ignorant man in the sense that he was unaware of how much 
he did not know.' (Tiverton , op. cit. p vii). 
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and social training'10 this characteristic made Lawrence inherently 
amoral and a dangerous influence: 'A trained mind like that of Mr. 
Joyce is always aware of what master it is serving; an untrained mind, 
and a soul destitute of humility and filled with self -righteousness, 
is a blind servant and a fatal leader.' 
In common with Leavis (and numerous other commentators on Lawrence) 
Eliot formulated this statement by referring only obliquely to the 
novels.12 Like Leavis, he was dealing with his impression of Lawrence 
as awhole entity, 'Lawrence' the cultural phenomenon. He used 
Lawrence's example as a means of pursuing a general thesis regarding 
the relationship of art to orthodox morality in contemporary culture. 
In this, he approached Lawrence exactly as Leavis approached him: 
with a view to using him as a means of advancing a specialised argument. 
Eliot's attack on the 'heresies' of the modern world found in Lawrence 
an example through which to make clearer his claim regarding the 
deleterious effect of the change whereby 'morals cease to be a matter 
of tradition and orthodoxy 13; Lawrence was supposed to enforce and 
support his case. Leavis discussed Lawrence in the same way. Since, 
however. Eliot was hostile to Lawrence and Leavis sided with him, 
it followed that Leavis must combine his advocacy of Lawrence with 
an assault on Eliot's position. 
10. After Strange Gods, p 59. 
11. 'A man like Lawrence, therefore, with his acute sensibility, 
violent prejudices and passions, and lack of intellectual and 
social training, is admirably fitted to be an instrument for 
forces of good or forces of evil; or as we might expect, partly 
for one and partly for the other.' After Strange Gods p 59. 
12. He did not claim even to have read all the major novels. (See 
After Strange Gods p 60). 
13. After Strange Gods p 54. 
The response of each critic to Lawrence's work was to perceive 
in it terms of its applicability to actual life. For Eliot, this 
relation was unacceptable: 
Mais même si l'on ne se cabre devant la terrible 
monotonie, sous ses admirables variations du thëme 
de M Lawrence, on se détourne néanmoins en pensant: 
"Ceci n'est pas mon monde, tel qu'il est, ou tel que 
je souhaiterais fût. "14 
Leavis, on the other hand, found the application not only relevant 
but essential: . . the insight, the wisdom, the revived and re- 
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educated feeling for health, that Lawrence brings are what, as our 
civilisation goes, we desperately need'.(15) The difference between 
Leavis and Eliot depended on the critics' respective attitudes to 
art and life. Eliot, clearly, was writing against the background of 
his committment to the established Church and state and he interpreted 
Lawrence as the threat to the stability of these institutions.15 It 
was not Leavis'srtnconformist ethos, however, which led him to a con- 
certed attack on Eliot's position. It was a combination of the desire 
to refute Eliot's argument and to account for the reasons why his 
former mentor should now be found to be occupying a position directly 
opposed to his own. In the nature of Leavis's critical process, this 
became a question not of how the stances of his and Eliot's came to 
be so differentiated,but of 'how, if I am right in sum about 
Lawrence's genius and achievement, a mind capable of Eliot's best 
14. 'Le Roman Anglais Contemporain', La Nouvelle Revue Française 
(Paris) vol. 28, (Mai 1927) p 62. (referred to by Leavis, pp 
23 -24n) 
15. Eliot wrote of 'the deplorable religious upbringing which gave 
Lawrence his lust for intellectual independence.' After Strange 
Gods p 58. 
207 
criticism can have been so wrong in matters so important'.(24) Leavis 
found himself in a crisis of opposition to Eliot and his response 
was to attack Eliot's position by attacking Eliot. rather than attemp- 
ting to explain the difference in terms taken from a discussion of 
Lawrence; by, that is, making the apprehension of Lawrence's sig- 
nificance a fundamental critical issue, in an all -or- nothing way. 
Leavis claimed that 'the failure of criticsm and of the cultivated 
in respect of Lawrence . . . is a disgraceful chapter of English 
literary history'.(21 -2) Leavis attested Eliot as the main source 
and cause of this failure, with Eliot not simply representative of 
a prevalent set of literary values that found Lawrence uncongenial, 
but as actively endeavouring to do as much positive harm as he could 
to Lawrence's reputation, by propagating adverse opinions and judgements 
about him. Eliot had influence, and he used it to malign Lawrence. 
Discussing Eliot's article in La Nouvelle Revue Française1ó Leavis 
said 
the valuations in general are essentially those of what 
was then the chic social -literary world. There is what 
would be distinguished intelligence if it were not 
stultified by the conventionality, and, where Lawrence 
is concerned, by grossly wrong preconceptions. blindly 
held, and the attendant unperceived contradictions.(23n) 
It should be noted that Eliot's article for the Revue appeared in 
1927, three years before Leavis's pamphlet on Lawrence found, among 
16. Cf. pp 23-24n. 
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other things, The Lost Girl the 'best novel', and Women in Love diffi- 
cult to get through.17 Certainly Eliot's opinions on Lawrence at 
this time later appeared jejune; but it can hardly be said to have 
been intended maliciously, the less so since at the time Lawrence 
was still alive and very much an écrivain contemporain with new work 
still likely to emerge. Leavis's real argument was with the case 
stated in After Strange Gods (1934). In his original review of the 
bookl8 , Leavis was also primarily concerned with Eliot's attitude 
to Lawrence. The review, however, was more balanced than the later 
discussion in D.H. Lawrence: Novelist. 
The discussion in the review hinged on the sources for the sense 
of moral value that is to be sought after in literature. For Eliot 
they were to be found in the dogmas of the established Church. This, 
for Leavis, was too much a matter of applying standards of valuation 
from the- outside. Leavis argued not against the need for an extra - 
literary level of understanding and 'discrimination', but against 
the idea that the criteria for such understanding can be pursued 
separately from the process whereby they are made apparent: 'When 
[Eliot] says that he is 'applying moral principles' to literature, 
we cannot accept those principles as alternatives to the criteria 
we know'. 
l9 
The capacity for discrimination must be engendered 
in the process of discriminating: the standards germane to this 
17. See D.H.Lawrence (minority pamphlet no 6) (1930) pp 11 and 14. 
15. 'Mr. Eliot. Mr. Wyndham Lewis and Lawrence'. Scrutiny III, pp 
184 -191. 
19. Scrutiny III, 2 p 185. 
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process must be already inherent in it and not superimposed through 
the medium of another doxa (in Eliot's case, the Anglo- Catholic creed): 
. . . we could recover such standards only by the development 
- as the development - of a more critical spirit out of the 
capacity for discrimination that we have already. To put it 
another way: moral or religious criticism cannot be a sub- 
stitute for literary criticism, it is only by being a 
literary critic that Mr. Eliot can apply his recovered 
standards to literature. . . .It is not as a substitute or 
an alternative that what Mr. Eliot nowadays offers us could 
recommend itself, but only as a completion, and this it is 
far from seeming.20 
Eliot's assertion of the priority of moral principles over those 
inherent in the process of literary criticism was an emphasis that 
Leavis found unacceptable. For him the discovery of religious values 
was part of a combined activity that aimed at eventually making the 
essential system of values apparent, 'as a completion'. 'Critical' 
values and 'moral' values were for him identical. Hence, Leavis dis- 
missed Eliot's concentration on his narrow version of 'tradition and 
orthodoxy' even while accepting the premise that the 'religious sense' 
in some way needed to be redefined and asserted in the modern world.21 
Leavis clearly felt that the boundaries of Eliot's orthodoxy needed 
to be widened to allow for the possibility of eliciting the 'religious 
sense' from something more than merely formal religion: 
20 Ibid. pp 185-6. 
21. ' . . . with conscious inadequacy, holding on to what one is 
sure of, one agrees that "to re- establish a vital connection 
between the individual and the race" means, in a civilisation 
that more and more. at higher and lower levels, fosters the 
chauffeur -mentality, reviving what it may be crude to call the 
religious sense - the sense that spoke in Lawrence when he said, 
"Thank God I am not free, any more than a rooted tree is free. "' 
Scrutiny, III. 2 p 184. 
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One may at any rate venture that health - even religious 
health - demands a more active concern for other things 
22 than formal religion than Mr. Eliot now shows or encourages. 
The weakness of Eliot's position was revealed to Leavis in the commen- 
tary on Lawrence. The integrity of Eliot's method could be tested 
only if he could 'demonstrate convincingly that his application of 
moral principles leads to a more adequate criticism' 
23 
; Leavis found 
that generally it did not, 4 although he acknowledged that the writing 
on Lawrence 'exhibit[ed] something much more like a critical attitude'. 
25 
Nevertheless, it was not a 'critical attitude' that was fully capable 
of dealing with its material. The 'main significance' of Eliot's 
comments on Lawrence was that they were 'largely and revealingly un- 
critical'26 and open to objections based on matters that forced Leavis 
to go beyond the convention of agreement and disagreement, or colla- 
borative exchange. 
27 
It was fundamentally a problem of attitude, 
of Eliot's orientation in relation to the question of the priority 
of the moral principle. Leavis did not claim that 'in Lawrence we 
have all we need of moral concern'; but, on the other hand, he said 
22. Loc. cit. p 186. 
23. Loc cit. p 185. 
24. 'In these lectures, if he demonstrates anything it is the opposite: 
the criticism seems painfully bad - disablingly inadequate, 
often irrelevant and sometimes disingenuous.' Loc. cit. p 185. 
25. Loc. cit. p 186. 
26. Ibid. p 187. 
27. 'We are decidedly far away from the imagined 'frightful con- 
sequences' of Lawrence the don at Cambridge, 'rotten and rotting 
others'. It would, indeed, have been ungracious to recall this 
unhappy past if Mr. Eliot's attitude now had been consistently 
or in general effect critical, to be agreed or disagreed with.' 
Loc. cit. p 187. 
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that 'a preoccupation with discipline - the effort towards orthodoxy 
- also has its disabilities and dangers'.28 
In 1934, Leavis's opinions about Lawrence were still in a state 
of flux. He was leaning towards Lawrence in this review, but his 
advocacy was not unqualified. He conceded, for example, that Eliot 
could make 'a strong case' for attributing "spiritual sickness" to 
Lawrence. He seemed to feel that from both quarters something valuable 
could be retrieved, in terms of the general ambition to restore 
humanity to some condition of 'health'. He clearly supported Eliot's 
preoccupation with 'tradition and orthodoxy', which he saw as a serious 
attempt to revitalise the human spirit and rescue the individual from 
the 'chauffeur- mentality'. Yet he also saw in Lawrence a different 
kind of 'moral concern', something 'without which the preoccupation 
(necessary as it is) with order, forms, and deliberate construction 
cannot produce health'. 
29 
However, by 1950, when Leavis began his articles on Lawrence, his 
views had crystallised into a deep antagonism to what Eliot had re- 
presented in After Strange Gods. It was an antagonism that was in- 
cipient in the review in the comments regarding Eliot's and Lawrence's 
respective attitudes to sex,30 but it extends in the later study to 
a condemnation of Eliot's whole aesthetic. For by this time, Lawrence 
2b. Ibid. p 190. 
29. Ibid. p 191. 
30. Cf. ibid. p 189. 
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had become the centre of Leavis's attention and the alternatives that 
Eliot presented were now fundamentally antithetical: Lawrence and Eliot 
had become for Leavis two sides of an irreconcilable opposition rather 
than, as they had been, distinct but resolvable elements of a comparable 
social and moral endeavour. 
This change must be seen in the light of the significance that 
Lawrence now had for Leavis and in terms of the consequential choice 
that he had made in this regard. Leavis's speculations on what might 
make for 'spiritual health' had evolved into more concrete deter - 
minatipns which were to be consummated in the study of Lawrence. 
Eliot had come to represent the opposing valuations and the significant 
crux of the debate was a question of the perceived or implied relation 
between art and 'life'. What in the introduction to the later study 
appeared to be simply an innocuous distinction (a preference for Joyce 
or Lawrence must be exclusive31 ) was in fact crucial and led to 
Leavis's increased antipathy towards Eliot. 
The whole matter of the moral responsibilities of the author in 
a novel had been charted in The Great Tradition : in the later study 
it was distilled essentially into the dynamic of the choice, Joyce 
or Lawrence. The archetype of the aesthetic represented by Joyce 
was, as it had been in The Great Tradition, Flaubert. Now Leavis 
was able to bring Lawrence's comments on Flaubert to substantiate 
his claim that the French writer had adopted an 'attitude to life' 
31. Cf. D.H.Lawrence: Novelist p 10. 
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that was essentially one of 'distaste and disgust'.(25) It was in 
this regard that he was equatable with Eliot, both writers sharing 
this negative 'attitude to life'. Leavis expanded this by comparing 
Flaubert's 'religion of art' with Eliot's Christianity. The plays 
following Four Quartets Leavis saw as exhibiting 'a Flaubertian inten- 
sity of art: . . . the slow meticulous labour of calculating judgement; 
. . land] the sick poverty, the triviality, and . . . the human 
and spiritual nullity'.(26) There was no detailed discussion of the 
plays; Leavis dismissed them as if their weaknesses were self -evident. 
It was here that Leavis's definition of 'intelligence' made itself 
felt, in all its senses. In one respect, Leavis saw Eliot's apparent 
incapacity for reading Lawrence as a 'persisting and grievous default 
of intelligence in a gifted writer'.(26) This failure extended to 
the poet's ' "standing off" from life', which indicated a similar 
'radical - sickness of the spirit' as that shown by Flaubert; both 
manifested in their work 'an inner contradiction, a defeat of 
intelligence'.(26) In this sense, intelligence was equated with a 
creative impulse tending towards the positive; it requires a capacity 
for making judgements of value that are applicable in actual life, 
in a similarly positive way. This is what Leavis called 'the major 
order of value -judgement' and Eliot failed when faced with the crucial 
test, of placing Lawrence accurately and understanding the contribution 
he made to the encouragement of 'health'. Eliot, despite his achieve- 
ments as a poet, which Leavis largely left aside, concentrating his 
attack on the plays and the criticism,32 had 'shown himself incapable 
32. Even to the extent of criticising the criticism for being 'badly 
written'. See p 310n. 
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of sustained precision of thought' and 'liable to shallowness and 
confusion'.(26) Hence he had proved inadequate when the challenge 
of Lawrence presented itself and he did not 'show up well in the major 
order of value -judgement, those depending upon the critic's sense 
for the difference between what, in his time, makes for health and 
what makes against it'.(26) 
In contrast, there was Lawrence's 'genius and achievement', which 
was further enhanced by the comparison. Where Eliot revealed 'an 
inner contradiction', Lawrence displayed a 'transcendental intelligence' 
that was 'inseparable from [his] creative genius'(27): 
. . . intelligence in him can be, as it is, the servant of the 
whole integrated psyche. It is representative in consciousness 
of the complex need of the whole being, and is not thwarted or 
disabled by inner contradictions in him, whether we have him 
as artist, critic or expositor.(27) 
Lawrence, in effect, defined 'intelligence' as the term was used by 
Leavis. In some respects, the refutation of Eliot's position was 
a redundant exercise; Leavis's claims for Lawrence would have stated 
the opposition clearly enough by implication, without Leavis having 
to go over arguments originally laid out some twenty years previously. 
Leavis's impulse behind the attack seems to have been finally to 
resolve the dilemma of his ambiguous attitude towards Eliot's critical 
principles and to emphasise his allegiance to the Lawrentian aesthetic. 
Eliot condemned himself, almost, by his professed interests, by 
finding] the creative originality that really matters 
in the contrivances of Joyce, where insistent will and 
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ingenuity so largely confess the failure of creative 
life, and in the technique of the Cantos, where, by 
Eliot's own account, he is not interested in what 
Pound says, but only in the way he says it.(27) 
In 1934, such a predisposition would have been regarded by Leavis 
as a matter for discussion: that is, a convention of agreement /dis- 
agreement would have been in force. By 1951 it had become the in- 
criminating grounds for strong condemnation. Such was the nature 
of the importance with which Lawrence was by then imbued in Leavis's 
mind. Contradiction had come to represent not so much a difference 
of attitude as a betrayal of the essential purpose. In the light 
of this, it is necessary to resist some of the claims that have been 
made for Leavis's critique. For example, P.J.M. Robertson33 has stated 
that 
in discriminating between Lawrence and Eliot, and 
discerning the defects as well as the virtues of 
each, Leavis sharpened his criteria, knew his own 
mind, spoke with a voice both distinctive and 
perhaps as influential as theirs, and in due time 
wrote of them with something like the impersonality 
he sought in them.34 
In D.H.Lawrence: Novelist , at least, the balance was not so nicely 
maintained as this suggests. 'Virtues' did not accrue to Eliot, who 
was disparaged by Leavis in strong terms and to the same kind of ex- 
treme as that to which Lawrence was praised. The 'criteria' that 
were adumbrated emerged only gradually out of the main body of the 
33. Cf. The Leavises on Fiction (London 1981) chapter 5. 
34. op. cit. p 77. 
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study, and were, in effect, self -defining. For example, Lawrence 
was said to possess a rare 'intelligence', manifested as 'creative 
genius'; while 'creative genius' was described as 'transcendental 
intelligence'. What the reader is left with is Lawrence, and an ac- 
cumulation of laudatory comments on him.35 It is necessary to inter- 
pret this study as saying as much about Leavis as it aimed to say 
about Lawrence, and the epithet 'impersonality' is not, therefore, 
that which is most appropriate to the enterprise. Certainly, Leavis 
spoke with a 'distinctive voice', but this was as much to do with 
the polemical intentions of his book as with the fact that he had 
achieved a well- defined perception of Lawrence's singificance. 
The key to Leavis's critical appraisal is contained in his dichotomy 
of Joyce /Lawrence, the two authors who were supposed by him to sym- 
bolise antithetical aesthetic attitudes. Notably, it was Flaubert 
who was made to bear the brunt of Leavis's hostility towards the 
'religion of art', that creativity which was not 'spontaneous' but 
'contrived', 'conscious' and 'intense'. Joyce presented an altogether 
more complex problem than Flaubert, against whom Leavis could bring 
35. Elsewhere, Robertson says that 'Leavis's terms[ when dealing 
with Lawrence] are almost mystical, not because he is being pur- 
posely porterbus but because Lawrence's uncanny rendering of 
life forces him to be allusive rather than explicit and definite.' 
Op. cit. p 90. 
Surely, though, one of the main responsibilities of the literary 
critic is to attempt to make explicit that which is obscure or 
in doubt? (This is what Leavis implied when he said that the 
critic's task was 'to realise as fully as possible' the work 
of art with which he is dealing.) 
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direct evidence from both Lawrence and Henry James36 . The terms of 
his discussion of Joyce37, however, provide further means of under- 
standing the critical procedure of D.H.Lawrence: Novelist. 
Leavis's rejection of Joyce's experiments following Ulysses can 
be seen as a dismissal of some of the basic precepts of the modernist 
aesthetic tradition, in a reaction away from the idea that formal 
innovation was of itself adequate to the challenge of the contemporary 
world. Leavis had always sought 'technical innovation' - Lawrence 
himself was 'as remarkable a technical innovator as there has ever 
been'(18) - but this had to be part of A whole process of expression, 
where the form is dictated by the needs of the subject matter and 
thus remains a constitutive element in the eventual work of art, rather 
than representing its primary interest. Form was not of itself ade- 
quate as the entire concern of the work of art, it was essential to 
have as well some other compulsion behind the desire for creativity. 
This is the theme that tells in Leavis's comparison between Joyce's 
creative procedure and Shakespeare's.38 What differentiated the two 
was the relation of the creative impulse to something coherent and 
36. Leavis quoted from Lawrence's review of Thomas Mann's fiction 
(originally published in the Blue Review, July 1913 and reprinted 
in Phoenix (1936)) and referred to James's essay on Flaubert 
in The Art of Fiction (ed. Morris Roberts) (1948). 
37. 'Joyce and "the revolution of the word "', Scrutiny II 2 pp 
38. This was a comparison instigated by a comment in one of the books 
under review (to the effect that Joyce's development of his form 
was comparable to Shakespeare's in the late plays). The comparison 
was expedient and can hardly be seen (pace Robertson op. cit. 
pp 80 -1) as a 'compliment to Joyce'. 
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in need of expression in the artist: 'Shakespeare's effects . . 
register the compulsive intensity and completeness with which [ he] 
realises his imagined world, the swift immediacy that engages at 
a point an inexhaustibly subtle organisation.' Joyce, on the other 
hand, practised a 'deliberate, calculating contrivance' and an 'exter- 
nal approach' that was essentially 'mechanical'. What Leavis 
stipulated was something of the order of 'inspiration' ('an inner 
impulse or principle of order') that was cognate with the 
'organisation' (a set of apprehensions and perceptions that was capable 
of giving each new sensory experience its allotted place and 
significance) within which the inspirational urge was manifested. 
Joyce's conscious 'stratification and complication', his pursuit 
of linguistic effect for its own sake, was alien to Leavis's conception 
of art and the creative act. Lawrence's specification of 'spontaneous- 
creative fulness of being' was one to which Leavis firmly adhered, 
since it - confirmed his presupposition that at some point in the 
creative process the urgency of the need to express would 'engage' 
an 'organised' capacity for expression and would thus produce the 
'genuine' work of art. This is a conception that is essentially of 
the same order as that adumbrated in his writings on poetry, where 
the fundamental requirements had been 'concrete particularity' and 
'mimetic flexibility'. 
Leavis, therefore, came to align himself completely with the kind 
of artistic achievement represented by Lawrence. He epitomised 
Leavis's version of the work of art, its potentialities and responsi- 
bilities, and seemed to personalise for Leavis a form of artistic 
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endeavour that answered to his own quasi -political stance regarding 
the relation between art and the contemporary society: 
when I think of the career that started in the ugly mining 
village in the spoilt Midlands, amidst all those apparent 
disadvantages, it seems to me that, even in these days, it 
should give us faith in the creative human spirit and its 
power to ensue [sic] fullness of life.(15) 
Lawrence, for Leavis, was the ideal combination of cogent inspiration 
and a morally- orientated sense of social responsibility. 
Where Leavis's preoccupation with refuting opposing preconceptions 
on D.H.Lawrence combined with his increasingly cohering sense of the 
magnitude of Lawrence's significance was in the chapter 'Lawrence 
and Class', dealing with The Daughters of the Vicar. This chapter 
was originally published in the Sewanee Review for 195439 and thus 
post -dates the bulk of the essays which in D.H. Lawrence: Novelist 
succeed it. Although the essay was ostensibly concerned with the 
question of 'class', the weight of Leavis's developed opinions of 
Lawrence lay behind it. 
A contemporary reference to Lawrence's 'class- consciousness'40 
was seen by Leavis as being the historical successor of, again, Eliot's 
comments in After Strange Gods on Lawrence's 'snobbery'. Leavis set 
out to dispose of this charge and the associated claim that Lawrence 
39. Sewanee Review lxii (1954) pp 535 -62. 
40. Cf. The Listener, 13 August 1953: see D.H. Lawrence: Novelist 
p 85- 
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had no 'moral or social sense'.(74) In his enthusiasm for extolling 
the contrary virtues in Lawrence, Leavis evinced a tendency to exag- 
gerate Lawrence's achievements that is also apparent in his discussion 
of St Mawr. There is not the space here to develop an exhaustive 
dissenting case against Leavis's evaluation of The Daughters of the 
Vicar; it is necessary only to indicate the nature of the claims that 
were made in order to see the general structure of Leavis's approach 
to Lawrence. 
In the first instance, Leavis claimed that The Daughters of the 
Vicar was a story that was 'profoundly representative of Lawrence'.(73) 
This is in itself unusual. The story appeared in The Prussian Officer 
volume (1914) and was amongst the earliest Lawrence ever published. 
The main themes of that collection - oppression, strain, alienation, 
defeat - were not those which later emerged in the best work; they 
werenotmarkedly 'affirmative' in their general tenor and outlook. 
The Daughters of the Vicar was 'representative', it must be assumed, 
insofar as it dealt with the contingencies of positive and negative 
'attitudes to life'. However, the tale is constructed in a way that 
is predictable and predetermining; the set of choices available to 
the contrasting protagonists (Louisa and Mary) are presented in such 
a way as to render the executive act of choosing virtually redundant41 
Nevertheless, Leavis found the tale the occasion for the statement 
that 'Lawrence is the greatest kind of creative writer'.(73) This 
41. For a development of this argument see Eliseo Vivas, D.H.Lawrence: 
the failure and the triumph of art (1960) pp 166 et seq. 
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introduced once more the contrast with Flaubert and Eliot, names now 
linked irrevocably in Leavis's mind with that which was 'life -denying', 
where the crux of the comparison was the orientation towards something 
that Leavis called 'life'. This, and Lawrence's attitude towards 
it as expressed in his writing, was a concept that Leavis employed 
with great facility but was unable to define. He claimed that, whilst 
'consciousness of class- distinctions ' operated at the centre of the 
story, they were used by Lawrence as a way of reifying his abstract 
considerations on how, in human affairs, a positive bearing manifests 
itself. As Leavis described it, Lawrence aimed to demonstrate the 
defeat of 'class- feeling' - to show 'the triumph over them of life'. 
(74) This was what Leavis claimed that the tale purported to drama- 
tise, butthe phrasing could only receive its full significance by 
reference back to the story: 
the phrase gets its force in the tale, the movement 
and sum of which define 'life' in the only way in 
which it can be defined for the purposes of the 
critic: he has the tale - its developing significance 
and the concrete particulars of its organisation - 
to point to.(74) 
The utilisation of such terminology indicates the radical difference 
thatLeavis perceived between Lawrence's art and that of Eliot or of 
Flaubert. Interpretation and evaluation along these lines - seeking 
the 'affirmative' aspects in the work - meant that writers not 
implicitly dealing with such matters must be seen as involved with 
a secondary order of artistic creation. Leavis saw in Lawrence a 
preoccupation with 'life', and an attempt to elucidate and define 
the exact nature of the kind of 'life' with which he was concerned. 
Leavis described Lawrence's attitude as one of 'reverence': 
The attitude is one of strength, and it is clairvoyant 
and incorruptible in its preoccupation with realities. 
It expresses, of course, the rare personal adequacy of 
an individual of genius, but it is also the product 
of a fine and mature civilisation, the sanctions, the 
valuations, and the pieties of which speak through the 
individual.(75) 
'Class -feeling' in Lawrence's story is only one aspect of a set 
of social relations through which Lawrence explored the positive and 
negative sides of human nature.42 In his observations on Lawrence's 
procedure in this, Leavis was able to substantiate his claims for 
Lawrence's essential characteristics, summarised in the above phrases. 
'Reverence' and 'life' were said to be defined in the course of the 
tale 43 and 'in the way in which the significance is developed and 
its profundity and scope are brought out we have Lauren- 
tian insight'.(76) The essay, it can be seen, was not a critique 
per se of the tale, but a further attempt to enforce the 'case' for 
Lawrence which Leavis wanted to develop. It was an analysis of 
Lawrence's creative attitude rather than method: weaknesses in the 
narrative or the prose were not therefore germane to the issue. The 
tale, Lawrence's treatment of his subject, was regarded by Leavis 
as confirming his assertion of Lawrence's significance. The essay 
42. 'Class is a major fact in the case presented, but attention 
focuses on the essential humanity this fact conditions, and the 
interest informing the attention remains pure and undeflected.'(86) 
43. Leavis could not go beyond the texts to find a definition of 
his terms, since they found their meaning specifically in relation 
to the material (the particular narrative) to which they were 
applied. In a digression on 'Fanny and Annie' in this same chapter 
he said that in the end Fanny 'has chosen life': 'The sense 
in which she has done so it takes the tale to define, and in 
defining it. the tale justifies that way of describing her 
decision.I(90) 
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was. as a consequence, proportionally occupied with this aspect, to 
the relative exclusion of topics more directly in the realm of literary 
criticism. This is not to say that Leavis's handling of the tale 
was in any way peremptory; but the emphasis of the discussion was 
on those aspects of the 'Lawrentian insight' which gave support to 
Leavis's appeal for recognition of Lawrence's significance, for 
confirmation that his was 'a spirit informed by an almost infallible 
sense for health and vitality'.(70) 
'Almost infallible' - Lawrence was not immune from criticism;. 
and yet even where Leavis found areas that were suspect, a prose style 
that was unconvincing or a narrative excessively ponderous, he never- 
theless extolled the creative impulse that he saw behind it: he 
argued, that ìs, that even where Lawrence exhibited weakness or incon- 
sistency,44 the overall creative intention was sound. This kind 
of tolerance can only be explained by reference to Leavis's overriding 
concern for establishing Lawrence as 'incomparably the greatest 
creative writer in English of our time'.(18) If anything, Leavis saw 
Lawrence as defeated - on the rare occasion45 - by the complexity 
of the problems with which he aimed to deal, by the intransigence 
of actual life and the uncompromising nature of his own ambition: 
To have found, as he contemplated human life, or lives 
44. ' . . .his art sometimes cherishes the illusion that it grasps 
and presents more in the way of positive 'answer' to the large 
issues raised than it actually does.'(69 -70) 
45. 'But for how little the things that call for such criticisms 
count in the whole body of Lawrence's work.'(70) 
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in the contemporary world, the answers he was looking 
for, Lawrence would have had to be more than a great 
creative writer - he would have had to be something 
hardly conceivable(69) 
This indicates precisely Leavis's feelings about Lawrence. His attach- 
ment to Lawrence's aesthetic ambition, or his perception of it, was 
such that even the failures were to be accounted for in terms of the 
strength of the originating creative inspiration. 
Despite Leavis's describing the Lawrence canon as 'an immense body 
of living creation'(70) a phrase that is meaningless in its vagueness, 
Leavis's commentary actually set aside most of the main novels: 'I 
want the stress to fall unambiguously on The Rainbow, Women in Love, 
and the tales'.(14) What he called the 'lesser novels' he regarded 
as almost a separate body of work, in dealing with which he could 
'concede to adverse criticism of Lawrence as an artist what I think 
has to be conceded'.(14) Leavis dealt with these works separately 
'in order to put them clearly apart from the work on which I would 
establish the claim for Lawrence'.(30) 
The early novels were set aside almost immediately, The White 
Peacock as 'painfully callow'(19), The Trespasser as 'hard to get 
through'(19) and Sons and Lovers as not portending 'greatness'(19), 
as well as having already 'not lacked attention'.(18) The novels 
that followed The Rainbow and Women in Love were 'exploratory and 
experimental' and, while 'very much open to criticism', were 'full 
of life and interest, . . . impressively the work of a novelist of 
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of genius'.(30) Aaron's Rod and The Lost Girl were notable, according 
to Leavis's estimation, for their successful parts, which were set 
amongst a confusion of undirected energies. The Lost Girl had 'no 
compelling total significance in control'(31) and in Aaron's Rod there 
was 'no closeness of organisation'(32) and Lawrence 'fail[ed] to trans- 
cend his own personal situation'.46(44) Kangaroo was a record of 
the failure of political action which also is distorted by unasimi- 
lated personal experience (the Harriet - Somers relationship partaking 
too much of the Frieda - Lawrence ménage). Lady Chatterley's Lover 
was 'too deliberate . . . to be a wholly satisfactory work of art, 
appealing to imaginatively sensitised feeling'.(70) 
Despite his general strictures on these novels, Leavis admitted 
positive qualities to them with a large degree of the same kind of 
tolerance that he evinced in his discussion of The Daughters of the 
Vicar. -For example, his comments on Lawrence's treatment in Aaron's 
Rod of the protagonist's attitude towards his wife and family involve 
him in an ambivalent statement on moral relativism. He described 
the situation as 'a familiar kind of life -frustrating deadlock' 
('familiar' to whom; and from what sources:life, or the novel ?), and 
this introduced the common theme of all his adumbrations on Lawrence. 
'Life' was the fundamental concept around which Lawrence, according 
to Leavis, structured his perceptions of the world. Leavis's intro- 
duction of the term to have the effect of a judgement of value was 
46. Although 'the whole evocation of Aaron Sisson en famille has 
a marvellous reality. The chapter by itself would be enough 
to establish that the author was a rare kind of genius.'(33) 
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a key strategy of his critical method as regards Lawrence. 'Life' 
was the measure, the standard, against which, notwithstanding its 
essential vagueness, all Lawrence's representations of the human condi- 
tion were implicitly judged. The artist's function, as Leavis saw 
it, was to observe and expatiate on the various forms, both positive 
and negative, which the individual response to particular circumstances 
takes. The critic's function, when presented with the case, wa8 to 
interpret, and according to the same fundamental standard of value. 
To describe, therefore, Aaron's relations with his family as 'life - 
frustrating' was virtually to close the issue; in such circumstances, 
the individual is justified in whatever action might be necessary 
to redeem the situation. Aaron Sisson abandons his wife and children, 
almost without compunction, yet Leavis claimed that this act had to 
be judged according to the extent to which it was pre -empted by the 
'life- frustrating' conditions that Aaron wanted to escape. This was 
the level of moral judgement that Leavis designated as the relevant 
one; apportioning blame (moral responsibility) to either Aaron for 
his selfishness or his wife for having made his life intolerable 
would not be 'to the point': 'the moral concern goes far deeper than 
the level of those judgements'.(35) It was not, of course, the act 
itself, perceived objectively, which was accessible to this specialised 
interpretation, but Lawrence's treatment of it, his presentation of 
the case. It was a presentation which, Leavis said, 'transcend[ed] 
ordinary moral judgements'.(35) That is to say, human judgement and 
action in the context of Lawrence's art are conditioned by the special 
moral framework which the aesthetic inhabits: 'life' is the final 
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arbitrating concept, to which 'morality' ('ordinary' morality) is 
subordinate. 
This is open to objection on two counts. First, it is not certain 
that Aaron's action has the validity which Leavis ascribed to it. 
The reader will only not demur at the apparent callousness if he 
consents to the special claims that Leavis made for the supra -moral 
pressure that the 'life- frustrating' circumstances exercised on Aaron's 
volitional capacities. Secondly, the introduction of the notion of 
moral relativism is a dubious ploy, begging as it does the question 
of to what kind of higher authority or sanction Leavis believed he 
was appealing when he posited the criterion of 'life' above and outside 
the realm of 'ordinary' moral judgement. 'Life' is not, of itself, 
a moral concept, engaging principles of right and wrong; placed out- 
side morality it becomes merely amoral.47 This is a truism which 
Leavis appears to have wanted to resist in his attempt to propose 
as superordinate something which was essentially indeterminate and 
definable only by reference to the texts in which it was said to mani- 
fest itself. This was a species of critical mystification, so to 
speak, whereby the manipulation of moral judgements reverts to an 
undisclosed, almost private sense of good and bad, so that 'what makes 
for health and sanity' becomes the arcane property of the artist, 
revealed to the reader only through the intercession of the critic; 
even then, the terms of the elucidation are cryptic and mysterious.48 
47. '... the appeal from morality to life is not what it pretends 
to be, for life itself, outside the moral law, or laws, cannot 
have primacy over morality. Outside morality ... life itself 
is . . . value- free'. 
Eliseo Vivas, op. cit. pp 32 -33. 
48. See note 35 above. 
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This is the nature of Leavis's relations with the Lawrentian text; 
its peculiar condition was only incipient in D.H.Lawrence: Novelist 
and its full effect was not apparent until the later study (Thought, 
Words, Creativity (1976)). Nonetheless, that this critical pro- 
cedure informed Leavis's study is a significant factor in any attempt 
to follow the arguments put forward in the book as a whole, and any 
attempt to account for the paradoxically closely related areasof 
success and failure of the critical exposition on Lawrence. 
2. 'The Rainbow' and 'Women in Love'. 
It is clear that Leavis had a special relationship with Lawrence and 
the Lawrentian text. In his discussion of Lawrence's novels, Leavis 
dealt -with problems and ideas that had been central to his own dis- 
course on art and society and the consequences for both of the radical 
changes ensuing on progressive industrialisation. Leavis's was amongst 
the earliest serious critical commentaries on Lawrence. However, 
its particular approach was not conditioned by this absence of pre- 
existing Lawrentian criticism but by the special interests of Leavis's 
general literary critical ambition and the congruence he discovered 
between the precepts of that ambition and the perceptions fundamental 
to Lawrence's aesthetic. The most serious consequence of this close 
connection between the art and the criticism was that the criticism 
was always in danger of abandoning its independent, objective stand- 
point and becoming merely the means whereby the esoteric significance 
of the particular texts received their explication for the ordinary 
reader. Criticism, as such, tended to be set aside in favour of 
exposition. 
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The effects of this peculiar interaction between text and criticism 
depend upon the nature and quality of the narrative under discussion, 
since the primary activity of literary criticism - adducing judgements 
of value - has been abandoned in preference for textual interpretation. 
Behind this adjustment lies the assumption that the 'value' of the 
text was not in question, especially when Leavis was dealing with 
The Rainbow and Women in Love49. The judicial part of the critical 
enterprise was subordinated to the practice of interpretation, of 
finding in the novels arguments, proposals and dramatic 'enactments', 
in the nature of diagnostic and remedial insights and representations, 
which confirmedLeavis's own adumbrations on the same fundamental issues. 
The extraordinary intensity of Leavis's essays on 
Lawrence - their energy of affirmation and raptness 
of attention - was that of a criticism in communion 
with its 'ideal' object. 50 
Mulhern's observation indicates the unusual relationship betwæn the 
writing and the criticism. Leavis's enforced collusion between the 
artist and the critic needs to be clarified. In the first place, 
it is necessary to emphasise the fact that 'energy of affirmation 
and raptness of attention' seem to have been exacerbated to levels 
of obvious exaggeration only where the text under discussion yielded 
its significance more intractably than the more obviously successful 
narrative: that is, the 'intensity' of Leavis's critique increased 
49. 'I want the stress to fall unambiguously on The 
Rainbow. Women 
in Love and the tales'(14) 
50. Francis Mulhern, The Moment of 'Scrutiny', (1979) p 297. 
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proportionally with the degree of difficulty involved in making a 
convincing case for his claims. Despite the extensive critical 
tolerance that Leavis demonstrated towards Lawrence, 'discipleship' 
is not the word that best characterises Leavis's attitude: 
Leavis ceases to function as a critic when he gives 
himself over to Lawrence in a spirit of trusting 
discipleship. 51 
It was not that Leavis ever 'ceased to function as a critic', but 
the tenor of his critical judgements was diverted by the fact that 
he found his own and Lawrence's extra -literary attitudes fundamentally 
commensurate. For that reason, Leavis's discussion of Lawrence dealt 
81, 
predominantly with the extra -literary dimension. Nevertheless, this 
did not amount simply to a matter of extricating from the novels ideas 
and beliefs pertaining to Leavis's discourse on contemporary culture. 
Leavis aimed to make explicit the ways in which the particular narra- 
tives contained essential truths about human relations. He wanted 
to make clear that a preoccupation with 'what makes for health and 
sanity' must inevitably find its counterpart in the prose that gives 
such a preoccupation tangible substance. The serious difficulties 
arise with Leavis's criticism when the reader discovers a lack of 
integration between what Leavis claimed a text was doing and that 
which it appears actually to have achieved. 
51. Roger Boyers, F.R.Leavis: Judgement and the Discipline of Thought 
(1978) p 121. 
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Part of Leavis's enterprise concerning Lawrence was to explain 
what had until then been generally taken for impenetrable doctrinal 
obscurity. He confessed to his own difficulties in this (particularly 
with regard to Women in Love 52) and embarked on an attempt to dispel 
confusion about Lawrence's essential artistic ambition. The other, 
larger, aspect of the project was to insist on Lawrence's profound 
importance in terms of the conflicts and stresses of the contemporary 
world. Since Leavis himself had developed comprehensive views on the 
same issues, his critique of Lawrence was inevitably going to be, 
in large part, a matter of his finding in the Lawrentian text material 
that confirmed his own thesis. 
Boyers said that this 'collaborative reading' should be undertaken 
'in a spirit consistent with, though not identical to, the original 
authorial project.'53 In a sense, this is a truism, since any critical 
'project' that was not going to be largely negative would aim to deal 
with material that was generally congenial in 'spirit' or intent. 
However, the question that arises has to do with the extent to which 
Leavis disadvantaged his case by identifying himself too comprehen- 
sively with the 'spirit' of Lawrence's 'authorial project', so that 
the essential distanced objectivity ('disinterestedness') of his 
critical perspective was undermined. Again, this balance between 
a commitment to the subject's ulterior purpose and a surrendering 
of critical independence was dependent on the nature of the material 
52. 'I have not always thought Women in Love one of the most striking 
works of creative originality that fiction has to show.'(146) 
53. Boyers, op. cit. p 122. 
232 
under discussion. Leavis read the 'lesser novels' with a marked degree 
of sympathetic tolerance, such that indicated the development of the 
idiosyncratic relationship with Lawrence's novels in general. 
It is necessary to examine whether Leavis maintained this judicial 
balance or whether on occasion his insistence on eliciting from the 
texts confirmation of facets of his own discourse on literature and 
society took precedence over the critical evaluation of the novels. 
This problem is not simply concerned with Leavis finding a weak narra- 
tive significant because of its implicit if unrealised intentions 
and thus overvaluing it; the need for maintaining some kind of 
judicial balance was equally pertinent when he was inquiring into 
those novels in which artist and critic found their 'ideal communion'. 
The writing of The Rainbow and Women in Love is the case in point, 
Leavis undoubtedly recognised extra -literary pre- 
occupations of his own that had found their consumate expression. 
For the critic, the question then is one of method. If the critical 
faculty is not called upon to judge the particular narrative, what 
ancillary function is it going to perform? While Leavis did find 
some slight weaknesses or faults in the novels - an occasional 'over- 
emphatic explicitness' in Women in Love, for example - for the most 
part the essays on these two major works were concerned with demon- 
strating that their incontrovertible 'greatness' was a matter of their 
being the product of 'creative genius', manifested as 'intelligence', 
that was preoccupied essentially with what, in human relations in 
the contemporary world, 'makes for health and sanity'. 
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The essays on The Rainbow and Women in Love both appeared in Scrutiny 
under the rubric 'the novel as dramatic poem'.54 One line of Leavis's 
interest in the novels was directed towards demonstrating the ways 
in which Lawrence's prose achieved its effects. A notable feature 
of Leavis's writing on Lawrence is the length of many of the quoted 
passages. The majority of these quoted extracts were accompanied 
by a minumum of comment, their relevance and their strengths supposedly 
being self -evident. In many of the cases, the quality of the writing 
is not in question, and on the occasions when Leavis attempted to 
dissect the ways in which Lawrence achieved his effect of 'sensuous 
immediacy'(107, 112), the result was strikingly heavy- handed.55 Never- 
theless, the several pages of quoted material that was included by 
Leavis and which he left to stand without comment comprise a complexity 
of literary effects and meanings that are not all immediately pertinent 
to,the points raised by Leavis's commentary. The reader is occasionally 
bewildered by the scope and intricacy of the quotation and the lack 
of clear guidance from Leavis as to which particular aspect of it 
he is referring. 
The reason for this lies in Leavis's conception of the ways in 
which a prose narrative operates, a conception summarised in the idea 
54. 'The Novel as Dramatic Poem' [V and VI] : Women in Love [I, 
II. III] , Scrutiny XVII pp 203 -70 and pp 318 -30; and Scrutiny 
XVIII pp 18 -31; and The Novel as Dramatic Poem'(VII), The Rainbow 
[I, II, III], Scrutiny XVIII pp 197 -210 and pp 273 -87 and Scrutiny XIX 
pp 15 -30. 
Other novels that were discussed by Leavis under this heading 
were Hard Times (Scrutiny XIV pp 185 -203), The Europeans (Scrutiny 
XV pp 209 -21) and St Mawr (Scrutiny XVII pp 38 -53); reprinted 
in D.H.Lawrence: Novelist as chapter 6, this was the earliest 
completed part of the study. 
55 See, for example, pp 112 -14. 
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of 'the novel as dramatic poem'. For Leavis the effects achieved 
in the linguistic dimension of a passage of a.narrative prose cannot 
be understood in isolation from the 'dramatic' element that provides 
the forward movement or ostensible purpose of that passage. Discussing 
Tom Brangwen's courting of the Polish woman at the vicarage, Leavis 
said, after two pages of quotation, that 
the marvellous reality of the evocation cannot be 
distinguished from an intense specificity of dramatic 
significance: what is evoked is a given spiritual 
crisis, a crucial moment in a particular human 
life.(114) 
This follows from his previously stated resistance to the idea of 
form for form's sake: the idea of 'dramatic poem' represents a con- 
catenation of the formal dimension with the implications of the subject 
matter in an inextricable relationship. Leavis's interpretation did 
not finish there, however; he found in Lawrence a relation between 
the 'poetic' and the 'dramatic' that was of a kind that extended beyond 
normal creativity and touched on the 'religious'. In this movement 
from a critical commentary to wide -reaching asseverations on an extra - 
literary plane lies a key to Leavis's critical method as regards 
Lawrence. 
In discussing the Lawrence of The Rainbow Leavis used George Eliot 
as a comparison, initially to elaborate the significance of the title 
he gave to the chapter as it appeared in the full published version, 
'Lawrence and Tradition'. Out of this comparison he developed his 
conception of the 'religious' intuition that informed Lawrence's 
creative impulse. 
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Leavis claimed that there was no 'organic' connection between The 
Rainbow and Women in Love, as revealed by the fact that 'there is 
much about The Rainbow that makes us see it as being, clearly and 
substantially, in a line from George Eliot'.(98) Apart from making 
this distinction, the comparison also had the function of refuting 
T.S.Eliot's assertion that Lawrence had suffered through 'not having 
been brought up in the environment of a living and central tradition'. 
(105) Leavis adduced The Rainbow as evidence absolutely to the contrary 
of this, which indicates how T.S.Eliot's criticisms provided Leavis 
with a polemical motive for making more emphatic his judgements on 
Lawrence. Leavis felt that The Rainbow, following as it did the pro- 
gress of people living in arural context with a deep historical past 
(the family had been in the region for 200 years) through the movements 
of civilisation that culminated in the contemporary situation, showed 
that Lawrence was familiar with the heritage and 'tradition' of the 
rural- labouring classes. Lawrence was a 'social historian' and his 
background and upbringing fostered an understanding of the processes 
of change and status in rural society: 'as a recorder of essential 
English history he is a great successor to George Eliot'.(107) In 
Leavis's view, Lawrence was very far from lacking the benefit of having 
known a 'traditional' environment: 'The book might have been written 
to show what, in the concrete, a living tradition is, and what it 
is to be brought up in the environment of one.'(10S) It was this back- 
ground that linked him, in Leavis's estimation, with George Eliot. 
It was what he brought from that environment, from 'the civilisation 
and the tradition that associate him with George Eliot'. that gave 
his writing its essential relevance as a 'social history' of rural 
English culture. What he developed out of this background was not 
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an 'evangelising earnestness, or a naive provinciality of ethical 
temper', but something that gave his work an extra dimension, one 
that ultimately superceded even George Eliot's ethical and religious 
valuations: 
'Upbringing' and 'environment' worked on him through the 56 
means by which (to quote Mr. Eliot's account of tradition ) 
'the vitality of the past enriches the life of the present'; 
and it is not anything merely residual he brings from them, 
but his very formation, something that lives and grows, and 
that expresses itself in his mature insight and wisdom, his 
creative impulse, and his criticism of the contemporary 
civilised world.(110) 
Lawrence had this kind of 'creative impulse' informing his 
representation of the old rural culture and it was this that associated 
him with George Eliot. Lawrence, however, went beyond George Eliot 
in the 'religious' intensity of his 'creative impulse'; where George 
Eliot was essentially 'ethical' in expression and valuation, Lawrence 
was something more than that. It was this 'something more' in Lawrence 
that attracted Leavis's attention. It involved ideas and transactions 
on a higher plane than the purely rational intellectual process of 
the literary text, matters of which the text is a blurred reflection, 
their essential substance being fundamentally indefinable. 
The opening passages of The Rainbow evince a preoccupation with 
the 'oneness of life' and an 'intensity of preoccupation with the 
individual'(102); the sequence at the start of the novel that deals 
with the conditions of farm life and the Braigwen women's aspirations 
56. See After Strange Gods p 30. 
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for something other than mere hard toil introduces the main theme 
of the novel: 
The life of 'blood intimacy' that [this passage] plays 
its part in creating is, in the novel, a necessary and 
potent presence as something to be transcended. The 
novel has for theme the urgency, and the difficult 
struggle, of the higher human possibilities to realise 
themselves.(99 -100) 
This 'struggle' is the focus of Leavis's interest in The Rainbow, 
that aspect which gave rise to the epithet 'religious'. An apprehension 
of 'the unity of life' was the central theme and it found its expres- 
sion in the larguage of Lawrence's narrative, in a way that enforces 
. tir description 'dramatic poem': 
Words here are used in the way, not of eloquence but of 
creative poetry . . . they establish as an actual 
presence - create as part of the substance of the book 
- something that is essential to Lawrence's theme.(99) 
The aspirations of the women, as expressed in this opening sequence, 
were 'indeterminate': 'what values may give it meaning, will be dis- 
covered and created in the living - in the actual life of the indi- 
vidual'.(l0l) Leavis took this aspect as the focus of his attention. 
The greater proportion of the subsequent essay was devoted to demon- 
strating how this aspiration towards 'realising "the higher human 
possibilities' was pursued by Lawrence through various manifestations 
that each in themselves adjusted to different sets of circumstances, 
to conditions that were affected as much by the past as by the present. 
Leavis was not primarily interested in the intricacies of the text; 
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or, at any rate, with elucidating its complexity or identifying the 
means whereby Lawrence's 'creative poetry' contrived its effects. 
He was, rather, impelled to expatiate on this religious aspect and 
to assert Lawrence's extraordinary capacities in that respect: 
The oneness of life; the separateness and irreducible 
otherness of lives; the supreme importance of 'fulfilment' 
in the individual, because here (if not here, nowhere) 
is life - the peculiar Lawrentian genius manifests itself 
in the intensity, constancy and fulness of the intuition(102) 
The 'intensity, constancy and fulness' of Lawrence's intuition was 
not shown by Leavis but was only asserted. Following on from the 
above, Leavis quoted a passage in which is described an experience 
undergone by Ursula during her study of botany while at college. She 
is faced with the existential problem of finding the sense of "purpose" 
in the inanimate world of natural forces. ( "Electricity had no soul, 
light- and heat had no soul ".) The quotation from Lawrence concludes 
with the following sentences: 
She could not understand what it all was. She only knew 
that it was not limited mechanical energy, nor mere 
purpose of self -preservation and self -assertion. It 
was a consummation, a being infinite. Self was oneness 
with the infinite. To be oneself was a supreme gleaming 
triumph of infinity.57 
The reader is entitled to ask what this means, since it is mysterious, 
and its meaning not immediately comprehensible. Yet Leavis did not 
57. See The Rainbow (Harmondsworth 1949) p 441. 
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quote the paragraph for the sake of illuminating its obscurities, 
but as a self -explanatory statement which supported the claim he had 
made, prior to the quotation, regarding the strength of Lawrence's 
'intuition'. The quotation, the material from Lawrence, was inserted 
into Leavis's argument not so that it could be discussed or analysed 
but in order to advance that argument to its next stage. Ursula's 
mystical perception that "self was oneness with the infinite "'was 
taken by Leavis almost as a concrete statement of fact and he followed 
up the intuition by saying that it revealed that 
it is only by way of the most delicate and complex 
responsive relations with others that the individual 
can achieve fulfilment. . . .Except between 'fulfilled' 
individuals - individuals, that.is, who are really 
themselves, recognising their separateness or otherness, 
and accepting the responsibility of that - there can 
be no personal relations that are lasting and 
satisfactory.(103) 
This kind of gloss does not help to advance an understanding of the 
preceding quotation; nor does it contribute substantially to the sum 
of the reader's awareness of what Lawrence was attempting in The 
Rainbow; a serious reading of the novel would already have found 
this kind of insight from ancillary texts by Lawrence himself. In 
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious Lawrence stated that "the goal 
of life is the coming to perfection of each single individual ".58 
It is necessary to recognise that what in effect Leavis was doing 
with the text of The Rainbow (and Women in Love, though in a different 
58. Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious (Harmondsworth 1971) p 240. 
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way) was glossing it. That is, he took certain passages or sections 
that he saw as focal, given his emphasis on the theme of the 'unity 
of life', and quoted or referred to them in the normal manner of a 
critical commentary. However, these quoted extracts were deployed 
primarily for the purpose of elaborating their meanings, which he 
did not make lucid or specific, into broad, extra -literary statements 
relating to what Leavis felt was the essential significance of 
Lawrence's art. Rather than analysing the text to elicit this 
significance, Leavis presupposed it. His further adumbrations on 
selected passages served to confirm the presupposition and to place 
it in a wider context of religious and doctrinal issues. These issues 
were not primarily of a literary nature, but had been raised by the 
implications of Lawrence's writing. That writing was then, as it 
were, set aside or subordinated by Leavis's interest in the doctrinal 
themes. The gloss on the original text was phrased in such a way that 
it almost seemed independent of the material which had instigated 
its formulation. The following quotation shows how and to what extent 
Leavis took Lawrence as the text for his own speculations on the 
existential dilemma: 
The particular concrete terms of the state of 'fulfilment' 
vary from individual to individual. To haveachieved 
'fulfilment' is to find meaning in life in the sense of 
having found immunity against torments of the question, 
'What for ?', and found it, not by falling into inert 
day -to- dayness, the anaesthesia of habit or automatism, 
but by achieving what Lawrence elsewhere . . . calls 
'spontaneous- creative fulness of being'.(117) 
Leavis was presenting his version of Lawrence and it was not exclusive 
of alternative representations. This version was predetermined by 
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the values and interests that informed Leavis's critical viewpoint. 
As a result of this, the themes which Leavis highlighted were those 
which he found commensurate with his own predispositions and beliefs. 
As the above quotation illustrates, this consonance led Leavis into 
an expansive discursive reading of Lawrence, the conclusions of which 
were ultimately only tenuously connected with the original text.59 
A further difficulty is hinted at in the above quotation, which 
concerns the resistance of Leavis's terms of approbation to rigorous 
definition, or specificity of meaning. The existential problem - lack 
of a sense of purpose- can be resolved by the achievement of what 
Lawrence called 'spontaneous- creative fulness of being'. This is 
as vague as Ursula's apprehension of "oneness with the infinite ": 
what does it signify? Typically, Leavis maintained that the meaning 
of the phrase was delineated by its context. It was a phrase that 
both the context of discourse in Psychoanalysis and 
the Unconscious and the art of The Rainbow and Women 
in Love make . . . very much more than phrase .(117) 
Leavis had quoted the passage from Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious 
in which Lawrence's phrase occurs in the essay on Women in Love. 
Since that essay followed the one on The Rainbow in the published 
volume, a certain amount of confusion might be instilled in a reader 
59. '. . . the works under discussion functioned, 
so to say, as pre- 
texts for a generalising discourse on human existence in the 
modern world'. 
Mulhern, op. cit. p 293. 
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not familiar with the passage to which Leavis was referring. This 
is less significant, though, than the fact that the phrase has been 
given no greater degree of specific meaning than this. The passage 
from Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious did little to make it any 
clearer; nor was the referral to the 'art' of the two major novels 
very helpful. The phrase, "spontaneous- creative fulness of being ", 
wasa key one for Leavis and was made to bear the burden of profound 
significance whilst not actually having had anything like a particular 
sense given to it. 
Other words and phrases in these essays suffered a similar handicap. 
Words such as 'fulfilment' and 'beyond', for example: as in 'it is 
in the establishment of a sure relation with the "beyond" that the 
creativeness of a valid marriage has its inclusive manifestation'.(117) 
These were also said by Leavis to have been defined by their context: 
the words were said to point to something which 'all the varied 
resources of Lawrence's dramatic poem are devoted to defining'.(117) 
The vocabulary, that is, had no independent meaning outside of the 
context in which it was employed. Either the words partook of a vague- 
ness ('beyond') that, outside their literary confines, signified only 
a general spatial relation; or words which had a comparatively specific 
meaning in normal usage were employed by Leavis as specialised terms, 
delimiting their ordinary sense to the point where, again, their sig- 
nificance could only be intimated by their context. 'Intelligence', 
'imagination' and 'impersonality' were words of this second order. 
Words like 'fulfilment' and 'beyond' were used to connote his concep- 
tion of Lawrence's moral, or 'religious', attitude to the human 
condition. These other terms were part of his vocabulary of critical 
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evaluation and as such they bore an even greater responsibility to 
approach something like an intelligible coherency. If they failed 
to do this, Leavis's commentary on Lawrence could only be seen as 
contributing to the problematical mysteries of his art, rather than 
disposing of its evident obscurities and so revealing his essential 
content. 
In many cases, Leavis's introduction of these polysemic terms 
without delineation was merely gratuitous, from the point of view, 
that is, of a critical explication of the workings of the novel. An, 
example of this is his discussion of Lawrence's treatment of Ursula. 
Brangwen. Leavis saw this treatment as largely autobiographical; 
he felt that Sons and Lovers had been cathartic and that Lawrence 
had turned the 'misfortune' of his childhood experiences into 
'insight'. In using the experience, Lawrence was being 'wholly 
impersonal', and there was nothing 'diagnostic about it in relation 
to the writer': that is, Lawrence was not seeking to understand himself 
by writing of it, but to explore the objective nature of that kind 
of experience. The most obvious way in which Lawrence attempted to 
escape direct autobiography was in making his protagonist a woman. In 
another author, Leavis said, this might have been 'a disguise prompted 
by a sense of danger'; but not in Lawrence: there 
it is rather the mark of creative genius, the impulse 
and the power to transcend the merely personal 
predicament by the intelligence that is imagination 
- or the imagination that is intelligence.(132) 
Leavis also described this 'impersonalising' or 'transcending' of 
private experience as 'a triumph of supreme intelligence - the 
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intelligence that is inseparable from imagination and self -knowledge'. 
(131) 
The series of propositions is highly characteristic of Leavis's 
criticism of Lawrence. Leavis noted the autobiographical nature of 
the treatment of Ursula and the psychological problems that derive 
from 'the excessive demand by parent on child'(132); and he disposed 
of the idea that Lawrence had been irretrievably damaged by his 
relations with his mother60 by demonstrating this distancing process 
that he had engaged in presenting Ursula. He went on to elevate his 
analysis of Lawrence's artistic procedure to an inflated level of 
approval, characterised by the vague language which attempted to assert 
an obscure extra dimension of significance to the achievement. 
Intelligence that is imagination - or imagination that is intelligence': 
even the form of Leavis's statement of the case indicated the limiting 
circularity of definition and meaning by which his terminology was 
restricted. Again, the reader's understanding of Lawrence's novel 
is not aided by the vague, expansive declarations of Lawrence's skills 
and achievements which were couched in a language unsubstantiated 
by a coherent controlling set of intelligible criteria. As Lawrence 
60. ' . . and those who talk as if Lawrence had been warped for life 
or in some way disabled by the strain set up in babyhood would 
be hard put to it to assemble any weight of critical evidence 
from the writings'.(156) This was a reference to Middleton Murry 
who had talked of 'that irreparable inward division into which 
[Lawrence's mother] had compelled him. The plasma of the total 
organism - the physico- spiritual unity which is man - had suffered 
vital injury'. 
Son of Woman (1930) pp 47 -48. 
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himself said: 
it seems to me a good critic should give his reader 
a few standards to go by. He can change the standards 
for every new critical attempt, so long as he keeps 
good faith. But it is just as well to say: This and 
this is the standard we judge by.61 
The problem with Leavis's criticism of Lawrence is that the 
'standards' to which Leavis referred his readers were those represented 
by, contained in, Lawrence himself. Leavis's procedure was to claim 
that certain particular qualities were manifested in Lawrence and 
that these qualities entailed a profound moral valuation, or 'religious 
sense'. The authority to which he appealed for confirmation that 
these moral valuations ('standards') were authentic and relevant was 
something as vague as 'life', which in turn found its definition, 
its function in the process, the in it was 
represented in Lawrence's art. The sanctions to which Leavis applied 
for confirmation of his commendations of Lawrence were sanctions 
that were themselves defined and delineated by Lawrence's work, either 
in the novels or in the discursive essays. Yet, as far as an under- 
standing of the Lawrence of The Rainbow and Women in Love is concerned, 
the appeal to a higher level of critical terminology ('higher', that 
is, insofar as it was more abstract) was unnecessary. The reason 
why Leavis extended his critique into this diffusive language 
('intelligence', 'impersonality', 'imagination') had to do with the 
ulterior purpose that was linked with his primary aim of making a 
61. 'John Galsworthy', Pheonix (1936) p 539. 
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'case' for Lawrence: that of making a 'case' for his ( Leavis's) own 
conception of literary criticism and its place in alleviating the 
conflicts being generated in the stresses of progressive industrial- 
isation and their effect on the discriminative powers of the individual 
in society. 
The elevation of the critical language was 'unnecessary' as far 
as these novels were concerned because Leavis's critique provided 
a valuable introduction to the problems and complexities of the two 
novels and established a model for the critical approach to a difficult 
subject. This statement is confined to The Rainbow and Women in Love 
because elsewhere Leavis showed himself to be less accomplished in 
maintaining even a minimal degree of judicial objectivity. Nonetheless 
the two essays on these novels were notably successful in many ways. 
For example, Leavis demonstrated that he had a clear grasp of the 
structure or organisation of The Rainbow in the way he was able to 
trace the development of the themes through the three generations 
of the Brangwen family. It is a complex narrative and, as Leavis 
said, many readers are defeated by it. Leavis's explication, both 
of the novel's actual structure and the creative reasoning behind 
it, provide a valuable guide to Lawrence. A related aspect is the 
way in which Leavis clarified the changes in the nature of the problems 
with which each successive generation is faced. These changes amount, 
effectively, to a study of 'the movement of civilisation in England', 
(137) and of the :plight of human life in an industrial civilisation'. 
(142) Out of this development, as the novel becomes increasingly 
'contemporary', Leavis observed that the themes were beginning to 
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over -reach the boundaries of this novel and to extend into the ethos 
of its successor. Leavis noted how the original conception (The 
Sisters, or The Wedding Ring) expanded with Lawrence's growing per- 
ception of what he needed to do to create the pre- history of the later 
novel, until the project became dissilient, as evidencedin The Rainbow: 
the novel had 'no real conclusion, only a breaking -off was possible'. 
(142) Many other examples of Leavis's perspicuity exist in his dis- 
cussion of The Rainbow. 
With regard to Women in Love, a similar pattern emerges. A large 
proportion of Leavis's attention was given over to consideration of 
the figure of Gerald Crich, Lawrence's treatment of which showed how 
the diagnosis of the malady of the individual psyche 
can become that of the malady of a civilisation.(152) 
. . . In Gerald, in fact, we see the malady of the 
individual psyche as the essential process of 
industrial civilisation.(158) 
In his discussion of Gerald, Leavis followed that theme of Women in 
Love which most closely answered to his own presentation of the 
condition of contemporary society and thepossible consequences. A 
third of the chapter on the novel was taken up by this theme. A similar 
bias of interest was evident when, in the chapter on the 'lesser 
novels', Leavis referred, as being the major focus of interest of 
Lady Chatterley's Lover, to Lawrence's depiction of the colliery town 
of Teversha11.62 The discussion of the relevant chapters ('Coaldust' 
62. Leavis quoted a long paragraph containing this description along- 
side a comparable passage from 'England, my England' (see pp 
71 -2). These quotations were appended to the essay without comment. 
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and, more particularly, 'The Industrial Magnate') was a rehearsal 
of his own political arguments, reformulated around specific notions 
in Lawrence, representative of the same kind of interest. For instance, 
Leavis took up Lawrence's concept of 'disquality' proposed by Birkin 
and, in the manner of his general technique in these essays, elaborated 
on it providing this expansive gloss on the basic principle: 
No great novelist can be a Benthamite; for him the fact 
that we can be said to be 'all abstractly and mathematically 
equal' has little to do with his interest in mankind. 
[Lawrence's ]study of the individual psyche has led him to 
the diagnosis of a civilisation in which the idealism he 
condemns (it amounts, he points out, to the same thing as 
materialism) has become a deadly enemy to life. The truth 
that 'disquality' insists on has, he knows, to be insisted 
on in the modern world - and he was writing Women in Love 
thirty years ago, when Lenin's revolution was contemporary 
news ('Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive').(162 -3) 
This example gives the typical pattern or movement of Leavis's commen- 
tary on Lawrence. A quite cogent and specific idea ('disquality') 
was discussed so that its full significance might be felt. From this 
level of practical comment, however, Leavis moved off into the wider, 
more diffuse realm of the historical context of Women in Love, 
culminating in a purely personal and unlocated evocation of the jejune 
excitement of revolutionary fervour. This sardonic aside left Lawrence 
receded into the background, with Leavis's comments, highly generalised, 
to the fore. The main analysis of Lawrence's ideas was more than 
reasonably salient; the problem is that Leavis identified so complete- 
ly with Lawrence's moral and political perspective that his commentary 
on the novels melded almost ineluctably with presentations of his 
own sense of the case. 
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Two areas in which Leavis's critical method manifested itself in 
revealing ways were his discussion of the Ursula -Birkin theme and 
the treatment of Hermione. The major difficulty for Lawrence's 'diag- 
nosis' of the 'malady of a civilisation' lay in presenting a convincing 
alternative to the surrender to mechanistic idealism figured in Gerald 
Crich. Birkin cannot be said to present an alternative in as convin- 
cing a manner as Gerald represents the inevitable advance to 'self - 
destruction'(156) of the complete materialist. Leavis claimed that 
a strong normative preoccupation, entailing positives 
that are concretely present in many ways (we have them 
in the above phrases, the goodness, the holiness, the 
desire for creation and productive happiness ") informs 
the life of Women in Love - the life that manifests 
itself in the definition and 'placing' of these 
opposite human disasters.(167) 
However, the actual substance of this 'normative preoccupation' is 
hard to locate. Birkin's attitude towards and relationship with this 
society is ambiguous and contemptuous rather than positive or 
'normative': 
iv* 
[ Birkin's ] totally inconsequent psychological attitude, 
blending a rejection of collective action with acceptance 
of its benefits Lie, the unearned income of £400 per annum] , 
underlies the whole social criticism of Women in Love, 
an emotional, affective, irrational criticism, always seen 
from the point of view of Birkin, the outsider.63 
Delavenay's is a reasonable reaction to the inconsistency of Birkin's 
63. Emile Delavenay, D.H.Lawrence: the Man and his Work. 
The Formative 
Years 1885 -1919 (1922) p 420. 
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status and circumstances in the novel, and to the incomplete 
intelligibility of his proposed remedies (as Daleski argues): 
Pace Leavis . . . I must confess that I find the norm 
Birkin proposes, in so far as it is defined by the 
values he advocates rather than by those he rejects, 
neither clear nor cogent. 64 
The problem with Birkin supposedly representing a remedial 
alternative may have a deeper ramification than this lack of cogency. 
Despite Leavis's claims of a 'strong normative preoccupation', 
Lawrence's politics have moved away in this novel from the attachment 
to the ethos of the rural labouring classes shown in Sons and Lovers 
and The Rainbow. He no longer exhibits the same concern for the 
character or condition of working class society. As Delavenay says, 
in this work created by a collier's son, not once does 
any character show a sign of sympathy or understanding 
of the common people. Birkin, Gudrun and Ursula all 
suffer from the ugliness of the industrial landscape, 
and protest against the defilement of the earth by the 
pitheads and the slag heaps. Not a word to show the 
true life of human beings in this setting, their pride 
their vitality, their sturdy independence.65 
This may be overstating the case, as well as sentimentalising 
Lawrence's early representations of working class life. Nonetheless 
it is true to say that Lawrence's 'diagnosis' of industrial 
civilisation is done from the outside, and it cannot be claimed that 
64. H.M.Daleski, The Forked Flame: a study of D.H.Lawrence (1965) 
P 174. 
65. Op. cit. p 421. 
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Birkin's remedial alternative extends to include any programme for 
alleviating the conditions of the working classes. The insubstantial 
nature of Lawrence's 'normative preoccupation' was indicated in 
Leavis's claiming to find its 'concrete presence' in a series of 
phrases such as "the goodness, the holiness, the desire for creation 
and productive happiness ". So strong was Leavis's desire to elicit 
positive attitudes from the novel that he was diverted away from con- 
sideration even of the possibility that Lawrence's political attitude 
of hostility to mechanistic idealism('Be nthamism') might have failed 
to generate a genuine notion of an effective alternative. 
In contrast, Leavis's analysis of Lawrence's treatment of Hermione 
was illuminating and provided an insight into Lawrence's creative 
method. The episode of the attack on Birkin with the paperweight 
revealed, Leavis said, 'the preoccupation with significances that 
are nót to be conveyed by crises and resolutions of the familiar kind, 
at the level of the drama of "characters".(184) Leavis demonstrated 
convincingly the way in which the violence 'issues with a sufficiently 
clear inevitability . . . out of a preceding exoteric drama'(184). 
Leavis's success in this analysis was due to the fact that during 
the course of it he maintained a strict fixity of attention to a 
specific aspect of the text and was not tempted to elaborate any 
element of his discussion into diffusive speculations on general 
themes. The criticism utilised a vocabulary of terms that were more 
directly comprehensible than those which invoked a distant philo- 
6e 
66. 'The way in which [Hermione] eventually succumbs to her own in- 
adequacy has been brilliantly analysed by F.R.Leavis with a com- 
prehensiveness that leaves little to be added'. 
Daleski, op. cit. p 139. 
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sophical authority for their substantiation. In these areas Leavis 
was dealing with matters which were more closely associable with events 
presented in the text (Hermione's attack on Birkin). The criticism 
was therefore able to avoid developing mystifying abstractions, such 
as had arisen in dealing with Ursula's cosmic experience in the Botany 
class, and was correspondingly more enlightening about the material 
under discussion. 
The success and failure of Leavis's criticism of these two novels 
were the result of the same set of conditions. Lawrence combined a 
feeling for the 'organic community', although this was not untainted 
by a political scepticism, with an interest in aesthetic exploration. 
As Leavis said, he was 'consciously and pertinaciously preoccupied 
with problems of method, technique and form'.(147) This set of 
interests paralleled Leavis's own concerns for the cultural heritage 
as represented by, inter alia, John Bunyan and George Eliot, and George 
Bourne's The Wheelwright's Shop (1923); and for the necessary aesthetic 
aesponse to the changing pattern of modern life in the technical and 
formal innovations introduced by T.S.Eliot. When Leavis sustained 
a close attention to the texts under discussion, his sensitivity to 
the problems and resources contained in Lawrence's art was invaluably 
illuminating. However, it was exactly because Leavis felt such a pro- 
found sympathy with what Lawrence was trying to do that he tended 
to extend his critique to involve generalised doctrinal and thematic 
divagations. The weaknesses and strengths of these essays on The Rainbow 
and Women in Love both derive from the congruity that Leavis found 
to exist between Lawrence's artistic aims and his own critical 
ambitions. 
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3. 'The Captain's Doll', 'St Mawr' and the tales. 
'The Captain's Doll' is one of Lawrence's more difficult works and 
one which needs to be read sympathetically in order for it to yield 
its main theme convincingly. The tone and substance of the tale are 
both vulnerable to parody, being poised in a delicate balance between 
the significant and the ridiculous. Nevertheless, its thematic 
significance is important and it is a demonstration of Leavis's inter- 
pretative subtlety that he should have been able to discuss the tale 
in such a way as to bring out the full force of this significance. 
Leavis's discussion of this tale was written after the essays on 
The Rainbow and Women in Love67 and it is therefore not surprising 
that much of the tenor and direction of the critique should have been 
adopted from these previous writings. What must be analysed, Leavis 
said, was 'a very remarkable flexibility', and 'a sure rightness of 
touch in conveying the shifts of poise and tone that define an 
extremely delicate complexity of attitude'.(197) It was necessary, 
he implied, to highlight again the fundamental connection in Lawrence's 
art between the nature and quality of the writing and the creative 
inspiration that lay behind it. Two long quotations were given in 
the first few pages to emphasise Lawrence's 'dramatic range', which 
was 'the range of a truly great dramatic poet'.(198) The success of 
the writing in this respect was seen as the result of the depth of 
67. The essay was originally published in Scrutiny XIX (1952), 
with 




Lawrence's creative vision: the 'rightness' of the nuances of speech, 
for example, were said to 'testif[y] to the profundity of the whole 
perception it registers'.(198) Continually, Leavis made the point 
that Lawrence's perceptions, what he saw and felt, conditioned the 
nature and quality of his writing: or, at least, did so with regard 
to that part of his creative achievement which was most accomplished. 
If this was a connection which Leavis wanted particularly to ènforce, 
it should have been clear to him that in those places where either 
the writing is less compelling or the perceptions less profound and 
less well- organised, a less certain kind of achievement is denoted. 
That this was not always the case with Leavis on Lawrence is a matter 
that will be discussed with reference to St Mawr. 
An initial problem with the tale 'The Captain's Doll' concerns 
the doll itself. To read it as being merely symbolic of the relation- 
ship between Hannele and the Captain would be limiting and reductive 
and would, in effect, make the business of the doll redundant and 
mechanical. Clearly, the fact that Hannele has made the doll is meant 
to indicate early on that a state of some intimacy exists between 
the two main characters, an indication that is emphasised by Mitchka's 
responding to the doll in a manner of restrained eroticism ( "Has he 
really such beautiful fine legs ? "). There must be more to the doll 
than this, though, in order that its symbolic function can avoid being 
banal. In Leavis's interpretation the doll had two ancilliary functions 
the first relating to the attention given to its legs, the second 
relating to the general theme of the nature of the relations between 
men and women. 
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The vaguely erotic insistence on the doll's legs and its "tight- 
fitting tartan trews" was an aspect of the doll's symbolism that had 
a key significance for Leavis. It was an insistence, he said, that 
gives us a clear intimation that the theme of 'The 
Captain's Doll' carries with it a characteristic 
Laurentian challenge to "personality' - to the 
place and valuation of 'personality' in the accepted 
understanding of personal relations, especially those 
between a man and a woman . . . The significance of 
the trews and the legs they insist on is one with the 
significance of the Laurentian 'body'.(201) 
At this point, Leavis referred to a passage he had quoted in the course 
of the essay on St Mawr.68 This quotation was from Psychoanalysis 
and the Unconscious and it signified for Leavis. what Lawrence intended 
to convey in discussing the 'body'. In that quoted extract there 
occurred various characteristic Lawrentian maxims - "The body's life 
is the life of sensations and emotions ", "All the emotions belong 
to the body and are only recognised by the mind" - which Leavis took 
up, wholesale and unquestioningly, as part of his own language of 
interpretation, alongside other phrases such as "spontaneous- creative 
fulness of being ". 
The dependence on Lawrence's discursive essays for an insight into 
a problem in his creative work is a common procedure. In the present 
case, at any rate, it enabled Leavis to gain and present a subtle 
understanding of the function of the doll in the story. The insistence 
68. This essay follows that on'The Captain's Doll' 
in D.H.Lawrence: 
Novelist, but was in fact completed two years 
previou* having 
originally appeared in Scrutiny XVII, 1 (1950). 
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on the physical characteristics of the doll, emphasised in Mitchka's 
response and by the fact that the 'tartan trews' are not a part of 
the Captain's regular attire, denoted for Leavis a preoccupation on 
Hannele's part with the 'body' of the Captain to the exclusion of 
any ability or inclination to be concerned with his personality - 
which is linked in Lawrence, Leavis said, with ' "ideals ", "ideas ", 
and "will "'.(201) The nature of Hannele's relationship with the Captain 
is thus placed firmly within the physical and emotional sphere, in 
an avoidance or denial of those aspects of 'personality' which make 
the Captain an effectual individual. This denial contributes to the 
'dramatic! contrast - the doll -portrait against the sentient being 
- that emerges when the Captain eventually arrives: Leavis noted a 
'pregnant paradox here, a profound contradiction'.(201) Hepburn is 
"like the doll" and yet at the same time the fact that he is a 
sentient Inman being undermines the doll's representational efficacy. 
The 'paradox' that Leavis saw lies in the fact that the doll both 
is and is not the Captain. It is in the sense that it resembles him 
in form and feature to a recognisable extent; and yet the doll gives 
no suggestion of the Captain as an individual, as Hepburn, the man 
who looks at Hannele with "dark eyes ", thus expressing a 'personality' 
which Hannele, in her emphasis on the physical characteristics, had 
attempted to deny. For it is that part of the Captain which affects 
her most strongly: "Her heart always melted when he looked straight 
at her with his black eyes ". The doll, then, has contributed a complex 
of intentions, suppressed and overt, and has suggested the central 
condition of the relations between the two characters: 
[ Hannele's] sense in his presence. when she can see 
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him and hear him speak, that what communicates with 
her through the voice and the dark eyes is something 
unknown and unpossessable imposes itself on us with 
compelling force. Troubled and baffled, she rebels, 
and yet has to reckon with the fact that what she 
rebels against is what irresistibly attracts her.(202) 
The confusion and bewilderment that mark Hannele's attitude towards 
Hepburn is figured in the doll she has made and makes up a main part 
of the 'dramatic tension' of the tale: her problem 
is that of determining whether the spell exercised 
upon her by the man owes its power to reality or 
illusion. . . . The solution, the dénouement, is 
her tacit recognition of her own deepest desire or 
need.(202) 
It is this subtlety of interpretative skill that indicates the 
capabilities of Leavis's critical faculty. The doll in the story 
is a potent image, compressed with meaning, but it is necessary to 
read the story attentively and with this kind of subtlety before the 
resources of the imagery become fully convincing. 
It is also necessary to read the tale with a certain degree of 
sympathetic attention. Elsewhere in Leavis's study of Lawrence, in 
his discussion of Aaron's Rod, for example, the critic's sympathy 
emerged as an easy tolerance of weakness or ambiguity. However, in 
the essay on 'The Captain's Doll', Leavis's identification and analysis 
of the major theme only gained from the fact that he found this presen- 
tation of it congenial to his own ideas. 
This is not to say that a familiar kind of overstatement did not 
258 
creep into the discussion: 'the tale expresses Lawrence's profoundest 
insights into the relations between men and women'.(203) That Leavis's 
qualitative clauses should be couched in the superlative case is a 
repetitive feature of the writing on Lawrence, as much as on other 
favoured authors; it is distracting, and the reader needs to develop 
an automatic qualifying response, one which dilutes the extremeness 
of the praise without rejecting its essential insight. For, undoubtedly, 
'The Captain's Doll' is preoccupied with the complexities of male - 
female relations and Lawrence's treatment is reciprocally complex 
and profound. The difficult nature of the subject matter is reflected 
in the difficulties of the text, which, superficially comic, yet deals 
with these issues in intricate detail and with great subtlety. It 
is to acknowledge Leavis's critical skill that, notwithstanding the 
occasional redundant superlative, he presented a reading of the story 
contributes complexity and significance. 
Hepburn's preoccupation with the moon and his telescopes does not 
have an immediately objectifiable symbolic or metaphorical function. 
Leavis's reading gave an interpretation of its functional properties 
that was compatible with his insistence that the story dealt with 
problems of human relations. Hepburn's astronomy is the means Lawrence 
employs for reifying certain essential abstractions contained in the 
Captain and in the general nature of human interaction. It indicates, 
Leavis claimed, 
that impersonal purpose (if 'purpose' is the word) 
which an individual human being must have while he 
has his integrity and his raison d'étre: that 
'purpose' which cannot, without disaster, be 
abdicated in favour of anything else.(213) 
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In comparison with the preceding comments on Ursula's existential 
trauma - presented by Lawrence and reported by Leavis witha large 
degree of mystifying ambiguity - this current discussion was more 
lucid and controlled. It remained in much closer contact with parti- 
cular material in the text and the comments contributed to a clearer 
understanding of the nature of the issues involved, rather than adding 
to the air of mystery and confusion. Leavis's comments on the'scenes 
following Hepburn's wife's death are exemplary in their interpretative 
lucidity and pertinence and are representative of the tone and orien- 
tation of the strongest parts of the whole essay: 
what we have had presented to us by the whole scene 
is the fact of otherness: we cannot possess one 
another, and the possibility of valid intimate 
relations - the essential lasting relations between 
a man and a woman, for instance - depends on an 
acceptance of this truth.(213) 
The exchanges between Hannele and Hepburn after they have been re- 
united involve a complex interplay of ideas and emotions. The 
Lawrentian maxims voiced by Hepburn, regarding the proper attitude 
for a man to adopt towards a woman. are tempered by the objections 
of the positive and strong- willed Hannele. This is not a simple 
opposition between emotion and intellect, but a drama of two 
individuals separating and identifying themselves and each other - 
a necessary process preliminary to their being capable of committing 
themselves to a shared existence. It is a drama which Leavis understood 
and analysed with great clarity.' The outing on the glacier serves, 
he said, 'to confirm the positiveness and the validity of Hepburn's 
ostensibly negative attitude - his repudiation of "love" and his 
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"meaninglessness "'.(217) 
Hepburn's 'attitude' is one of 'insistence on the reality', the 
force of which 'expresses an ultimate - an unsentimental and unideal 
- vital faith, a profound assertion of life and wholeness'.(217) 
Another phrase Leavis had was 'affirmation of life', a positive aspect 
that was contained in, for example, the 'vehemence' of Hannelè's 
retorts when Hepburn berates her on the glacier. The tale culminates 
in an interchange between the two characters in the course of which 
their essential attitudes are outlined, weighed and balanced. Leavis 
was sensitive to the significance of this process: 
[the ]terms of the formulation define . . . a conception 
of the relations between a man and a woman that cannot 
readily be convicted of impoverishment . . . . The 
traditional terms . . . are revitalised in the service 
of a profound insight into the deeper human needs and 
desires.(220) 
This was not a commentary which involved a series of obscuring 
glosses on already intractable material, as sections elsewhere in 
the book had tended to be. The positive, or 'normative', aspiration 
of the story69 was more readily identifiable than, say, Birkin's had 
been and Leavis was not therefore forced to engage in a series of 
mysterious metaphysical adumbrations. On the contrary, where Birkin's 
'normative' preoccupation had been obscure and ambivalent, Hepburn's 
was difficult, complex, but essentially rational. Leavis elucidated 
69. 'We have to note of course that theme and creative impulsion 
are, as I have said, essentially normative.'(267) 
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these difficulties and elicited from the complexities of the text 
its essential theme. As Leavis himself said, ' "The Captain's Doll" 
does not propound or generalise';(221) consequently, it can be said, 
neither did Leavis's critique of it: it sustained, in fact, its co- 
herency and inclusiveness. 
In contrast, there exists a radical inconsonance between Leavis's 
claims for St Mawr and the actual creative achievement represented 
by that story. This is a contradiction that has a significance for 
Leavis's criticism of Lawrence, as well as for his general critical 
enterprise. The reasons for this distortion have to do with Leavis's 
emphatic and deep sympathy for the theme of the nouvelle, but also, 
more importantly, with a funademntal incapacity in Leavis for 
discriminating between doctrine and artistic method. The critic 
appeared to suppose that if the theme was important enough, its ex- 
pression would be inevitably an accomplished and brilliant thing. 
In fact, throughout the chapter on St Mawr, the actual writing was 
very little discussed, while the story's doctrinal concerns were con- 
strued painstakingly and at length, despite the fact that the essay 
was included under the general heading 'the novel as dramatic poem'.70 
A notable feature of Leavis's discussion of St Mawr is the aggres- 
sive assertiveness of the language he employed: 
70. See note 54 above. 
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St Mawr seems to me to presenta.creative and technical 
originality more remarkable than that of The Waste Land. 
being, as that is not, completely achieved, a full and 
self -sufficient creation. It can hardly strike the 
admirer as anything but major.(225) 
(The 'admirer', note, not just the 'reader'). The disparagement of 
T.S.Eliot, the unqualified praise (the sentence before this had called 
the story an 'astonishing work of genius'), and the gratuitous 
insistence of the last sentence: all these features combine to give 
an impression of overstatement and exaggerated claims. The last 
sentence particularly encapsulates the kind of urgent, would -be 
intimidating, nature of Leavis's critical style when he is faced with 
the problem of making claims for a literary work that can really only 
be substantiated through a series of the broadest and most unspecific 
generalisations. When the work in hand yielded its literary qualities 
more readily, the criticism was correspondingly clearer and more astute; 
such phrases do not occur in the essay on 'The Captain's Doll'. 
Leavis not only made claims for St Mawr which were exaggerated 
and vague: some of the positions that he adopted towards the story 
were simply untenable: 
Lawrence writes out of the full living language with 
a flexibility and a creative freedom for which I can 
think of no parallel in modern times.(226) 
This claim, if the reader takes it to be referring exclusively to 
St Mawr. is preposterous. The quality of the writing in the story 
cannot be classified as part of that order of literary achievement. 
Many examples of indifferent, dull, repetitive, vague and meaningless 
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passages can be pointed to, to the extent that Leavis's saying that 
the story is 'completely achieved' appears perverse. An additional 
problem arises with the attempt to determine what the phrase 
'completely achieved' actually signifies: the comparison with The 
Waste Land (on grounds, ostensibly, of subject- matter) is not helpful 
and even Leavis himself did not develop it. These are typical features 
of the discussion; evaluative overstatement not evidenced by the text 
and a deliberate ambiguity in the terminology of that evaluation. 
One reason for the excessive praise that Leavis offered may be 
the early date of the piece. First published in Scrutiny, XVII 1 (1950) , 
the essay on St Mawr preceded all the writing on Lawrence that subse- 
quently went to make up D.H.Lawrence: Novelist. Leavis therefore began 
his 'revaluation' of Lawrence with this essay. That it appeared under 
the rubric 'the novel as dramatic poem' indicates that Leavis saw 
the piece as belonging more to that continuing enterprise than to 
any full -scale project on Lawrence. Hence he might have felt obliged 
to enforce claims for the Lawrence canon in general rather than re- 
stricting himself to the tale under immediate discussion. This would 
help to explain the distance between what was said by Leavis about 
Lawrence in this chapter and the actual quality of the work under 
discussion. 
That this was the case becomes clear when Leavis can be seen to 
have been employing phrases and ideas about Lawrence which were to 
be expanded later in the essays on The Rainbow and Women in Love. 
The quality that Leavis found predominant in St Mawr was 
'intelligence' in the presentation of the essential ideas. This was 
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not a quality that 'prove[d] its possibility by being presented in 
any character'; on the other hand, 
it [was] no mere abstract postulate. It[ waJ present 
as the marvellous creative intelligence of the author. 
. . creative genius in Lawrence manifests itself as 
supreme intelligence.(234) 
The familiar litany was thus reiterated: 'intelligence' equals 
'creative genius' manifested as 'intelligence'. What reward or insight 
this might offer the reader of Lawrence is not clear. Leavis discussed 
in this context Lawrence's 'generalising power which never leaves 
the concrete'.(23.5) What Leavis might be said to have exhibited was 
a 'generalising power' that rarely made any contact with the 'concrete' 
at all. 
St Mawr is not, one of Lawrence's most striking performances, 
although undoubtedly there is much in it that deserves attention. 
Eliseo Vivas71 and Graham Hough have discussed St Mawr in the light 
of Leavis's comments on the tale. Vivas called St Mawr 'second -rate 
Lawrence' and Leavis's comments a 'baffling panegyric'.73 The story 
is in two parts, comprising Lawrence's animosity towards the sophis- 
ticated English milieu that he had characterised 'dramatically' in 
71. Eliseo Vivas, 'Mr. Leavis on D.H.Lawrence', Sewanee Review lxv 
(1957) pp 123 -36. 
72. Graham Hough, The Dark Sun, (1956) pp 179 -86. 
73. Vivas, op. cit. p 126. 
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the Hermione circle in Women in Love, but which was here reductively 
'conceptualised' ('Rico and his friends are merely puppets, fabricated 
to be sacrificed to the author's hatred'); and the 'American episode', 
which was 'essentially inchoate and inconclusive'. Vivas allowed for 
some 'passages of good writing' in the latter part, but found that 
in general 'the writing of St Mawr is stale and flat.'74 
Hough felt that some of the 'characterisation and description' 
merited high praise but that on the whole it was not 'an authentic 
piece of work' and that there was 'a falsity in the motive and the 
conception that fatally affects the whole'.75 Hough, like Vivas,. 
found the social satire too much conditioned by personal irritation, 
and that the story had been written not 'out of experience . . 
but out of a need and a mood that are too partial and too close'.76 
He also felt that the stallion was 'too obvious and unmodulated a; 
symbol of primitive energy'; and Lou's and Mrs. Witt's insistence 
that Rico ride the horse as implausbile ('crazily impossible'77). 
An accumulation of contradictions and inconsistencies in the story 
led Hough to the conclusion that this whole elaborately painted English 
scene is pure pasteboard, a stage set done with nothing more than 
74. Ibid. p 126. 
75. hough, op. cit. p 180. 
76. Ibid. p 181. This was a 'need' brought on, in Hough's view, 
by 
Lawrence's visit to England from Mexico - 'one of the most dismal 
episodes of his career'.(180 -81) 
77. Ibid. p 182. 
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a scene -painter's knowledge'.78 Furthermore, although the move to 
Mexico involves one of Lawrence's 'most magnificent pieces of descrip- 
tion' the conclusion of the story is 'inadequate', and has 'no general 
validity': 'the creative struggle with wild nature . . . throws no 
light, however indirect, on the problems of a complex civilisation 
where this particular struggle has long ceased.'79 
Yet, despite the existence of these palpable weaknesses, this was 
story of which Leavis felt able to say that it was 'an astonishing 
triumph of the highest creative art'.(231) The reason for this is 
that Leavis was not primarily interested in the story in terms of 
its artistic achievement. What he was concerned with was its doctrine, 
the thematic message that he felt the story was attempting to transmit. 
Leavis talked early on in the chapter about Lawrence's 'free play 
of poetic imagery and imaginative evocation, sensuous and focally 
suggestive'(226) and supplied appropriately pertinent quotations in 
support. However, the quoted extracts were not analysed in an attempt 
to particularise the ways in which Lawrence utilised language to 
promote meaning, to give expression to his creative inspiration. Rather 
they were exploited by Leavis as a means of giving vent to his own. 
highly diffuse and inexact, ideas about what he believed Lawrence was 
trying to achieve. 
78. Ibid. p 182-3. 
79. Ibid. p 184-5. 
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This attitude towards the story enabled Leavis to overlook the 
inconsistencies and implausible elements of the tale. For example, 
that Mrs. Witt should deliberately cause the stallion to bolt as Rico 
rides him through Hyde Park is a dangerously irresponsible act and 
highly unrealistic, given that Mrs. Witt is not psychopathically dis- 
turbed. Yet Leavis was able to ignore this aspect - a failure to be 
realistically convincing that diminishes the value of the story as 
a whole - because of his insistence that 'Rico is the antithesis of 
St. Mawr; he represents the irremediable defeat of all that St Mawr 
stands for'.(228) For this to be true, Rico would have to be more 
tangibly present as a character, an individual, and St Mawr would 
have to represent something more than merely a potentially dangerous 
'primitive energy'. If Rico was to bear the burden of representing 
a satire on the sophisticated Bloomsbury milieu of the period, then 
he could not simultaneously be represented as a figurative type in 
a non - realist moral fable. Leavis, however, was convinced that this 
is what was intended in the counterposition of Rico and St Mawr and 
he introduced, as further evidence, the reference to the 'body' as 
the source of 'sensations and emotions' from Psychoanalysis and the 
Unconscious. Leavis's gloss on this passage was that 'body' for 
Lawrence 'means all that deep spontaneous life which is not at the 
beck and call of the conscious and willing mind. . . . St Mawr, the 
stallion, is that life'.(231) This claim amounts to an uncritical 
reflection on Lawrence's metaphoric or symbolic aims in the tale. 
It was not supported by any serious analysis to demonstrate 
in what 
ways and how effectively the metaphors and symbols are 
developed in 
the story. The quotations given by Leavis betray an 
obviousness 
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that even the critic acknowledged, although without finding it to 
be disadvantageous to any extent. Leavis quoted the lines comparing 
Rico with Lewis the groom in which the latter's ability to deal with 
St Mawr is supposed to contrast with sophisticated inadequacies: 
You could not imagine his face dirty, or scrubby, and 
unshaven or bearded, or even moustached. It was 
perfectly prepared for social purposes. If his head 
had been cut off, it would have been a thing complete 
in itself, would not have missed the body in the least. 
Leavis said: 'The force of this needs no explaining'.(232) 
This is exactly the point: Lawrence's tale is replete with similar 
examples of a simplistic presentation of ill- thought -out themes, re- 
dundant imagery (why John the Baptist ?), an unmediated doctrine and 
the impatient jargon of half -developed, occasionally absurd, ideas. 
St Mawr is an incompletely construed and poorly constructed piece 
of writing, notwithstanding its occasional flashes of brilliance. 
That Leavis should have found it so important and 'achieved' is a 
sign of the extent to which his critical judgement was subordinated 
to his exposition of Lawrence's doctrine, for which he sustained a 
strong interest because it coincided to such an extent with his own 
beliefs.80 
80. Leavis said that the stallion 'represents deep impulsions of 
life that are thwarted in the modern world'(287), a phraseology 
reminiscent of some of his own pronouncements on the state of 
contemporary civilisation: and Leavis eagerly applauds Lawrence 
for his hostility to Bloomsbury, a bate noire that loomed 
large 
in Leavis's animadversions on the state of contemporary culture. 
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The insubstantial quality of the story and the abeyance of critical 
judgement on Leavis's part is evidenced in the vagueness combined 
with assertiveness of his commentary: 
The power of the affirmation lies, not in any insistence 
or assertion or argument, but in the creative fact, his 
art; it is that which bears irrefutable witness. What 
his art does is beyond argument or doubt. . . . Great 
art, something created and there, is what Lawrence gives 
us. And there we undeniably have a world of wonder and 
reverence, where the life wells up from mysterious springs. 
It is no merely imagined world; what creative imagination 
of the artist makes us contemplate bears an unanswerable 
testimony.(235) 
It is impossible to reconcile this statement with Leavis's criterion 
which stated that criticism should maintain a close connection with 
the text under discussion. This commentary was very far away from 
a close critical analysis and the weakness of Leavis's critique is 
clinched by the manner in which he endeavoured to see the ending of 
the tale - generally recognised to be unsatisfactory and not connected 
to the first half of the story - as 'essentially so germane, so 
belonging to the significance'(244)81 of the tale as a whole. This 
claim was enforced only by the vaguest of means: by reference to the 
'pioneering' life of the log cabin as a 'triumph of civilisation' 
and 'a triumph of the spirit'(245); and by quoting some of Lawrence's 
bizarre final paragraphs - 
And every civilisation, when it loses its inward vision 
Si. The marked occurrence of italicised words in this essay 
is a 
small indication of the way in which vague insistence has 
taken 
over from persuasive argument. 
270 
and its cleaner energy, falls into a new sort of 
sordidness, more vast and more stupendous than the 
old savage sort. An Augean stables of metallic filth. 
. . . To win from the crude wild nature the victory 
and the power to make another start, and to cleanse 
behind him the century -deep deposits of layer upon 
layer of refuse: even of tin cans. 
- with the comment: 'Lawrence can allow himself this because the affir- 
mation merely brings to explicitness what his art has affirmed per- 
vasively and cumulatively'.(245) 
Leavis placed too great a burden of responsibility on the achieve- 
ment of the 'art' of St Mawr which that 'art' was unable to carry 
off and which Leavis himself left unanalysed to speak, one supposes, 
for itself. Yet Lawrence's undigested doctrinal generalities do not 
have the scope and achievement which Leavis claimed for them; the 
tale is not 'great art' even in the narrow terms of the Lawrence canob. 
Leavis's misjudgement - the 'result of his fascination with the 
doctrinal elements - has serious implications with regard to the 
motivations that lay behind his general critical enterprise. 
In Leavis's discussion of Lawrence's tales, a similar pattern 
emerges. In the collected edition of 1934 there were forty -six tales 
(inclusive of The Virgin and the Gypsy and 'The Fox') and Leavis men- 
tioned, in passing or at length, fourteen of these. Of these, he found 
'The Prussian Officer', 'The Thorn in the Flesh' and 'A Fragment of 
Stained Glass' 'immature'(246) and he set them aside. The rest, as 
far as Leavis was concerned, were all competent, 'achieved' works 
of art, full of insight, brilliant and wide -ranging. Again, Leavis's 
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critique, his expatiation on Lawrence's themes in the tales, was more 
convincing in those passages where it was concerned with stories that 
are overtly successful. But Leavis was determined to find a similar 
series of qualities and set of values in whatever story he happened 
to be discussing, and despite, it seems, the relative merits of each 
individual tale. 
What Leavis was concerned to argue for the tales was their range 
of variety, their 'reverential' attitude to human life ('human 
centrality') and their diagnostic approach to contemporary society. 
These were the general headings under which he organised his Assessment 
of the stories he chose to discuss. Those stories for which he 
preserved strongest approval, and whose quality would receive a 
general assent, included 'The Horse -Dealer's Daughter', 'You Touched 
Me', 'The Fox', 'England my England', 'Mother and Daughter' a,nd The 
Virgin and the Gypsy. Those stories for which Leavis made claims that 
are difficult to substantiate included 'The Princess', 'The Man Who 
Loved Islands', 'The Woman Who Rode Away', 'Two Blue Birds', 'Sun' 
and 'Things'. 
The first group were chosen for reasons which were typified by 
the discussion of 'The Horse -Dealer's Daughter', which Leavis described 
as 'a love -story - a story of the triumph of love and of life'.(251) 
In Leavis's view, Lawrence was 'concerned always with the relations 
between individual human beings - the relations in all their delicate 
complexity'.(252) And of 'You Touched Me' he said 
What we . . . feel is the challenge to realise the full 
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complexity presented, and the tale leaves us with a 
sharp sense of how much, to what rare effect, this is 
an art calculated to promote one's imaginative percep- 
tion in the face of ordinary human life.(256) 
With regard to these two stories, Leavis's argument was developed 
around extensive quotations that were discussed in relatively general 
terms, leading to the kind of summary conclusions quoted above. Again, 
the writing itself was not closely scrutinised to examine how and 
in what ways it achieved its effects and the quotations themselves 
were made to do a disproportionate amount of work towards demonstrating 
the validity of the claims that were being made for them. Leavis sought 
other qualities in the passages, and in the stories as a whole, than 
those which might have come under the heading 'stylistics'. He was 
preoccupied with an exposition of the implications of the narrative 
structure of the story and he tended to take the literary techniques 
and effects as self -evident and pre -assumed. For example, discussing 
'The Horse -Dealer's Daughter', in which a young doctor rescues a girl 
from drowning and then finds himself in love with her, Leavis said 
The surprise [with which the doctor greets his new -found 
passion] is a complex one, and the compelling inevitability 
of truth that, in such a matter, one must recognise to be 
beyond the power of any but a very great writer.(250) 
This was followed by a brief quotation which was supped to demonstrate 
the 'unnerving rightness of touch'(250) of the scene in which this 
action takes place, and how the doctor's response to the girl is 
'something profound and positive'.(251) 
This discussion was all contrived as part of a general 
'case' which 
Leavis intended to enforce with regard to the tales in general. The 
discussion of this story ended with his saying that the significance 
of the last scene was 'plain enough' and needed no analysis but merely 
the insistence that 'it is what it is'. This statement was followed 
by a reference to T.S.Eliot designed to disparage that poet's attitude 
to love and sex82 in contrast with Lawrence's, a recurring comparison 
in Leavis. The implication of this procedure was that the qualities 
of the story were not in question; all that was necessary as far as 
Leavis was concerned was to highlight and underscore the profound 
significance of the fundamental theme. This was his attitude to the 
,tales in general, and was expressed in such comments as that on 'The 
Fox': 'the whole fox motive in all its development is remarkable for 
its inevitability of truth and the economy and precision of its art'. 
(258) In actual fact, Leavis's description of the structure of 'The 
,Fox' was competently done, bringing out the essential theme of a 
relatively complex narrative. That he avoided any consideration of 
the form83 of the story is less important given the fact that the 
extracts that were quoted were more readily comprehensible in relation 
to the major theme of the tale and required no detailed exegesis to 
make their significance apparent. The same can be said of his 
commentary on 'England, my England' and, especially, The Virgin and 
82. Leavis referred back to his earlier quotation of Eliot's article 
inithe Nouvelle Revue Française in which Eliot had attacked what 
he thought of as the barbarity with which Lawrence's characters 
'font l' amour' ('quelque hideux accouplement de protoplasme'). 
(See footnote to p 24.) 
83. 'Structure' is here taken to mean the way in which the 
sequence 
of events in the story is organised: 'form' to mean the literary 
techniques involved in the writing. 
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the Gypsy. The problem is Leavis's apparent inability or reluctance 
to discriminate between the successful and the less successful of 
the tales; it is not possible to assume that those which he left un- 
discussed were those of which he had a less exalted opinion84. This 
indiscriminateness was the result of two factors: the main point of 
this essay on the tales was to demonstrate Lawrence's 'range'(246); 
and the secondary intention was further to enforce his 'case' for 
Lawrence as the 'greatest creative artist' of his age. 
The first of these aims turns out to be the least important. 
Essentially, Leavis maintained at the beginning of the chapter that 
Lawrence's tales 'constitute a body of creative work of such an order 
as would of itself put Lawrence among the great writers'(246). He 
then spent the rest of the chapter demonstrating the validity of this 
claim, by seeking in each respective, story a reflection of what he 
saw as Lawrence's fundamental values; in the process, he emphasised 
his secondary point about the tales, their undoubted variety. 
The second main intention of the essay may provide a clue as to 
why Leavis's account of the tales emerges as generalised and 
undiscriminating and how, given his own insistence on their 'range', 
he managed to credit Lawrence with an apparently homogeneous creative 
purpose behind the writing. 
Leavis's formulation of a 'case' for Lawrence had a positive and 
84. 'Of this great body of work all but a very small fraction is trans- 
cendently good.'(356) 
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a negative side. The negative aspect appeared in his approach to Rico 
in St Mawr and his having been willing to see such a weakly -drawn 
and ill -conceived character as a suitable vehicle for ironic comedy 
at the expense of the Bloomsbury milieu. The point is that Lawrence 
was, eventually, hostile to this social circle and felt himself to 
have been rejected by it, particularly during his visit to England 
from Mexico in the winter of 1924 -25. Leavis, of course, had long 
sustained a comprehensive rejection of the social and literary values 
of Bloomsbury and also saw himself cast in the role of an outsider;85 
for these reasons he may have been especially receptive to Lawrence's 
satire on Bloomsbury, even to the extent of failing to see that the . 
satire was not actually very good. 
In the same way, the chapter on the tales was punctuated with dis- 
paraging references to T.S.Eliot (several times), Wyndham Lewis, 
Maupas -sant, Flaubert, as representatives of an aesthetic practice 
that failed to come near the achievement seen in Lawrence. Leavis 
recruited Lawrence in his battle against the encroachment into 
literature and criticism of those values represented by his main 
antagonists, Bloomsbury and Eliot - especially the Eliot of The 
Cocktail Party. 
On the positive side, Leavis identified closely with Lawrence's 
diagnostic attitude towards contemporary society. He found, for example. 
in 'The Princess' 'an earnestness and profundity of response to the 
85. See, for example, 'Keynes, Lawrence and Cambridge'. The 
Common 
Pursuit, (1952) pp 255 -60. 
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problems of modern civilisation'.(275) He claimed that stories such 
as 'Two Blue Birds', 'Sun' and 'Things' attested to the fact that 
'in Lawrence modern civilisation has a student and analyst of incom- 
parable range as well as insight'.(282) Furthermore, it was Leavis's 
contention that this analysis was above all 'positive'86 and remedial 
and that in Lawrence there was not onlya perception of how bad things 
were in contemporary society, but also a programme for amelioràting 
the present condition of mankind. 
The stories discussed in this respect, however, are not all the 
most completely successful performances on Lawrence's part. 'Sun', 
for example, is a short, wordy exercise in simplistic counterpointing 
which Leavis called 'a terrible criticism of an aspect of industrial 
megalopolitan civilisation . . . done with great subtlety'.(283 -4) 
However, it appears that this distinction was attributed by Leavis 
to a story for which he retained a large degree of intellectual 
sympathy which hindered him from viewing it objectively and seeing 
such weaknesses as are manifestly present in it. Similarly, for Leavis 
to talk so commendatorily of 'The Princess' was out of consonance 
with the strange, undeveloped characterisation of that story and the 
underlying viciousness of the tale - what Hough called its 'offensive 
. sexual malice'.87 Once more, it would seem that Leavis has 
read more into the tales than can actually be said to be there because 
he is so essentially in sympathy with the underlying creative motive. 
86. 'What is remarkable about Lawrence's irony is that, astringent 
as it may be. it never has a touch of animus'.(333) 
87. See Hough, op. cit. p 180. 
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The chapter on the tales confirms the thesis that in the process 
of making a literary and social polemic out of the discussion of 
Lawrence, Leavis failed to adopt a position of judicial objectivity 
and was not as vigorously critical or discriminating as, by his own 
criterion, it is necessary for the critic to be. 
5. The Critical Imperative (1953 -69): the consolidation of Leavis's 
critical positions 
1. Disputations and Controversies: the pattern of Leavis's polemical 
engagements 
It is not necessary to examine the contents of C.P. Snow's 1959 Rede 
lecture, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, in any detail. 
What is important about it for the present study is the nature of 
the response which it elicited from Leavis and the effect which the 
debate had'in focusing Leavis's cultural thesis andin instigating 
the formulation of his subsequent literary and social criticism. 
That Leavis felt obliged - eventually1 - to counter Snow's arguments 
is consonant with his general reactions to the literary debate and 
dispute, as previously presented in Scrutiny. Following the closure 
these were expressed in a series of letters and articles to various 
journals and weekly newspapers in both Britain and the US.2 Right 
1. Three years separated the Rede and the Richmond lectures. Leavis 
said that he had dismissed Snow's lecture as negligible at the 
time of its initial publication, but gradually the argument had 
become popularised. 'as if Snow . . . had given trenchant formu- 
lation to a key contemporary truth'; and he found, 'from marking 
scholarship scripts'. thatthis pervasiveness was increasing. 
Cf. Two Cultures p. 11. This led to his mounting a full -scale 
attack. 
2. Cf. D.F. McKenzie and M -P. Allum, F.R.Leavis: a checklist 1924- 
64 (1966). especially pp 40 -56. 
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from the time of the establishment of Scrutiny Leavis had been prepared. 
had felt obliged, to engage in literary critical debate: much of his 
radical programme for Scrutiny and his own critical writing were 
developed in a series of articles which were occasioned by disobliging 
reviews of the new journal or volumes of criticism which were felt 
to betray an inadequate awareness of critical responsibilities.3 
This nolemicism was a key element of Leavis's critical practice: the 
maintenance and continuance of constructive disputation amongst those 
involved with literature was a fundamental part of the 'collaborative' 
critical process. With the closure of Scrutiny Leavis lost his platform 
for promulgating his own views, although it is necessary to note that 
in the last pages of the journal he responded to F.W. Bateson's 
editorial for the new Essays in Criticism4, an exchange of differences 
that was not diluted in its energy by the circumstances of the imminent 
extinction of Leavis's own public.tion. 
The disputes in which Leavis became involved followed a distinctive 
pattern. Typically, it was not an example of great critical acuity 
or socio- literary integrity that provoked the more extensive responses, 
but rather manifestations of a departure from the basic principles 
and responsibilities of criticism as he saw them. The 'collaborative' 
process was not, by and large, an exchange of views between like -minded 
critics disputing minor points in an area of general consensus. Rather, 
3. See especially 'The Literary Mind', Scrutiny I, 1 (1932): 
'What's 
Wrong with Criticism ?', I,2; ' "Under Which King, 
Bezonian ? "' 1,3: 
and 'Restatement for Critics', 1,4 (1933). 
4. 'The Function of Criticism at the Present 
Time', Essays in 
Criticism. III,1 (January 1953) pp 1 -27. 
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Leavis would aim to devalue the whole basis upon which a particular 
critical exercise rested. He dealt in fundamentals, and his concessions 
to dissenting viewpoints were few. 
Two particular exchanges illustrate the procedure. Between 1953 
and 1956 Leavis responded to different kinds of material in a consis- 
tent manner. Fr Martin Jarrett -Kerr published an article specifically 
on Leavis's criticisms and F.W. Bateson outlined a programme or mani- 
festo for Essays in Criticism.6 To this disparate material Leavis 
replied in ways that were essentially similar. These replies provide 
a background to Leavis's tactics during the 'two cultures' débâcle. 
Jarrett -Kerr's article was ostensibly a review of Leavis's The 
Common Pursuit (1952), but the wide variety of material contained 
in that collection allowed for a general discussion of Leavis's 
literary critical practice. This discussion was presented as an attempt 
to undermine the 'common account' of Leavis: 'behind the battlements 
of Downing sits an ogre, guarding a treasure chest. small but precious. 
of all that after much scrutiny survives of English literature'. The 
Common Pursuit provided 'a fit occasion for re- examining this common 
account',7 in a way that The Great Tradition (Leavis's previous 
publication) had not, being narrowly confined, in the main, to four 
5. Fr. Martin Jarrett -Kerr, 'The Literary Criticism of F.R.Leavis', 
Essays in Criticism, 11,4 (1952) pp 351 -68. 
6. Bateson, op. cit. 
7. Jarrett -Kerr. loc. cit. p 351. 
281 
novelists. Further, whereas The Great Tradition 'carried its negations 
and dismissals more lightly' than in most of his criticism, in The 
Common Pursuit 'they are explicit and firm, and the reader is never 
in doubt as to what must be rejected'.8 
Jarrett -Kerr praised the homogeneity of Leavis's critical approach: 
'his reaction to the most varied work is all- of- a- piece'.9 He also 
recommended Leavis's avoidance of philosophical paraphenalia; the 
'metaphysical and moral judgements' that lie behind the criticism 
are 'deliberately kept out of sight because they could so easily become 
the focus of attention (and of dispute) and thus detract from the 
real subjects under discussion'.10 This, of course, begs several 
questions, not the least of which would be why should 'dispute' regard- 
ing these underlying critical assumptions be an unwelcome distraction? 
how can these aumptions be separated from the particular judgements 
made about 'the real subjects under discussion'? Jarrett -Kerr stated 
that a discussion of Leavis's aesthetic would not have an effect on 
the 'concrete judgements' he makes; in which case, why acknowledge 
the presence of an aesthetic as such? if it is not effective in this 
way, then what is the deeper source for the actual 'concrete judgements' 
and how do these latter fit in with a general apprehension of the 
nature of literature and literary criticism? These questions were 
not raised by Jarrett -Kerr and what he presented was an unconvincing 
defence of Leavis's avoidance of abstract theoretical discussion. 
8. Ibid p 352. 
Q. 'bid p 352. 
10. Ibid p 357. 
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The article in its second section then moved on to make what 
Jarrett -Kerr called 'the necessary criticisms'.11 These involved objec- 
tions to the inclusion of some pieces in the collection and to Leavis's 
'style'; and dissent from certain of Leavis's critical valuations. 
Jarrett -Kerr doubted whether Leavis should have bothered 'preserving' 
essays which deal with essentially 'ephemeral' material: attacks on 
John Hayward and Maurice Bowra ('The Progress of poesy'),12 the demo- 
lition of Tillyard's study of Milton13 ('In Defence of Milton'), or 
the derogation of Stephen Spender;14 it indicated a lack of a sense 
of 'proportion' on Leavis's part. A further problem for Jarrett -Kerr 
was Leavis's tendency to use clichés: either in using individual 
figures ('the Warden of Wadham') or representative notions ('the Sunday 
reviewing' or ' the academic') to stand as symbolic of sets of critical 
compromises and betrayals as seen from Leavis's point of view. In 
this, of course, lies the key to the preceding problem the "'ephemeral' 
is representative in its very ephemerality and the subject of a review 
11. Ibid p 358. 
12. John Hayward (1905 -65), anthologist and bibliographer and com- 
panion to T.S.Eliot until the latter's second marriage in 1957. 
(Sir) Maurice Bowra (1898 -1971), Warden of Wadham College, Oxford 
1938 -70; Oxford Professor of Poetry 1946 -51. 
In 'The Progress of Poet'y', Scrutiny XV (1948) [reprinted in 
The Common Pursuit (1952)] Leavis attacked Hayward's 'presentment 
of the currency- values of Metropolitan literary society and the 
associated University milieux as the distinctions and achievements 
of contemporary England'. (The Common Pursuit p 297) Hayward, 
in Prose Literature in England since 1939 (1949) praised Bowra 
as a humanistic critic; Leavis noted ironically that Bowra had 
recently 'applied his scholar's ripeness and percipience to an 
extended appreciation of the poetry of Edith Sitwell'.(The 
Common 
Pursuit p 298) 
13. E.M.W. Tillyard, The Miltonic Setting (1938). 
14. 'Keynes, Spender and Currency Values', a 
review of Spender, World 
Within a World (1951) and R.F.Harrod, The Life of John 
Maynard 
Keynes (1951), Scrutiny. XVIII (1951) pp 45 -56. 
This review was 
not reprinted in The Common Pursuit, but Jarrett 
-Kerr was 'uncom- 
fortably reminded' of Leavis wasting 'precious pages' 
on an 'unim- 
portant biography' by his preservation of other discussions 
of 
apparently irrelevant subject matter. 
may have little, eventuall.y,to do with that review's main purpose. 
Often, as will be seen in Leavis's reaction to Jarrett -Kerr's own 
article, the aim was, in may of these cases, to demonstrate the kinds 
of failure in critical responsibility that are manifested in the 
material. Thus, the aberrant quality of Tillyard's study of Milton 
- a book that Jarrett -Kerr suggests would have been forgotten but 
for Leavis's 'devastating review' - is not the central point.'Leavis 
was concerned with elucidating the reasons behind the weaknesses and 
with setting those reasons in a wider context that included similar 
types of literary critical irresponsibility. This was an insight that 
was not accessible to Jarrett -Kerr. 
The second order of 'necessary criticism' concentrated on the par- 
ticular 'concrete judgements' that Leavis made and tended in the main 
to derive from a feeling Jarrett -Kerr had that, at, bottom, Leavis 
was rather 'narrow', 'stern', and 'humourless'. The feelings of appre- 
hension displayed by Leavis on approaching new work was seen as a 
lack of readiness 'to revise opinions'15 and as symptomatic of his 
place in a severely moralistic 'realistic- empiricist tradition'. 
Evidence for this lies in his unwillingness to discriminate amongst 
the'good' and the 'bad' in W.H.Auden;16 in his dismissal of Charles 
Williams, failing to recognise value in an 'imaginative writer' who 
15. Loc. cit. p 364. 
16. 'This is a failure to appreciate the embarrassment of those of 
us who, admiring Mr. Auden's genuinestrength and intelligence, 
find it hard to be patient when he so constantly giggles at his 
own seriousness and falls back on clever patter when he is afraid 
of appearing solemn.' 
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was not 'primarily [ a] creator'; and in mistaken overestimations 
of novels and novelists (Ruth Adams I'm Not Complaining, L.H.Myers) 
based on a 'community of interest and valuation' and not genuine 
critical worth.17 
In the same way that Leavis took Tillyard or Spender as superficial 
symptoms of a deeper problem his response to Jarrett- Kerr18 saw that 
critic's article as in itself symptomatic. For Jarrett -Kerr not to 
realise that a degradation in literary values was being deliberately 
pursued by the 'literary establishment'19 meant that Leavis's 'insis- 
tence' on this point had proved inadequate: 
. . . the appearance in Essays in Criticism of such an essay 
must be for me a challenge and an occasion that I earnestly 
hope I shall be permitted tp take. For the issues, I repeat, 
are of the most urgent importance to all who think that 
literature and literary criticism matter, and it is 
impossible to believe that, if under the conditions of 
advantage offered by such an occasion, what may b20so 
readily Hrified is bluntly stated, the blankness can 
survive. 
17. Ibid p 366. 
18. 'The State of Criticism: representations to Fr. Martin Jarrett - 
Kerr', Essays in Criticism, III (1953) pp 215 -33. 
19 'He would seem to agree with me in judging the 'currency values 
of metropolitan literary society and the associated University 
milieux' to be not really the 'distinctions and achievements 
of contemporary England' (my phrases): why then should he think 
it not a matter to be taken seriously when the resources and 
authority of the British Council are used to impose them as such ?' 
Leavis, loc. cit. p 216. (Leavis used these phrases in the article 
quoted in note 12 above.) 
20. 'If I have failed with [Jarrett -Kerr] . . . .then I must have 
failed with many others whose continued blankness before the issues. 
urgent as they are. I should be equally reprehensible to acquiesce 
in 
Loc. cit. p 216. 
21. Ibid p 216. 
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As to the case of Spender. Leavis said, the point was the 'very impor- 
tant question of how the author of the "unimportant autobiography" 
became an established glory of British letters'.22 
Leavis defended himself against Jarrett -Kerr's other charges in 
a similar vein. The reviewing in the 'Sunday papers' represented the 
work of the 'enemies of criticism', a fact for which he was cònstantly 
trying to gain recognition in his continual deprecatory references 
to it. As for the use of the term 'academic' in a derogatory mode, 
this was entirely justified by Leavis's experience of the 'academic 
mind' against which it was necessary 'to defend literature', the 
academic approach being inimical to the 'study of literature that 
should be a discipline of intelligence, fostering life'. 
23 
Leavis's 
detailed defence against Jarrett -Kerr's criticisms continued along 
these lines. The particulars of th'e dispute are not of primary impor- 
tance; it is Leavis's animadversions on the way he saw an 'anti - 
critical impulsion' 4 emerging in Jarrett -Kerr's representations - 
of the value of Auden, Charles Williams_ George Every - that are 
significant. Leavis himself stated that 'a general principle [was] 
at issue - a general truth about the nature of literary criticism'.25 
22. Ibid p 216. 
23. Ibid p 215. Leavis characterised the 'academic' approach as one 
of inventing a spurious 'problem' and then providing a 'solution' 
to it with a display of erudition. Cf. The Common Pursuit p 35. 
24. Ibid p 229. 
2$. Ibid p 230. 
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This relates to his earlier essay, attempting to counter and refute 
the 'doctrinal' approach to T.S.Eliot's poetry.26 Any 'special interest' 
that the reader may bring to the poetry (compatible doctrinal beliefs, 
for example) is legitimate only provided that the reader is not dis- 
tracted by them away from a genuine, objective appraisal of the 
poetry's actual literary value. This latter tendency is what Leavis 
called the 'anti- critical impulsion' and he saw it in Jarrett = Kerr's 
valuations: 
The judgements that they result in cannot be good as literary 
criticism, and I canno't believe that the indulgence - the 
refusal of discipline,, test, self -questioning - such judgements, 
represent can truly serve any2 ;eal spiritual interests they 
may be supposed to speak for. 
MI 
This was a statement of principle, but it was essentially merely 
an adjunct to the major statement Leavis was exploiting Jarrett- Kerr's 
article to develop and enforce, regarding the state of contemporary 
criticism and the critic's task in the face of it: 
Literary criticism, then, has . . . an important function. 
It seems to me impossible that anyone who does with con- 
viction agree should. having looked round, fail to see how 
nearly in our time the function has been extinguished, and 
what forces are arrayed against any serious attempt to 
make it effective again. 
26. 'Eliot's Later Poetry', a review of The Dry Salvages, Scrutiny 
XI (1942), reprinted as an appendix to Education and the 
University (1943). 
27. Leavis, loc. cit p 231. 
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. . . The assumption that there is [an interested and 
responsible] public . . . is necessary to all critical 
thinking: all criticism aims at justifying it.. . The 
more conscious a critic is that the assumption is ill - 
founded, the more conscious will he be of the need to 
evoke (or 'create') a public - t9,8provoke, challenge 
and persuade one into existence. 
The details of this exchange of views were not, clearly, its most 
important aspect. What is significant is that Leavis developed, along- 
side a declaration of the importance of the function of criticism, 
a systematic analysis of the ways in which he felt that that function 
was, contemporaneously, being resisted and betrayed. It also marked 
an emerging sense in Leavis himself of how much work in terms of the 
reiteration and reformulation of Scrutiny's critical programme still 
remained to be done: 'When I have so clearly failed, what further 
can I do ?' 29. His opposition was to the 'system of personal and 
institutional relations ['that takes in the weeklies, the ,Sunday papers, 
the British Council and the BBC'] . . . that has resulted in so com- 
plete a triumph, in what should be the field of literary criticism, 
of the socio- personal values'.30 The critical orientation of his 
response to the original article was such that his radical objections 
to the contemporary state of affairs inevitably emerged out of the 
discussion of particulars. Leavis's tactic was to see the details 
as representative of an underlying critical habit or procedure out 
of which he would generalise his own agenda for the crucial, broader 
28. Ibid pp 231-2 
29. Ibid p 217. 
30. Ibid p 217. 
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aspects of the argument. He related the 'representative' weaknesses 
of the minor case to fundamental misdirections in the major field 
of literary criticism. In this way, he was able to relate each current 
dispute to a generalised background representing his main discontents 
and his insistent programme for counteracting the prevailing tendency 
for 'the function of criticism' to be gradually 'extinguished'. 
By moving thus from the particular to the general, Leavis paralleled 
his literary critical procedure, keeping in touch with 'the concrete' 
but combining this with observations relevant to a broad spectrum 
and in a wider context. ,There was not a great deal of critical writing 
in existence that Leavis felt exhibited the appropriate sense of 
critical responsibility. Leavis's convictions urged him to dispute 
exactly those critical attitudes which were antithetical to his own 
position and which allowe,d him to continue his campaign for the re 'Sus- 
citation of the 'true' "function of criticism ". It was a campaign 
organised to demolish prevalent misconceptions and at the same time 
to alert the 'interested and responsible public' to the dangers of 
the gradual undermining of critical principles that was taking place. 
F.W. Bateson's editorial for the emerging Essays in Criticism was 
a 'pronouncement on Essays in Criticism's point of view ánd programme' 31 
and thus set out to do explicitly what had been done only circum- 
spectly in the first number of Scrutiny. The editorial board of 
Scrutiny had eschewed a detailed introductory 'programme', although 
31. F.W.Bateson loc. cit. p 1. 
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the 'manifesto' of the first number made its critical orientation, 
or 'point of view', very clear.32 Even in its abbreviated form this 
was entirely lucid in its sense of the relation between literary 
criticism and the general 'dissolution of standards'; in contrast, 
Bateson merely discussed thevague notion of the critic's 'social ob- 
ligation not to mislead his readers'.33 
Bateson's essay began with a lament for the state of the art of 
contemporary criticism. He adduced, along a simple dividing line, 
two types of critical endeavour, both of which he felt had tended 
,to extreme forms and had evinced a central weakness of 'irresponsibility'. 
The two schools identified by Bateson were, broadly, those critics 
in the T.S.Eliot line who concentrated on formal problems at the ex- 
pense of 'historical and social factors'; and the 'sociological critics134 
;whose 'lack of interest in verbal and stylistic analysis' meant that 
their 'literary judgements tend[ed] to be superficial and second -hand'. 
Out of this very basic analysis Bateson drew a simplistic conclusion, 
to the effect that if the 'explicators' and the 'sociologists' were 
untrustworthy, then the 'obvious' conclusion was 
that if we are to see the object as it really is we must 
32. See Scrutiny 1,1 (1932) pp 2 -7. The 'manifesto' was signed 'The 
Editors', who were nominally L.C.Knights and Donald Culver; the 
terminology is such, however, that it is certain that Leavis 
made a substantial contribution to it. 
33. Bateson loc. cit. p 23. 
34. Bateson grouped under this heading a heterogeneous 
assortment 
of names: 'Wyndham Lewis, Christopher Caudwell. 
Edmund Wilson, 
George Orwell, Kenneth Burke and Lionel Trilling'. 
35. Ibid p 24. 
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use both methods - abalance, in other words, of literary and 
sociological criticism, in which one mode may serve as the 
complement and the corrective of the other.3ó 
This elastic compromise was easier to propose than to envisage 
working in practice. Essays in Criticism, Bateson went on to say, 
would not be a vehicle for bland uncontroversial critical writing 
but would aim for 'a balance of genuine opposites'. The journal would 
seek 'to secure articles of every critical complexion and colour, 
the one test of acceptability being that they are good of their kind 
(whatever that kind may óe)'.37 This posits a conception of literary 
criticism as an activity which, like politics, is undertaken at a 
multitude of points along a spectrum between two extremes but which, 
ignoring the particular biases engendered by its place on that line, 
can be seen as essentially the same activity in a series of arbitrary 
guises. These different forms were, despite unfortunate no'minal dif- 
ferences, basically equatable, representing sets of aims and values 
that were ideologically equivalent. At best, this was intellectually 
a very naive thesis for the new journal and it contained ideas about 
criticism that were so inimical to Leavis that a reply from him was 
inevitable. 
Leavis must have felt the irony of the circumstances of this ex- 
change. His 'insistent' opposition to the decline in critical standards 
took place at a time when his own publication was on the brink of 
36. Ibid p. 25. 
37. Ibid p. 26. 
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closure and was directed against impoverished ideas in a journal that 
was newly- established and apparently thriving. Nevertheless, despite 
these circumstances, Leavis mounted a detailed counter to Bateson's 
'pronouncement'. This statement came to be his last opportunity for 
a reiteration of his principles within the journal he and his wife 
had sustained for so long. The whole exchange was clearly seen by 
Leavis as a summation on his part of the essential critical principles 
that had been contained in Scrutiny's example.38 It was Leavis's last 
attempt - within the pages of his journal - to enforce and elucidate 
its critical raison d'être. 
Leavis's reply was a generalaccount, derived by way of dismissing 
Bateson's propositions, of his own conception of the aims and practice 
of literary criticism. He rejected Bateson's claim that it was neces- 
ary and possible for a critic to re- establish the 'total context'; 
of a work of art through a series of 'contextual checks' that would 
ultimately yield 'a final meaning' for the work which could be called 
'the correct meaning, . . . since it is the produce of progressive 
corrections at each stage of the contextual series'.39 This ambition, 
38. It was the penultimate chapter of A Selection from 'Scrutiny' 
(1968) under the title 'The Responsible Critic' and was succeeded 
there only by Leavis's 'Valedictory' from the final issue. This 
last stated that 'there has never been a Scrutiny orthodoxy, 
but there has certainly been a Scrutiny conception of the function 
of criticism at the present time, together with a corresponding 
one of the proper spirit of a critical quarterly'. Leavis's essay 
in reply to Bateson encapsulated that conception and, paradoxi- 
cally and ironically, a detailed 'manifesto' or 'programme' 
for the journal was laid out only at the moment of its closure. 
39. Cf. Bateson loc. cit. p 18. 
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Leavis said, was 'gratuitous' and the possible achievement 'illusory': 
this 'contextual apparatus' was entirely unnecessary for a reading 
of the poem or novel. Leavis in fact inverted the argument, stating 
that 
it is to creative literature, read as creative literature, 
that we must look for our main insights into those 
characteristics of the 'social context' (to adopt for a 
moment Mr. Bateson's insidious adjective) that matter most 
to the critic - to the reader of poetry.40 
In Leavis's formulation, 'creative literature' has that relation to 
contemporary life and society that makes it inevitably the pre- eminent 
source of our knowledge about its 'social context'. 'Creative 
literature' has this pre- eminence by virtue of its being 'creative' 
and encouraging in the reader a 'creative' response to it. This, Leavis 
argued, can only be derived by relating the content of the poem to 
personal experience: 
if the poem is an important challenge, it engages, in the 
response that 'reconstructs' it, and as an inseparable 
part of the response, the profoundest and completest sense 
of relative value that one brings from one's experience.41 
This was a rearrangement of priorities that undermined Bateson's 
preoccupation with 'objectivity' and the search for a 'final meaning' 
by making the source of a reading of the poem primarily the experiences 
40. Loc. cit. p 174. 
41. Loc. cit. p 176. 
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of the reader, and by making the poem primarily the source of any 
wider 'context' involved in that reading. The question of 'values' 
as raised by Bateson (Leavis found his account 'wholly unintelligible') 
was not served by vague references to 'literary values' or the 'social 
obligation' of the critic not to 'mislead'. There was an altogether 
higher level at which the burden of the critic to be responsible 
operated: 'The critic, by way of his discipline for relevance,in 
dealing with creative works, is concerned with life'.42 
This took the argument into a different realm and Leavis went on 
to state that the 'special responsibility' of the critic was to become 
aware of how the 'function of criticism' should be made effective 
in 'contemporary England'. The critic must becomé alert to his task 
of 'helping, in a collaborative process, to define - that is, to form, 
- the contemporary sensibility'; this aim in turn proposes the 
existence of 'a public intelligently responsive and decisively 
influential'. 43 In these respects, Bateson had been less than 'res- 
ponsible' because, Leavis claimed, he had demonstrated no awareness 
of the fact that 'contemporary cultural conditions' were militating 
against the proper function of criticism. In this way the argument 
was brought to a familiar combination of generally stated principles 
and specific polemical discontents, as in the previous dispute with 
Jarrett -Kerr. For Leavis, the general principles behind the function 
of criticism ('at any time') were not separable from the specific 
misdirections and incomprehensions that were afflicting the function 
of criticism ('at the present time'). 
42. Loc. cit. p 178. 
43. Ibid p 178. 
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It was precisely this sense of a critical imperative - to maintain 
an opposition to those who by carelessness or deliberate design were 
undermining the function of criticism44 - that led Leavis eventually 
to embark upon an attack on Snow's Rede lecture. This impulse was 
entirely commensurate with the sense of obligation to his conception 
of that function and it was a fulfilment of a sense of responsibility 
consonant with that which had urged him to respond to Jarrett -Kerr 
and F.W.Bateson. That is to say, the content of Leavis's side of the 
controversy was neither extraordinary nor unexpected, although its 
tenor seemed to disturb many people45 and probably contributed to 
the notoriety of the whole issue; but this notoriety clearly ought 
not to have been attached to the ideas Leavis was expressing, as he 
had been offering them - often equally vigorously - for several years 
previously. 
Historically, the 'two cultures' 'debate' was not in any way 
original, in the sense of being concerned with issues and problems 
entirely new to the human condition. Matthew Arnold and T.H.Huxley 
had disputed exactly this question of the priority of science over 
the arts in the early 18805.46 Arnold's version, also delivered as 
44. To keep up the 'daily battle . . . against the processes 
of 
civilisation that have been documented in Scrutiny . . . during 
the past twenty years'. 
Loc. cit. p 179. 
45. Cf. The Spectator, March 23 1962. 
46. Cf. T.H.Huxley. 'Science and Culture' ('An 
address delivered 
at the opening of Sir Joshua Mason's Science College 
on 1st 
October 1880') in Science and Culture and other essays (1881): 
and Arnold, 'Literature and Science' the Rede 
lecture 1882 
in The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, (ed. 
R.H.Super) 
X. (Ann Arbor 1974). 
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a Rede lecture (1882), had dealt more equitably with the issues but 
still had found that while the natural sciences' habit of 'dealing 
with facts' was 'a valuable discipline', nonetheless the 'results' 
of science remained mere 'knowledge'; only 'poetry and eloquence . 
. . the best that has been thought and uttered in the world' was 
capable of 'helping us to relate the results of modern science to 
our need for conduct, our need for beauty'.47 
Furthermore, the ostensible material of the Leavis -Snow exchange 
was largely secondary to underlying ulterior purposes; the classic 
terms of the 'science versus arts' dispute were deployed by Snow in 
their twentieth century guise and as crucial to the contemporary age48 
for reasons that may have been centred on more immediately practical 
motivations. John Tasker wrote of Snow's lecture that its real purpose 
had been 'to advocate the expansion of technological specialisation 
and to provide a rationale for the empire -building of scientific 
research in the universities'; therefore, he 'coupled his scientific 
chauvinism with a gratuitous and nasty attack on literature and the 
arts'.49 A large proportion of Snow's lecture was preoccupied with 
a commentary on the condition of educational achievement in the USA 
and USSR, to the detriment of the British situation. This commentary 
47. Arnold loc. cit. pp 66 -67. 
48 Snow had also denied great originality for his ideas, although 
for different reasons. The 'flood of literature' attendant upon 
the publication of his lecture suggested to him that 'the ideas 
were in the air. Anyone, anywhere, had only to choose a form 
of words.' 
Snow. The Two Cultures; and A Second Look, an expanded version of 
'The Twul tures and the Scientific Revolution'(1964) pp 54 -55. 
49 John Tasker. 'The Richmond Lecture - its purpose and achievement'. 
Books and Bookmen October 1972, p 17. 
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was combined with dire warnings about the consequences for the nation 
of ignoring these apparent disadvantages.50 Consequently, Snow's 
analysis of the dissilience of contemporary 'cultures' (science versus 
arts) tended in its attention to literature merely to denigrate the 
literary values that were current at that time. That is to say, Snow's 
attention was directed towards the practical and quotidian, unlike 
Arnold's or Huxley's broader philosophical approach. 'Literature', 
therefore, was not given serious consideration as a form of human 
endeavour, but was deprecated for particular weaknesses peculiar to 
the moment of the discussion. 
This gave Leavis the line of attack to pursue in his approach to 
Snow's thesis. The historical question of the 'two cultures' - of 
the priority of arts or sciences over one another - barely troubled 
him. Leavis's reply was almost exclusively directed towards vindicating 
'literature' on an Arnoldian or philosophical level against Snow's 
strictures in the practical sphere. Ironically, Leavis's lecture also 
displayed an antipathy towards contemporary 'literary values', with 
the difference that Snow was not only included as a representative 
of those values, he was presented by Leavis as the archetype of the 
decay endemic in contemporary 'cultural conditions'. Leavis employed 
the same argument here as he had previously, in justifying (to Jarrett - 
Kerr) his attack on Spender's autobiography: Snow was himself 
'negligible' but: 
50. 'For the sake of the intellectual life, the sake of this country's 
special danger, for the sake of the western society 
living precar- 
iously rich among poor, ... it is obligatory for us 
to look at 
our education with fresh eyes'. 
Snow, loc. cit. p 50. 
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his significance is that he has been accepted - perhaps 
the point is better made by saying 'created': he has been 
created as authoritative intellect by the cultural 
conditions manifested in his acceptance.51 
Representatives of the literary culture, criticised already by Snow, 
did not find themselves redeemed by the literary critic. The subsequent 
correspondence in The Spectator was not edifying either in its content 
or its tone; according to Roy Fuller, speaking as Oxford Professor 
of Poetry52 many correspondents displayed 'a gratuitous insolence 
that showed how excruciatingly Leavis had managed to knock their 
concepts'. Thèse people were not offended by 'Leavis's denial of the 
problem of the two cultures but in his questioning the values of the 
literary culture as it is assumed to exist'. For Leavis., the dispute 
was all part of the same campaign of vindicating 'the function of 
criticism' and alerting the whole culture to the prevailing decline 
in standards. 
Leavis attacked Snow's simplified notion of 'social hope'. Snow 
had argued that because the individual condition is 'tragic' there 
was no reason to suppose that the 'social condition' must inevitably 
be so. Leavis could not identify 'the social hope that transcends, 
cancels or makes indifferent the inescapable tragic condition of each 
individual',53 unless it resided in the mere material satisfactions 
51. Two Cultures? the significance of C.P.Snow (1962) 
p 10. 
52. Roy Fuller, 'The Radical Skinhead', TLS February 5 1971, 
p 151. 
53. Leavis, loc. cit. pp 19 -20. 
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that Snow represented as 'jam'.54 It was not Snow that Leavis was 
attacking, but the general ethic that held that material advancement 
was the ideal standard against which to measure human achievement 
and ambition. Simple materialism was life -impoverishing and it was 
only 'in coming to terms with great literature [that] we discover 
what at bottom we really believe'.55 This was because 'language' was 
'a prior human achievement of collaborative creation' and language 
is not fixed: 'it lives in the living creative response to change 
in the present'.56 Literary criticism was a parallel 'creative - 
collaborative process' and literature can only exist 'in the living 
present, in the creative response of individuals, who collaboratively 
renew and perpetuate what they participate in, a cultural community 
or consciousness'.57 Leavis claimed the 'English school' in the univer- 
sity as the centre for this 'human consciousness' and stated that 
Scrutiny 'contemporary intellectual- cultural frontier 
in maintaining the critical function',58 
Leavis's attack on Snow's thesis was, on the one hand, part of 
a continuing process of engagement in polemical exchanges for the 
purposes of indicating his reiterated critical principles. On the 
other hand, though, the 'two cultures' controversy was the beginning 
54. Discussing the advances in Asian, African and 
Chinese industrial- 
isation, Snow commented approvingly that these nations 
had 'proved 
that common men can show astonishing fortitude in chasing 
jam 
tomorrow. Jam today, and men aren't at their most 
exciting: jam 
tomorrow, and one often sees them at their noblest'. 
(Loc. cit. 
p 44.) 
55. Leavis loc. cit. p 23. 
56. Ibid p 27. 
57. Ibid p 28. 
58. Ibid p 29. 
299 
of a new phase in Leavis's career during which his criticism moved 
increasingly towards a plMccupation with a more abstract vocabulary 
of value -terms, involving, in a more central way, large concepts that 
were not primarily literary in origin. This was a logical development 
of his critical principles. For if the critical response to literature 
involved 'the profoundest and completest sense of relative value that 
one brings from one's experience' and if 'the critic, by way.of his 
discipline for relevance in dealing with creative works, is concerned 
with life', then, clearly, the literary criticism that would arise 
out of this type of approach was not going to be confined to straight- 
forward textual analysis and a discussion of historical context. Leavis, 
in stating that it was through 'great literature' that we discover 
'what at bottom we really believe', was making explicit the im- 
plications of his critical method. 'Experience', 'belief', 'life' 
were terms that invoked concepts outside the realm of the purely 
literary and which involved Leavis in increasingly metaphysical and 
teleological explications of the literature under discussion. 
2. Literature, Civilisation and the University 
It won't do to make a rising material standard of living 
the self-sufficient aim on the confident assumption that we 
needn't admit any other kind of consideration, any more 
adequate recognition of human nature and human need, into 
the incitement and direction of our thinking and our effort.59 
59. 'Luddites? or, There is only one Culture', 
Lectures in America 
(1969) chapter 1, p 4. 
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Leavis's was not a lone political voice protesting against the in- 
creasingly utilitarian ethos of advanced industrial society. What 
was distinctive about his resistance to this ethos was the means he 
outlined for establishing a 'community' which would be source of a 
non -materialist philosophy and which would attempt to sustain, via 
its concentration on literature, the advancement of positive, 
'creative' values throughout society in general. This 'community' 
was the university, and the means by which it was to propagate these 
values centred on literature, literary criticism and a literary 
education as a prerequisite requirement of the responsible minority. 
Leavis persevered in his belief in this proposal in the face of in- 
creasing indifference and inertia amongst the mass of society to the 
standards and values he represented by 'creative art'. The examples 
which indicated the decline in standards multiplied, his concern to 
make his conviction of the dangers known intensified and the effective- 
ness of his remedial programme was brought more and more into question. 
The 1967 Clark lectures ( English Literature in our time and the 
University (1969) reiterated the ideas and arguments that had made 
up the bulk of Leavis's earlier polemical writings. The process was 
one of restatement and reinforcement. At this stage, a generation 
after Education and the University (1943), circumstances had changed 
considerably. This change was not simply a matter of worsening effects 
of cultural degeneracy making Leavis's case more crucial and more 
urgent, though this was an important aspect. Other significant changes 
had occurred, changes which served to give more force to Leavis's 
arguments and greater substance to his claims to represent 
an active 
political and pedagogic means for resisting the decline. 
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Leavis's earlier gamut of targets - Northcliffe, H.G. Wells, 
American behavioural scientists and advertising manuals60 - had given 
way by the 1960s to Lord Robbins, C.P.Snow, and the like. These figures 
and their public work and pronouncements focused Leavis's attention. 
He was able to elaborate from their example a general case against 
the common views amongst the politicians and administrators as to 
the function of the university in a modern society, the place' of 
literature and literary study in regard to that function and the con- 
sequences of advanced industrialisation on the 'cultural consciousness'. 
There was no detailed rejection of the report of the Committee on 
Higher Education (1964), or of Robbins's The University and the Modern 
World (1966) in these lectures. What Leavis attacked was an attitude, 
which he saw not as a new and dangerous phenomenon in the approach 
to the problems of higher education and the university but as another 
factor in the growing,utilitarianist ideology of British society. 
That attitude was summed up for him by Robbins finding Snow's Rede 
lecture unexceptionable, its 'diagnosis' seeming to him to be 'obvious'61 
and further illustrated by the increasing tendency for university 
teaching to be seen in terms of vocational training and ancillary 
support in relation to the general problems of secondary and higher 
education.62 Against this background Leavis presented his own con- 
ception of the nature and function of the university.. 
60. Cf For Continuity passim. 
61. Cf English Literature in our time p 171. Robbins's comment was 
quoted by Leavis from The University and the Modern World (1966). 
62. Cf Leavis's letter to The Times, January 22 1968, rejecting Lord 
Annan's insistence that the university should provide help for 
under- educated (ie under -qualified) early school -leavers, and 
'elementary teaching' for new students who have undergone a 're- 
vised' (ie simplified) sixth -form course. (Appendix I, English 
Literature in our time.) Annan's comments were made in a letter 
to The Times, January 19 1968. 
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This conception remained very largely what it had been in Education 
and the University, although the later version was characterised by 
a more urgent insistence on the importance of his claims and by a 
higher degree of detail in the presentation of them. As before, the 
centrality of the university derives from the presence within it of 
the 'English School', itself in turn significant because only in the 
proper study of literature can the cultural heritage be sustained, 
replenished and passed on. This was because only literature can embody 
and transmit the deeper characteristics and significances of a culture. 
Only the kind of 'recreative' reading that would be taught in a 
properly orientated 'English School' would be capable of receiving 
this elemental culture, revivifying it to make it contemporaneously 
relevant and communicating it to the next generation. Leavis pursued 
this case through the lectures in a cycle of repetition and re- emphasis 
(essential in a public lecture series) and the alignment of his argu- 
ment along various perspectives, literary critical, polemical and 
social -analytical. Essentially though, the substance of his thesis 
was a reinforced version of the arguments of 1943 and before. 
It was an idealistic conception, unconcerned for the mechanics 
of social relations that would enable the enlightened wisdom of the 
'educated and responsible minority' to percolate through to the mass 
of society. Leavis saw creative literature as the primary expression 
of a culture's entity, in the face of the fact of a declining reading 
public. He took no cognisance of the complex and interactive ways 
in which economic organisation affected the structure of human 
relations. He saw the pressures engendered by that interaction as 
simply a matter of the triumph of a materialistic, anti -individualist 
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ideology ('technologico -Benthamism'). The implication, which was un- 
examined, was that by undermining that ideology, by insisting on human 
'needs' in a spiritual, non -materialistic dimension, it was possible 
to reverse or arrest the 'decline' consequent upon its present pre - 
potence. Leavis did not formulate a practical political programme 
and his vision of a remedial ameliorative process for recapturing 
the ground lost to the commercial and industrial order was embodied 
in the language of his diagnosis, rather than taking more concrete 
form. Even the proposals regarding the 'English School' in the univer- 
sity were limited in their practical applicability in the realm of 
the ' technologico- Benthamite' society. 
Iñ some ways, Leavis's argument was assisted by history. While, 
for example, Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture could only offer 
a resolute and positive outlook," in later years Leavis was able 
to point to the example of his own criticism, and the existence of 
Scrutiny and the work of its associates, to demonstrate that it was 
indeed possible to mount an effective resistance to the prevailing 
conditions. It was an example to which Leavis referred many times 
in the years following the journal's closure; the circumstances of 
his ostracism from Cambridge were eventually elevated to the level 
63. 'We cannot help clinging to some such hope as Mr. Richards 
offers; to the belief (unwarranted possibly) that what 
we value most matters too much to the race to be finally 
abandoned, and that the machine may yet be made a tool'. 
Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture p 28. 
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of myth.b4 Scrutiny undoubtedly existed as concrete evidence of a 
sustained critical enterprise that went against the flow of the general 
consensus; but the other inescapable fact was that the journal had 
closed, had ultimately been unable to maintain its heterodox position. 
This, to some extent, was because towards the end the journal was 
being kept alive almost entirely by the efforts of the Leavises alone. 
The paradox was that Leavis should refer, as an example of what might 
be done, to an enterprise that had proved ultimately insupportable. 
Nevertheless, the example of Scrutiny, and the legend of exclusion 
and hostility, were potent adjuncts to the argument; and yet Leavis 
himself indicated that Cambridge, previously the great hope for 
cultural regeneration,65 was no longer actively resisting the 
'reductive process'.66 
64. Discussing Leavis's time at York in the 1960s and '70s, a bio- 
grapher writes: 'In lectures and seminars, as at informal meetings 
over a cup of tea, he would be prone to speak at length about 
his experiences of being treated as an outsider by the cultural 
establishment and by the Cambridge English Faculty. Students 
would find this at worst boring and at best irrelevant to their 
own problems. For them it was almost impossible to realise that 
he had been an educational revolutionary.' 
Ronald Hayman, Leavis (1976) p 121. 
65. Leavis said that the early advocates of the idea of the English 
Faculty had hoped, by their insistence on it, to 'ensure that 
the actuality should sufficiently root itself at Cambridge to 
be permanently established, a robust living and developed presence 
at the centre, its necessity and significance recognised, its 
growth a matter of intelligent response to the advances of tech- 
nological civilisation'. 
English Literature in our time, p 23. 
66. 'Cambridge is no longer a centre of life and hope. No clear 
purpose or positive idea replaces what has been exorcized. Where 
there is no positive idea that could inform a clear. strong and 
disinterested purpose ambition and incuria, natural consorts, 
reign in security. . . . Cambridge, that is, exemplifies rather 
than resists the universal reductive process.' 
Ibid p 24. 
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The less problematical material of these lectures involved the 
literary critical discussions that Leavis undertook. These critiques 
were also a matter of reiterating former statements and setting them 
in the context of this social and cultural diagnosis. To enforce his 
point regarding the pre- eminence of literary study in the university, 
Leavis discussed the nature of 'great criticism'. He elucidated his 
version of the ultimate purpose of literary criticism in a comparison 
of the writings of T.S.Eliot and D.H.Lawrence; and he presented, 
through a discussion of Four Quartets, his own developed sense of 
what should be the form and the subject matter of a creative art that 
aspired to a general relevance in the context of an age characterised , 
by the signs of dislocation and degeneracy which he had already noted. 
Or 
The criticism of Eliot's that escaped Leavis's general censure 
was that which dealt with the, poetry of the seventeenth century: that 
is, broadly, the essays contained in Homage to John Dryden (1924). 
Seeing this criticism from the point of view of the student in the 
hypothetical English School, Leavis said that a reading of this 
criticism would provide an insight into the meaning of the word 'sen- 
sibility', a word he felt to be 'essential'.67 Eliot's interest in 
the seventeenth century68 had meant that his critical approach to 
67. Ibid p 85. 
68. Discussing 'Portrait of a Lady', Leavis said: 'the play of tone 
and inflection mean the possibility of a kind of strong and subtle 
thinking in poetry, an intellectual nerve, that explains Eliot's 
interest in the Metaphysicals'. 
Ibid p 54. 
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the period had been to see the poetry and its techniques very much 
in terms of his own problems. His approach therefore involved him 
in a polemical history of poetry that effectively consigned the verse 
of the nineteenth century to the arena of the poetically obsolete. 
This had been the intention of Eliot's suggestion regarding the 'dis- 
sociation of sensibility'. This was a suggestion that answered forcibly 
to Leavis's own conception of the problem of the status of poetry, 
its content and technique, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning 
of the twentieth centuries. Leavis had argued, in the first lecture 
in the series, that a 'cultural tradition' could only be sustained 
('changing in response to changing conditions (material, economic, 
and so on)') 'by continuous collaborative renewal'.69 This 'renewal' 
involved an awareness of the relation of the past to the present and 
of the principle that the literature of any period had its significance 
only in the ways in which it could be demonstrated to have a relevance 
in the present.70 
What gives Eliot his acuteness as a critic of poetry and poetic 
development in the seventeenth century is his diagnostic (and 
creative) concern with the state of things in 1920.71 
So Eliot's appraisal of the Metaphysicals became a paradigm 
69. Ibid p 54. 
70. 'English literature . has its reality and life (if at all) 
only in the present. . . . What matters for each age is coherence 
- significant relatedness in an organic whole, the centre of 
significance being (inevitably) the present.' 
Ibid pp 7 -8. 
71. Ibid p. 87. 
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for the practice of criticism in the hypothetical English School, 
and in general. Leavis's discussion of Eliot's critical work on the 
seventeenth century aimed to highlight the critical technique in 
a manner that evoked a conception of the deeper intentions of literary 
criticism. Leavis's appraisal was phrased in a way that was clearly 
intended to include his own critical practice in the formulation. In 
other words, the following comment on Eliot was designed to be appli- 
cable in a wider context and to include Leavis's criticism within 
it. The essays in Homage to John Dryden, Leavis said, 
contain a highly compressed charge of perceptions, 
intuitions and suggestions. They offer_ no simple 
diagnostic formulas and no simple prescriptions. . . .. 
Complex, packed and delicately organised, they obviously 
don't present an expository development of any one 
thematic strand, and so do obviously count on an energy 
of active critical intelligence in the reader - 
intelligence that responds constructively as well as in 
the questioning or dissenting way that is commonly 
felt to be meant by 'critically'. 72 
Leavis was presenting here his ideal example and his praise for the 
particular qualities of Eliot's criticism amounted to a set of pro- 
posals for criticism in general. For this reason it was central to 
his discussion of the place of criticism in the English School, and 
hence in the university. Furthermore, the historical element of Eliot's 
thesis on the 'dissociation of sensibility', as expounded by Leavis, 
became a key factor in the hypothetical syllabus. Leavis felt that 
by coming fully to understand the processes of the change and the 
72. Ibid pp 78-79. 
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emergence of 'modern prose' at the time of the Restoration, and the 
attendant development of rational enlightenment, the student would 
perforce recognise the source and derivation of contemporary conditions: 
All the forces of change that had been at work through the 
century had come together to inaugurate the triumphant 
advance towards the civilisation, technological and 
Benthamite, that we live in.73 
Eliot's essay on Metaphysicals provides a starting -point for the 
student to see how the 'Benthamite' era was ushered in; his essay 
on Blake74 reveals an understanding of the means whereby the utilita- 
rían ethos may be counteracted: 
. . . the sense of human responsibility that Blake represents is 
what we desperately need, to supplement, correct and guide - 
in sum, subdue to the service of life - a victorious, cock -a- 
tioop and hardly questioned Benthamism.75 
Leavis took Eliot's criticism as a text from which he argued in favour 
of the seventeenth century as the proper and necessary subject of 
study by his prospective students in the ideal 'English School'. In 
this way he expounded his deeper abstract considerations on the essen- 
tial drive of literary criticism to combat (to 'subdue to the service 
of life') the reductive ideology of materialism. 
Throughout the lecture series the pattern was the same. Leavis 
73. Ibid p 95. 
74. Cf Eliot, Selected Essays (1951) 
75. English Li tErature in our time and 
the University p 107. 
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displayed his polemical and literary critical ideas together, aiming 
to evolve a coherent statement of his beliefs by submitting these 
ideas to contemplation from the perspective of his cultural diagnosis. 
Eliot's poetry and Lawrence's criticism76 were thus both utilised 
to explore further dimensions of the contemporary situation and to 
propose an effective set of values capable of alleviating the present 
crisis. Developing previous reflections on Four Quartets, the burden 
of one of the lectures - 'Why Four Quartets matters in a technologico- 
Benthamite age' - was Leavis's attempt to 'justify my associating 
the special importance I attribute to Eliot's poetry with the fact 
that the civilisation we live in is what it is'.77 To persuade his 
audience of this connection, Leavis quoted his own commentary on 'East 
Coker' of twenty years previously.78 He had stated then that the poetry 
was not theologically didactic, but was 'a searching of experience, 
a spiritual discipline, a technique for sincerity - for giving 'sin- 
cerity' a meaning'.79 He elaborated further on this point, with a 
view to the context and direction of the lectures. The poetry of Four 
Quartets, he insisted, could not be read in a 'detached, intellectual 
way' - 'it involves one's basic attitudes and one's habits of thought 
and valuation'. That the demands of the poetry were such allowed for 
the associated reflection on the current demise of cultural standards: 
76. Leavis used Lawrence's essays in Twilight in Italy (1916) as 
the text for a comparison of the critical abilities of Eliot 
and Lawrence, rather than any more overtly 'literary critical' 
writing by Lawrence. 
77. English Literature in our time p 22. 
78. 'Eliot's Later Poetry' a review of The Dry Salvages, Scrutiny 
XI (1942) pp 60 -71. Cf. Appendix I, Education and the University. 
79. English Literature in our time p. 125. 
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No -one could take the communication of 'Burnt Norton' 
and not know, with decisive force, that the spiritual Philistinism 
of the world we live in is menacingly anti -human, or inertly 
accept 'a rising standard of living' as an adequate account of 
human ends and needs. 80 
Thus, the diagnosis of the 'reductive process', the propositions re- 
garding the operation of a 'creative' critical response in the function 
of a university and the critique of Four Quartets were bound'together 
in a co- ordinated attempt to reinforce the diagnostic points. Leavis 
was aiming to overthrow the prevailing materialist ideology of contem- 
porary civilisation by reawakening it to the possibilities of spiritual 
enlightenment. At this point Leavis's criticism began to move towards 
what developed into an explicitly religious position. As a result, 
the tenor and direction of his literary criticism changed and his pre- 
occupation with contemporary 'spiritual Philistinism' and his concern 
for 'human ends and needs' meant that he was to become more involved 
with 'concepts' such as 'morality', 'thought', 'responsibility' and 
'life'. This vocabulary consisted of orthodox philosophical concepts 
('morality') and evaluative terms unique to Leavis's critical practice 
('life'). The consequence of this for his literary criticism, as 
against his social analysis, was that the literature was in a sense 
subordinated to the larger theme, so that the commentary on the spe- 
cific works constantly referred outward from the particular text to 
this theme of counteracting the general spiritual anomie. In a sense, 
the literature became secondary to the main subject of the developing 
critical discussion, relevant (in Leavis's view) only in the ways 
80. Ibid p 129. 
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in which it could be made to yield matter pertinent to the commentary 
on contemporary civilisation. 
3. The Creative Principle: Eliot, Yeats and the Novel 
Leavis's mature consideration of the place occupied by T.S.Eliot in 
the history of modern English literature was split decisively along 
the line separating Eliot's criticism and his poetry. Leavis's opinions 
regarding these two, aspects of Eliot's achievement were utterly op- 
posed, the strength of praise for the poetry being matched by the 
intensity of his condemnation of the criticism. Even so, Leavis's 
critical judgements being structurally consistent, there was behind 
this ambivalent evaluative conclusion an inescapable logic: the weak- 
nesses of the criticism were related directly to the strengths 
manifested in the poetry. 
Several years separated Leavis's 'revaluation' of Eliot's standing 
as a critic81 and his summarisation82 (a prelude to a more detailed 
analysis83) of Eliot's status as a poet. Nothing in the interim had 
caused him to readjust his position with regard to the criticism. 
Eliot's death in 1965 had brough the poetic career to a close. Develop- 
81. 'T.S.Eliot's stature as critic: a revaluation', Commentary 
(November 1958). Reprinted as 'T.S.Eliot as Critic' in 'Anna 
Karenina' and other essays (1967). 
82. Eliot's Classical Standing', Lectures in America (1969). 
83. The Living Principle (1975), chapter 3, 'Four Quartets'. 
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ments in the social environment had made Eliot's poetry increasingly 
important as a source for attitudes and concepts that were capable 
of redeeming Western Man's life -impoverished state in the face of 
mass material advancement. In this respect, Eliot's creative achieve- 
ment provided Leavis with a tangible literary example with which to 
substantiate his own cultural analysis. The poetry was the positive 
counterpart to those second -rate literary productions that Leavis 
had pointed to as evidence of a deep cultural decline in standards. 
Leavis's regard for what he saw Eliot as having attempted during 
his poetic life was high indeed. It was a 'creative pareer', he said, 
that was 
a sustained, heroic and indefatigably resourceful quest of 
a profound sincerity of the most difficult kind. The 
heroism is that of genius. The poetic technique oÎ his 
intense preoccupation is a technique for sincerity.84 
Leavis referred, as before, to 'The Love -Song of J Alfred Prufrock' 
as 'impressive'; but he preferred to discuss in detail 'Portrait of 
a Lady' to enforce his conviction that there were contained in this 
poetry capacities for 'rhythmic life' and changing subtleties of 'tone'. 
The poetry evinced a use of language that allowed for 
a new freedom of access to experience and a closeness to its 
actual texture, together with a flexibility of tone incon- 
84. Lectures in America p 30. 
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ceivable in serious poetry . . . while the Arnoldian 
canons prevailed.85 
Eliot's technique' was developed through 'La Filia the piange' and 
'The Hollow Men'. The latter revealed that Eliot 'had a desperate 
need to be able to believe in, to be sure of, something real not him- 
self that should claim allegiance and give meaning'.86 This develop- 
ment continued into Ash -Wednesday where the 'quest' became 'consciously 
religious'. Yet the 'discipline' of that poem which Leavis admired 
was not the discipline of Christian devotion that forms so central 
a part of it. It was.the process of creation that Leavis concentrated 
on, the searching for positive values to set against 'death's twilight 
kingdom'. Eliot achieved this by means of a.'tentative, exploratory 
and wholly unwilful kind of creativeness, scrupulously unassertive ; 
it was an 'exploratory- creative procedure'.87 It was not necessary 
to be an Anglo- Catholic, nor yet to be greatly concerned with Christian 
theology in general, in order to see the 'validity' of Eliot's poetry; 
its significance lay in the 'spiritual values' that it'prompt[ed] 
and nourish[ed]'.88 The importance of these values pertained not to 
a specifically Christian or an abstractly 'supernatural' dimension, 
but to the realm of actual human life: 
85. Ibid p 36. In the 1958 article on Eliot's criticism, Leavis had 
referred to the poet as having been 'the man of genius who, after 
the long post -Swinburnian arrest, altered expression'. (See 'Anna 
Karenina' and other essays, p 178.) 
86. Lectures in America p 45. 
87. Ibid pp 46; 48. 
88. Ibid p 51. 
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There is an intrinsic human nature with needs that don't 
exist for the technologist and the Benthamite as such; 
there is a need for significance, for that which makes 
life significant - something that can't be discussed or 
taken account of in terms of what can be averaged or 
defined, though rationality and intelligence (whether 
they know it or not) are thwarted when it fails.89 
This was a consideration of which, in Leavis's view, art, criticism, 
'thinking' in general, should be aware. It was this 'spiritual' aspect, 
and Eliot's struggle for 'sincerity' in the expression of it, that 
made the poetry something that was fundamentally relevant to contem- 
porary human life. It was Eliot's implicit denial of the relevance 
of this in his critical writing that attracted Leavis's hostility. 
The 1958 article was remarkable for the violence with which Leavis 
rejected Eliot's claims to status as a major critic.90 The grounds 
straightforward. Leavis argued that the premise 
of the separation of "the man who'suffers and the mind which creates" 
was tenable only in relation to an artist such as Flaubert; in relation 
to 'Tolstoy or Lawrence . . . or Shakespeare - or George Eliot or 
Mark Twain' it was not intelligible. It was a separation that was 
not apparent in Eliot's own poetry. This fact led Leavis to a diagnosis 
of what he saw as a major 'disability' in Eliot: it was apparent in 
this critical proposition as an attempt to 'absolv[e] the artist from 
the need to have lived',91 which was allied to Flaubert's perception 
89. Ibid p 51. 
90. Of 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' Leavis wrote: ' . .. 
the trenchancy and vigour are illusory and the essay is notable 
for its ambiguities, its logical inconsquences, its pseudo - 
precisions, its fallaciousness, and the aplomb of its equi- 
vocations and its specious cogency'. 'Anna Karenina' and other 
essays p 179. 
91. Ibid p 181. 
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of 'art' as something superior to and apart from 'life'. This attitude 
was a 'significant defeat of intelligence' and it contributed to 
Eliot's errors and misvaluations in his critical essays.92 
Leavis saw Eliot as having a public and a private self characterised 
by differing modes of intellectual behaviour and expression. On the 
one hand, in his poetry he pursued his solitary and 'heroic'' quest 
for sincerity, for something beyond the self in which to have faith, 
a quest which produced 'great creative art' as a consequence of its 
determined artistic integrity. In contrast, there was the public Eliot 
of the British Academy lecture on Milton (1949)93 and the plays, where 
the 'heroic sincerity' disappears in deference to the 'social world'94 
ANI 
Eliot's criticism belongs to this latter social persona and it contains 
'abundant evidence of negative attitudes towards life, attitudes 
of disgust and fear and rejection'.95 Eliot suffered this 'radical 
failure of wholeness and coherence' when he betrayed the creative 
principle of honesty and responsibility towards self -recognition and 
self -knowledge and tried to deny the essential complexity of human 
existence and human relations. 
Naturally, the poetry was not entirely uncontaminated by this in- 
herent flaw. Leavis felt that for all its major importance, the critic 
92. Leavis's article was ostensibly a review of Eliot's On Poets and 
Poetry (1957), which he derided for its 'inert and banal conven- 
tionality' and the lack of 'engagement' in Eliot as a critic. 
(He was too much swayed by the 'coterie' values of the Bloomsbury 
milieu, for example). 
93. Which 'in its equivocal kind of noble and sophisticated innocence, 
concedes all that one needs for putting the case against Milton 
that is ostensibly suffering refutation'. 'Anna Karenina' and 
other essays p 189. 
94. Cf .Lectures in America p 50. 
95. 'Anna Karenina' and other essays p 183. 
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should still cultivate an attitude of 'Yes, but . . ' when dealing 
with the poetry. His main reservation concerned the inability of Eliot 
'to take cognisance of full human love between the sexes', an aspect 
of human relations that should of been of 'supreme importance' to 
him, but which he reduced to a receded background role. This gave 
the 'spiritual quest' an element of 'starvation', but also of 'inten- 
sity', which was a 'necessary condition' of the 'creative integrity' 
of Four Quartets.° 
A specific example of the way Leavis's conception of the true 
creative process operates in Eliot can be seen from his comment on 
lines from 'The Dry Salvages',97 including 
The hint half -guessed, the gift half- understood is 
Incarnation. 
Of the inclusion of the word 'Incarnation', Leavis wrote 
there is no sleight, nothing but openness, in the way 
the word presents itself at this point in the poem as 
if drawn up into a gap, a crucial emptiness, which it 
rises inevitably to fill.98 
The ulterior connotations of the word are not primarily significant; 
it significance, clearly, will vary depending on the predisposition 
of the reader.99 What impressed Leavis about its usage was its 
96. Lectures in America p 50. 
97. Section V, 11 32 -39. 
98. Lectures in America pp 52 -53. 
99. Leavis himself later came to feel that 'Incarnation' represented 
too great a falling back on orthodox Christian theology, at the 
expense of the aspirations of the poetry towards an original 
inquiry into the human condition. 
(cf. The Living Principle, chapter 3) 
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intellectual 'openness', or availability to interpretation, and its 
appropriateness in the created context, its 'inevitability'. It was 
the process by which the poet achieved these effects that Leavis called 
'heroic sincerity' and it was this sincerity that characterised the 
genuine 'creative principle'. 
Leavis employed this distinction in discriminating amongst Yeats's 
poetry in a lecture that was part of the same series,100 It was the 
nature of the creative procedure that distinguished the great poems 
in the canon. One of the main limitations attendant upon a reading 
of Yeats is the need to refer outside the actual poetry for assistance 
in comprehending its intended content, references either to a system 
of 'symbolical elaborations' 
101 
or to biogmphical information.102 This 
necessity was the result of the interference of 'extra -poetical habits' 
that inhibited the creative process and undermined ;the poet's 'sin- 
cerity', the completeness with which he has grasped and expressed 
his vision. The successful poems, Leavis said, were those, such as 
the 'Byzantium' poems, which attained 'a convincingness and inevit- 
ability that comes of, that is, a complete sincerity - the sincerity 
that is of the whole being, and not merely a matter of conscious in- 
tention'.103 Too clear a notion of intention in the poet was contrary 
to geniune poetic expression: 'the process of composition . . . is 
the process of discovery or determination'.104 That which is discovered 
100. 'Yeats: the problem and the challenge'. Lectures in America pp 
59 -81. 
101. Ibid p 65. 
102. Leavis had referred extensively to Yeats, Autobiographies (1958) 
when discussing Yeats in New Bearings in English Poetry. 
103. Lectures in America p 65. 
104. Ibid p 65. 
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has a relation only to the poet's experience and his expression of 
it. No external scheme is necessary or relevant; the poem is self - 
sufficient, and the process of self -discovery that it narrates is 
a measure of its sincerity.105 
The overt moral overtones of Leavis's earlier approaches to poetry 
are absent here, having been replaced by a more abstract notion 
('sincerity'). The implication is that the poet's responsibilities 
begin and end within himself, with his accessibility to self -knowledge 
and self -discovery. The language of Leavis's critical appraisal has 
changed. No longer were the star* pronouncements about poetry, 
morality, the poet himself, proffered undiluted by circumspection 
and an awareness of a more general context. These summaries were marked 
by a sense of the complexity involved in 'creativity' and in relating 
the products of that creativity to a conception of the ways in which 
literature and criticism impinge on actual life and have an effect 
there. This change featured largely in Leavis's critical language. 
'Sincerity', 'belief', 'spiritual', 'wholeness' began to appear, the 
vocabulary of empirical moralism being replaced by a vocabulary more 
metaphysical and speculative. The stridency gave way to a tone that 
inclined more to the abstract. The intensity of his approbation (and 
its opposite) was directly proportional to the degree to which he 
felt that Eliot's poetry, say, attested to the 'need for significance' 
in mankind, and to what extent it recognised and expressed attitudes 
and concepts that could offer a remedial contrast to the overwhelmingly 
materialist ideology of contemporary society. Leavis insisted on this 
105. ' . . . this self -imposed ordeal of self -questioning and self - 
realisation (a major poem for Yeats was that)'. 
Ibid pp 73 -74 
319 
correlation because of his developing and intensifying sense of the 
dangers of loss and impoverishment in the face of rapid technological 
change. Eliot provided the concrete example from which the critic 
could elaborate a literary critical demonstration of the crucial role 
that was open for literature and criticism in the dimension of social 
change. 
In relation to the novel - specifically Anna Karenina106 Leavis 
introduced another key word; or, rather, he brought to the fore and 
made crucial a word he had always found useful : 'thought'. In some 
respects, this word may be seen as, the major term in Leavis's differen- 
tation between poetry and the novel. Conscious deliberation or thought 
in the poet was liable, Leavis believed; to undermine his creative 
integrity and so diminish the potential for the poem to aspire to 
the condition of great art. In the novel, different considerations 
apply.. Differences of scale, range and ambition make the novelist's 
task , creatively speaking, a more sustained, less immediately intense, 
expression of his insights and perceptions. 'Thought', in the sense 
of a continuously alert consciousness, is always present in the process 
of writing prose, whereas for the poet it is more of an ante - or 
post -facto activity, consciousness as such being suspended, so to 
speak, during the (for the poet, generally briefer) acts of composition. 
In dealing with the novel in these later essays, Leavis was discus- 
sing works that related very closely to an ideal of novelistic achieve- 
ment: that is, he dealt with material that matched in attainment his 
106. 'Anna Karenina: Thought and Significance in a great creative 
work', an address to the Cambridge University Slavonic Society 
(1966), Cambridge Quarterly I, (1965 -66) pp 5 -27. 
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own idea of what the novel, perfectly created, should be capable of 
being. The essay on Anna. Karenina did not set out to prove the novel's 
greatness; it was assumed, proclaimed in the essay's title, and Leavis 
was in fact preoccupied with understanding - in the broadest of terms 
- in what qualities that greatness actually inhered. This meant that 
the novel under discussion, together with his critical evaluation 
of it, became exemplary, providing a paradigm of creative writing, 
and the critical response to it, which could be presented as part 
of a practical discourse on the state of contemporary writing and 
criticism. The significances that Leavis identified in Anna Karenina 
were, by implication, significances that should be contained by any, 
novel that aimed to be anything other than mediocre and transient. 
Propositions made, with regard to Anna Karenina, about 'thought' and 
the function of the novel in comprehending human relations were pre- 
sented as both specific evaluative judgements about Tolstoy's nove] 
and as representative truths about the novel in general. 
Leavis contrasted Tolstoy with Henry James, saying that the latter's 
fixation with a 'definitive' purpose in his writing 'entail[ed] a 
severe limitation in regard to significance'; Tolstoy represented 
'an immensely fuller and profounder involvement in life on the part 
of the artist'.107 This related to Leavis's version of what constituted 
the importance of Eliot's poetry; the 'greatest kind of artist' 
is 
one who evinces 
the distinctive preoccupation with ultimate questions 
- 
those which concern the nature of one's deepest inner 
107. 'Anna Karenina' and other essays p 11. 
321 
allegiances and determinations, the fundamental significances 
to be read in one's experience of life, the nature and 
conditions of 'fulfilment' .108 
The intellectual effort required to approach these questions was not 
a matter of mere cold ratiocination: 
Thought, to come at all near truth and adequacy, must 
engage the whole man, and relate in a valid way - such 
a way, that is, as precludes and defeats the distorting 
effects of abstraction and selection (both inevitable) - 
all the diverse elements of experience. 109 
The avoidance of 'abstraction and selection' might have been a way 
of appealing for 'sincerity' in the novel. Leavis noted that Tolstoy 
had avoided any simplication of the issues in a denial of their com- 
plexity: 
The greatness of Anna Karenina lies in the degree to 
which, along with its depth, it justifies the clear 
suggestion it conveys of a representative comprehen- 
siveness. The creative writer's way of arriving at 
and presenting general truths about life is that which 
Tolstoy exemplifies with such resource, such potency, 
and on such a scale, and there is none to replace or 
rival it. Only a work of art can say with validity, and 
force, as Anna Karenina does, 'This is life'. 110 
In these quotations is encapsulated Leavis's matured and developed 
considerations about the nature of creative art, and in particular 
108. Ibid p 12. 
109. Ibid p 11. 
110 Ibid p 13. 
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the novel. He was sensitive to writing that promoted the contemplation 
of problems and questions that lay beyond the material universe. He 
was attentive to the conditions suffusing the creativeftocess that 
produced 'art' that, in its grappling with these matters, maintained 
an 'integrity' of perception and expression, so that an awareness 
of complexity and of the impossibility of a final answer was contained 
within it. Only true 'art' - that which maintained this creative in- 
tegrity or 'sincerity' - could reflect states of being and of human 
relations with the kind of responsibility, scope and lucidity that 
was required to counteract the mystifying and destructive processes 
of technological progress. Tolstoy, Leavis claimed, had experienced 
the upheavals of the changes involved in this kind of expansion, 
'taking their significances with personal intensity' and responding 
to the 'disharmonies, contrasts and contradictions' in a way that 
defeated the faith of optimism in 'progress': 'Anna in its 
human centrality, gives us modern man; Tolstoy's essential problems, 
moral and spiritual, are ours'.111 
The critical attitude emerging from these essays was to develop 
into an increasingly spiritual and religious series of observations 
on the relationship between literature and 'life', and on criticism's 
place with regard to that relationship. Leavis's bearing on the 
problems of this relation is evident from the preceding quotations. 
The moral and spiritual aspects of his literary criticism were 
inevitably propelled to the fore by his conception of 'creativity'; 
the critical response to it, involving the individual's personal 
111. Ibid p 32. 
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experience - and therefore his or her capacity for experience; and 
his expectations of the potential achievements of 'great creative 
art'. Only this, he argued, could show us what we 'believe' and know, 
and only 'a work of art' can specify what 'life' is and represent 
to us our 'essential moral and spiritual problems'. The significance 
of this perception for Leavis's critical practice can be seen in the 
developments featured in the later critical studies of Dickens, Blake 
and T.S.Eliot. 
324 
6. The Late Criticism (1970 -76) 
1. Dickens:'art', criticism and 'life'. 
Dickens the Novelist is an uneasy combination of two distinct types 
of critical method. Q.D.Leavis's essays - written with the book in 
mind and over a definite working period' - are fluent, scholarly and 
persuasive: detailed attention to their format and the structure of 
their arguments belongs in a separate study. F.R.Leavis's contribution 
to the collection, on the other hand, is more problematic. His three 
chapters do not exhibit a similar kind of coherence to that of Q.D. 
Leavis. The vocabulary of the criticism and its forms of expression 
reveal an underlying search for an 'essential' significance in the 
novels that resided not so much in what Dickens wrote as in what Leavis 
had to say about it. In this way, a familiar pattern of extension 
is established, with Leavis's criticism in a sense using the Dickens 
novel as a means for exploring abstract metaphysical ideas. The asser- 
tion of Dickens's significance for English literature was the primary 
motive: out of this, Leavis developed a set of values, and associated 
critical terms for their expression, which reflected his growing con- 
cern with the spiritual life of mankind and the way in which this 
could be examined by the means of literary criticism. 
1. '[The four chapters by Q.D.Leavis Il were all written ad hoc as 
- constituent parts of the book when it had been conceived as some- 
thing to be undertaken forthwith, and worked at in an intensive 
and sustained way until completed'. 
Dickens the Novelist (1970) p xi. 
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The praise given to Dickens by Leavis was not in itself alarming 
or outrageous; but the critique of Dickens was dependent upon a 
specialised vocabulary for the expression of its value judgements. 
Following Leavis's characteristic method, the novels of Dickens, having 
been given exemplary status, gave the critical vocabulary its substan- 
tiating force. As with Lawrence before, the evaluative judgements 
on Dickens were dependent upon a terminology legitimised by the example 
of Dickens himself. Thus it appears that F.R.Leavis's contribution 
to Dickens the Novelist was designed, in the manner of D.H.Lawrence: 
Novelist, not as a comprehensive critical analysis of the Dickens 
canon but as a detailed setting out and defence,of particular claims 
for the nature of Dickens's art. This was combined with an account 
of the wider significance of the values perceived to be at the centre 
of Dickens's achievement, values that had an ultimate relevance in 
actual1life. comprehensively than before, Leavis was attempting 
to pursue both a literary and a social criticism, and his commentary 
on contemporary society was becoming increasingly metaphysical, if 
not explicitly religious. 
F.R.Leavis had a highly specialised set of claims to make for 
the significance of Dickens's creative achievement. For F.R.Leavis 
in 1970 a book on Dickens was a kind of completion, a filling in of 
a gap in his criticism of post -1600 English literature. Dickens was 
one of two major writers (excepting Shakespeare) whom Leavis had come 
to recognise as warranting serious attention but about whom he had 
not written at length (the other being Blake). This may explain in 
part why Leavis was keen to give his past criticism a kind of retros- 
pective coherence. In this way the study of Dickens could be seen 
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to be fitting in to a congruous line of critical practice. 1n any 
case, the two later essays on Dickens were culminative. They 
represented the advanced expression of Leavis's concern with dis- 
covering the true significance of artistic achievement, and of his 
sense of the function and responsibilities of literary criticism. 
As such they contain versions of his notion of what 'significance' 
in art consisted of, together with a grammar of evaluative terms that 
operated to give that perceived significance tangible form. 
Leavis called Dombey and Son 'the first major novel' and he based 
this judgement on a claim that the novel marked the beginning of a 
key development in Dickens's career, 'his first essay in the 
111, 
elaborately plotted Victorian novel'.(2)2 The achievement of the 
novel was mixed. On the one hand 
the theme in actuality serves as a licence for endless 
overworked pathos, for lush unrealities ofhigh moral 
insistence, for childish elaborations of sensational 
plot, and for all the disqualifying characteristics (a serious 
theme being proposed) of melodrama - Victorian melodrama.(2) 
On the other hand these weak elements were balanced by something more 
interesting: 
the genial force of Dickens's inexhaustible creativity is 
also strongly present, in the vigour of the perception 
and rendering of life, the varied comedy, the vitality 
of expression as manifested even in the melodramatic high 
moments and tours de force and . . . a kind of strength 
2. Figures in parentheses refer to page numbers in Dickens the 
Novelist (1970). 
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that . . . demands some maturity of experience in the 
reader for a full recognition.(2) 
As with his study of Lawrence, the vocabulary of Leavis's praise of 
Dickens is enthusiastic, but Leavis is less inclined to be betrayed 
by his enthusiasm in to making claims for the novelist that are in- 
supportable. This is because his field of interest was narrower 
(limited to three novels); because he acknowledged the weaker aspects 
of, say, Dombey and Son, using them to give shape to his positive 
critical judgements; and because he found, in Little Dorrit in par- 
ticular, a text through which he was able to formulate his own extra - 
literary account of the relations between 'art', criticism and 'life'. 
His commentary on that novel therefore takes the form of a kind of 
exegesis of its implicit meanings which were simultaneously extra- 
polated in the field of social criticism. What Leavis discovered in 
the 'moral' structure of Little Dorrit reflected and gave forni to 
the values he saw as prerequisite to the maintenance of 'cultural 
health'. The values represented in the novel answered to Leavis's 
conception of the values that were essential to human existence. 
Discussing the early part of Dombey and Son, Leavis saw as a signi- 
ficant achievement the depiction of Dombey as 'personified Pride'. 
This theme, he said 'tells so strongly because of the way in which, 
by Dickens's astonishing art, human life is evoked in its fullness'.(3) 
The pathos inherent in the theme was exploited by Dickens as the story 
was developed; but in this early part the novelist was 'possessed 
by an intense and penetrating perception of the real'. The theme rep- 
resented by Dombey received 'its most poetic and dramatic definition' 
(5) in the scene between Dombey and Polly Toodles the wet- nurse. In 
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this scene, Leavis argued, Dicken's presentation of Dombey's self - 
defeating pride has a profound effect because of the way in which 
its opposite is drawn. The strength of this scene resulted from Dickens 
having been 'wholly commanded by a profound theme - a Dickens profound- 
ly serious, that is, as well as genially creative'.(6) This statement 
recalls the commentary Leavis made on Hard Times. There he described 
Dickens as having been 'unmistakably possessed by a comprehensive 
vision'(188); but Hard Times was for Leavis a 'moral fable', a narra- 
tive in which 'the intention is peculiarly insistent, so that the 
representative significance of everything . . . is immediately 
apparent as we read'.(252) Dombey and Son was not a fable, but a nar- 
rative in which Dickens had been 'possessed by an intense and pene- 
trating perception of the real'.(5) This novel represented an advance 
on the fable. Dickens evinced 'an intense concern for the real'(4) 
and he strove 'to achieve the expression of his own vision and sen- 
sibility in an art that should convey his profoundest sense of life'. 
(26) 
It is clear that Dombey and Son was being approached from a 
different direction from that of the essay on Hard Times. The idea 
of a 'moral fable' was a formal concept indicating a highly organised 
and delimited narrative dominated by a single idea to which all the 
composite elements contributed thematic development. In the essay 
on Dombey and Son the attention to the formal dimension has been 
dis- 
placed by the 'moral' and 'realist' aspects. The language and focus 
of Leavis's criticism has been modified. He is now seeking 
qualities 
in the narrative not merely relating to formal design 
but which main- 
tain a connection with life outside the bounds 
of the novel at the 
320 
moral level. These qualities contrast with the symbolic relations 
between narrative and life contained in the 'fable'. Leavis sought 
some correlation between the moral substance of the narrative and 
the actual world it was aspiring to represent. This movement from 
attention to formal characteristics to a focus on moral problems re- 
presents a significant shift in Leavis's critical interests. The 
Dickens essays indicate the way in which this search for a correlation 
between narrative development and intention and external moral values 
had become the dominant concern in Leavis's later criticism. 
The way in which this concern was manifested is demonstrated in 
Leavis's reservations regarding the thematic development of the later 
part of Dombey and Son (essentially, after the death of Paul). The 
theme of 'money -pride' was translated into that of the 'Bought Bride'. 
a theme of which, Leavis argued, Dickens 'knows nothing. . . What 
he takes for knowledge is wholly external and conventional'.3 The 
ingenuities of the plot were supposed to have 'a serious moral signi- 
ficance in relation to his theme'(23) but this was undermined by the 
surrounding unrealistic rhetorical gestures: 
It is impossible to make moral sense of [Edith's] attitude 
towards her marriage, and only in the world of melodramatic 
rhetoric could there be any illusion to the contrary.(24) 
3. The question of 'knowing' was not a simple matter of information, 
but had a deeper connotation relating to intuition and unconscious 
patterns of cognition. This idea of 'knowing' was developed by 
Leavis in later essays (see. for example. Nor Shall My Sword) 
which explored the concept of knowledge with assistance from the 
writings of Michael Polanyi. 
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Similarly, Carker's villainy belongs 'to the same ethos of unreality'. 
The comic material also functions to obscure the correlation between 
the moral values operative in real life and those Dickens is attempting 
to assert in the novel. The comic passages, Leavis said, do not reveal 
moral truth, but simply provide 'reassurance': 
reassurance that works by implicitly discounting the 
seriousness of the drama - by intimating that what we have 
to do with does not, at bottom, make any claim to be the world 
where the sanctions, conditions and inexorabilities of real 
life hold without remission.(24) 
This insistence indicates the nature of Leavis's primary in,terests 
in Dickens and in the novel form in general. Leavis distinguished 
between the comic creations of Captain Cuttle and the Toodles: Cuttle 
belonged in the realm of 'reassurance', while the Toodles, having 
been in the opening chapters the focus of the 'life' to which Dombey's 
pride was 'stultifying' and 'inimical'($), had overall, Leavis felt, 
an 'essential part . . . in an art that offers an astringent and wholly 
serious "criticism of life "'.(25) The strengths of Dombey and Son 
derive from that kind of evaluating moral structure. The weaknesses 
derive from an avoidance or denial of 'the sanctions, conditions 
and inexorabilites of real life'. 
Dombey and Son was a partial success on these terms. 'Intelligence' 
and 'poetic' were two predominant critical terms utilised by Leavis 
in this context. The 'intelligence' manifested in the evolution of 
his art was revealed' in the seriousness with which he undertook this 
'criticism of life'. In this sense even the humorous characters (e.g. 
the Toodles) were substantiated by the underlying seriousness of their 
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relation to the main theme. Dickens achieved this seriousness by estab- 
lishing 'a poetic conception of his art' expressed in the 'inexhaust- 
ibly wonderful poetic life of his prose'.(27) The comparison that Leavis 
made here was directly with Shakespeare, a comparison that Dickens 
was equal to by virtue of his 'vitality of language' (in 'description 
and narrative and dramatic presentation and speech'). This comparison 
lent support to Leavis's contention that 'in the Victorian age the 
poetic strength of the English language goes into the novel, and that 
the great novelists are the successors of Shakespeare'.(29) Dickens 
earned his place in this collocation by virtue of the serious moral 
structure of his narrative and the linguistic vitality of his artistic 
expression. When these two elements were combined most successfully 
Dickens was capable of producing fiction that qualified as 'major 
art'. As an artist, Dickens, Leavis claimed, had 'a penetrating insight 
civilisation, its ethos, its realities and its 
drives', and he had the ecpressive capability for organising this in- 
sight into a coherent moral scheme. Dombey and Son was regarded by 
Leavis as 'intelligent', 'serious' and 'complex' in ways that were 
not apparent in Hard Times. Leavis felt that Dickens, 'with the cons- 
cious pride of responsibility as an artist',(30) understood his obli- 
gation to recreate in fiction 'the world where the sanctions, 
conditions and inexorabilities of real life hold without remission' 
in order to fulfil the responsibilities of the creative artist in 
relation to the world. That is, to be intelligently and creatively 
critical whilst keeping in view an ameliorative set of positive values 
and moral convictions. Dickens's creative power was not distinguishable 
for Leavis from his moral outlook. This consonance between the two 
aspects was crucial in Leavis's analysis. 
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The essay on Dombey and Son was in many ways a prelude to the 
more detailed study of Little Dorrit, about which Leavis had fewer 
reservations. Shakespeare was again invoked as the most pertinent pre- 
decessor to Dickens, both in terms of the latter's artistic endeavours 
and his relations with his reading public, or the general cultural 
milieu in which he had a significant place. Leavis deployed his 
critical commentary on Little Dorrit in such a way as to present a 
simultaneous critique of his own contemporary society, either by direct 
statement or by implicitly contrasting contemporary values and con- 
, 
ditions disadvantageously with those operative in the age of Dickens. 
This meant that the terms of his critical exposition had a dual func- 
tion: of formulating his commentary on the novel, as well as of 
defining the values implicit in his observations on contemporary 
society. The criticism merged with the social analysis. Increasingly, 
Leavis was to with the spiritual state of contemporary 
society and this preoccupation took its terms of value from the realm 
of literary criticism. Even where the judgements on the present were 
only implicit the valuations proceeded from Leavis's understanding 
of the need for the correlation to be established between the external 
moral universe and the logic of the moral structure of the particular 
narrative. The development of this process can be seen in the essay 
on Little Dorrit. 
The direct comparison of Dickens with Shakespeare was based on 
the mutual accessibility and responsiveness of these writers to their 
respective publics and the conditions relating to artistic production 
that were prevlaent in the contemporaneous culture. Leavis felt it 
necessary 
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to insist that Dickens no more than Shakespeare started 
from nothing and created out of a cultural void. . . .. 
Dickens belonged as a popular writer, along with his 
public, to a culture in which the arts of speech were 
intensely alive.(214) 
That vitality, moreover, stemmed in a large part from Shakespeare. 
In the chapter on Dombey and Son Leavis had emphasised that Dickens 
was abetted 'by the potent fact of Shakespeare, not only in his own 
life, but in the life of the English people for whom he wrote'(29). 
And just as Shakespeare in his own time retained an appeal to varied 
types of audience, Dickens, 
pursuing indefatigably his career as best -selling 
producer of popular fiction, c.ould develop into a 
creative writer of the first order, the superlatively 
original creator of his art.(214) 
In the modern world - as the Leavises had often argued - a large popu- 
larity was hardly compatible with great artistic success. Dickens's 
achievement, significant in itself, additionally threw light upon 
the present state of culture: 
the conditions of the kind of greatness represented by 
Little Dorrit have disappeared from the world and a 
corresponding blindness results, induced by the climate 
of implicit assumptions and ideas that now prevails.(213 -14) 
Leavis's essay on Little Dorrit developed a series of critical valu- 
ations on the novel. These were derived from a perception of the 
novel's strengths being dependent upon the relation between the moral 
position of the narrative and its critique of society. The terms in- 
troduced by Leavis to account for these valuations were in turn extra- 
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polated and universalised to allow them to be employed as a general 
set of critical values applicable in a literary sense, as well as 
formulating a critical stance in relation to contemporary society. 
The moral valuations that Leavis discovered in Dickens's novel were 
representative of a general literary critical position as well as 
functioning as a universally applicable morality. 
Leavis insisted on the relevance of Dickens to the contemporary 
world, and on the consonance between the values perceivable in art 
and those which he felt were essential in life. His argument was con- 
ducted predominantly in the realm of the spiritual, involving a meta- 
physical and teleological series of propositions. The essay on Little 
Dorrit culminated with the statement that 
Little Dorrit confronts the technologico -Benthamite 
world with .a conception of man and society to which it 
is utterly blank, the blankness being a manifestation of its 
desperate sickness.(273) 
It is necessary to separate out from the long and detailed critique 
of the novel the particular values and terms and their meanings which 
led to this formulation. There are two types of criticism in Leavis's 
study, one being concerned directly with the narrative, its language 
and its structure;4 the other dealing with the moral implications 
4. That is, the kind of analysis of the text that was undertaken 
to prove Leavis's contention that with regard to Little 
Dorrit 
'there are no large qualifications to be urged, and 
the whole 
working of the plot, down to the melodramatic dénouement, 
is sig- 
nificant - that is, serves the essential communication 
felicitously' 
(214); and that Dickens's was an art 'sensitively supple 
over 
so unlimited a human range'.(248) 
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of the novel and involving a broader philosophical approach to the 
text. These two elements are essentially inseparable, clearly; but 
the following is primarily concerned with the second type of approach 
and its place in the general development of Leavis's literary critical 
practice and his moral philosophy. 
The relation between 'art' and 'life' that Leavis discovered in 
Dickens was crucial. He saw the Clennam house as representative of 
the 'Calvinistic commercialism' of Victorian England whose destructive 
ethos Dickens 'sums up . . in its hatred of art': 
What, at a religious depth, Dickens hated about the ethos 
figured by the Clennam house was the offence against life, 
the spontaneous, the real, the creative, and, at this 
moment preceding the collapse of the symbolic house, he 
represents the creative spirit of life by art.(215) 
'Life' was a metaphysical abstraction that Leavis introduced into 
his criticism to function as a major term of critical evaluation. 
What it signified was summed up for him in Lawrence's phrase 
"spontaneous- creative fulness of being" and this vocabulary recurs 
throughout the essay on Little Dorrit. The 'criticism of life' which 
Leavis believed Dickens to have been undertaking was in one sense 
a commentary on society; but it also aspired to the status of a teleo- 
logical inquiry. Clennam, for Leavis, was engaged in a personal search 
for a fundamental sense of purpose, the answer to the question ' "What 
are the possibilities of life - for me, and, more generally, in the 
very nature of life? "'.(216) This search paralleled the kind of inquiry 
undertaken by the novel as a whole. In the definition and analysis 
of these complementary metaphysical inquiries is contained the sub- 
stance of Leavis's critical philosophy and the key terms of its 
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formulation: 
The inquest into contemporary civilisation thatC Dickens 
undertook in Little Dorrit might equally be called a study 
of the criteria implicit in an evaluative study of life. 
What it commits him to is an enterprise of thought; thought 
that it is in our time of the greatest moment to get 
recognised, consciously and clearly, as thought - an affair 
(that is) of the thinking intelligence directed to a grasp 
of the real. Dickens's capacity for effective thought about 
life is indistinguishable from his genius as a novelist.(216) 
The terms employed by Leavis in his account of Dickens's novel 
were 'life', 'spontaneous', 'real', 'creative', 'intelligent' and 
'thought'. As a critical terminology this is highly unspecific. Defini- 
tion of the individual terms as generally applicable in critical 
practice is not available; they gain their definition in the process 
of functioning in the developing critical argument. What was true 
for the'novel - 
it works by imaginatively prompting suggestion, so that 
the reader sees and takes in immediate perception what 
logic, analysis and statement can't convey(219) 
- held, in some sense, for Leavis's account of it. The terms of 
evaluation find their definition in the text, not outside it. In 
Dickens, Leavis saw a process of 'definition by creative means'. 
He regarded this as more valuable than attempting definitions in the 
abstract. A word such as 'life', indeed, could only exercise critical 
force if it gained specific connotations from the context in which 
it was used. Leavis generalised at the level of the abstract about 
the relations between 'art' and 'life', 'creativity' and 'reality'. 
These generalisations were set out as observations on Dickens and 
337 
became prerequisites of artistic significance. He then developed his 
argument along more specific lines. His method was to take the 'focal 
words' and make the 'essential commentary'(225) on them: this 
represented a move towards a closer definition of the preliminary 
statements involving the abstract terminology. 
Leavis's main exemplar for what Dickens was attempting in the novel 
was Little Dorrit herself. His commentary on the character illustrates 
the critical method, at the same time illuminating the relation between 
'Dickens and Blake' (the title of this chapter). However, he denied 
the possibility of achieving a 'neat and,systematic exposition'; what 
he proposed was some 'reflections' on the character of Amy, the novel's 
'incongruous' heroine.(225) Out of these reflections would emerge 
an 'exposition' (unsystematic) of Leavis's fundamental intellectual 
position, as regards both literature and human relations. 
Little Dorrit and Arthur Clennam represent two counter -poised 
themes, Clennam undergoing a process of self -discovery and Little 
Dorrit comprising 'human qualities on which Dickens sets a high value'. 
(225) Amy, Leavis said, is 'indefectibly real, and the test of reality 
for the others'.(226) This is manifested in her supportive relations 
with her family, as 'the vital core of sincerity' in a world of collu- 
sive self -deceit. The character of Amy represents a 'human possibility 
. . that has a normative bearing'.(226) The meaning of this obser- 
vation was expanded by Leavis's comparison with Blake: the parallel 
arose from 'the way in which the irrelevance of the Benthamite cal- 
culus is exposed',(228) the way in which Blake, in the face of 'the 
ethos of Locke and Newton'. insisted on the individual's responsibility 
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to something other than him- or herself. Little Dorrit is set off, 
in this respect, against characters such as Mrs. Clennam, Gowan, Miss 
Wade and others who are suffering from the 'selfhood' which is 'the 
closure against the creative flow from below [and] at the same time 
a closure against surrounding lives and life'.(230) Amy demonstrates 
that 'reality is a collaborative creation'. This impulse to collabora- 
tion will produce either a 'perverse' system of social relations: 
the 'unreality' maintained by Dorrit outside the prison as well as 
inside, or the 'Society' of Fanny, Merdle, Bar, Bishop and the Chief 
Butler; or a 'reality' of 'the disinterested individual life, the 
creative identity, [which his of, its nature a responsibility towards 
what can't be possessed'.(269) 
Leavis's study of this novel was detailed and complex and Little 
Dorrit was seen as embodying is possible to see 
the way in which his main evaluative terms find their context in the 
midst of what is simultaneously an analysis of the meaning of the 
narrative in a literary sense; and a commentary on matters arising 
from the text which were applicable in actual life. The anser to 
Clennam's implicit question - ' "What are the possibilities of life ? "' 
- is to be found in the qualities represented by Little Dorrit (and, 
to a lesser extent, Doyce, Pancks, and Flora Casby): qualities Leavis 
summarised as 'reality, courage, disinterestedness, truth, spontaneity, 
creativeness - life'.(237) This may seem to be not much closer to 
a clear definition of the values which Leavis saw as prerequisite 
to the creation of á habitable 'reality'. But 'truth' and 'reality', 
the example of Little Dorrit shows, are dependent on the 
'courage' 
and 'disinterestedness' of the individual, qualities 
displayed as 
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as a 'spontaneous creativity'; so might run the gloss on this aggre- 
gation of abstract terms. Does this yield any valuable insights into 
the nature of Leavis's criticism at this point in its development? 
Leavis's commentary on the novel had an indissoluble connexion 
with his commentary on contemporary society. This commentary was, 
at different points of the essay, either overt or merely implicit. 
These terms of value were only defined in the process of their usage 
in the critique. A term such as 'disinterestedness' for example, found 
its embodiment in the nature of the character of Amy Dorrit, so that 
the term and the character were mutually defining. Nevertheless, they 
also have a relevance beyond the boundaries of the particular text. 
Leavis sought to establish a consonance between the moral evaluations 
which emerged from his discussion of the particular narrative and 
those which he felt were necessary all The crux 
of this whole critical enterprise was the equation of 'life' ('as 'spon- 
taneous creativity') with 'art'. 
'Disinterestedness' is manifested by Doyce, who behaves as though 
his inventions were the products of "the divine artificer" and he 
had no part in the process of their discovery. Doyce's example demon- 
strated for Leavis the key point that Dickens 
was a great artist, and familiar with the compelling 
impersonal authority of the real (and not the less for 
knowing so well that there is no grasp of the real 
that is not creative).(239) 
So 'reality' and 'creativity' are mutually inderdependent, not just 
in the fictional narrative, but in real life as well. For Leavis, 
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all this had a profound spiritual aspect. The passage describing the 
death of Merdle with its New Testament references served 'to emphasise 
how essentially the spiritual, in what no -one could fail to recognise 
as a religious sense, is involved in the whole evocation'.(270) Leavis 
called the novel 'a vindication of the spirit'.(270) He discussed 
the relevance of the incidents in the pass Great St Bernard in terms 
that indicate the emerging final phese of Leavis's critical practice. 
Dickens's 'potent evocation of time, eternity, the non -human universe 
. . . and death'(272) is of profound relevance to contemporary society. 
It gives form to the oppositions involved in the clash between 'human 
needs' and the ,'technologico- Benthamite' world. The individual life 
is essentially 'creative' and human creativity 'essentially collabora- 
tive', as in the maintenance of a cultural tradition in the 'living 
language'. These sanctions and requirements were developed by Leavis 
out of this stucty of Dickens's novel and it was this increasingly 
'religious' spirit that characterised his later writings. To gain 
a fuller understanding of the significance of this critical and moral 
philosophy it is necessary to set the commentary on Little Dorrit 
in a wider context involving Leavis's broader metaphysical propo- 
sitions. These can be made clearer by an analysis of his developing 
attitude to William Blake. 
Little Dorrit, Book the Second, chapter 5; this chapter concludes: 
". . . he, the shining wonder, the new constellation to be followed 
by the wise men bringing gifts, until it stopped over certain 
carrion at the bottom of a bath and disappeared - was simply the 
greatest Forger and the greatest Thief that ever cheated the 
gallows." 
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2. Leavis and Blake: 'the creative nature of life'. 
It can be seen from the foregoing that in this later period Leavis's 
literary criticism was undergoing significant change. The late 
criticism is consonant with that which preceded it, but there is 
apparent a change of emphasis, an expansion, into a metaphysical realm, 
of Leavis's specifications regarding literature and criticism. The 
terms of evaluation employed in the essay on Little Dorrit reveal 
an increasing concern on Leavis's part for examining a literary work 
in a manner that eventually involved fundamental, considerations on 
the nature of artistic achievement and the relations between artistic 
production and quotidian life. The philosophical centre of Leavis's 
literary criticism had previously been evacuated by a refusal to engage 
in ;questions of definition, or abstractions regarding ultimate 
purposes. It was indirectly occupied during this late phase by a con- 
ception of both the creative and critical function that was fundamen- 
tally teleological, seeing the ultimate purpose of both forms of en- 
deavour as being irrevocably related to a moral vision of human 
existence. This conception linked all the major components in Leavis's 
system ('art', 'life', 'thought', 'creativity') inextricably. Leavis 
proposed a set of criteria for literature and literary criticism that 
had a moral basis, aimed at a polemical and diagnostic intervention 
in contemporary culture and was ultimately religious in spirit. This 
conception was both analytical and criterial: it established an 
evaluative response to literature and other cultural forms that simul- 
taneously implied a set of criteria necessary for the achievement 
of parallel artistic significance. It is possible to clarify Leavis's 
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developing position by understanding his attitude towards Blake. 
The essay on Little Dorrit in Dickens the Novelist was entitled 
'Dickens and Blake'. Leavis sought to draw a parallel between the 
two artists - first to substantiate his feelings about the significance 
of the particular novel; and secondly to promote the idea of a funda- 
mental relationship between 'art' and 'life'. This relationship became 
increasingly more important for Leavis and the later criticism is 
marked by this tendency to generalisation at an abstract level. Of 
this novel Leavis wrote that 'the inquest into contemporary civili- 
sation that [Dickens] undertook in Little Dorrit might equally be 
called a study of the criteria implicit in an evaluative study of 
life'.(216) Leavis's reading of the novel might equally be termed 
a study of the same criteria, which in turn extended their applica- 
bility to general notions as an 'evaluative' adjunct to 'life'. 
Leavis was concerned, as always, with 'art' at its highest level of 
performance, at its most successful. The relationship that, according 
to Leavis, had to be established between art and ordinary existence 
was a primary condition of the achievement, prerequisite to a positive 
evaluative jdugement. A work of art that was remote from the criteria 
implicit in Leavis's conception of the creative function, that did 
not satisfy the expectations of that conception in its bearings on 
ordinary human life, disqualified itself from the higher estimates 
of artistic success. Leavis's attitude to 'art' required a positive 
moral dimension in the work under scrutiny. The terms of his evaluation 
of artistic achievement were not based on formal or aesthetic 
principles but on criteria that were essentially moral, political 
and ultimately religious. It was Blake who provided the model in which 
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these criteria were fulfilled and whose poetry substantiated Leavis's 
increasingly metaphysical critical terminology. These evaluative 
criteria were encapsulated in the metaphysical ambiguities (as Leavis 
saw them) in T.S.Eliot. 
Leavis published two complementary essays on Blake in 1972 which 
integrated these stipulated criteria and set them in a substantiating 
philosophical context.6 They developed themes which had been introduced 
in Dickens the Novelist: 
Dickens lays the same kind of emphasis on the creative nature 
of life as Blake does, and insists in the same way that there 
is a continuity from the inescapable creativeness of perception 
to the disciplined imaginative creativeness of the skilled 
artist, and that where art doesn't thrive or enjoy the 
intelligent esteem due to it the civilisation is sick.(236) 
It is impossible to discuss Amy Dorrit as disinterestedness 
the creative nisus7that placed her at the centre of Little 
Dorrit is intrinsically normative) without being brought to an 
explicit recognition that the disinterested individual life, 
the creative identity, is of its nature a responsibility towards 
what can't be possessed. . . . The value of Dickens's vindi- 
cation of the spirit lies in its being a great artist's - as 
Blake's is; and that kind of vindication has a peculiar 
importance for us today.(269 -70) 
The three main components in these statements have respectively 
6. 'Justifying One's Valuation of Blake', a lecture given at Bristol 
University, 15 November 1971, reprinted in The Human World no 
7 (May 1972) and Paley, M.D. and Phillips, M. (eds) William Blake: 
essays in honour of Sir Geoffrey Keynes (1973). 
'Introductory:-"Life" is a necessary word', Nor Shall My Sword 
(1972). 
7. The meaning of this word is discussed below. 
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a moral, a political and a spiritual or religious aspect. The impor- 
tance and centrality of these interrelated themes to Leavis's concep- 
ation of the function of criticism emerged in his subsequent 
suggestions on Blake. The essays on Blake do not constitute a 
comprehensive appraisal of his poetry but are more in the nature of 
speculative propositions. Attention to the poetry was displaced by 
the larger matters Leavis was concerned to explore. 
Blake's 'prophetic books' were dismissed as failures. The failure 
derived from Blake having been unable to break out of the logic of 
the Christian tradition which led him to attempt to balance the myth 
of the Fall of Man with a prophesied resurrection of Eternal Man. 
Leavis argued that by becoming fixated with this telos ('Jerusalem', 
Eternal Man) Blake was abandoning his own perceived truth regarding 
the human, individual responsibility operating in daily life. Such 
a perception was more essential than the prophesied telos, which Blake 
consequently failed to realise poetically, the prophetic books being 
for Leavis a 'plunge into a wordy and boring unreality'. This was 
because Blake's insistence on 'human responsibility' refuted all forms 
of determinism and because, in Leavis's formulation, 'human reality, 
the human condition to which art belongs, is inescapably a matter 
of individual human beings in their relations with one another, the 
only conceivable way in which Man could be "there "'.8 
In rejecting Blake's traditional or orthodex telos Leavis implicitly 
8. 'Justifying One's Valuation of Blake', The Human World, 7, (1972) 
p 60. 
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asserted his own. He developed a. teleology of critical understanding 
that had its basis in his evaluation of Dickens's Little Dorrit, en- 
forced by the terms of his appreciation of Blake. The telos that Leavis 
posited was one that was contained in individual lives in their quoti- 
dian social relations. It was permanently renewable and had a 
fundamental moral aspect, extending eventually into a version of the 
relations between art and life that was didactic, heuristic and ul- 
timately religious. 
(i) Moral 
Key terms in the discussion of Little Dorrit are 'disinterestedness' 
and 'responsibility'. These are qualities that were for Leavis mani- 
fested in the individual. Blake, he argued, represented'the 
of human responsibility' that emerged in the Romantic movement. This 
sense of 'responsibility', moreover, was accompanied bya 'realisation 
that without creativity there is no apprehension of the real, but 
that if experience is necessarily creative, the creativity - as every 
great artist testifies - is not arbitrary'.9 
'Creativity', then, is a feature of human existence not confined 
to the activity of the artist; 'life' itself was, ideally, a 'creative' 
process. Blake testifies to the 'intrinsic relation between creativity 
in the artist and that which is inseparable from life'.10 Here Leavis 
9. Nor Shall My Sword (1972) p 12. 
10. Ibid. p 20. 
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was integrating his committment to Lawrence's description of life 
as 'spontaneous- creative fulness of being' with the belief that somehow 
art embodied the ideal representation of the 'creativity' that informed 
all human activity. The key differentiation between art and life was 
this 'ideal' status. Human existence, clearly, isfrequently an ugly 
and destructive experience. The insistence in Leavis's criteria for 
high artistic achievement was that 'art' presented in its relations 
with the world a fundamentally 'moral' viewpoint. 'Responsibility' 
meant a 'disinterested' concern for the fate of others and required 
of the artist that the deeper implications of his work shared this 
underlying moral impulse. The representation of. 'reality' had to in- 
volve this primary sense of responsibility; indeed, 'reality' for 
Leavis was the responsibility that was allied to 'creativity' in all 
human endeavour and made manifest in the work of art. Leavis's 
evaluation of the achievement of the artist began with an appraisal, 
not of formal characteristics, but of the artist's 'attitude to life'. 
'Life' was a word that Leavis insisted on as being 'necessary',11 
and what it indicated was something that was 'concretely "there" only 
in individual lives'. The 'study of the individual life can't but 
be a study of lives in relation, and of social conditions, conventions, 
pressures as they affect essential life'.12 Therefore, the novelist, 
say, was required by this critical approach to present through his 
art his own, necessarily evaluative, study of human relations and 
behaviour. The achievement would be assessed according to the degree 
11. This phrase recurs in the later criticism. Cf for example Dickens 
the Novelist p 217; the introductory chapter of Nor Shall My 
Sword has the phrase as its title. 
12. Dickens the Novelist p 216. 
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to which the modes and patterns of behaviour in the narrative reflect 
the moral code. The 'really great novelist can't but find himself 
making an evaluative inquiry into the civilisation in which he finds 
himself'.13 The moral code behind the evaluation was one that was 
ultimately informed by Leavis's political and religious propositions. 
Leavis established his analytical terms - of 'responsibility', 
'creativity' and the individual life in its social relations - as 
a means of exploring the moral significance of a work of art such 
as Little Dorrit. Leavis had always maintained that literature provided 
a means of understanding the world and contained, in its highest forms, 
a set of values distinctively applicable in the field of ordinary 
human behaviour. This conviction found its most complete formulation 
in these discussions of Dickens and Blake (and of Eliot). Leavis's 
moral code, as derived from his perceptions and assertions regarding 
the nature of the 'reality' that is transcribed in literature, was 
also an evaluative schema in the literary critical sense. The degree 
to which a work of art involved, in Leavis's exegesis, a committment 
to the concepts of 'human responsibility' and 'human creativity'. 
the extent to which they enforced a moral validation for the codes 
of thought and behaviour which they enacted, meant a corresponding 
level of valuation in his critical judgements upon it. Moral 'truth' 
and literary value were equivalent terms in this criticism. Literary 
criticism is the discourse in which the structures and impulses 
of 
the literary text are reconstituted and in which they achieve 
their 
13. Ibid. p 216. 
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evaluative assessment. In Leavis's exploration of this discourse, 
the referent which governs both the reconstitution of the text's sig- 
nificance and substance as well as its objective valuation was this 
established moral code, determined by the concept of 'responsibility'. 
At this level, the criticism was essentially didactic in its promul- 
gation of the overlying 'morality'. 
(ii) Political 
Nor Shall My Sword (1972) is a, polemical book. In it Leavis reverted 
to the themes of Education and the University (1943), Two Cultures? 
01, 
the signficiance of C.P.Snow (1962) and English Literature in our 
Time and the University (1967).14 The main body of the text comprised 
four lectures in England during -72 pub- 
lished in the Times Literary Supplement and The Human Worlds These 
public events were made the occasion for polemical analyses of contem- 
porary culture, from the point of view of the study of literature 
in higher education. Leavis ranged over diverse areas of contemporary 
affairs, from the 1966 Robbins report on higher education, the new 
universities, student unrest, forms of popular culture, the function 
of the 'English School' in the university, the political vocabulary 
14 In Nor Shall My Sword were reprinted the whole 'Two Cultures ?' 
lecture, together with 'Luddites? or, There Is Only One Culture' 
from Lectures in America (1969). 
15 'English, Unrest and Continuity', lecture given at the University 
of Wales, 1969; reprinted in the TLS (1970); ' "Literarism" and 
"Scientism ": the misconception and the menace', lectures given 
at the University of Bristol, 1970, published in TLS (1970): 
'Pluraliam,Compassion and Social Hope' and 'Elites, Oligarchies 
and an Educated Public', lectures given at the University of 
York, 1970 and 1971 and published in The Human World.(nos. 11 and lt.) 
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and general attitudes current in society. Discussion of the details 
of Leavis's politics belongs in a study of his overall political and 
polemical cultural analysis. As far as the literary criticism is con- 
cerned, what is important is the rationale governing the interven- 
tionist determination that the criticism insisted upon and the 
perception of the function of criticism that saw the intervention 
as necessary and valuable. 
In the passage from Dickens the Novelist quoted above there is 
a statement of which variations occur throughout the essay: 'where 
art doesn't thrive or,enjoy the intelligent esteem due to it the 
civilisation is sick'.(311) Leavis continually strove to give his 
commentary on Dickens a contemporary context. This involved extrapola- 
ting the analysis of Dickens's art - as an 'evaluative study of life' 
(286) - into the reali of generality. Dickens's specific act of inquiry 
into contemporary civilisation became a principle of novelistic en- 
deavour. This principle was formulated by Leavis in his critique of 
Dickens and established as a component of his own evaluative criteria. 
It is as if the criticism which discovered the 'evaluative' or socially 
critical element in Dickens felt obliged to establish this particular 
artistic achievement as a general model upon which the creative artist 
ought to proceed. This was the result of the fact that Leavis found 
in Dickens an attitude towards 'life' and 'society' which consummated 
his own diagnostic inclinations. By analysing this element in Dickens 
Leavis was able to give form to his own version of the function of 
criticism and the obligations of the artist, and his own analysis 
of the condition of contemporary society. His essays on Dickens have 
this ulterior purpose and the novels become in some respects adjuncts 
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to Leavis's primary, diagnostic purpose. The discussion of Little 
Dorrit is comprehensive and compelling. Its context was a matter of 
an attempt to pursue the implications of the principle which stated 
that 'the discipline of literary criticism . . . is one without which 
there can be no adequate attention paid to the problems of our civili- 
sation'.16 The consequences were that what was essentially a version 
of the content and significance of Little Dorrit was asserted as pro- 
viding incontrovertible truths about the nature of art and the respon- 
sibilities of the artist. The judgements on the novel conspire to 
generate a teleology of critical and creative endeavour. The relation- 
ship between Leavis's criteria and their substantiation in the terms 
of his study of Dickens produced a highly exclusive critical circuit. 
This exclusivity also meant that the material on which Leavis con- 
centrated was of the higher orders of critical achieveipent: 
Dickens was a 'great' novelist, and he and Blake were both 'geniuses'. 
The heightened praise thus gained a corresponding intensity and 
Leavis's critique used the superlative adjectival form. No provision 
was allowed for lesser, more modestly ambitious literary forms. If 
a work could not be said to he equal to the 'best' achievements of 
the 'greatest' novelists, it was destined for an arena of critical 
inquiry regarding which Leavis had no interest. This is one of the 
major limitations of the closely confined cycle of the movement from 
the analytical to the criteria'. It originates with the intensity 
of Leavis's concern with ultimate values, as if (as in his version 
16. Nor Shall My Sword, p 204. 
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of Blake) his telos of 'moral responsibility' and 'human creativity' 
had itself obscured the more mundane significances of lesser literary 
endeavour. It is too facile to dismiss these secondary orders of 
literature as evidence of a 'sick' society. That there was no contem- 
porary equivalent of Dickens (both popular and important) may be the 
case. The reasons for this can be understood outside the predominantly 
moral and metaphysical values of the approach adopted by Leavis. 
(iii) Religious 
Leavis sought to construe a philosophy of literary criticism discreetly, 
so to speak, without any overt recourse to recognised and defined 
philosophical terms. In this later criticism he attempted to define 
by example a teleology of literary criticism (and, by association, of 
the creative act). A teleology involves the contemplation of ultimate 
ends and values, as in Clennam's self -interrogation, as Leavis saw 
it: ' "What are the possibilities of life - for me, and, more generally, 
in the very nature of life? ".(285) Leavis's investigations therefore 
inevitably involved considerations and propositions which were essen- 
tially religious. The implication is inherent in the phrases from. 
Dickens the Novelist quoted above, 'a responsibility towards what 
can't be possessed' and 'a vindication of the spirit'. 
Leavis's aim in elucidating these significances of the particular 
text was essentially maieutic: the exegesis was organised so that 
it appeared to bring to the surface meanings underlying the main text. 
This procedure was not objective or impartial. The exegesis was 
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governed by a prior set of values which predisposed the critic to 
the discovery and formulation of meanings that fulfilled the primary 
expectations. In Leavis's case especially, these expectations were 
unstated and undefined; they achieved their definition in the process 
of exegesis. The vocabulary of critical analysis was elided with the 
terminology of evaluation so that the relations between the two 
appeared inevitable. In this way, a version of a text was made to 
seem the single available interpretation. The collaborative process 
of critical exchanges which Leavis advocated is only sustainable once 
certain a priori assumptions are made regarding fundamental critical 
choices. These choices may in fact pre -empt subsequent critical judge- 
ment. The central question in studying Leavis's criticism concerns 
the degree to which the assumptions whidhhe held to be indisputable 
- Lawrence's 'greatness', say - make critical debate redundant. What 
Leavis presents to the reader is the result of an internal cogitation 
which, in being reported to a reading public, omits the preliminary 
reasoning that generated the type and direction of the critique. 
A sympathetic reader may reconstitute this process to elicit as much 
as possible from the work. For the point of view which holds contrary 
or alternative positions the criticism may seem merely dogmatic and 
unhelpful. 
In political terms, Leavis had always been concerned with the state 
of contemporary society. This state was ascertainable by means of 
a diagnosis of its cultural forms. For Leavis the use of language 
was the clearest index of a culture's subtlety and resources, and 
literature the most heightened form of linguistic expression. Leavis's 
iterated polemic centred on the condition of contemporary culture, 
the sources for the condition and the kinds of effort required for 
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its amelioration. In this later period, 'society', or 'civilisation', 
was replaced by 'life' as the key term in the discussion. The 
increasingly teleological thrust of Leavis's criticism meant that 
he required a value, or its conceptual embodiment, that transcended 
the concept of 'society' and was able to attain the status of a value - 
term that was both particular and general. 'Life' in this context 
encompassed both the quotidian and the transcendent. Leavis glossed 
the usage by reference to the notions of 'responsibility' and 
'creativity'. In his discussion of this latter term the deeper, 
religious implications of his propositions emerge, and the strategy 
of asserting these terms so that they took on a greater significance 
than was superficially apparent, achieved their consummation. 
It is notable that in his effort to circumscribe this literary 
critical teleology Leavis enlisted the support of contemporary philo - 
Michael Polanyi, Marjorie Grene and R.G.Collingwood.17 This 
tendency represents an attempt to gain confirmation of his argument 
from a non -literary source18 and the desire to give it a broader 
philosophical credence without having recourse to a precise philo- 
sophical vocabulary. 
17. Leavis referred to and quoted from Marjorie Grene, The Knower 
and the Known (1966) and R.G.Collingwood, The Idea of Nature 
(1945) in 'Justifying One's Valuation of Blake', The Human 
World 
7, 'May 1972) pp 62 -3; that article mentioned Polanyi in passing 
and Leavis quoted several passages from Knowing and Being: Essays 
by Michael Polaanyi, (ed. M.Grene, 1969) in the introductory 
essay to Nor Shall My Sword, as well as occasionally in later 
chapters of the book. 
18. 'I am myself helped to make the necessary points by Michael Polanyi 
who, for years a Professor of Physical Chemistry, isn't thinking 
of Blake and won't be accused of "literarism "'. 
Nor Shall My Sword, p 21. 
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Leavis drew an oblique parallel between Blake and Polanyi which 
was facilitated only by his (Leavis's) recognition that they were 
both antipathetic to the prevailing intellectual ethos of their respec- 
tive cultures. Blake reacted to the ethos of Locke and Newton by 
asserting the primacy of 'human responsibility' and 'creativity' 
against the empiricism which made perception merely passive and any- 
thing unstateable in rational terms non -existent. This ethos had its 
counterpart in the contemporary period in the reductive rationalism 
of what Leavis called 'the technologico -Benthamite calculus'. Polanyi, 
Leavis argued, in common with Blake, refuted this 'Cartesian dualism', 
or the absolute separation of spirit and matter. Leavis quoted, Polanyi: 
'An exact mathematical theory means nothing unless we recognise an 
inexact non- matFìmatical knowledge on which it bears and a person whose 
judgement upholds this bearing'.19 This insight demonstrated for Leavis 
the fact that 'neither the scientist's nor the technologist's ;concern 
for reality is sufficient'20 and that there must be something other, 
something beyond the rationally apprehensible. 
To carry the burden of this part of his philosophical inquiry Leavis 
employed the terms 'ahnung' and 'nisus', signifying 'presentiment', 
19. Knowing and Being, p 195, quoted in Nor Shall My Sword, p 21. 
In 'Justifying One's Valuation of Blake' Leavis quoted Grene's 
complementary statement: 'we have had to free ourselves from 
the bonds of Newtonian abstraction, to dare, not only to mani- 
pulate abstractions, to calculate and predict and falsify, but 
to understand. The revolution before us is a revolution of life 
against dead nature, and of understanding against the calculi 
of logical machines'. 
The Knower and the Known p 13; cf. The Human World. vol cit p 
62. 
20 Nor Shall My Sword, p 23. 
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or 'foreboding', and 'effort', or 'impulse' respectively. This idio- 
syncratic phraseology appears to be a deliberate avoidance of any 
more recognisably 'philosophical' terms. The uncommon nature of the 
words lends them an unassimilable awkwardness that makes what is essen- 
tially a straightforward argument unnecessarily more difficult. Leavis 
employed these terms to explicate 'that movement towards the achieved 
work . . . which starts with an elusive sense of some coherence or 
pattern to be found in experience, or the sense of some deep inner 
need'.21 He also spoke of 'the directing ahnung implicit in life'.22 
This underlying awareness or 'presentiment' emerged as human creativity. 
The 'nisus' ,represented an effort, a heuristic process, of under- 
standing and making explicit the 'anticipatory apprehension' which 
provoked creative inquiry. 
23 
Criticism, in its turn, continued or 
completed the heuristic process, making intellectually explicit that 
which had been expressed in the first instance artistically. Criticism, 
therefore, in Leavis's practice, was equally a part of the inquisitive 
impulse (the 'nisus') and was aimed at formulating and making conscious 
both the presentiment (' ahnung') of what the creative work contained 
and the presentiment which engendered the work itself. This is the 
way in which criticism in Leavis's sense functioned maieutically: 
it aimed at the completion or resolution of a long process of heuristic 
endeavour. For this reason it tended to deal in an exclusive evaluative 
21. Ibid p 25. 
22. 'Justifying One's Valuation of Blake', loc cit p 63. 
23. Polanayi wrote that 'a problem for inquiry comes to the scientist 
in response to his roaming vision of yet undiscovered possibi- 
lities'. 
Knowing and Being, p 201; quoted in Nor Shall My Sword, p 22. 
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terminology and to speculate in the realm of mysterious spiritual 
absolutes. 
The 'ahnung' - unconscious or inexplicit apprehension - was invoked 
in Leavis's recurrent use of Lawrence's statement about Tom Brangwen: 
'he knew he did not belong to himself'. 24 Blake, Leavis noted, said 
of his paintings: 'Tho' they are Mine, I know that they are not Mine'. 25 
Leavis found his sense of this transcendent 'other', the reality that 
existed outside the individual in his relations with other individuals, 
in 
the potent authority with which Blake conveys his knowledge that 
in creative work he himself serves someth,ng authoritative - 
a living reality that is not his selfhood: testimony that goes 
with his vividly imparted sense of the intrinsic relation 
between cre tivity in the artist and that which is inseparable 
from life.2u 
'Life' has thus been elevated to the position where it stands for 
all the unrecovered 'presentiments' that continually inform human 
'creativity': it serves Leavis as the ultimate concept to which the 
critical 'nisus' can refer. Though this 'nisus' was fundamentally 
teleological, Leavis refrained from establishing a fixed and absolute 
'end' for critical and creative activity, but insisted rather on the 
constantly renewable 'life' that was 'creativity' and was manifested 
24. Leavis called this 'an apt locus classicus' (Dickens the Novelist, 
p 317). The phrase recurs frequently in Leavis's writings after 
D.H.Lawrence: Novelist. 
25. 'Justifying One's Valuation of Blake', loc cit p 59. 
26. Nor Shall My Sword, p 20. 
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as 'emerging newness'. 
27 
The burden placed on the concept of 'life' 
signifies that this was as close asLeavis was likely to get to an 
absolute critical concept. As such, the term 'life' occupied a place 
in his critical structure that gave it an essentially 'religious' 
connotation. 
For example Leavis found the use of his terms 'ahnung'' and 'nisus' 
illuminating when discussing T.S.Eliot's 'religious poetry'. They 
describe the movement from the 'destitution' of 'The Hollow Men' to 
the 'affirmation' implied in the "Incarnation" of 'The Dry Salvages'. 
What Eliot was attempting to assert, Leavis, said, was a 'transcendental 
spiritual reality'.28 'Life' in Leavis's criticism was the central 
concept in an attempt to establish a similar 'reality' in the practice 
of literary criticism in order to evoke a concrete sense of what was 
implied in the notion of 'responsibility towards what can't be 
possessed'. The use of this concept sets Leavis apart as a critic: 
These latter critics [Eliot, Richards, the New Critics] have 
offered a set of terms in which to think, true; but these 
have been sets of terms which bore only on literary criteria: 
Impersonality, Tradition, synaesthesia, irony, paradox, 
ambiguity, etc. Leavis alone has upheld Realist criticism, 
struggling to establish a set of terms which intersect with 
the real world, which 'correspond' to life, rather than to 
accept terms which set up amongst themselves, very harmoniously 
no doubt, a merely pleasing 'coherence'. Leavis . . . adopts 
a rigorous fidelity to Reality as an initial stance in which 
the ethics of the whole critical enterprise consists. 29 
27. Ibid, p 20. 
28. Cf. ibid, pp 25 -26. 
29. Roger Poole, 'The Affirmation is of Life: the later criticism 
of F.R.Leavis', Universities Quarterly XXIX (Winter 1974) p 85. 
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This 'struggle' to uphold a 'Realist criticism' emerged in Leavis's 
study of Four Quartets. The material of that poetry meant that both 
the poet and the critic had to explore speculative ideas about the 
world and the individual's place within it. Leavis attempted a dis- 
cursive exposition of Eliot's poetic argument in his discussion of 
these poems; but judgement and analysis ( as the central section of 
The Living Principle argued) are not separable activities. Analysis 
of the poetry and exposition of the ideas inevitably involved an 
evaluative judgement on both. To formulate such a judgement regarding 
such predominantly metaphysical poetic material required of the critic . 
that he produce (or have in the background) a coherent metaphysic 
of his own, which was capable in itself of legitimising the value - 
judgements it presented. The critique of Four Quartets differed from 
that of Dickens in this one fundamental respect: the text under 
scrutiny, because of the need to enforce an adverse judgement, could 
not be used to substantiate the values implied in the criticism, 
in the way that textual evidence from Little Dorrit had been exploited 
to give concrete form to the values that the criticism claimed to 
have' discovered. The critical procedure with regard to Four Quartets 
is therefore different in a significant way from that of Little Dorrit. 
In his discussion of Eliot's poetry Leavis was required by the need 
to pass an ultimately negative judgement to be more explicit than 
before about his own metaphysic; it stood apart from, rather than 
being absorbed into, the text under discussion. Leavis's study of 
Four Quartets therefore forced him to develop and establish an 
independant metaphysic from within which he could approach the 
poetry. 
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3. Reading 'Four Quartets': criticism, metaphysics and the 'living 
principle'. 
The problem for Leavis in The Living Principle (1975) was to find 
a way of stating the unstatable, of defining the indefinable. This 
was a problem of method and it manifested as a search for a set of 
value -terms capable of carrying the weight of references and inexplicit 
apprehensions necessary to the formulation of a criticism that could 
meet the poet of Four Quartets in the realm of the metaphysical, and 
substantiate itself as a convincing moral and philosophical alternative. 
Leavis's reading of Four Quartets was unable simply to present an 
exposition of its metaphysic or an elucidation of its allusions and 
references. The teleology of 'creativity' and critical practice that 
Leavis had developed meant that exposition and analysis not merely 
implied but were thetsame thing as evaluative judgement. This was 
because of the nature of Leavis's critical language, in which to say 
what something was or meant, or to describe how a line of poetry 
achieved its effect, was to evaluate the thing described; Leavis's 
expository and descriptive terms were his terms of value. 
On the other hand, 'the living principle is a concrete something 
apprehended but indefinable'; that is, the 'principle' which 'the 
whole of this book . . . is devoted to defining'(14)30, may be said 
to be the deepest qualitative criterion informing not just art and 
literature but the whole of life itself. It was not accessible to 
30. Figures in parentheses refer to page numbers in The Living 
Principle (1975). 
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'definition' in a pure sense. It was something that could be pointed 
to only indirectly, thrown into shadow, so to speak, by the surrounding 
material until its form was apparent from its context, but remained 
inexact, unstated. As Leavis recognised, this was a difficult problem 
- 'it needs a collaborative reader'(14) - and in pursuing it Leavis 
became explicit about his own position and beliefs to a degree that 
was unprecedented since the 1962 Richmond lecture on the 'Two Cultures' 
theme. Complex questions were raised and the polemical aspect of 
Leavis's critical enterprise was subsumed into the philosophical. 
The function of the university and the present 'crisis' of civilisation 
were reiterated themes, but essentially Leavis was taxed with concepts 
of meaning and the nature of language. In his attempts to understand 
'language' Leavis amplified his notion of 'collaboration'. He found 
in the critical discussion of a literary text an analogue of the means 
whereby 'meaning' is generated in language in general; and how this 
was above all a process that is historical and chronological - that 
takes place in time. This insistence had its consequences when he 
came to deal with Four Quartets. 
Leavis, in the opening chapter of The Living Principle ('Thought, 
Language and Objectivity'), sought to establish that a statement of 
fact is simultaneously a value -judgement and he used propositions 
from Marjorie Grene's The Knower and the Known (1966)31 to support 
31 For example: 'there can be no purely factual statements, ie, 
statements which do not even presuppose evaluation, because there 
can be no intelligible discourse except on the ground of evalu- 
ation or appraisal. There are, in other words, no descriptions 
wholly independent of prescriptions.' 
The Knower and the Known, p 160. 
And: 'All knowledge, even the most abstract, exists only within 
the fundamental evaluation, first of the total community. which 
permits and respects such knowledge, and second. within this 
totality, of the special community whose consensus makes possible 
the existence of this special discipline'. 
Ibid, p. 180; quoted in The Living Principle, p 34- 
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his argument. This was a principle crucial to his whole critical prac- 
tice of 'judgement and analysis'. 32 Leavis developed ideas from Grenc 
and Polanyi to refute what he called 'Cartesian- Newtonian dualism'33 
and to advocate 'the precondition of language, thought and objectivity'. 
(41) The collaborative process that engenders language is the same 
as that which adduces critical judgement. The 'creativity' that, in 
the essay on Little Dorrit, was shown to be the same thingas 'life' 
in Dickens's aesthetic, manifests itself as essentially part of human 
activity at whatever level of complexity of behaviour: the 'day -to -day 
work of collaborative creation includes the creating of language, 
without which there couldn't have been a human world'.(44) 'Life' 
is the 'basic unstatable' which Cartesian logic is unable to recognise 
but which is fundamental to 'the human world''. In language, which 
received its 'fullest use' in the great works of literature, the 'basic 
unstatable' is most 'open to recognition'.(44) Through the study of 
language in its literary forms it is possible to approach a definition 
of the indefinable (Leavis talked of 'creative imprecision'(34) and 
'intelligently unsatisfactory answer[s]'(37) in relation to the study 
of this theme) and to come to as complete as possible an understanding 
of what 'life' is and how it is made manifest. Leavis denied the reduc- 
32. Leavis reprinted in The Living Principle, with some additions, 
his earlier Scrutiny articles, 'Notes in the Analysis of Poetry'; 
an essay on 'prose'; and the comparison between Dryden and Shake- 
speare, 'Antony and Cleopatra and All for Love: A Critical 
Exercise', Scrutiny V (1936). These were included under the 
general heading 'Judgement and Analysis'. 
33. Leavis was borrowing the phrase from the philosophers: see 
for 
example, Grene, The Knower and the Known, p 157, in the chapter 
'Facts and Values' recommended by Leavis to his students (The 
Living Principle, p 29). 
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tivism of the disciples of Wittgenstein34 or the linguisticians35 
and proposed a concept of language that was more open and inexact 
than pure logic would allow. The conception had behind it the history 
of Leavis's struggles to give substance to his critical apprehensions: 
a language is more than a means of expression; it is the 
heuristic conquest won out of representative experience, the 
upshot or precipitate of immemorial human living, and 
embodies values, distinctions, identifications, conclusions, 
promptings, cartographical hints and tested potentialities. 
It exemplifies thé truth that life is growth and growth change, 
and the condition of these is continuity.(44) 
It is almost as if a conception of language had been construed 
specifically to refute the premises of the first section of 'Burnt 
Norton'. However, it is essential to notice that this conception 
derived from the positive appreciation of Dickens, Blake and Lawrence, 
as well as in opposition to Eliot. It is necessary to recap the special 
references and sources that have been accruing in this later work 
of Leavis's. Much of his argument was cyclical and iterative, the 
force of some of the fundamental points being dependent upon their 
incremental allusive repetition. At the same time, the recurrence 
of a reference was often minimally explicit, relying on the recall 
of the reader to supply it with its full retrospective significance. 
Key references which appeared in the discussion of Four Quartets 
included Blake, Polanyi, the dichotomy of 'selfhood' and 'identity' 
and the imposed vocabulary of 'ahnung' and 'nisus'. 
34. Cf The Living Principle, p 13. 
35. Cf ibid, p 58. 
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Leavis quoted Blake's referral to his designs and paintings: "Tho' 
I call them Mine, I know that they are not Mine "36; and his declaration 
that "Jesus was an artist ".37 These reflections were associated with 
Tom Brangwen's sense that "he knew he did not belong to himself ". 
All three referents, when extrapolated out of their minimised encap- 
sulation, summoned up for Leavis the spiritual dimension of literature 
and art. The idea of belonging, or having responsibility 'to, something 
'other' had its more explicit form in the opposition of 'selfhood' 
and 'identity'. Leavis, arguing against criticism which saw this 
vocabulary as merely 'jargon'38, said that the distinction was 'basic 
to the realisation that they "human world" on which both our sense 
of reality and our attainment of objectivity depend is a product of 
collaborative human creativity'.(59) The difference is therefore one 
of attitude and perspective. In 'Justifying One's Valuation of Blake' 
Leavis described the 'selfhood' as that which 'seeks to possess' from 
within its 'self- enclosure' thus advancing an egocentric viewpoint 
involving responsibility only to itself. 'Identity', in contrast, 
was manifested as 'the individual being as the disinterested focus 
of life':39 its perspective was apersonal, engaging, or rather existing 
as, responsibility to something 'other'. This 'other' appeared in, 
though did not wholly constitute, the 'collaborative creativity' that 
36. Cf. ibid, p 44; Leavis has a footnote to the effect that the 
letter was 'To Trusler, 16 August, 1799'. 
37. Cf. 'Justifying One's Valuation of Blake'. loc cit, p 59. 
38. Cf. Ian Robinson, The Survival of English (1973), p 239; quoted 
in The Living Principle, pp 58 -9. 
39. 'Justifying One's Valuation of Blake', loc cit, p 59. 
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emerged, for example, as 'language'. 
40 
The vocabulary of 'selfhood' 
and 'identity' became a kind of shorthand for this conception. Each 
reference gives a further shading to the terms themselves, and intro- 
duces the concept of 'responsibility to something other' into the 
particular context. 
'Ahnung' and 'nisus' were supposed to operate in a similar manner, 
though they are not so directly explicable. 'Ahnung' can be glossed 
by Polanyi's phrase 'anticipatory apprehension', but its meaning 
remains obscure. Leavis noted that Lawrence's word was 'inkling'41 
but felt that this lacked the weight that 'foreboding', anot )1er 
possibility, had.(63) Leavis acknowledged the difficulties associated 
with the word, but insisted on his need for it, which, he said, derived 
from his sense of the implications of 'anticipatory apprehension'. 
'Nisus' was preferçed to 'effort' or 'impulse', both close 'synonyms, 
because they impliéd the presence of 'will'. The 'creative nisus' 
was not willed, but ineluctable (Blake's paintings were, and yet were 
not, 'his').42 Discussion has focused on the question of whether these 
40. Cf: 'Thought about language should entail the full and firm recog- 
nition that words 'mean' because individual human beings have 
meant the meaning, and that there is no meaning unless individual 
beings can meet in it, the completing of the element of 'intend' 
being represented by the responding someone's certitude that 
the last condition obtains.' 
The Living Principle, p 58. 
41. In Study of Thomas Hardy: cf. The Living Principle, p 63. 
42. The Oxford English Dictionary (1933) has a reference that gives 
the sense as Leavis intended: '1899 Allbutt's System of] Med 
[icine] [1889 -99] VIII 248: "When the nisus of web -spinning 
dominates the spider, when the nisus of nest -building dominates 
the bird ". 
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words have been assimilated satisfactorily into Leavis's critical 
vocabulary so as to advance his argument,43 and certainly the colla- 
borative tolerance required of the reader with regard to them is high. 
What is more interesting, though, is what Leavis's need of such a 
vocabulary reveals. This need is associated with his dependence upon 
the ideas of the philosophers Collingwood, Grene and Polanyi. A 
specialised, almost technical, vocabulary and extensive borrowing 
from explicitly philosophical sources: these are two features of 
Leavis's late criticism that demonstrate a marked change in critical 
habit. The reasons for the change are twofold: Leavis's field of 
inquiry had expanded; and recourse to particular texts for substan- 
tiating evidence in the concrete of abstract statements was not 
available to him when it came to dealing with Four Quartets. 
In the 1967 Clark lectures Leavis had to acknowledge a problem 
of subject- matter: discussing 'East Coker' in particular he wrote 
that 'this poetry is insistently religious in preoccupation in a way 
that raises for a commentator like myself a problem of delicacy' 
because of 'the way in which it depends on the creative presentation 
of what compels a response that is recognition, recognition that is 
not distinguishable from assent'.44 The problem was that the poem 
could not be read detachedly, as in 'the mastering of a logical dis- 
quisition; the whole being is involved, and one is compelled, in the 
43. Cf. Robinson, op cit, pp 239 -40; Andor Gomme, 'Why literary 
criticism matters in a technologico -Benthamite age', Universities 
Quarterly XXX (1975) pp 43 -45. 
44. English Literature in our Time and the University: the 
1967 Clark 
lectures, (1969), p 125. 
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taking, to achieve a new realisation of the nature of experience . 
. involv[ing] one's basic attitudes and one's habits of thought 
and valuation'.45 In The Living Principle Leavis said that the poetry 
'compels one to determine and verify one's own ultimate beliefs'.(178) 
This sense of compulsion was not lightly suggested. Eliot had pre- 
sented a lifelong challenge to Leavis, and Four Quartets, unlike, 
say, Eliot's literary criticism, formulated that challenge in the 
realm of a complex metaphysic. It was not until Leavis had developed 
and established an equivalent metaphysic that he was able to meet 
the demands made on the critic by this poetry. The extrapolation of 
critical values into the social sphere that characterised, for example, 
the essay on Little Dorrit, was later transformed into a consideration 
of the deeper spiritual nature of human existence. The criticism in- 
cr'.easingly found itself constrained a cogent metaphysic; 
that metaphysic certainly had its expression in the essays on Dickens 
and Blake but it came more and more to depend on the positive concepts 
of 'selfhood', 'creative nisus' and the anti -Cartesian vitalism of 
Polanyi to fulfil itself in the notions of 'responsibility', 'dis- 
interestedness' and 'creativity': terms which were to be set against 
Eliot's explicitly theological "Incarnation ". 
Leavis's use of these philosophers illustrates a further adjustment 
in his critical practice that was caused by the changed context of 
this later criticism. This problem of formulating a cogent metaphysic 
with which to counter Eliot's vision meant that Leavis could not be 
45. Ibid, p 129. 
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content simply to asset that ' "life" is a necessary word'. In the 
essay on Little Dorrit this tactic was capable of producing coherent 
critical observations because Leavis was able to illustrate his theme 
with concrete examples from the text. There were limitations to the 
cycle of interdependence thatthis engendered, the terminology of 
evaluation being legitimised by examples from the text under scrutiny. 
However, a convincing critique of Dickens's novel did become available 
through the exploration of the terms and their concrete textual ana- 
logues. When Four Quartets was in question, the fact that Leavis's 
ultimate disposition towards the poetry was negative, together with 
this sense that determination and verification of 'one's own ultimate 
beliefs' was involved (compellingly), it was necessary for him to 
be able to exercise a metaphysical perception that was independent 
of the analysed text. There was no legitimate way that Leavis could 
a of evaluatioñ for Four Quartets that aspired 
to substantiating itself by example from a text that was in itself 
an autonomous complex metaphysic towards whichLeavis was intellectually 
and spiritually hostile ('I am sure . . . that my answers to those 
questions are not Eliot's'(178)). 
Grene and Polanyi expecially were of assistance to Leavis in his 
assertion that 'the "living principle" - the principle implicit in 
the interplay between the living language and the creativity of 
_ndividual genius'(49) was 'apprehended but indefinable'.(14) Whilst 
complete explicitness in the discussion of these ideas was not possible 
('finality is unattainable'(49)), this incompleteness enhanced rather 
than diminished the strength of the argument. Polanyi wrote that 
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the ideal of a strictly explicit knowledge is indeed 
self- contradictory; deprived of their tacit co- efficients, 
all spoken words, all formulae, all maps and graphs, are 
strictly meaningless.46 
In acknowledging this premise Leavis increased the authority of his 
own propositions and gave validity to the seemingly paradoxical 
ambition to 'define' what was essentially, and necessarily, 'in- 
definable'. 
The passages Leavis quoted from Collingwood, Grene and Polanyí, 
apart from demonstrating an ancillary point regarding the value to 
the student of 'English' of some familiarity with philosophical ideas, 
were not mere external augmentation to an already established line - 
of argument. Rather they were the necessary 'sub -text' of Leavis's 
case, replacing and fulfilling the role of the substantiating sub -text 
of his literarycriticism.,The philosophical proposition performs 
explicitly the function previously given to, say, Amy Dorrit or Daniel 
Doyce in the essay on Dickens's novel47 - that of giving concrete 
form to an abstract statement. Without the philosophical propositions 
that were interwoven into the text, Leavis's thesis would have been 
adrift in the vague assertiveness of its terminology. To contend that 
the 'moral sense' in humankind was equivalent to 'human responsibility' 
and that 'human responsibility' was 'the manifest potency of life' 
(48 -9) would have been unavailing without the support of an 
analysable 
literary example (such as Leavis found again in Lawrence for his last 
46. Knowing and Being (1969), P 195; quoted in The Living Principle, 
p 3q. 
47. The example of Doyce recurs in other contexts 
as well. his useful- 
ness as an exemplification of a critical point not being limited 
to the study of Dickens; we even on occasion have the 
adjective 
'Doycean' (The Living Principle, p 238, 249). 
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book48) or explicit philosophical parallels. Leavis found support 
in Collingwood - 
The world of nature or physical world as a whole, or any 
such view, must ultimately depend for its existence on 
something other than itself49 _ 
and Grene: 'Knowing is essentially temporal activity, directed temporal 
activity, drawn by the future pull of what we wish to understand'. 50 
It was in this context that Leavis's critical terminology had its 
place. It drew on this reasoning when it approached Four Quartets 
prepared with an antagonistic evaluative metaphysic with which to 
analyse the poetry. The tenor of the analysis was indicated in the 
introduction to The Living Principle. Leavis discussed the 'paradox' 
Eliot represented, and the developed terminology gave shape to Leavis's 
description: 
He has genius (which is of the 'identity'), and the creative 
nisus works impressively in him, but something in him too 
makes him deny human creativity - he recoils from being 
responsible. The denial . . . comes from the selfhood.(63) 
The vocabulary of this paragraph is highly specialised and would be 
practically meaningless were it not for the supporting semantic and 
48. Thought, Words, Creativity: art and thought in Lawrence, (1976). 
49. Collingwood,R.G., The Idea of Nature (1945), p 155; quoted in 
The Living Principle, p 65. 
50. Grene, The Knower and the Known, p 244; quoted in The Living 
Principle, p 65. 'The future pull of what we wish to understand' 
would be a further way of interpreting Leavis's notion of 'ahnung' 
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and philosophical accretions that the terms employed have gained during 
this later period. The introduction to The Living Principle summarised 
and enforced the significances and implications of the developing 
terminology and concurrently formulated a strategy for the 'judgement 
and analysis' of Four Quartets which followed. 
Leavis's dissatisfaction with Eliot dated from the publication of 
After Strange Gods (1934) but it emerged for the most part in increas- 
ingly hostile commentaries on Eliot's literary criticism. These 
comments culminated in the rejection of many of Eliot's main ideas 
in 'T.S.Eliot's Stature as Critic: a Revaluation' (1958)51 . This 
rejection had become a settled conviction by the time of Lectures 
in America (1969)52. The criticism was the focus of Leavis's doubts 
because in dealing with the matters raised by it he was able to argue 
from a position of strength. He had himself established a coherent 
method of critical practice which enabled him to make comparative 
judgements on Eliot's work. With Four Quartets, though, Leavis was 
not, until much later, thus prepared. He lacked, clearly, the resources 
of a critical vocabulary of evaluative terms and metaphysical concepts 
that were of a sufficient weight to counter those of Eliot. In an 
early review of 'The Dry Salvages'53 Leavis found Eliot's poetry 
51. Cf. Commentary (November 1958), PP 399 -410, reprinted as 'T.S. 
Eliot as Critic' in 'Anna Karenina' and other essays (1967). 
52. Cf. 'Eliot's Classical Standing', Lectures in America. 
53. 'Eliot's Later Poetry', Scrutiny XI (1942), pp 60 -71; reprinted 
in Education and the University (1943). 
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remarkable for the extraordinary resource, penetration and 
stamina with which it makes its explorations into the 
concrete actualities of experience below the conceptual 
currency; into the life that must be the raison d'être of 
any frame - while there is life at al1.54 
In his review of 'Little Gidding'55 he said that 'a critical account 
of any poetry can only point, or draw a line round. It must always 
be left to each reader to grasp for himself what is concretely 
presented'.56 
This gives the impression of a criticism slightly in awe of its 
subject, the second statement especially seeming, to have abdicated 
the obligation to evaluate via the 'critical account'. Leavis's poetry 
Or 
criticism up to that point (Revaluation, for instance) certainly had 
not been context with impartial circumscription. It appears that 
Leavis';s criticism faltered in the face of the breadth of the issues 
raised by Four Quartets. The Living Principle was not simply a summing 
up of previous ideas, as, in many ways, Thought, Words. Creativity 
was. It was a wholly new inquiry into Eliot's later poetry set against 
the background of the philosophical development of Leavis's later 
criticism. For even if in 1969 Leavis could say that Eliot's poetry 
was not born of 'rich human experience' but came out of 'a decided 
poverty', 57 he was not in a position to focus that observation on 
54. Loc cit p 71. 
55. 'Reflections on the above' (a response to 
D.W.Harding's review 
of 'Little Gidding' in the previous number), Scrutiny, XI (1943) 
pp 261 -67. 
56. Loc cit p 267. 
57. English Literature in our Time and the University, 
p 144. 
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Four Quartets and base a comprehensive critique of the poetry upon 
it. Only when Leavis's critical terminology was fully commensurate 
with the demands of the poetry could he stage a full -scale critique. 
At the centre of the discussion was the attempt to demonstrate 
'the Eliotic self -contradiction - the paradoxical will to deny human 
creativity'(65) and to show how this contradiction undermined the 
'affirmative' aspirations of the poetry. Leavis could only achieve 
this if he could give a convincing account of what 'human creativity' 
consisted of and what 'affirmation' resided in, given that Eliot's 
own account, in Leavis's estimation, was misguided and incomplete. 
Leavis was unable to 'endorse'(164) Eliot's "humankind /Cannot bear 
very much reality" because of the conception of 'reality' that was 
in question and because the declaration was 'a perverse judgement 
on mankind'. The conception of 'reality'' that was invoked Leavis had 
to 'repudiate' because of its specific fixture in a Christian tradi- 
tion.58 The attitude towards mankind which he rejected would later 
recur in 'East Coker' in the lines from Thomas Elyot's Boke of the 
Governour. Leavis saw the lines 
The time of the coupling of man and woman 
And of beasts . . . 
Rustically solemn or in rustic laughter 
Lifting heavy feet in clumsy shoes . . . 
58. Leavis adduced as further evidence for his argument the lines: 
. . . the enchainment of past and future 
Woven in the weakness of the changing body, 
Protects making from heaven and damnation 
Which flesh cannot endure. (`Burnt Norton'. Section II) 
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as 'reductivist', reducing 'matrimonie' to mere sex and revealing an 
'innocent' assumption that disgust is the 'normal' attitude towards 
sex (19.5 -6); and reducing the Tudor agrarians to 'yokels, clumsy, 
crude and gross'.(196) Leavis, reading this against the background 
of his conception of the 'organic community' and the process of cul- 
tural change attendant upon its loss, could not fail to find it anti- 
pathetic. Those Tudor yokels, he said, 'created the English language 
- robust, supple, humanly sensitive and illimitably responsive and 
receptive'(196) and made possible in their turn Shakespeare, Dickens 
and Eliot himself. Eliot could not comprehend that 'the English 
language participated decisively . . . in the higher intellectual 
and spiritual continuities, so that it had the power to ingest the 
Renaissance cultural inflow'.(197) Eliot's 'American blankness' was 
mirrored in the Americanisation of English and European culture that 
Leavis saw as a feature of contemporary history. The paradox Eliot 
presented was symptomatic of a general cultural malaise: 'consideration 
of the plight his poetry reveals sharpens our understanding of our 
civilisation'.(197) 
Eliot was a 'case' to be diagnosed, and the diagnosis could not 
be confined to Eliot. Its implications ramified into a universal con- 
text. Clearly, though, objections such as those raised against Eliot's 
attitude towards bucolic Tudor society might have been anticipated 
from the earliest period of Leavis's criticism. The phraseology, in 
fact - 'a language is a cultural life, a living creative continuity' 
(197) - echoes that of his first essays in cultural diagnosis. The 
difference that this later criticism exhibits resides in the way it 
moves effectively from the 'social' to the 'spiritual'. The critique 
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of contemporary civilisation which Leavis had reformulated in this 
later period (as in the polemical essays of Nor Shall My Sword (1972)) 
was not contained within the frame of social -cultural analysis. A 
specifically spiritual dimension was introduced. The 'cultural crisis' 
was characterised not merely as a reductive process of'mass- 
production, standardisation and levelling -down' but as manifesting 
as a profound 'spiritual philistinism'. Eliot's poetry offered a demon- 
stration of this trait that was revealingly limited in its own version 
of 'spiritual values'. For example, Leavis called the opening of 
section III of 'East Coker' 'a magnificent piece of Eliotic poetry' 
because of its evocation of 'the actual presence and process of the 
world we know'.(203) His great importance was his 'using a major poet's 
command of the English language to bring home to us the spiritual 
philistinism of our civilisation'.(205) On the other hand, the adverse 
judgement poetry (and the poet59) derived from Eliot's 'fear 
of life and contempt, which includes self- contempt, for humanity'. 
This combination resulted in 'a frustrating and untenable conception 
of the spiritual'.(205) 
59. 'It's impossible to say with complete convincingness and accuracy 
what [Four Quartets] is without some account of its relation 
to Eliot's earlier poetry and to his curiously (and significantly) 
contradictory record as a literary critic - all of which involves 
some observations about the kind of man Eliot was'. 
'Mutually Necessary', Universities Quarterly, XXX, no 2 (1976), 
p 144; a reply to Michael Tanner, 'Literature and Philosophy', 
Universities Quarterly XXX no 1, pp 54 -64. 
This statement should be compared with the one quoted above: 
'a critical account of any poetry can only point, or draw a line 
round'. 
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It is a measure of the advance that Leavis had made in his critical 
thinking that he was able to argue that 'a conception of the 
spiritual' was 'untenable'. Such a claim had to be supported by a 
positive notion of what kind of spiritual conception would be tenable 
and on this point Leavis was explicit and emphatic: 'there is no accep- 
table religious position that is not a reinforcement of human respon- 
sibility'.(236) This was the direct antithesis of Eliot's assertion 
of 'human abjectness and nullity' and in order to give the statement 
of principle substantial force (it was the principle upon which the 
whole analysis rested) Leavis's familiar allies were invoked. Blake's 
oft -quoted comments, and all that they had been shown to imply, were 
used against Eliot's 'spiritual values'. The 'true' (Blakean) artist 
maintains 'supreme respect for his creativity' and thus 'demonstrates 
his allegiance to what he knows to be other than himself'. This demon- 
stration was 'the assertion of spiritual values, spiritual signifi- 
cance, spiritual authority'.(205) Thus, any art that was genuinely 
'creative' was a positive affirmation of 'human creativity': that 
is, art did not represent or express the affirmation, it was the 
affirmation. 
This theme in turn was based upon Polanyi's 'vitalism' - at any 
rate, Leavis's interpretation of it. Leavis found a reaction in Eliot 
away from 'life's essential creativity' in the lines from section 
III of 'Burnt Norton': 
This is the one way, and the other 
Is the same, not in the movement 
But abstention from movement: while the world moves 
In appetency, on its metalled ways 
Of time past and time future 
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The 'appetency' is made 'an inhuman meaningless drive' that is a 
'recoil from mechanistic determinism' but which also 'denied life's 
essential creativity'.(181) To make sense of this Leavis alluded to 
his interpretation of Polanyi's declaration: 
If all men were exterminated, this would not affect the 
laws of inanimate6nnature. But the production of machines 
would stop 
That is, even mechanistic energy was not self -generated but depended 
on active human initiation: it also was 'a manifestation of that vital 
creativity which has so wide a range of modes'.(181) Eliot insists, 
in his search for a 'spiritual reality' on the 'unreality . . . of 
life in time'(179); but Leavis denied that such a 'reality' could 
be more than a mere phrase 'unless apprehended out of life, in which 
we are, and in terms of our human livingness'.(181) (This was followed 
by a repetition of Blake's "Jesus was an artist ".) 
The one place in Four Quartets where Eliot, according to Leavis, 
acknowledged this fact himself was in the terza rima section of 'Little 
Gidding'. This 'unquestionably major' passage of poetry was the excep- 
tion in a quartet that evinced on the whole 'a poetic inferiority 
too sustained to be doubted'.(250) The 'All Clear' section, Leavis 
argued, had a 'vivid precision' which was 'an involuntary recognition 
on Eliot's part of the reality of life, life in time'.(250) Eliot's 
experience as an air -raid warden 'was a rude and salutary exposure 
to life - a kind of exposure necessary to a life -fearing potential 
60. Knowing and Being, p 225; quoted in The Livign Principle p 65. 




This underlines Leavis's overall attitude towards 
Four Quartets. The explicitly 'theological affirmation' ('the hint 
half guessed, the gift half understood, is Incarnation') meant that 
'the disinterestedness of major creative genius' was not available 
to Eliot; his 'inner contradictions and irreconcilabilities[ were] 
incapacitating'.(249) Leavis himself was only in a position to hold 
this judgement because he had organised a supporting alternative 
critical and metaphysical perspective out of which to argue his com- 
parative (as opposed to merely elucidatory) evaluation. 
The comparison centred on the question of 'affirmation' - 'art' 
for Leavis had an 'affirmative' effect or propulsion before it could 
aspire to the condition of 'great' art. Since Eliot's invocation of 
'Incarnation's was explicitly theological in an orthodox Christian sense, 
it was seen by Leavis as undermining the claims of the poetry to re- 
present an original inquiry into the individual human condition. Eliot 
had, as it were, betrayed his originating creative impulse (or 'nisus') 
by abandoning his individual private search for an adequate 'affir- 
mative' orientation in favour of the answers provided by orthodox 
Christianity. 
The effect of this was to concentrate Leavis's sense of Eliot as 
a 'life- fearing potential major poet' into a general rejection of 
the mode and tenor or Four Quartets. Leavis's developed ,ritical termi- 
nology, and the now more explicit metaphysical background that 
61. It is impossible on reading this not to be reminded of Leavis's 
experiences in the First World War. (Cf.Hayman, Leavis (1976) 
p 2.) 
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supported it, produced this somewhat inflexible account of Eliot's 
poetry. Leavis's own search for 'significance', 'intelligence', 'af- 
firmation' in the work of art was a search conducted along increasingly 
strict and limited lines and one that despaired of finding its con- 
summation anywhere other than in the novels of D.H.Lawrence. The 
changing ethos of contemporary civilisation was not congenial to Leavis 
nor was he able (intellectually or morally) to adjust to it. His last 
book, (Thought, Words, Creativity: art and thought in Lawrence 1976)) 
reverted - in a sense, withdrew - to a discussion, a reiteration, 
of the values Leavis held to exist in Lawrence as the epitome of the 
'great creative artist', but this also represented a reversion or 
withdrawal away from contemporary society and its literature. The 
rigour of Leavis's critical attitude - while capable of analyses of 
problems as complex as those represented in Four Quartets - was 
limited in its interest in contemporary literature and 
to prescribe the creative values of a previous generation (ie Lawrence) 
as being relevant to the contemporary situation. Even an analysis 
of why Leavis so totally ignored current literature may have been 
more valuable than evocation of a writer of an earlier age. In this 
last period of Leavis's career, the critical vocabulary and its meta- 
physical substantiation - still largely a matter of a specialised 
grammar, rather than a philosophical system - proved themselves capable 
of generating a significant and illuminating critique of something 
as difficult as Four Quartets, but unable to transcend the constraints 
of its own moral perspective. This has the consequence, for example, 
that 'Little Gidding' received only 14 pages of commentary in 
The 
Living Principle (compared with 37 for 'Burnt Norton' and 32 
for 'The 
Dry Salvages'), the book seeming to tail off uninterestedly 
after 
37p 
the discovery (the disappointment) of Eliot's Christianity. By its 
very nature, Leavis's critical attitude to the poem was unable to 
see through its own limitations to represent this kind of 'affirmation' 
as positive and valid in spite of its orthodoxy. Such were the conse- 
quences of Leavis's exploitation of a critical vocabulary determined 
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